PAF Chief flies mission out of Skardu

[MastanKhan]

OK so we should call bhanhizzz from Lahore to serve in armed forces or the PAF?

Hi,

Please speak clear---. I did not understand your comment.

 

[IceCold]

yes we have myself served more than two decade. have any doubt?

Actually his contention is with the drones violating our airspace and killing with impunity? Rest assured he is well aware about Pakistan armed forces.

 

[The Diplomat]

so its an official thing? awarded by paf?? btw 3-0 vs a EF is awesome

Yes, the sticker is kind of like an award for the pilot. 3:0 is magnificent!

Is there any confirmation for this? Thanks

Yes, below: (In simulated warfare)
http://forums.theregister.co.uk/forum/3/2011/06/08/eurofighter_beaten_by_f16/#c_1089967
http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15661
http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/raf-eurofighter-typhoons-beaten-by-pakistani-f-16s.164676/
https://theaviationist.com/2012/04/26/typhoon-kill/

 

[imiakhtar]

Do you have proof? CAA reports or otherwise for these accusations?
Accident reports?

Yes.

Accident reports are available on the CAA Pakistan website.

The Bhoja 737 captain was Noorullah Afridi formerly of 8 Squadron Pioneers PAF
Can't member the names of the others but the reports are published on the aforementioned CAA website.

 

[SQ8]

Yes.

Accident reports are available on the CAA Pakistan website.

The Bhoja 737 captain was Noorullah Afridi formerly of 8 Squadron Pioneers PAF
Can't member the names of the others but the reports are published on the aforementioned CAA website.

The only two incidents you mentioned which are available are the Airblue and Bhoja air.

The airblue one is thus with the civilian captain and PAF FO:
During initial climb, the Captain tested the knowledge of FO and used harsh words and snobbish tone, contrary to the company procedures/norms.

8.4 The question / answer sessions, lecturing and advises by the mishap Captain continued with intervals for about one hour after takeoff.

8.5 After the intermittent humiliating sessions, the FO generally remained quiet, became under confident, submissive, and subsequently did not challenge the Captain for any of his errors, breaches and violations.
http://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/SIB-337.pdf

The reminder of the report is available int eh above link, and DOES NOT to even an ounce back up your claim for the PAF pilot being at fault.


Lets go to Bhoja which is the only verifiable example you have given:

1.It was important to find out the reasons of CRM failure which otherwise could have averted the accident. It was observed during the process of investigation that Captain of mishap aircraft was one of the instructional staff when FO was undergoing his initial flying training at PAF Academy as a cadet. Captain always remained a fatherly figure in the mind of the FO. Captain looked after the FO in SAI and later became a factor in his joining Bhoja Air. In Bhoja Air FO flew a total of 23 flights, 16 of which were flown with Captain. FO had an average flying experience and not undergone any simulator training of automated aircraft / flight deck management. That is why, FO kept on reminding the Captain and suggesting a go around to get out of unsafe / hazardous set of conditions after entering the severe weather, but remained reliant on Captain to take the required actions. The FO should have taken over the controls of aircraft to execute a go around once there was inadequate response / inaction by the Captain.

2. In case of Bhoja Air, the Flight BHO-213 was being managed by the cockpit crew who were not professionally competent to operate the flight in the given set of unsafe / severe bad weather conditions. FO did not have formal simulator training for operating an automated flight deck, on the other hand Captain underwent simulator training in South Africa under the supervision of South African instructor and the simulator check was not monitored by Flight Standard Inspector CAA Pakistan. It is observed that during these simulator sessions Captain was not exposed to wind shear / TAWS / GPWS exercises and their recovery techniques. Due to the absence of required training, Captain kept relying on automation to provide him a solution whereas he should have followed the Boeing FCOM / QRH recommended procedures.

3The captain while undergoing his simulator training had seven “satisfactory with brief (SB)” entries. The cockpit crew of his experience, is not expected to perform in this manner, as seven SBs grading of such experienced cockpit crew are considered as poor performance. After the arrival of Captain from South Africa, neither any specific recommended training was imparted nor his performance to manage the automated flight deck evaluated. This was a serious mistake on the part of Bhoja Air management in grooming / training of Captain.

The fault then lies more so within Bhoja's management rather than anything to do with the pilots training. If you are going to hire an inexperienced captain to fly for you then you are asking for trouble.

So again, I ask the merit of your blanket statement? Or is it something based on pure personal opinion and not backed up with any factual evidence?

 

[imiakhtar]

The only two incidents you mentioned which are available are the Airblue and Bhoja air.

The airblue one is thus with the civilian captain and PAF FO:
During initial climb, the Captain tested the knowledge of FO and used harsh words and snobbish tone, contrary to the company procedures/norms.

8.4 The question / answer sessions, lecturing and advises by the mishap Captain continued with intervals for about one hour after takeoff.

8.5 After the intermittent humiliating sessions, the FO generally remained quiet, became under confident, submissive, and subsequently did not challenge the Captain for any of his errors, breaches and violations.
http://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/SIB-337.pdf

The reminder of the report is available int eh above link, and DOES NOT to even an ounce back up your claim for the PAF pilot being at fault.


Lets go to Bhoja which is the only verifiable example you have given:

1.It was important to find out the reasons of CRM failure which otherwise could have averted the accident. It was observed during the process of investigation that Captain of mishap aircraft was one of the instructional staff when FO was undergoing his initial flying training at PAF Academy as a cadet. Captain always remained a fatherly figure in the mind of the FO. Captain looked after the FO in SAI and later became a factor in his joining Bhoja Air. In Bhoja Air FO flew a total of 23 flights, 16 of which were flown with Captain. FO had an average flying experience and not undergone any simulator training of automated aircraft / flight deck management. That is why, FO kept on reminding the Captain and suggesting a go around to get out of unsafe / hazardous set of conditions after entering the severe weather, but remained reliant on Captain to take the required actions. The FO should have taken over the controls of aircraft to execute a go around once there was inadequate response / inaction by the Captain.

2. In case of Bhoja Air, the Flight BHO-213 was being managed by the cockpit crew who were not professionally competent to operate the flight in the given set of unsafe / severe bad weather conditions. FO did not have formal simulator training for operating an automated flight deck, on the other hand Captain underwent simulator training in South Africa under the supervision of South African instructor and the simulator check was not monitored by Flight Standard Inspector CAA Pakistan. It is observed that during these simulator sessions Captain was not exposed to wind shear / TAWS / GPWS exercises and their recovery techniques. Due to the absence of required training, Captain kept relying on automation to provide him a solution whereas he should have followed the Boeing FCOM / QRH recommended procedures.

3The captain while undergoing his simulator training had seven “satisfactory with brief (SB)” entries. The cockpit crew of his experience, is not expected to perform in this manner, as seven SBs grading of such experienced cockpit crew are considered as poor performance. After the arrival of Captain from South Africa, neither any specific recommended training was imparted nor his performance to manage the automated flight deck evaluated. This was a serious mistake on the part of Bhoja Air management in grooming / training of Captain.

The fault then lies more so within Bhoja's management rather than anything to do with the pilots training. If you are going to hire an inexperienced captain to fly for you then you are asking for trouble.

So again, I ask the merit of your blanket statement? Or is it something based on pure personal opinion and not backed up with any factual evidence?

And some of the best pilots who showed their calibre in a recent International exercise.

The fault then lies more so within Bhoja's management rather than anything to do with the pilots training. If you are going to hire an inexperienced captain to fly for you then you are asking for trouble.

So again, I ask the merit of your blanket statement? Or is it something based on pure personal opinion and not backed up with any factual evidence?

I take issue when pump out their chests in silly patriotic and nationalistic fervour and start claiming their pilots are ' the best'. It happens with quite regularly with Pakistanis for some reason

In both the Bhoha and AirBlue accidents we see a disregard for rules and operating procedures, or what we call in the civilian world, a lack of basic airmanship. Airmanship isn't something an airline syllabus or Boeing flight manual can teach you. That we have such a number of accidents occur and the incidents at Shaheen does not paint a pretty picture of the PAF flying ethos.

 

[SQ8]

I take issue when pump out their chests in silly patriotic and nationalistic fervour and start claiming their pilots are ' the best'. It happens with quite regularly with Pakistanis for some reason

In both the Bhoha and AirBlue accidents we see a disregard for rules and operating procedures, or what we call in the civilian world, a lack of basic airmanship. Airmanship isn't something an airline syllabus or Boeing flight manual can teach you. That we have such a number of accidents occur and the incidents at Shaheen does not paint a pretty picture of the PAF flying ethos.

Again, you are posting in semantics and talking about emotional issues rather than hard facts. Where is the hard fact for your claim regarding poor airmanship?

 

[imiakhtar]

Again, you are posting in semantics and talking about emotional issues rather than hard facts. Where is the hard fact for your claim regarding poor airmanship?

The facts are in the accident reports but seeing as you have an issue with reading comprehension, I'll break it down into baby bite size bits for you.

Airblue - Captain flying. Captain decides to carry out a non-standard circling approach. Co pilot (ex-PAF) doesn't voice concerns. Captain loses situational awareness and aircraft continues on a trajectory towards restricted airspace AND terrain at Margalla hills. EGPWS detects rising terrain and issues over 10 "TERRAIN WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" commands.

Now at this point, basic airmanship and airbus operating procedure would dictate PM (Pilot monitoring/co pilot) to issue voice command "My controls, my aircraft, I have control", pitch sidestick full back and advance throttles to TOGA. Instead, the copilot sat on his arse and allowed the aircraft and his pax to be flown into a hill.

 

[Thorough Pro]

That was not an accident...........

The one they slammed into the mountain side with their air chief in it.



Hi,

He is not angry---but tired of the bull sh-it that the armed forces have served the nation over the years---specially the air force.

 

[SQ8]

The facts are in the accident reports but seeing as you have an issue with reading comprehension, I'll break it down into baby bite size bits for you.

Airblue - Captain flying. Captain decides to carry out a non-standard circling approach. Co pilot (ex-PAF) doesn't voice concerns. Captain loses situational awareness and aircraft continues on a trajectory towards restricted airspace AND terrain at Margalla hills. EGPWS detects rising terrain and issues over 10 "TERRAIN WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" commands.

Now at this point, basic airmanship and airbus operating procedure would dictate PM (Pilot monitoring/co pilot) to issue voice command "My controls, my aircraft, I have control", pitch sidestick full back and advance throttles to TOGA. Instead, the copilot sat on his arse and allowed the aircraft and his pax to be flown into a hill.

Your baby bits are full of your own emotions and do not AT ALL reflect the report which Ive already pasted there.
Moreover, it has NOTHING to do with airmanship and more to do with the bullying attitude of the captain and the copilots failure to assert his authority. That again has to do with airline training and authority relegation instead of the airmanship mantra you keep repeating.

Considering i actually bothered to put the report here for you and it goes contradictory to all your claims, one can safely assume that your posts are more of a personal agenda and needless parroting than any factual and statistical backup of airmanship issues.

 

[MastanKhan]

That was not an accident...........

Hi,

Please share with us what it was.

Hi,

That also happened with korean airlines landing at San Francisco--- pilot was flying in first time to SFO---senior pilot was sitting next to him---did not say anything to the Pilot to correct---.

At SFO----you come over the ocean and land at the runway flying over the sea wall-

Enjoy the read from the link



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214

The final report into the crash was released on June 24, 2014.[79] The NTSB found that the "Mismanagement of Approach and Inadequate Monitoring of Airspeed Led to Crash of Asiana flight 214". The NTSB determined that the flight crew mismanaged the initial approach and that the airplane was well above the desired glidepath. In response, the captain selected an inappropriate autopilot mode, which, without the captain's awareness, resulted in the autothrottle no longer controlling airspeed. The aircraft then descended below the desired glide path with the crew unaware of the decreasing airspeed. The attempted go-around was conducted below 100 feet, by which time it was too late. Over-reliance on automation and lack of systems understanding by the pilots were cited as major factors contributing to the accident.[80]

The NTSB further determined that the pilot's faulty mental model of the airplane's automation logic led to his inadvertent deactivation of automatic airspeed control. In addition, Asiana's automation policy emphasized the full use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight during line operations. The flight crew's mismanagement of the airplane's vertical profile during the initial approach led to a period of increased workload that reduced the pilot monitoring's awareness of the pilot flying's actions around the time of the unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control. Insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach likely resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. Lack of compliance withstandard operating procedures and crew resource management were cited as additional factors.[81]

The NTSB reached the following final conclusion:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's mismanagement of the airplane's descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying's unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew's inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew's delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing's documentation and Asiana's pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew's nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the pilot flying's inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches; (4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot's inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance.[1]:129

Preliminary analysis indicated that the plane's approach was too slow and too low. Eighty-two seconds before impact, at an altitude of about 1,600 feet (490 m),[20] the autopilot was turned off, the throttles were set to idle, and the plane was operated manually during final descent.[83]NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman stated the pilots did not "set the aircraft for an auto-land situation... They had been cleared for a visual approach and they were hand-flying the airplane," adding: "During the approach there were statements made in the cockpit first about being above the glide path, then about being on the glide path, then later reporting about being below the glide path. All of these statements were made as they were on the approach to San Francisco." "Three seconds before the crash, someone in the cockpit called for the plane to abort the landing, or 'go around'. Then 1.5 seconds before impact, a different crew member again called for a 'go around'". Both were spoken in the cockpit but not over the radio.[75][84]

 

[imiakhtar]

Your baby bits are full of your own emotions and do not AT ALL reflect the report which Ive already pasted there.
Moreover, it has NOTHING to do with airmanship and more to do with the bullying attitude of the captain and the copilots failure to assert his authority. That again has to do with airline training and authority relegation instead of the airmanship mantra you keep repeating.

Considering i actually bothered to put the report here for you and it goes contradictory to all your claims, one can safely assume that your posts are more of a personal agenda and needless parroting than any factual and statistical backup of airmanship issues.

Basic airmanship:

noun - basic skill/judgment in flying an aeroplane

I'll highlight the poor airmanship via an asterisk in the airblue synopsis I gave prior:


Airblue - Captain flying. Captain decides to carry out a non-standard circling approach. Co pilot (ex-PAF) doesn't voice concerns* Captain loses situational awareness and aircraft continues on a trajectory towards restricted airspace AND terrain at Margalla hills. EGPWS detects rising terrain and issues over 10 "TERRAIN WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" commands.

Now at this point, basic airmanship and airbus operating procedure would dictate PM (Pilot monitoring/co pilot) to issue voice command "My controls, my aircraft, I have control", pitch sidestick full back and advance throttles to TOGA. Instead, the copilot sat on his arse and allowed the aircraft and his pax to be flown into a hill*.

Two examples of poor airmanship there :

*1 Not raising the matter of an unbriefed non standard approach with captain

*2 Not carrying out terrain avoidance maneuver

There are probably more examples of poor airmanship if I read the full report again but there is no need. I've pointed out the two biggest examples.

If you don't think allowing a fellow pilot to break protocol and fly an aircraft into a hill smacks of poor basic airmanship, you're dumber than I thought.

 

[MastanKhan]

Basic airmanship:

noun - basic skill/judgment in flying an aeroplane

I'll highlight the poor airmanship via an asterisk in the airblue synopsis I gave prior:


Airblue - Captain flying. Captain decides to carry out a non-standard circling approach. Co pilot (ex-PAF) doesn't voice concerns* Captain loses situational awareness and aircraft continues on a trajectory towards restricted airspace AND terrain at Margalla hills. EGPWS detects rising terrain and issues over 10 "TERRAIN WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" commands.

Now at this point, basic airmanship and airbus operating procedure would dictate PM (Pilot monitoring/co pilot) to issue voice command "My controls, my aircraft, I have control", pitch sidestick full back and advance throttles to TOGA. Instead, the copilot sat on his arse and allowed the aircraft and his pax to be flown into a hill*.

Two examples of poor airmanship there :

*1 Not raising the matter of an unbriefed non standard approach with captain

*2 Not carrying out terrain avoidance maneuver

There are probably more examples of poor airmanship if I read the full report again but there is no need. I've pointed out the two biggest examples.

If you don't think allowing a fellow pilot to break protocol and fly an aircraft into a hill smacks of poor basic airmanship, you're dumber than I thought.

Hi,

The pilot of the Air Blue was supposedly fasting against regulations---with older age---as his blood sugar level dropped---so his ability for sane judgement dropped as well.

His non response to the co pilots exclamations could mean that he might have been going into mini comas / mini strokes due to very low sugar levels---.

Happened to my uncle---that is what the driver told us when he had his final stroke---that he would faze off while talking and would not respond.

The cockpit recording is somewhere available.

 

[imiakhtar]

Hi,

The pilot of the Air Blue was supposedly fasting against regulations---with older age---as his blood sugar level dropped---so his ability for sane judgement dropped as well.

His non response to the co pilots exclamations could mean that he might have been going into mini comas / mini strokes due to very low sugar levels---.

Happened to my uncle---that is what the driver told us when he had his final stroke---that he would faze off while talking and would not respond.

The cockpit recording is somewhere available.

That's precisely my point above and that is why you have two pilots up front.

If you see the pilot flying break standard op procedure - you CALL IT OUT. You don't act like a meek dog who replies "woof woof" to his master at each calling The co pilot here didn't call out the non standard flying. That is poor airmanship

Second, if the pilot flying does something which puts you and your pax in jeoprady, eg flies towards a hill - YOU TAKE CONTROL. The co pilot didn't do that.

Here is the taking control procedure which the airblue copilot didn't apply:

Read the first step.

 

[Viper 94]

That's precisely my point above and that is why you have two pilots up front.

If you see the pilot flying break standard op procedure - you CALL IT OUT. You don't act like a meek dog who replies "woof woof" to his master at each calling The co pilot here didn't call out the non standard flying. That is poor airmanship

Second, if the pilot flying does something which puts you and your pax in jeoprady, eg flies towards a hill - YOU TAKE CONTROL. The co pilot didn't do that.

Here is the taking control procedure which the airblue copilot didn't apply:

Read the first step.

May I ask what is your professional background? Are you an aviation enthusiast or have you ever piloted an aircraft?