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Pak may never try another Kargil, but it could get worse

Nawaz Sharif makes some very good remarks, and I find him credible as the prime minister of pakistan,much respect for him.

Nawaz Sharif was one of the few democratically elected PMs in Pakistan in so many years of Khaki Raj. And he had the guts to face off to the Gernails and Kernails unreservedly. Much respect for the bloke.

Besides he is a Haji. So he ought to be considered to be very honest, is'nt it? :tup:
 
We all know india is the eternal enemy, NS will learn that soon enough, and general pal says india did not win the war.
 
We all know india is the eternal enemy, NS will learn that soon enough, and general pal says india did not win the war.

:rofl: When did he say that??? I guess you did not see the youtube video yourself that you posted 20 times on this thread itself. Suggest you to see the video and then comment :rofl::rofl:

He was talking about India's intelligence failure and the upsetting fact that India had to fight a weaker enemy to free it's own territory. he probably had issues with the top brass for some issues - particularly the IA chief who was not in the country to take care of matters.

He meant to say that we won militarily in our objectives but failed to efficiently(not failed) tackle the intrusion with long delays in deployment and the late response in evicting all the posts and vacating India's territory.
 
General pal says india did not win the war, pretty clear to me.
 
General pal says india did not win the war, pretty clear to me.

:rofl: that's a simpleton's POV that you are having, men in important positions do not speak out rightly, their every word carries weight - it takes some brains to really understand what they mean, so go ahead I gave you the nuances of his interview in my post try and match that by watching the video again.
 
Nawaz Sharif makes some very good remarks, and I find him credible as the prime minister of pakistan,much respect for him.

How so?

Nawaz was kept totally in the dark. He had no idea that Kargil was happening. This was a pure military operation in absolute secrecy and the Prime Minister was kept totally out of the loop.

Musharraf was the Battlefield commander who planned the Kargil incursion.

I will take his word on the casualties than someone who had no idea what is going on like Nawaz Sharif.

Its like Napolean telling how many men he lost in a Battle and yet you are relying on some stooge in Paris who is far away from battle reporting on battlefield losses designed to discredit Napolean.
 
Nawaz Sharif makes some very good remarks, and I find him credible as the prime minister of pakistan,much respect for him.

How so?

Nawaz was kept totally in the dark. He had no idea that Kargil was happening. This was a pure military operation in absolute secrecy and the Prime Minister was kept totally out of the loop.

Musharraf was the Battlefield commander who planned the Kargil incursion.

I will take his word on the casualties than someone who had no idea what is going on like Nawaz Sharif.

Its like Napolean telling how many men he lost in a Battle and yet you are relying on some stooge in Paris who is far away from battle reporting on battlefield losses designed to discredit Napolean.
 
Musharraf's Secret War in Kargil
by A. H. Amin
Kargil stands as perhaps the final military
effort on Pakistan's part to settle the
Kashmir dispute by military means.
Analysis has mostly centered around
political aspects of the operation while the
military aspects have been largely left to the
imagination of the public. Lately it has been
claimed that Kargil was launched to bail out
Mujahideen as a last resort ! This is an insult
to the memory of the Pakistani armed forces
"Volunteers" who died in that Himalayan
wasteland without a funeral and in
circumstances of unimaginable misery !
Kargil operation cannot be understood
unless the personalities and motives of the
principal characters are examined ! Every
action in history is the final culmination of a
personality's self perception, ambition and
subconscious as well as conscious urges.
In this context the Kargil operation was born
out of two key factors ! One was the
personality of general Pervez Musharraf and
the second was the un-ceremonial manner
in which Nawaz Sharif ousted General
Jahangir Karamat Musharraf's predecessor
army chief of Pakistan Army.
Musharraf as those who have served with
him know which includes this scribe also has
always been an intensely ambitious man !
One hallmark of his personality is that he
wants to stand out as a great military
commander ! Propelled by an enormous ego
wherever he served he endeavored to do
something extraordinary ! However fate did
not allow him the glory in battle which his
other course-mates like shabbir sharif
achieved ! In 1965 Musharraf was a
subaltern in an artillery unit which saw
little action apart from supporting
operations by indirect fire ! The 16 SP unlike
3 SP which fired on Indian tanks with direct
gun-sights at Chawinda stayed in
conventional artillery role ! In 1971
Musharraf's commando company was not
involved in action ! Nevertheless Musharraf
compensated for this lack of combat laurels
by achieving laurels in army courses and in
various command assignments ! His final
opportunity came when he ascended to the
post of army chief in a situation when the
army was! in a subservient position vis-à-
vis the civilian head of state , something
which was regarded by the military
hierarchy as worse than blasphemy !
The forced retirement of General Karamat
by prime minister Nawaz Sharif was
regarded as a personal defeat by the
Pakistani military brass and by Musharraf
who felt that he would be a far weaker army
chief under a strong prime minister who had
asserted civilian control over the military
machine !
These two factors were the fathers of the
Kargil operation ! Ambition accompanied by
a perception that the Pakistani public must
be convinced that the soldiers were better
than politicians.
Kargil at the military level was the
brainchild of three men i.e. General
Musharraf the army chief,
Aziz the then army Chief of general Staff and
Mahmud the then corps commander 10
Corps ! Musharraf and Mahmud were
motivated by intense ambition to achieve
military glory and Aziz was motivated by his
Kashmiri ancestry plus military ambition.
The person they selected to execute the
operation was again one distinguished by out
of proportion ambition i.e. Major General
Javed Hassan , author of a book in 1990s that
claimed that India was on its way to
disintegration and in which
moughal king Humayun was resurrected
from the grave to fight at Second Battle of
Panipat !
In November December 1998 just one month
after Musharraf's elevation to the post of
army chief volunteers were asked for at the
army level for an operation in Kashmir !
Many thousand volunteered including both
officers and men from various units !
At no stage did any Mujahideen enter
Kargil ! This is a piece of fiction and has no
veracity !
These were attached to NLI units in the 80
Brigade sector for training. The principal
idea of the plan was to infiltrate four
battalions of NLI (Northern light Infantry)
stationed in 80 Brigade Sector into Kargil
Heights overlooking and dominating the
Srinagar Ladakh road the lone Indian link
with the Siachen and Leh Sectors ! The idea
being to cut the lifeline of Indian supplies to
Leh and Siachen Sectors ! Indian held heights
in Kargil were to be occupied in February
1999 while Indian infantry had abandoned
these heights at the approach of winter snow
as an annual routine since 1948.In
occupying the heights no fighting was
involved ! The real issue was that of
supplying Pakistani troops holding these
heights which was far more difficult from
the Pakistani side than from the Indian
side !
Plans were kept secret and even the
Commander 10 Corps Engineers of was not
allowed to enter the Operations Room in 10
Corps Pindi.
The distance involved in reaching the heights
varied from 15 to 35 kilometers from
Pakistan side over mountains as high as 13
to 19,000 feet .To do this each battalion was
divided into two parts , one acting as porters
taking supplies forward and one half
occupying the heights.
The heights were occupied as per the plan
but the four units while doing so were
severely exhausted ! In March-April the
Indians discovered the Pakistani presence
and reacted severely ! Severe fighting
continued till July once the Indians finally
re-captured the heights after Pakistani
troops had been left to the mercy of Indian
artillery and overwhelming troop
concentrations as a result of the Blair House
Accord !
A brief military examination of the plan
reveals following weaknesses.(1) Failure to
assess strategic repercussions of the
operation at geo
-politic and national strategic level .(2)
Logistic failure in incorrect appreciation of
supplying the troops . (3) Failure to
understand that by occupying the heights the
Indians were driven into a corner and had
no choice but to retaliate , not for glory as
was the Pakistani military's case but for pure
military survival . (4) At a more subtle level
the use of the Chora-Batalik Sector as a
future spring board for Pakistani operations
against India was sealed since Indians
heavily fortified this sector for any future
war.
The Pakistani planners failed to assess that
war as an instrument of policy is no longer
in vogue at the international level and their
temporary military success would only bring
greater international censure and a negative
war mongering image without any
corresponding military gain at the strategic
level.
This scribe interviewed a former
commander of FCNA and 10 Corps about
logistics and General Imtiaz Warraich
replied as following :-
"We initiated this operation but failed to
support it with comprehensive operational
planning and above all buildup for essential
logistic support without which no operation
can succeed"......'" the principal reason for
our heavy casualties and lack of progress
was unimaginative and callous logistic
operations to support the units".
At one point the sepoys who had volunteered
to fight and had come from many other
infantry units to the NLI units refused to act
as porters carrying supplies over 15
kilometres and were so exasperated that
they defied Javed Hassan's personal orders
in unit durbars to carry supplies and when
Javed Hassn threw his cap on the ground
threatened to march over it unless they were
not employed as porters ! One such
volunteer told this scribe that we had
volunteered to fight ,not to act as porters !

The same fact was also mentioned in ISI
chief Ziauddin ****'s secret report to Nawaz
Sharif prepared by an Engineer officer on
Zia's staff in ISI !
The failure to assess the "Enemy" factor was
another strategic planning failure at the
highest level .I asked General Warraich this
question and he stated " Capture of Kargil
Heights would totally stop all Indian
movement to Leh and Ladakh Sectors unlike
Pakistan in Siachen and Indians had no
option but to do and die " !
Lust for glory and honour in battle are
perfectly reasonable aspirations as long as
they are accompanied by commensurate
military talent in the generals who are at the
helm of affairs ! This was sadly lacking in
the Musharraf team who planned the
operation. Their egos were many times
larger than their real military talent !
By promoting an intensely ambitious man to
the rank of army chief Nawaz did a favor
which could only be repaid by betrayal ! The
plan was based not on sound military
reasoning but on burning ambition and an
unrealistic desire for glory by men far away
from the heat of battle ! No one above major
level died , yet in a report to the military
secretary
's branch Javed Hassan recommended
retiring 75 % of officers involved in the
operation below colonel level !
The prime minister was not fully briefed
because of ulterior motives ! Had the
operation succeeded it would have been
projected as a proof of Musharraf's
Napoleonic brilliance and if it failed as it
did Nawaz Sharif would have been made the
scapegoat !
The operations planners were distinguished
neither by loftiness of thought, nor audacity
in the conduct of battle at
the operational or strategic level. T
 
. Thus
boldness at tactical level was sacrificed
because of operational and tactical timidity
at the highest level.
No one appreciated that the army men who
were employed , and it is a fiction that there
was a single Mujahid in Kargil, had flesh
and blood ! These men mourned by a few
hundred families were sons husbands
fathers and brothers !
The Kargil operation at the military level is
a watershed ! Idealism that propelled many
hundred to die in those Himalayan wastes is
buried for good ! Now there is a new breed
which dominates the army ! The ones who
aim at going on lush UN second
-ments or to KESC,WAPDA or as well paid
consultants !
What can one conclude ! It was the human
heart that failed in Kargil and this heart
which failed was housed in the ribcage of
men sitting in the GHQ and not on the rocky
pinnacles of Kargil ! Once the supply lines
were closed under Indian threat of a counter
attack , these brave men all Pakistan Army
regulars were abandoned to die, pounded by
artillery fire , bayoneted by overwhelming
numbers , weakened by starvation ! Who can
hear their cries ! Our ears are covered with
heaps of lies ! Truth died at Kargil ! What
remains is a bodyguard of lies!
A. H Amin is a writer , journalist , ex editor
of Defence Journal
(Pakistan), ex Editor of Globe (Pakistan);
author of Indo Pak Wars
from 1947 to 1971, Man's Role in History
and Land of the Pure (short stories).
He contributed above article to
Media Monitors Network (MMN) from
Sindh, Pakistan.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2003 A. H. Amin


Musharraf's Secret War in Kargil (by A. H. Amin) - Media Monitors Network
 
You will never get a chance. See below:

Kargil lesson: India plugs LoC gaps

India seems to have learnt its lesson from Kargil. Thirteen years after Pakistani troops and mujahideen infiltrated the sensitive sector in J&K, the country has plugged many gaps and beefed up defences along the LoC so that 1999 is not repeated.

The Centre is going all-out to ensure that supplies reach troops 24x7 in the forward areas. The work on the first phase 6-km strategic all-weather Zoji La tunnel — linking Srinagar to Leh — is scheduled to start next month.

Sources said after the Kargil war, the Indian Army has deployed nearly a division — around 10,000 troops — along the Mushkoh-Drass-Kaksar-Yaldor axis of the LoC. Just a brigade — 3,000 troops — used to man this place before May 1999. Striking capacity has also been doubled to 2,000 men.

According to Army brass, after Kargil, when Pakistan had occupied vacated Indian Army posts along the LoC in March 1999, it was decided that all posts with rare exception of the least vulnerable ones would be manned round-the-year.

With all battalion headquarters in the sector accessible through metal roads now, the troops at over 15,000 feet are taken care of even during the harsh winter months.

Besides, unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance aircraft and satellites are routinely deployed over this sector to pick up military activity across the LoC or intrusion on the Indian side. The Indian defences are backed by Leh airport, which was turned into a fighter base after the Kargil war.

However, the key change after Kargil has been infrastructure upgrade. Currently, the following upgrade is on:
The 422-km Srinagar-Leh road is being made into double carriage way at the cost of Rs. 981.45 crore. The project which began in 2006 is scheduled to be completed by December 2015.
The advance landing ground at Kargil with a runway of 6,000 feet has been made operational.
An alternative road axis is being built to link Manali with Leh with a tunnel under Rohtang La. On the Ladakh side, Darcha-Padam-Nimu-Leh 251 km road is under construction to feed troops on the LoC and on the border with China.

Kargil lesson: India plugs LoC gaps - Hindustan Times
Looks like These all developments are done under the lessons of Kargil, But as I said Before Pakistan have prepared as well against these measurements. As Various military installations have done by them on bordering Northern areas. Few examples are in recent Tests that has been done by our military of increasing the capability of Tatical weapons. These Kind of military installations in highly conflict zones are considered common nowdays.
 
To believe there will never be another Kargil like event is to believe and have faith in the ego and greed of powerful men. For it is not the Pakistani people who have any interest in waging a war against India...a common man has far bigger problems, of mere survival, than the conquering of the world.

The misadventures that we seem to take every decade and a half has much more to do with the politicized nature of the Pakistani armed forces. Soon after the founding of the nation, the army took on a mythical status, not because of its exploits, but the first of the military dictators had staked his claim on the nation. Pakistanis saw the armed forces as the only defense against an aggressive and unpredictable India...in reality, that more accurately portrayed the Pakistani side. Military glory was the only way these generals could gain power and hold onto it...well if not really glory, then one feigned through propaganda. War became a crucial part of the "election campaign", for no man or woman would pick a general to fix fiscal policy and social issues...they were a necessity due to the constant threat of war. Were the threat to disappear, what reason would there be for an all powerful military?

As long as Pakistan functions under the rules set forth in the 1950s, aggressive military actions will always be a very real possibility...every ambitious new military leader will first look to carve his place in Pakistani lore, legitimizing his eventual reign. Thankfully for him, history has proven, only a war has to be undertaken (planning optional), the details of which can be manipulated to make the relevant leader seem like the second coming of Alexander the Great...a glory created from the blood of brave young men who would die defending, not Pakistan's honor, but the misguided ambition of their military leaders.

That is not to say all military leaders are of the same ilk. But unfortunately due to the formidable framework already set forth by the army and then cultivated over decades, it only takes one man every couple of decades; one man with ambition and greed...everything else easily falls into place.
 
To believe there will never be another Kargil like event is to believe and have faith in the ego and greed of powerful men. For it is not the Pakistani people who have any interest in waging a war against India...a common man has far bigger problems, of mere survival, than the conquering of the world.

The misadventures that we seem to take every decade and a half has much more to do with the politicized nature of the Pakistani armed forces. Soon after the founding of the nation, the army took on a mythical status, not because of its exploits, but the first of the military dictators had staked his claim on the nation. Pakistanis saw the armed forces as the only defense against an aggressive and unpredictable India...in reality, that more accurately portrayed the Pakistani side. Military glory was the only way these generals could gain power and hold onto it...well if not really glory, then one feigned through propaganda. War became a crucial part of the "election campaign", for no man or woman would pick a general to fix fiscal policy and social issues...they were a necessity due to the constant threat of war. Were the threat to disappear, what reason would there be for an all powerful military?

As long as Pakistan functions under the rules set forth in the 1950s, aggressive military actions will always be a very real possibility...every ambitious new military leader will first look to carve his place in Pakistani lore, legitimizing his eventual reign. Thankfully for him, history has proven, only a war has to be undertaken (planning optional), the details of which can be manipulated to make the relevant leader seem like the second coming of Alexander the Great...a glory created from the blood of brave young men who would die defending, not Pakistan's honor, but the misguided ambition of their military leaders.

That is not to say all military leaders are of the same ilk. But unfortunately due to the formidable framework already set forth by the army and then cultivated over decades, it only takes one man every couple of decades; one man with ambition and greed...everything else easily falls into place.
man, that was some awsome post, that i have come accross in recent times.
 
I think your ex Army chief's explanation was even better, you like posting youtube videos go and post the videos of his views on Kargil war!

As for '65, the whole world knows who invited independent watchers and analysts for an independent and neutral assessment of the war and who refused independent and neutral assessment. And we know why that is, does the little Indian?? I guess not.

Share the video source.

Oh really this what you told:


v9ysD.png


The Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.



In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes —

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.


Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made. Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war. Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote –

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.


Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of occupying Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.

Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces, but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.


One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan. The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.


Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States. After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation war and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.









The little toilet cleaner wants to speak too??? It was an Indian achievement to gain independence from East Pakistan or a Bengali achievement?? Little toiled cleaners have too little to rejoice so stories have to be made up of how Bangladesh was liberated by India when all the while it was Bengalis using Indians as ******.....now look how that pretty little country treats the ******!

And you were responsible for PNS mehran? Please dude, the best you can do is provide arms and $$$, you cannot provide manpower as your Indians would rather wash American toilets.

Well I have written nice reply to your toilet paper but Oscar deleted my post said: "There is no need for tit for tat". I think video is fine for people like you.

Well Pakistanis proudly claim they defeated USSR in afghanistan through ISI(with more CIA help ofcourse, US provide you arms and money) !!!

 
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To believe there will never be another Kargil like event is to believe and have faith in the ego and greed of powerful men. For it is not the Pakistani people who have any interest in waging a war against India...a common man has far bigger problems, of mere survival, than the conquering of the world.

The misadventures that we seem to take every decade and a half has much more to do with the politicized nature of the Pakistani armed forces. Soon after the founding of the nation, the army took on a mythical status, not because of its exploits, but the first of the military dictators had staked his claim on the nation. Pakistanis saw the armed forces as the only defense against an aggressive and unpredictable India...in reality, that more accurately portrayed the Pakistani side. Military glory was the only way these generals could gain power and hold onto it...well if not really glory, then one feigned through propaganda. War became a crucial part of the "election campaign", for no man or woman would pick a general to fix fiscal policy and social issues...they were a necessity due to the constant threat of war. Were the threat to disappear, what reason would there be for an all powerful military?

As long as Pakistan functions under the rules set forth in the 1950s, aggressive military actions will always be a very real possibility...every ambitious new military leader will first look to carve his place in Pakistani lore, legitimizing his eventual reign. Thankfully for him, history has proven, only a war has to be undertaken (planning optional), the details of which can be manipulated to make the relevant leader seem like the second coming of Alexander the Great...a glory created from the blood of brave young men who would die defending, not Pakistan's honor, but the misguided ambition of their military leaders.

That is not to say all military leaders are of the same ilk. But unfortunately due to the formidable framework already set forth by the army and then cultivated over decades, it only takes one man every couple of decades; one man with ambition and greed...everything else easily falls into place.

But the problem is Indian soldiers also pay the price for these Generals adventurism, these policies are making India spend exponentially on defense - to top it all Pakistan has the Bomb which with the volatility that exists in the PA might create an accidental launch towards India. Afghanistan is also suffering due to these antics of such people. What is the solution to this problem?
 
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