Origins of Black in the Pakistan Army

[PanzerKiel]

LATs also have apcs entirely? So the only difference bw hat and lat is of TOW missiles and baktar shikan?

... Yeah.... And let's not forget the Kornets as well, apart from some MILANS.

 

[Raja Porus]

... Yeah.... And let's not forget the Kornets as well, apart from some MILANS.

Weren't the kornets (just 52 ) for mi35s and what may be tge approx number of milans as i haven't heard much about them in PA

 

[airmarshal]

We had our Army uniforms fashioned on British colonial period. For a very long time, you would see a military man and would think he has just come back from WW2.

Until Pakistan got involved in War on Terror, its uniforms looked like vintage WW. Now, we see modern uniform and gear fashioned on troops that came to fight in Afghanistan. From embroidered ranks, camouflage, bags, knee caps and gloves. All seem to have been inspired by modern armies which have fought war recently in our neighbourhood.

 

[Raja Porus]

We had our Army uniforms fashioned on British colonial period. For a very long time, you would see a military man and would think he has just come back from WW2.

Until Pakistan got involved in War on Terror, its uniforms looked like vintage WW. Now, we see modern uniform and gear fashioned on troops that came to fight in Afghanistan. From embroidered ranks, camouflage, bags, knee caps and gloves. All seem to have been inspired by modern armies which have fought war recently in our neighbourhood.

Yes, the khakis must have been uncomfortable for the soldiers on field

 

[GriffinsRule]

Scouts wore black too ... shalwar kameez that is, as part of their uniform =)

 

[Marker]

Men in black!

 

[Raja Porus]

Scouts wore black too ... shalwar kameez that is, as part of their uniform =)

Thats malayshia shalwar kameez(similar to the shirts won by the police) moreover their berets are of dark greenish color and also they are not part of tge regualar military

 

[Signalian]

The black beret and dress can be discussed, but its the mind set of red tapers commanding bigger armored formations which holds the key between success and failure.

 

[Raja Porus]

The black beret and dress can be discussed, but its the mind set of red tapers commanding bigger armored formations which holds the key between success and failure.

Sir what is your view on this? I often think if our red tappers especially GOCs are compatible, flexible and tactically sound or are still like the British generals of ww1/2. I wanted to actually start another thread on this topic.

 

[Signalian]

Sir what is your view on this? I often think if our red tappers especially GOCs are compatible, flexible and tactically sound or are still like the British generals of ww1/2. I wanted to actually start another thread on this topic.

British training is long gone, American training was next.

 

[Raja Porus]

British training is long gone, American training was next.

Training and doing courses is though a very important aspect of command of troops and theur employment but i want to ask that if our gocs are capable and can think out of the box like rommel or will stick to the book like Montgomery . Keeping in mind that Pakistan made many tactical as well as strategic mistakes which led it to not having a complete victory in many areas especially considering that PA had technological(some also say numerically; including Maj Gen S.A Hamid) superiority in tanks during 65

 

[PanzerKiel]

Training and doing courses is though a very important aspect of command of troops and theur employment but i want to ask that if our gocs are capable and can think out of the box like rommel or will stick to the book like Montgomery . Keeping in mind that Pakistan made many tactical as well as strategic mistakes which led it to not having a complete victory in many areas especially considering that PA had technological(some also say numerically; including Maj Gen S.A Hamid) superiority in tanks during 65

- Pakistan's early military leaders were junior officers during WW2, with no formal exposure to operational strategy.
- Most of them were influenced by the great tank battles fought in the Western Desert. They viewed the situation through the lenses of a junior officer, with focus on local / tactical level.
- They then rose to higher ranks post partition, in a telescoped timeframe.
- Understanding of operational strategy was restricted to a few luminaries like Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, that too by virtue of personal interest, study and exposure to a few courses abroad like IDC, UK.
- There was no forum for operational strategy, till beginning of War Course, first at Staff College during late 60s, followed by NDC.
- Therefore, with a few exceptions, the tactical level remained the basis of planning and conduct of military operations from the earliest days of Pakistan till 70s. It may be remembered that our first conflict with India, Kashmir War of 1948, was restricted to a series of tactical actions, although they created strategic effects.
- lack of political will, vision and competence.
- Inadequate understanding of actual capabilities / limitations of formations and arms / services.
- Equipment limitations.
- Predominance of firepower over manoeuvre, and slogging matches.
- No worthwhile operations conducted in desert / semi-desert terrain, due to hesitation to venture into it, keeping in view poor communication, hostile weather and daunting logistic and movement requirements.

 

[Raja Porus]

- Pakistan's early military leaders were junior officers during WW2, with no formal exposure to operational strategy.
- Most of them were influenced by the great tank battles fought in the Western Desert. They viewed the situation through the lenses of a junior officer, with focus on local / tactical level.
- They then rose to higher ranks post partition, in a telescoped timeframe.
- Understanding of operational strategy was restricted to a few luminaries like Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, that too by virtue of personal interest, study and exposure to a few courses abroad like IDC, UK.
- There was no forum for operational strategy, till beginning of War Course, first at Staff College during late 60s, followed by NDC.
- Therefore, with a few exceptions, the tactical level remained the basis of planning and conduct of military operations from the earliest days of Pakistan till 70s. It may be remembered that our first conflict with India, Kashmir War of 1948, was restricted to a series of tactical actions, although they created strategic effects.
- lack of political will, vision and competence.
- Inadequate understanding of actual capabilities / limitations of formations and arms / services.
- Equipment limitations.
- Predominance of firepower over manoeuvre, and slogging matches.
- No worthwhile operations conducted in desert / semi-desert terrain, due to hesitation to venture into it, keeping in view poor communication, hostile weather and daunting logistic and movement requirements.

But what about the current ones. Do they have the abilities to deploy,move and manoeuvre, attack, counter attack,be flexible and mold their plans under the heat of the battle
Also how about the War on Terror. How do u think it has affected our generals' abilities to carry out large scale maneuvers;positively or negatively

 

[PanzerKiel]

But what about the current ones. Do they have the abilities to deploy,move and manoeuvre, attack, counter attack,be flexible and mold their plans under the heat of the battle
Also how about the War on Terror. How do u think it has affected our generals' abilities to carry out large scale maneuvers;positively or negatively

The next war will tell exactly. Its been fifty years since we have fought a full scale conventional war. Whatever we have learned will be validated if we are able to win the next round.

 

[Signalian]

Training and doing courses is though a very important aspect of command of troops and theur employment but i want to ask that if our gocs are capable and can think out of the box like rommel or will stick to the book like Montgomery . Keeping in mind that Pakistan made many tactical as well as strategic mistakes which led it to not having a complete victory in many areas especially considering that PA had technological(some also say numerically; including Maj Gen S.A Hamid) superiority in tanks during 65

But what about the current ones. Do they have the abilities to deploy,move and manoeuvre, attack, counter attack,be flexible and mold their plans under the heat of the battle
Also how about the War on Terror. How do u think it has affected our generals' abilities to carry out large scale maneuvers;positively or negatively

I will synthesize three major points from your post through example of Wehrmacht and then you can decide on your own.

1. Size of force being commanded (Army Group ? Corps ? Division ?)
2. Logistics to maintain an armored offensive
3. Replacement of destroyed vehicles

1. Rommel had seen (not commanded) various successes of Wehrmacht in WW2 even before he commanded his Ghost Division. Wehrmacht had Field Armies (Army Groups), not just Corps or Divisions, it was so massive. In previous Indo-Pak wars, Armored Division level Ops cannot be mentioned in prime words, they were mediocre if one wants to give the formation some dignity. Brigade and Regimental level Ops stood out in some cases. The German commanders were commanding Corps level and Army Group level Panzer forces. Their experienced was of 2-3-4 years of continuous combat and they were being promoted as such. In Indo-pak scenario, a conventional war touching 30 days may not even pan out, in rare cases it could yes. Now compare years and years of experience of a German Panzer commander to a Pakistani/Indian Tank commander and then think rationally.

Can a tank commander from subcontinent pull out an armored warfare miracle when commanding a Division sized or above force ?

2. In WW2, to sustain such a force a humongous amount of resources in transport, fuel, ammunition, spare parts etc were needed for Panzer Forces. And yes they were available. When Rommel informed his superiors and the General staff that he wishes to reach beyond Egypt, he was asked how was he supposed to support such an operation ? He replied, thats not my headache, that is QMG's job's. Even when supplies and replacements were dwindling through attacks on German ships by Allied Navy and tonnage was being lost in the sea, nothing deterred Rommel from driving his forces along the North African desert. Firstly, Rommel knew that Afrika Korps can be supported through sea and air. Secondly, he knew that art of warfare was to keep the momentum going, even when African campaign became a sideshow after invasion of USSR. In Pakistan's case, the Armored Divisions will not be eclipsed by any other theatre of war, unless PA heavily invests in Air assault and Airborne Ops but even then not much supplies need to be diverted towards them. Armor and its related units require most of the supplies.

So how will a PA GOC think in regards of supplies and supply lines extending on the desert?


3. Rommel knew that his lost Panzers will be replaced, otherwise he will use Italian tanks. In African campaign, he kept going as he got replacements in men and material. This changed after Operation Barbarossa but somehow he kept getting panzers and eventually even got Tigers in Africa. 501st Heavy Panzer Battalion was decimated completely 2,3 times but the replacements kept it going. When the replacements stopped coming and hope was lost, Wehrmacht surrendered in Africa. The same happened in 65 and 71, Khem Karan (1st Armd Div) and Longewala (22 Cav). PA has a mixture of tanks, the best have been deployed in Armored Divisions. There may not be any replacements for lost T-80s or lost AKs. One could argue that Afrika Corps had a mixture of Panzers I,II,III and IV as well as Italian tanks and still Rommel was able to reach outskirts of Egypt.

How will a PA Armored Commander cope up with losses and replacements if he decides to go in like Rommel did?