Origins of Black in the Pakistan Army

[Raja Porus]

I will synthesize three major points from your post through example of Wehrmacht and then you can decide on your own.

1. Size of force being commanded (Army Group ? Corps ? Division ?)
2. Logistics to maintain an armored offensive
3. Replacement of destroyed vehicles

1. Rommel had seen (not commanded) various successes of Wehrmacht in WW2 even before he commanded his Ghost Division. Wehrmacht had Field Armies (Army Groups), not just Corps or Divisions, it was so massive. In previous Indo-Pak wars, Armored Division level Ops cannot be mentioned in prime words, they were mediocre if one wants to give the formation some dignity. Brigade and Regimental level Ops stood out in some cases. The German commanders were commanding Corps level and Army Group level Panzer forces. Their experienced was of 2-3-4 years of continuous combat and they were being promoted as such. In Indo-pak scenario, a conventional war touching 30 days may not even pan out, in rare cases it could yes. Now compare years and years of experience of a German Panzer commander to a Pakistani/Indian Tank commander and then think rationally.

Can a tank commander from subcontinent pull out an armored warfare miracle when commanding a Division sized or above force ?

2. In WW2, to sustain such a force a humongous amount of resources in transport, fuel, ammunition, spare parts etc were needed for Panzer Forces. And yes they were available. When Rommel informed his superiors and the General staff that he wishes to reach beyond Egypt, he was asked how was he supposed to support such an operation ? He replied, thats not my headache, that is QMG's job's. Even when supplies and replacements were dwindling through attacks on German ships by Allied Navy and tonnage was being lost in the sea, nothing deterred Rommel from driving his forces along the North African desert. Firstly, Rommel knew that Afrika Korps can be supported through sea and air. Secondly, he knew that art of warfare was to keep the momentum going, even when African campaign became a sideshow after invasion of USSR. In Pakistan's case, the Armored Divisions will not be eclipsed by any other theatre of war, unless PA heavily invests in Air assault and Airborne Ops but even then not much supplies need to be diverted towards them. Armor and its related units require most of the supplies.

So how will a PA GOC think in regards of supplies and supply lines extending on the desert?


3. Rommel knew that his lost Panzers will be replaced, otherwise he will use Italian tanks. In African campaign, he kept going as he got replacements in men and material. This changed after Operation Barbarossa but somehow he kept getting panzers and eventually even got Tigers in Africa. 501st Heavy Panzer Battalion was decimated completely 2,3 times but the replacements kept it going. When the replacements stopped coming and hope was lost, Wehrmacht surrendered in Africa. The same happened in 65 and 71, Khem Karan (1st Armd Div) and Longewala (22 Cav). PA has a mixture of tanks, the best have been deployed in Armored Divisions. There may not be any replacements for lost T-80s or lost AKs. One could argue that Afrika Corps had a mixture of Panzers I,II,III and IV as well as Italian tanks and still Rommel was able to reach outskirts of Egypt.

How will a PA Armored Commander cope up with losses and replacements if he decides to go in like Rommel did?

A very detailed and informative answer. Considering the fact that PA hasn't got much in the reserve our generals would have to make very calculated moves. So in short we may not be able to perform the bold, dashing and foolhardy moves and will have to more cautious. So this may affect our performance and we might not even be able to do what Montgomery did as he had complete superiority in men and material. And only time will tell the the capabilities of Pakistani generals in particular and Sub continent's generals ln general(both of which haven't performed much brightly)

 

[TheTallGuy]

Gentlemen,
I have been reading articles published A,H Amin regarding Pakistan Armoured Corps and it operations in 1965 & 1971 Wars.

What i have found by reading them is Pakistan Army never had Proper General Staff who were bold & intuitive in like of Von Manstien & Guderion or even like Patton.

That what has bring us down.
So the real question is, do we have them now ... in our headquarters ... someone like Von Mainstien or Guderion?

I ask because ... if we had a staff like this, we would have seen changes in equipment and deployment.

I would ask scholarly posters to participate

 

[Raja Porus]

Gentlemen,
I have been reading articles published A,H Amin regarding Pakistan Armoured Corps and it operations in 1965 & 1971 Wars.

What i have found by reading them is Pakistan Army never had Proper General Staff who were bold & intuitive in like of Von Manstien & Guderion or even like Patton.

That what has bring us down.

Yes exactly, and the thing that had almost shocked me was that Maj Gen Abrar Hussain(who was the inspiring GOC of 6th armd div during battle of Chawinda) retired due to irreconcilable differences with the GHQ and what's more is that the CO of the legendary 25 cavalry (men of steel) during the same battle of chawinda reached brigadier rank with great difficulty. Similarly Gen Akhtar Hussain was replaced in the middle of the battle by Yahya khan and every one knows how he turned an almost victory into a defeat

 

[TheTallGuy]

Yes exactly, and the thing that had almost shocked me was that Maj Gen Abrar Hussain(who was the inspiring GOC of 6th armd div during battle of Chawinda) retired due to irreconcilable differences with the GHQ and what's more is that the CO of the legendary 25 cavalry (men of steel) during the same battle of chawinda reached brigadier rank with great difficulty. Similarly Gen Akhtar Hussain was replaced in the middle of the battle by Yahya khan and every one knows how he turned an almost victory into a defeat

That is where the pain is... care to elaborate that brigadier in 1971 (Col,Nisar of 25th Cav) did on the Battle of Bara pind at Shakar Garh...same Gen Akhtar was commending that sector what he did..

we never learn...

That is why i ask do we have now (Modern Day) post Gulf war 1991....better then previous lot? how do we guage that?

 

[PanzerKiel]

That is where the pain is... care to elaborate that brigadier in 1971 (Col,Nisar of 25th Cav) did on the Battle of Bara pind at Shakar Garh...same Gen Akhtar was commending that sector what he did..

Brig Muhammad Ahmad was commanding 8 Armored Brigade at Barapind, not Brig Nisar ex 25 Cavalry.

Brig Nisar earned his laurels....again....as commander of Chengez Force (adhoc) while delaying whole Indian 1 Corps offensive for almost a week across two minefields even though his orders were to impose a delay of 48 hours only.

 

[TheTallGuy]

Brig Muhammad Ahmad was commanding 8 Armored Brigade at Barapind, not Brig Nisar ex 25 Cavalry.

Brig Nisar earned his laurels....again....as commander of Chengez Force (adhoc) while delaying whole Indian 1 Corps offensive for almost a week across two minefields even though his orders were to impose a delay of 48 hours only.

I Stand corrected

An ad hoc covering troops force known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in 1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for effective counterattack by corps/division resources'. One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M-48 Tanks) was to impose delay along the second minefield. 13 Punjab the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade

 

[Raja Porus]

I Stand corrected

An ad hoc covering troops force known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in 1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for effective counterattack by corps/division resources'. One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M-48 Tanks) was to impose delay along the second minefield. 13 Punjab the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade

Weren't there three mine layers

 

[Signalian]

Yes exactly, and the thing that had almost shocked me was that Maj Gen Abrar Hussain(who was the inspiring GOC of 6th armd div during battle of Chawinda) retired due to irreconcilable differences with the GHQ and what's more is that the CO of the legendary 25 cavalry (men of steel) during the same battle of chawinda reached brigadier rank with great difficulty. Similarly Gen Akhtar Hussain was replaced in the middle of the battle by Yahya khan and every one knows how he turned an almost victory into a defeat

If such incidents do happen or have happened in WOT Ops in the past decade, then its something to worry about. If not, means vision of General staff has changed and hopefully blunders like these won't be committed anymore.

 

[Reichmarshal]

A very detailed and informative answer. Considering the fact that PA hasn't got much in the reserve our generals would have to make very calculated moves. So in short we may not be able to perform the bold, dashing and foolhardy moves and will have to more cautious. So this may affect our performance and we might not even be able to do what Montgomery did as he had complete superiority in men and material. And only time will tell the the capabilities of Pakistani generals in particular and Sub continent's generals ln general(both of which haven't performed much brightly)

It all boils down to our over all strategy, which is "offensive defence".......with the emphasis being on defence.
The equipment on the disposal of our armed forces is to meet/cater the above stated eventuality.