Operations in Dir and Buner

[Hellfire]

Come on dude, now dont teach me ballistics!

i was concerned about your claim as regards to "frequency of screw ups"

You talked as if we are living in the stone age where 100 catapults throw 1000 stones and 10 actually makes to the target and out those 10, 2 manage to so some damage at the target end!

Yes screw ups do happen, but it will not happen that a round would land like a 1000 m away from its intended to land.

As for the "windspeed, drag, drafts" there is something known as meteorology which every modern artillery make use of. You must have heard (as you are a militarily trained doc) about electronic met computation and its application.

They are not fighting Siachen where the met effect is exaggerated.

And the guns that you and we have a quite accurate. Rather i must say very accurate!

As for your "zero error probability", the 'probable error' (both the range PE and the deflection PE) in any gun actually helps the aim of any fire support rather than hindering it.

If your gunners sleep and smoke hash while shooting and load projectiles with wrong fuze and pump in a few extra charge bags inside the breach block and 'lay' the gun (the panoramic telescopes)on a passerby's (who happens to be a beautiful South indian) instead of the Aiming Posts, then i can assume the high 'frequency of screw ups' at your end, but 'unfortunately' our gunners don't do that

And yes, before i forget, in mountainous terrain what else would you like to employ to kick the militants out from there? i hope you dont recommend using Armour where tanks are getting stuck in defiles!

Artillery and Airforce are the suitable (though not the best) resources available currently!

Chill!

Enigma

I stress ....


1. dynamic and fluid nature of the engagement area

2. urban area with significant local populance in loc.

1000m you have quoted is a bit of exaggeration. and even 2 meters deviation does play a havoc in a CI grid as it exponentially increases collateral damage/civillian casualty in a built up area.

its upto you to appreciate the fact.

as for the met data and computed fire solutions being utilised, mountains, IMO are still tricky to be able to be sufficiently accurate in your fire. the reason primarily is again the shifting nature of met conditions, wherein the latest data may be valid for a very short span of time.

in addition the topography of the region invariably increases the dead space in any fire mission. its further compounded if the targets are on reverse slope as the line of sight is considerably reduced (your RADARs become useless in it).

further, effectiveness in a mountainous terrain is found in utilisation of HE/DPICMs something which has effectiveness in a linear engagement but has tendency to increase the casualty rate amongst non-combatants manifolds.

as for armor, you shall find that its PA who is employing armor for whatever reasons. my contention is on employment of adequate infantry assets with full complement of BSWs. RL has been found to be quite accurate for localised fire support as also the Bn Mortar Platoon.

IMO you are out fishing and I refuse to further take your bait. You know exactly what I mean .... but being your enigmatic self as usual ........

 

[blain2]

Jeep mounted RLs are also in use. A problem that I see with the above assessment (while appreciating the point about the care that needs to be taken in the execution of CI operations) is that you compare IA's operations in Kashmir to those that are being conducted by the PA in FATA and Swat and then you suggest operations to be conducted as they were done so by the IA. There is a very big difference in the two because of the vast expanse of land and the very mountainous terrain in both of the locations inside of Pakistan.

Also you are not the first Indian who has pointed this issue of why PA is using tanks and air support as if IA would not have. They did not in Kashmir because the terrain did not allow them to do so. Every single time the IA got into a firefight, it was with groups no larger than 50 or so combatants (this number is also on the high side). These were essentially quite a few low-scale encounters either in remote jungles or in built up areas. This situation in Swat is nothing like your engagements. Here the oppforce numbers in the many hundreds or thousands and they have essentially taken over the entire towns leading to the townsfolk being forced to leave.

Sending only infantry in there without softening up militant positions first is pretty much a non-starter since the valleys and the terrain eat up men just due to the shear size of the area and is a perfect terrain to overwhelm even battalion sized forces due to the protection afforded to the militants and also the large number of armed men on the other side.

Armour is being employed because unlike most remote areas in FATA, Swat affords decent roads and terrain over which tanks can traverse and provide support to troops on the move. Most of the towns etc. that have been taken over by militants allow 4x4 transport and this is the preferred method of movement for these elements thus armour employment does not pose as big a challenge.

 

[Hellfire]

blain2


A problem that I see with the above assessment (while appreciating the point about the care that needs to be taken in the execution of CI operations) is that you compare IA's operations in Kashmir to those that are being conducted by the PA in FATA and Swat and then you suggest operations to be conducted as they were done so by the IA.

The intention is not to compare and suggest a policy as followed by IA. I can quote US policy in Afghanistan which relies in similar terms as PA on air/armor/arty assets. And you can see what I am drawing your attention to.

US has made the same fundamental mistake in the first place by relying on support weapons to cover up for smaller number of pers inserted into area of operations, as a result, the overwhelming fire which is needed to suppress the insurgents, has been in form of heavy claiber weapons, which are very difficult to adequatley adjust to minimise casualties. Result is there for you to see.


There is a very big difference in the two because of the vast expanse of land and the very mountainous terrain in both of the locations inside of Pakistan.

While the contention may hold true to a certain extent in valley, the same is not so in Kupwara, Gurez, Pehelgam and other areas which are equally mountainous

Also you are not the first Indian who has pointed this issue of why PA is using tanks and air support as if IA would not have. They did not in Kashmir because the terrain did not allow them to do so.

We utilise ICVs in ROP roles. But have desisted from using them as fire support in urban areas.




Sending only infantry in there without softening up militant positions first is pretty much a non-starter since the valleys and the terrain eat up men just due to the shear size of the area and is a perfect terrain to overwhelm even battalion sized forces due to the protection afforded to the militants and also the large number of armed men on the other side.

I agree that is why have said you need to infuse more troops, not cover up for the inadequacy by employment of heavier weaponry.

Armour is being employed because unlike most remote areas in FATA, Swat affords decent roads and terrain over which tanks can traverse and provide support to troops on the move. Most of the towns etc. that have been taken over by militants allow 4x4 transport and this is the preferred method of movement for these elements thus armour employment does not pose as big a challenge.

Your contentions are rational enough. Valley is tankable country too. The area from Srinagar to Anantnag and above is falt and relatively smooth, as such adequate space is there for armour to be employed. I have no queries about the tactical soundness of the approach in linear fields at all.

But the points which really have rendered me confused are:

1. PA contention of not being seen as proxy of US - IMO by following a heavy handed approach and asking the local populance to vacate, you have created a situation which may be taken as being at war, and waging war on people who are primarily your own citizens thus further reinforcing this misconception which shall be thoroughly exploited by Talibs. IMO you have played right into their hands. An approach based on minimal firepower employed would have been more conducive. It would have allowed you to treat the problem as simply a law and order and not as war and as such you would not have had to force people from their homes rendering them refugees. That means you would have had to infuse greater number of troops in the first place, I agree.

2. Cost of operations must be reasonable due to scarcity of resources. Again the approach negates this position. employment of forces in conventional grid will lead to extensive damage to properties and infrastructure. As such your post-war construction costs will be very high. In addition, the economic condition in the area, you may agree, is not optimal. Thus any private property which is destroyed will only add fuel to fire. It will promote a feeling of resentment amongst the local populance who will return eventually. And that resentment will be directed against the GoP and PA and NOT Talibs (for the latter couldnt care less and also now PA is seen as waging war on fellow citizens)

3. The impact of the above 2 points will be seen subsequently. While you will win this round, the Talibs will shift their focus to more dispersed mode of operations, thus blending into local populance once they return and forcing a war of attrition on you. As such your present actions will have largely inflamed a local population against you and there just maybe, and I say maybe, greater sympathy for Talibs now.

Blain2

Have quoted IA as we have learnt the hard way. The approach you have adopted now, this is what we did in late 80s and early 90s much to our misfortune. The results were seen immediately when the support for insurgents was maximum in early 90s. A radical shift in our approach saw it at minimal in 97-98. That is all

Your contentions I repeat are sound in conventional set up. Not CI.Its contradictory to your reasons for not inducting more troops.

Thanks.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

1. dynamic and fluid nature of the engagement area

For us non-military folks, what sort of dynamism and fluidity are you talking about?

For example, if PA/FC troops engage the enemy, calling in Air or artillery strikes (provided risk to non-combatants was low) relatively quickly would not necessarily allow the enemy to relocate quickly enough to render strikes ineffective.

Similarly, if recon indicates bases, camps, fortified defensive positions or static groups of militants (resting, guarding, refueling whatever), a shifting of the situation before artillery strikes are called in may not be possible.

So there is only so much 'fluidity and dynamism' that can be mustered, and if used judiciously, air and artillery strikes have an important role to play I would think.

2. urban area with significant local populance in loc.

Significant urban population does limit air and artillery strikes, but the PA/PAF haven't gone that route. In Buner, the PA/FC is still fighting for the town where the Taliban are using an estimated 2000 residents as human shields, and the fighting in Mingora in Swat has been similarly slow, to avoid collateral damage.

If air strikes or artillery were not being employed appropriately, the PA/PAF would have leveled the Pir Baba area in Buner by now.

 

[EyelessInGaza]

Hellfire, I don't know your area of expertise, and do not wish to either, but this is from my amateur's perspective, a quite high standard of debating.

However, while massive use of force in a civilian terrain is always debatable (unless you're nuking the whole damn shebang a la Nagasaki etc), this time around the PA is using force in their own territory, as opposed to the US in Afghanistan. The overwhelming firepower solution, if followed by a more permanent army presence, coupled with effective civilian administration, may prove to be a better solution than the PA adopting a lower profile approach that results in perpetual insurgency.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

hellfire:

I agree that is why have said you need to infuse more troops, not cover up for the inadequacy by employment of heavier weaponry.

India has what, upwards of 600,000 military and paramilitary troops in Kashmir. Extrapolating form that, the numbers required for Swat and FATA would be astronomical and unfeasible.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

2. Cost of operations must be reasonable due to scarcity of resources. Again the approach negates this position. employment of forces in conventional grid will lead to extensive damage to properties and infrastructure. As such your post-war construction costs will be very high. In addition, the economic condition in the area, you may agree, is not optimal. Thus any private property which is destroyed will only add fuel to fire. It will promote a feeling of resentment amongst the local populance who will return eventually. And that resentment will be directed against the GoP and PA and NOT Talibs (for the latter couldnt care less and also now PA is seen as waging war on fellow citizens)

I agree with your overall argument here.

However, assuming majority of residents have evacuated, going 'slow' would seem to imply that your refugee population is in refugee status for a much longer time. That longer duration then imposes significant additional costs in terms of taking care of the refugees along with the costs of an extended military operation. Then there are indirect social costs of a displaced population in refugee camps, health issues etc.

Applying overwhelming force where necessary may cause greater damage to property and increased reconstruction costs later, but if it allows for a significantly quicker military victory, the amount of time the IDP's spend in refugee camps can be much smaller and they can be moved back to their land and be made a part of reconstruction activities.

Its a tough call either way it seems.

The approach you have adopted now, this is what we did in late 80s and early 90s much to our misfortune. The results were seen immediately when the support for insurgents was maximum in early 90s.

I would argue that the situation the IA faced in that period where you shifted your approach resembled the situation seen recently in the areas around Peshawar, and not the badlands of Bajaur, Waziristan or today's Swat.

 

[Hellfire]

AgNoStIc MuSliM


For us non-military folks, what sort of dynamism and fluidity are you talking about?

Sorry. I mean that in a conventional war where you are fighting an invading/occupying force, parameters pertaining to own citizen casualties and collateral damage are accepted by the citizens in lieu of operations being executed to eliminate/eject the common enemy. But in a classic CI grid, the problem is different. Over here you have a large number of Pakistani nationals who are members of TTP and who are fighting you. They are in majority of cases from local areas (the bulk is afterall made up now by volunteers from FATA populance). As such the variables which come into play ie change of situation minute on minute in terms of localisation of any insurgent(s), civillian population, own forces etc etc, the determinants which are involved in the particular phase of operation, are continuously changing and hence there is fluidity as there can be no static environment created. So the own citizen casualty rate is NOT acceptable beyond a certain point as it shall only inflame the situation. Fluidity is determined by the changing scenarios on minute to minute in any ongoing operations, dynamism involves the various forces which are interacting (be it civillian or military or whatever)

For example, if PA/FC troops engage the enemy, calling in Air or artillery strikes (provided risk to non-combatants was low) relatively quickly would not necessarily allow the enemy to relocate quickly enough to render strikes ineffective.

Holds true in conventional sense, but suicidal approach in CI where you are trying to limit casualties. There is ALWAYS a time delay in requesting a fire mission and execution of the same. The same can be held valid in open area where the Talibs may be in conventional format, but NOT in urban where you have to operate under the conditions you have yourself highlighted.

Similarly, if recon indicates bases, camps, fortified defensive positions or static groups of militants (resting, guarding, refueling whatever), a shifting of the situation before artillery strikes are called in may not be possible.

Trus. But insurgency does not depend upon static operations. And if the insurgent is static, he is a fool.

So there is only so much 'fluidity and dynamism' that can be mustered, and if used judiciously, air and artillery strikes have an important role to play I would think.

role is there as long as you have conventionalism in a particular phase. I agree

 

[Hellfire]

hellfire:


India has what, upwards of 600,000 military and paramilitary troops in Kashmir. Extrapolating form that, the numbers required for Swat and FATA would be astronomical and unfeasible.

AM

Granted you can not match the levels we can employ, but your present force structure is woefully inadequate. You will face a blended insurgent soon, be rest assured. As such whatever gains you make now, need to be consolidated. And that means infusing more troops. IMO 200000 should suffice.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

AgNoStIc MuSliM


For us non-military folks, what sort of dynamism and fluidity are you talking about?

Sorry. I mean that in a conventional war where you are fighting an invading/occupying force, parameters pertaining to own citizen casualties and collateral damage are accepted by the citizens in lieu of operations being executed to eliminate/eject the common enemy. But in a classic CI grid, the problem is different. Over here you have a large number of Pakistani nationals who are members of TTP and who are fighting you. They are in majority of cases from local areas (the bulk is afterall made up now by volunteers from FATA populance). As such the variables which come into play ie change of situation minute on minute in terms of localisation of any insurgent(s), civillian population, own forces etc etc, the determinants which are involved in the particular phase of operation, are continuously changing and hence there is fluidity as there can be no static environment created. So the own citizen casualty rate is NOT acceptable beyond a certain point as it shall only inflame the situation. Fluidity is determined by the changing scenarios on minute to minute in any ongoing operations, dynamism involves the various forces which are interacting (be it civillian or military or whatever)

For example, if PA/FC troops engage the enemy, calling in Air or artillery strikes (provided risk to non-combatants was low) relatively quickly would not necessarily allow the enemy to relocate quickly enough to render strikes ineffective.

Holds true in conventional sense, but suicidal approach in CI where you are trying to limit casualties. There is ALWAYS a time delay in requesting a fire mission and execution of the same. The same can be held valid in open area where the Talibs may be in conventional format, but NOT in urban where you have to operate under the conditions you have yourself highlighted.

Similarly, if recon indicates bases, camps, fortified defensive positions or static groups of militants (resting, guarding, refueling whatever), a shifting of the situation before artillery strikes are called in may not be possible.

Trus. But insurgency does not depend upon static operations. And if the insurgent is static, he is a fool.

So there is only so much 'fluidity and dynamism' that can be mustered, and if used judiciously, air and artillery strikes have an important role to play I would think.

role is there as long as you have conventionalism in a particular phase. I agree

Ahh - I think you may have hit upon the issue that is causing a divergence in views.

I woudl argue that, as in Bajaur, the TTP-S are trying to fight a conventional/guerrilla battle.

While employing hit and run tactics, the Taliban are also trying static defenses and large conventional assaults. In Bajaur for example, towns like Loisam were turned into fortresses. Houses were fortified, had bunkers, tunnels led from the house to house and to dry river beds and other bunkers. Sniper nests, and ambush traps around the town. For whatever reason, the Taliban actually tried to hold ground, and hence the 1500+ dead, and the necessity to level much of Loisam.

I think the initial phase here is going to be more of a 'conventional infantry battle'. But I agree with you that these numbers may prove inadequate later on, when the insurgents melt away realizing they cannot hold ground.

 

[Hellfire]

AgNoStIc MuSliM


However, assuming majority of residents have evacuated, going 'slow' would seem to imply that your refugee population is in refugee status for a much longer time. That longer duration then imposes significant additional costs in terms of taking care of the refugees along with the costs of an extended military operation. Then there are indirect social costs of a displaced population in refugee camps, health issues etc.

Your contentions are sound and true and can not be ignored. However the aim was to highlight the redundancy of heavy handedness where in you could have let the population be in place and approached in a more deliberate and careful manner, ensuring peace being enforced in the area with adequate force levels. This would have made Talibs look like nothing more than band of dacoits and miscreants, a significant psychological victory as then the local population would have felt PA as a protective force and not disruptive.

Applying overwhelming force where necessary may cause greater damage to property and increased reconstruction costs later, but if it allows for a significantly quicker military victory, the amount of time the IDP's spend in refugee camps can be much smaller and they can be moved back to their land and be made a part of reconstruction activities.

A desirable scenario which I may go onto applaud (and I hope so) later on. But that is only possible if Talibs accept a defeat and do not go for further nonlinear escalation ... ie operating in small groups like we have groups in Kashmir and perpetuating the conflict further, then the economic cost would have been too high for something that was always on - the reorientation of Talibs from direct confrontation to operating in small numbers and in specificity. That shall enable them to enhance their influence through terror on local population. And this time round the situation will be that the local population will have faced displacement and damage to properties, continued economic hardships with no end in sight to the misery being imposed by Talibs and security forces both.

Its a tough call either way it seems.

Truly said!



I would argue that the situation the IA faced in that period where you shifted your approach resembled the situation seen recently in the areas around Peshawar, and not the badlands of Bajaur, Waziristan or today's Swat.

Question of time as the Talibs wise up. They too study doctrines and history of war

 

[Hellfire]

Ahh - I think you may have hit upon the issue that is causing a divergence in views.

I woudl argue that, as in Bajaur, the TTP-S are trying to fight a conventional/guerrilla battle.

While employing hit and run tactics, the Taliban are also trying static defenses and large conventional assaults. In Bajaur for example, towns like Loisam were turned into fortresses. Houses were fortified, had bunkers, tunnels led from the house to house and to dry river beds and other bunkers. Sniper nests, and ambush traps around the town. For whatever reason, the Taliban actually tried to hold ground, and hence the 1500+ dead, and the necessity to level much of Loisam.

I think the initial phase here is going to be more of a 'conventional infantry battle'. But I agree with you that these numbers may prove inadequate later on, when the insurgents melt away realizing they cannot hold ground.

yes

finally we get onto convergence

that is why have been persistent in asking further infusion of troops, so that you consolidate the gains made now. the operations should be complete and force them before they adopt

Clausewitz aptly said: "Never engage an enemy for too long, for then it adopts to your strategy and tactics and bogs you down" or something to that .......

 

[blain2]

blain2


A problem that I see with the above assessment (while appreciating the point about the care that needs to be taken in the execution of CI operations) is that you compare IA's operations in Kashmir to those that are being conducted by the PA in FATA and Swat and then you suggest operations to be conducted as they were done so by the IA.

The intention is not to compare and suggest a policy as followed by IA. I can quote US policy in Afghanistan which relies in similar terms as PA on air/armor/arty assets. And you can see what I am drawing your attention to.

US has made the same fundamental mistake in the first place by relying on support weapons to cover up for smaller number of pers inserted into area of operations, as a result, the overwhelming fire which is needed to suppress the insurgents, has been in form of heavy claiber weapons, which are very difficult to adequatley adjust to minimise casualties. Result is there for you to see.

Comparing the US vs. Pakistan is wrong in many ways. First of all, Pakistani troops are right in the middle of Swat. There are smaller formations based in and around many towns of Swat. So we are not sitting outside and conducting an air/artillery campaign only. The primary reason that PA has lost quite a few men is because we are putting our troops in the middle of the population. Most of the casualties are being taken when convoys are on the move inside of these areas and as a result you also hear about civilians getting caught in these attacks. So our approach is very much different from that remote sort of an approach which you are attributing to us.


There is a very big difference in the two because of the vast expanse of land and the very mountainous terrain in both of the locations inside of Pakistan.

While the contention may hold true to a certain extent in valley, the same is not so in Kupwara, Gurez, Pehelgam and other areas which are equally mountainous

Ok even if the terrain is similar, what types of targets are you going after there? Certainly nothing bigger than a dozen or two militants hiding in a particular locations mostly armed with AKs and RPGs. These guys are using 12.7mm deployed in well dug out positions (from what has been seen, their dug into the ground positions run across for extended distances) and also some AAA which they are using in direct fire mode. Try sending up infantry against such defences. The magnitude of resistance here is up by quite a few notches compared to what you folks have ever encountered in Kashmir. You have to grant that.


Also you are not the first Indian who has pointed this issue of why PA is using tanks and air support as if IA would not have. They did not in Kashmir because the terrain did not allow them to do so.

We utilise ICVs in ROP roles. But have desisted from using them as fire support in urban areas.

Again that was either because the terrain did not allow or the opposition was not of the type which required employment of anything greater than Carl Gustavs. In FATA/Swat, these tribals fight each other with weaponry that exceeds calibers of anything that your troops have come across in Kashmir. I can think of a few other campaigns that may be similar to what we are having to face in FATA and SWAT before I consider IA ops in Kashmir.

I agree that is why have said you need to infuse more troops, not cover up for the inadequacy by employment of heavier weaponry.

But why is the assumption being made that more troops are not going in? We did the same in Loi Sam. Attack helis went in first, followed by troops and armour. Eventually it was the troops on the ground who had to fight from village to village to regain the ground and they did it successfully.

Armour is being employed because unlike most remote areas in FATA, Swat affords decent roads and terrain over which tanks can traverse and provide support to troops on the move. Most of the towns etc. that have been taken over by militants allow 4x4 transport and this is the preferred method of movement for these elements thus armour employment does not pose as big a challenge.

Your contentions are rational enough. I have no queries about the tactical soundness of the approach in linear fields at all.

But the points which really have rendered me confused are:

1. PA contention of not being seen as proxy of US - IMO by following a heavy handed approach and asking the local populance to vacate, you have created a situation which may be taken as being at war, and waging war on people who are primarily your own citizens thus further reinforcing this misconception which shall be thoroughly exploited by Talibs. IMO you have played right into their hands. An approach based on minimal firepower employed would have been more conducive. It would have allowed you to treat the problem as simply a law and order and not as war and as such you would not have had to force people from their homes rendering them refugees. That means you would have had to infuse greater number of troops in the first place, I agree.

While I cannot deny that there may well be sympathy for the Taliban in the minds of some, the difference here is that the vast majority of the population in Swat wants to see this issue resolved over a shorter period of time than have a long campaign which keeps them away from their homes. For Pakistan this is picking between a bad situation and a worse one from the standpoint of the need to conduct these operations while also being mindful of how such operations may come across to many civilians in the area. I am sure the issue of excessive firepower and its impact on the populace is not lost on the local commanders.

2. Cost of operations must be reasonable due to scarcity of resources. Again the approach negates this position. employment of forces in conventional grid will lead to extensive damage to properties and infrastructure. As such your post-war construction costs will be very high. In addition, the economic condition in the area, you may agree, is not optimal. Thus any private property which is destroyed will only add fuel to fire. It will promote a feeling of resentment amongst the local populance who will return eventually. And that resentment will be directed against the GoP and PA and NOT Talibs (for the latter couldnt care less and also now PA is seen as waging war on fellow citizens)

As I said, claiming that none of the above will happen would be unrealistic, however given how the operations in Loi Sam were handled and how the population has been allowed to rehabilitate after consolidating control over that area gives an indication that people of Swat have considerable problems with having to live under the yolk of Taliban and would prefer rebuilding and rehabilitation once the Taliban are pushed back. The costs of re-construction will remain, however at this point the operation will go in hot and heavy and may eventually slow down keeping in mind the loss of life and property to the civilians.

3. The impact of the above 2 points will be seen subsequently. While you will win this round, the Talibs will shift their focus to more dispersed mode of operations, thus blending into local populance once they return and forcing a war of attrition on you. As such your present actions will have largely inflamed a local population against you and there just maybe, and I say maybe, greater sympathy for Talibs now.

They will not shift their focus post this round, they already do that and have been doing it all the time. Its Taliban by night and Pashtun by day unfortunately and this is something that we are mindful of. as such I, for one, am under no disillusion that the Taliban can be defeated completely this way or eliminated. They cannot. At best, their control in Swat can be negated and I believe this is the success criteria for the Army. They will fall back to FATA after being pushed back.

Blain2

Have quoted IA as we have learnt the hard way. The approach you have adopted now, this is what we did in late 80s and early 90s much to our misfortune. The results were seen immediately when the support for insurgents was maximum in early 90s. A radical shift in our approach saw it at minimal in 97-98. That is all

While definitely worthwhile to look into, I believe the threat you faced was of a different type and could be compared to what we have seen in Balochistan potentially. I guess we will have to see how these operations proceed.

 

[S-2]

"I can quote US policy in Afghanistan which relies in similar terms as PA on air/armor/arty assets. And you can see what I am drawing your attention to."

Do so, please. Make sure it references policy developed specifically for Afghanistan. As a former fire support coordinator, I'll look forward to this updating. Professional edification, don't you know?

"US has made the same fundamental mistake in the first place by relying on support weapons to cover up for smaller number of pers inserted into area of operations..."

This is a gross generalization that's unsupported and contains a straw-man. You assume that large numbers of personnel are the answer ad absolutum.

Ain't so. There are very recent battlefields that will chew the finest troops to hamburger in the space of minutes. Absent hardware, the more troops you bring to the fight, the more who'll die.

Sorry. Better be ready to use what's in your bag. Any light infantryman will tell you that his bestest buddy is the F.O., CAS, and tank-fire when he can get it.

You must think these guys are fighting a "police action" or else you just don't face sh!t in Kashmir any longer.

You move an infantry company in Helmand or the Korengal valley without air, artillery, or resupply, you will die just as you absolutely should upon the unforgiving shoulders of the gods of war.

It'll be the same in SWAT. If those dudes want it bad enough, there'll be a fight. The militants have had plenty of time to prepare. We saw that in Loe Sam. Maybe you forgot or maybe your vaunted army could have just overwhelmed them in numbers.

I'll look forward to that "U.S. policy".

Thanks.

 

[S-2]

Lot of gibberish from you on that artillery spat.

Metro flies every two hours or as conditions dictate. Updating that data in an FDC is a snap. Digital burst right into the AFATDS computer. Good muzzle velocity data from the guns and all other non-standard conditions accounted, first round fire-for-effect.

That's the standard. No registration unless absolutely essential. It shouldn't be so long as metro flies and communicates.

Radar operates fine in the mountains with good recon. Not what they can see but where they can go and be secured.

Reverse slopes are nothing for radar nor eyeballs. Nor engaging targets. High angle fire with a gunner's quadrant and you can be deadly accurate with HE/PD-even with dense contour lines/slope.