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Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

The army in Bahrain

Monday, June 01, 2009
Bahrain is a scenic town in upper Swat generally known as Swat Kohistan. Swat Kohistan comprises the narrow valley beyond Madyan, another scenic town in upper Swat. Bahrain is the main business hub of the adjacent villages with a collective population of over 90,000. The people of Swat Kohistan are ethnically distinct from the rest of Swat. The people of Bahrain speak Torwali while the people of Kalam have their own language called Gawri. The people of both the communities have their own culture as well. The whole valley beyond Madyan is the most visited tourist resort with its tributary valleys such as Daral, Jabba, Ushu and Utrot.

On May 28 the Pakistan army entered Bahrain and was greeted by the local people who came forward with white flags and kept on chanting “Pak Fauj Zindabad’. This is unique in that something like this has happened for the first time in the whole of the troubled Swat valley. It was also unique as Bahrain had been under the control of the Taliban since the beginning of April. When the brave soldiers of the Pakistan army saw this scene they also became emotional and began chanting slogans in favour of the army and the people. The people were so happy at this spectacle of the state forces that they happily carried the ammunition, guns and other luggage of the soldiers to their positions. Even a big gun was carried by 20 local people to a small hilltop above the main town of Bahrain. This was a pleasant surprise for the army as they thought that the people would despise them because, they say, they have gone through such experiences in some parts of the tortured valley.

The people and the soldiers later mixed with each other and exchanged stories. The soldiers then flocked to the shops in order to get the SIM cards of the sole functional cell phone provider. Those who are still in Bahrain told me that initially a curfew was imposed but seeing the enthusiasm and warmth of the people it was lifted after two hours. The locals have even tried to invite the soldiers for dinner despite the fact that food is still short in the whole area. In the wake of this, the army has abandoned shelling of the area and whenever they shell the nearby hills they inform the people before. The people are so jubilant that they have now forgotten about the food crisis and really regard the army as true saviours. This change is important because initially in the previous phases of the military operation — carried out last year and the year before that — the people were most disheartened by what they saw the army’s ambiguity regarding the Taliban militants. And it is in that context that what has happened in Bahrain must be replicated in the whole valley. The war against the militants can only be won by winning the hearts and minds of the local population — and this has been done in Bahrain.


And this will be done only if the armed forces realise that their only real assets are the people of Pakistan and not those who have till now been regarded as ‘assets’ against India or Afghanistan. The real threat for Pakistan is from the enemies within. Of course, there is one major flaw with the current operation and that is of intelligence — proved by the fact that no one among the top leadership of the Swat Taliban have yet been arrested or killed. The people of Pakistan pay for a regular well-equipped and trained army and therefore they are justified in demanding that the said force carry out its constitutional responsibility to protect them from all enemies — from within or without.

Zubair Torwali

From Bahrain and now in Islamabad
 
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Friends - the main battle has not begun - the army and FC have so far fought with vigour and determination and the mortal enemy has escaped to the hills to fight another day - that fight will take place in the waziristan/bajaur border areas!

Sir,

Does it mean that we will chase them accross the border into Afghan territory? Is there any kind of agreement with Kabul and USA/Nato forces there?
 
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Swat diary: 'We fled our village'

Munir (not his real name), an administrator in the Swat region of Pakistan, describes fierce battles as the army wrests control of his valley from the Taliban. He and his family fled their village near Mingora in early May, and have since left Swat altogether.

This time the Pakistani army means business, their operation against the Taliban militants is real. The army imposed a curfew in Swat on 4 May and army helicopters shelled our village for the next two days. One shell landed just 20 yards [metres] away from us.

In my village they killed eight militants. My brother and nephew saw the bodies. Many innocent people in the area have also been killed, but the majority of dead are militants.

When the fighting began, the army took control of the roads, so the militants were moving about using fields and rivers.

It has all been so violent. Friends in a nearby village saw the bloody remains of a house where Taliban militants had been preparing a bomb. It blew up, killing everyone in the room.

Escape

There is no one left in my village, they all fled on 6 May. We left the next day for the nearby village of Kabal.

We stayed there for three weeks. There was no electricity, not much gas, and little food, but it was relatively safe. More than 200 extra people had gathered there.

A few days later, some Taliban militants from our village started arriving in Kabal too. Some of them had shaved their beards off! I recognised one of the local Taliban commanders who had trimmed his beard. I saw fear on his face!

When we got the chance to leave Kabal, we did. We left last Tuesday. It was risky because we heard the army was firing on vehicles driving during the curfew.

We later heard that a few hours after we left, the army started shelling Kabal. A brother-in-law and nephew of mine who stayed behind were seriously wounded and they are now in hospital in Peshawar.

We drove over mountains to leave Swat valley and we are now staying with relatives on the outskirts of Mardan - all 11 of us.

We have postponed my wedding, I don't think it can happen this year. Right now we are just looking for a house to live in.

We are all missing our home in Swat very much, especially my parents.



BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Swat diary: 'We fled our village'
 
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Sir,

Does it mean that we will chase them accross the border into Afghan territory? Is there any kind of agreement with Kabul and USA/Nato forces there?

I am not aware of any "deal or agreement" but IMO I dont expect the PA to chase these barbarians across the border - let NATO/ISAF/US deal with it when it happens!

They are going to get "Pounded" make no mistake about it!
 
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I am not aware of any "deal or agreement" but IMO I dont expect the PA to chase these barbarians across the border - let NATO/ISAF/US deal with it when it happens!

They are going to get "Pounded" make no mistake about it!

NATO/ISAF/US cant delt them in last of 8 years , how come they this , time?:azn:;)
i guss, its the best time , that pakarmy go for the kill , even its out of our ranges,the term what US dscribes as PREMPTIVE strike/.:pakistan:;):tup::angry:
 
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Army wins key battle but a difficult battle looms on the horizon.

The Pakistan Army has taken the key city of Mingora with surprising ease, as the majority of the militants have fled to the hills to live and fight another day.

The army’s military campaign which started nearly four weeks ago (and continues) is a well planned and well co-coordinated operation which has taken full advantage of the land and air assets available to it like SOFs, armour and long-range artillery, aviation helicopter gun ships and the Pakistan Air Force fighters for CAS.

The army and the FC, in the words of one commentator “are fighting with great élan, a war that has to be won – the Battle for Pakistan”. It is even more surprising that an army trained and tooled to fight a conventional war has adapted it self to fight a counter-insurgency which requires overrunning militant camps and hideouts located on the top of hills (Peochar),conducting search and clear operations in towns and villages, and urban warfare (house-to-house fighting esp. in Mingora). This speaks volumes about the Leadership of the Pakistan Army led by the soft-spoken but carry-a-big stick General Kiyani, and the DG of the FC, Maj-General Tariq Khan who has turned the FC into a fighting force to be reckoned with. Having said that a lot of hard work lies ahead.

The vigor and determination of the officers and jawans of the army can be gauged from the sacrifices and acts of heroism these brave soldiers are displaying on a daily basis. The sacrifice of the SSG men who overcame their captors before they were killed by the enemy in a cowardly fashion, the heroism of Major Abid Majeed, who put his life in the line-of-fire to rescue his injured jawans and so on. We are witnessing on our TV sets on a daily basis the burial of these brave souls who have made the ultimate sacrifice, so that we can sleep in comfort knowing that these “men are on the wall” defending the soul of Pakistan.

We can only be proud of our men and women in uniform!

The army is in the process of clearing the districts of Buner, Shangla, Upper & Lowe Dir and finally the main prize of this military operation, Swat valley with the liberation of Mingora. Mopping up operations is in progress to ensure that these areas are cleared and safe for the IDPs to return to their homes. Main roads are now in complete control of the army and FC and the enemy has been denied access. Pickets and check-posts are being set-up at all strategic locations with the objective of clear & hold.

The enemy has suffered heavily in comparison to the army. Their camps and hideouts have been overrun and destroyed with the help of the army aviation’s deadly cobra helicopter gun-ships and the use of PGMs (Precision guided munitions) by aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force with deadly results.

Make no mistake, the enemy is on the run but has not been defeated completely. More than likely they have escaped to the safer confines of Bajaur and N/S Waziristan. There the dreaded TTP leader waits in his liar with his 15,000 strong hard-core militants. There are reports that he is the source of supply of weapons, food and fuel for the militants who having been forced out from their camps and hideouts, are conducting hit & run tactics against army and relief convoys, check-posts and FOBs and will continue to do so till the enemy is completely defeated.

There is a thinking developing in the media that since the news of the operation in Waziristan has been leaked, the army may not undertake this operation anytime soon. If this is true then this will be a huge mistake on the part of the political and military leadership. A lot of hard work which has resulted in denial of “space to operate” in Swat and its adjoining districts will go to waste, not to mention the sacrifices made by our “Shaheeds” and “Ghazis”.

This war needs to be taken to its final conclusion which is Deter, Demoralize and Defeat the enemy especially the TTP which is now the biggest threat to Pakistan, its people and its armed forces. The military operations in Bajaur / N&S Waziristan are going to be much more difficult as the enemy will not give the army the luxury of fighting this battle on the army’s terms and conditions. Real COIN will happen here. The PAF will have to play a much larger role in this operation to destroy the enemy’s camps and hideouts. The militants would need to be flushed out from their mountain hideouts to the plains below so that the army can finish them off.

It is crystal clear, that the armed forces of our country are fully capable to defeat this enemy and the political leadership must give “Clear cut signal” to the military commanders to defeat this enemy at all costs.

God Bless Pakistan, its People and its Armed Forces!
Pakistan Zindabad!
 
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Have the Swat Taliban been routed?

Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Rahimullah Yusufzai

As expected, the armed forces have regained control of most of Buner and Lower Dir districts. In the Swat valley, the Taliban fighters were outflanked and forced to flee the principal town, Mingora, and other important population centres such as Matta, Khwazakhela, Bahrain, Kalam and Charbagh. The thin presence of the militants in Shangla and Upper Dir don't pose a major threat and could be contained.

There was no way the 4,000-5,000 Taliban militants could have stood up to the far numerous, better-equipped and aerially-supported Pakistan Army troops. Taliban commanders knew their fighters would be decimated if they attempted to take the heavily-armed soldiers head-on. Their best chance was to wage guerilla warfare, supplementing their hit-and-run tactics by sending suicide bombers and planting roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to disrupt the military convoys, slow down the advancing troops and demoralize the men in uniform. Though the Taliban did detonate some IEDs and ambush a few army convoys, including the one at Landaki where the limits of Malakand Agency ends and Swat district begins, they were unable to cause any significant harm to the troops.

But their singularly biggest failure until now has been the absence of the dreaded suicide bomber in the battlefield. The Swati militants, or for that matter their comrades in rest of the Malakand division, never had a steady supply of suicide bombers. There were unconfirmed reports that a network for motivating and training suicide bombers existed in certain Taliban strongholds in Swat, but it appears more likely that majority of the young bombers sent to the valley and other districts of Malakand region weren't locals. Most of them could have come from the training centre of Qari Hussain, a trusted aide to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) head Baitullah Mehsud, in South Waziristan. Known as the "Ustad-i-Fidayeen," or the teacher of suicide bombers, Qari Hussain is often heard boasting that he could motivate a normal person to become a "fidayee" within half an hour. He has been supplying suicide bombers to different chapters of the TTP in the NWFP and also sending them on missions in Islamabad, Lahore and other cities.

The fact that the Swati Taliban were desperate to seek help from Baitullah Mehsud became evident from an intercepted communication in which Muslim Khan, the spokesman for Maulana Fazlullah, reportedly pleaded with his contact person among militants in South Waziristan for using suicide bombers to strike targets in the cities of Punjab. He wanted attacks on army generals and other officers so that they could feel the pain of losing their family members in retaliation for the military action and death and destruction in Swat. Help did eventually come from Baitullah Mehsud in the shape of the suicide bombing targeting police and ISI offices in Lahore and some terrorist strikes in public places in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan. More such attacks could be in the pipeline with the aim to put pressure on the government to call off the military operations, but it is doubtful if Baitullah Mehsud is doing this solely in support of the beleaguered Taliban in Swat, Buner and Dir and not for avenging the latest army action against him in his native South Waziristan. Though one of his commanders, Hakimullah Mehsud, tried to reassure the Swati Taliban by claiming that the Lahore suicide bombing was in retaliation to the military action in Swat, the fact remains that Maulana Fazlullah and his men were expecting greater support from Baitullah Mehsud in their hour of need.

That support didn't materialize and one reason could be the military strategy that was pursued during the crucial stages of the Operation Rah-i-Raast in Malakand division. Under this strategy, a jirga of tribal elders and clerics was sent to Baitullah Mehsud by the political administration of South Waziristan to keep him busy in peace talks. Subsequently, artillery guns were fired to shell his positions in the area populated by the Mehsud tribe to warn him to stop attacking the security forces. It is possible that tribal fighters from Waziristan stopped going to Swat to reinforce the Maulana Fazlullah-led Taliban or those already there started returning home once it became evident that they had a battle at hand in their native South Waziristan. The government also reportedly renewed its peace arrangements with the Maulvi-Nazir led Taliban in Wana in South Waziristan and with Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. This was necessary to prevent Baitullah Mehsud from joining hands and getting help from Maulvi Nazeer and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, two powerful Pakistani Taliban commanders with whom he has had a love-hate relationship. The alliance that the three formed some months ago primarily to fight the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan didn't really take off due to the mistrust that Maulvi Nazeer and Hafiz Gul Bahadur harbour for Baitullah Mehsud. Unlike Baitullah Mehsud, they don't want to fight the Pakistan Army and would like to focus their attention on aiding and abetting the Afghan Taliban.

It seems the Taliban in Swat and Dir got some badly-needed support from the militants in Bajaur. Some top Taliban commanders could even be hiding in Bajaur, or in Lower and Upper Dir. The government tried to neutralize the Bajaur Taliban by taking the tribal jirga to task for its inability to rein in the militants and threatening another military operation in the Mamond area. The security forces appear to have made some headway in disrupting the Taliban supply routes stretching from Waziristan to Kurram, Orakzai and Khyber tribal areas and onwards to Mohmand, Bajaur, Dir and Swat. The military action now underway in Lower Dir district's Maidan and Adenzai tehsils is crucial in this respect. Though the militants are still active in parts of Lower Dir, they no longer enjoy the freedom of movement that they had until April 25 when the military struck against them. The aerial strikes against the Taliban in the neighbouring Upper Dir district's Doog Darra area were a continuation of the policy to deny them sanctuaries and disrupt their links with each other.

The reason the Taliban failed to put up a fight in the twin towns of Mingora and Saidu Sharif was the collapse of their command structure and disruption of their supply lines. The fighters were no longer getting instructions and supplies because their top commanders were on the run. Though the Taliban leadership claimed they abandoned the fight in Mingora to avoid civilian casualties and destruction of the city, the more likely reason for their retreat was an inability to send reinforcements, ammunition and food to the fighters. In fact, the Taliban fighters had fled Mingora days before the troops arrived and, therefore, the house-to-house battle that was feared didn't take place. The same story was repeated in Malam Jabba and Kalam in Swat and in parts of Buner and Lower Dir. The army for the first time airdropped its commandoes in its two-year battle for control of Swat in the Taliban command centre, Peochar, delivering a blow from which the militants couldn't possibly recover, at least for the time-being.

However, no military action could be a complete success story. If one recalls, the army had driven out the Taliban from most of Swat valley in 2007 and 2008 also but the militants subsequently returned and, in fact, gathered further strength. This time around the military operation is bigger and sustained but at times excessive force was used and the bombing by jet-fighters and gunship helicopters and the shelling by long-range artillery guns not only caused civilian deaths and losses to property but also forced an unmanageable number of people to flee their homes and villages. Uprooted villagers have repeatedly complained of being bombed and shelled in places where there are no militants.

The media blackout helped the army to control the flow of information but it also fuelled speculations and rumours and created doubts about the battleground achievements being made by the military authorities. The fact that almost all top Taliban commanders in Swat have avoided capture or death is also raising questions about the effectiveness and success of the military operation. By offering head-money for the 21 leading Swati Taliban commanders, the ANP-led NWFP government in a way conceded that the military action was incomplete and, therefore, public cooperation was needed to nab or kill the wanted militants.

The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar
 
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^^^the professional writers/analyst are agreeing to the assessment of the board here!
 
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Rawalpindi, June 2:

1. Security forces reacting promptly recovered 71 kidnapped cadets and 9 staff members of Razmak Cadet College early this morning at Ghariom, North Waziristan Agency. According to details security forces on receipt of information that coaches of cadets have been hijacked at Khajori, North Waziristan blocked all exit routes. At Ghariom Check post- 20 KMs South West of Razmak, when terrorists were trying to shift, kidnapped cadets to South Waziristan Agency, they were challenged at the Check Post. An encounter took place in which terrorists fled from the area leaving behind kidnapped personnel. All recovered cadets including staff have been shifted to Bannu by Army helicopters.

2. Meanwhile, in last 24 hours, 21 miscreants-terrorists were killed and 18 apprehended in various areas of Swat. Whereas, 3 soldiers embraced shahadat and 6 soldiers were injured.

3. Mingora-Charbagh
a. Security forces are conducting operation in Charbagh. Security forces cleared Jangle Tekri and area upto Sara China in Charbagh. Due to stiff resistance, one security forces personnel embraced shahadat while 4 were injured. Security Forces have successfully secured Alam Gunj, Waliabad and Gulibagh (north of Charbagh). 14 miscreants-terrorists were killed and 18 apprehended in Charbagh and Alam Gunj areas.
b. Normalcy is returning in Mingora. Efforts are in hand for restoration of services in the city of Mingora.
c. Own troops commenced operation at Kot and cleared Khairabad, Sarsanai Check Post. 2 terrorists were also killed in exchange of fire.

4. Peochar
a. Security forces carried out search and destroy operation in Mandi Banda area and recovered some Arms and Ammunition.

5. Shangla
a. During exchange of fire between security forces and miscreants, 2 soldiers embraced shahadat and 2 were injured, while 5 miscreant-terrorists were killed.
b. Miscreants-terrorists fired 2 mortar shells at Runial and Dang Arkot Qila resultantly 3 children were injured.

6. Relief and Support Activities by Army
a. In Mingora, Army in coordination with civil administration have so far distributed 22 Trucks load of rations among the stranded people.
b. Army has so far distributed 778 ton of relief and food items among the stranded people and IDPs of Swat.
c. 5 trucks carrying 25 tons of rations despatched for the stranded people of Khawzakhela and 5 trucks for Kalam.

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Cadets of Razmak Cadet College after being rescued by the Security Forces at Bannu Haliport on Tuesday. (02-6-2009) – Photo ISPR

KIT
 
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US paper hails Pakistan army’s successes in Swat and Buner

* Wall Street Journal urges US Congress to pass military, economic aid package
* Says govt should press advantage while Taliban are retreating


NEW YORK: A major American newspaper on Tuesday hailed the Pakistan Army’s successes in clearing Taliban from Swat and Buner and called on the US Congress to do its part and pass the military and economic package for the country.

“Now is the time for Congress to show its support by passing (President Barack) Obama's request for military and economic aid for our allies in Islamabad,” The Wall Street Journal wrote in an editorial. “In symbolic and strategic terms, the fall of Mingora on Saturday marks a potential turning point for Pakistan, and perhaps for the fight against Al Qaeda. Three weeks after launching its counter-offensive against the Taliban, Pakistan's military took back the largest city in the Swat Valley and is now pushing further against insurgents in the unruly tribal regions of that nuclear-armed country,” noted the editorial, A Victory in Pakistan.

Referring to the “peace accord” with the Taliban, the Journal said, “The Taliban got greedy, soon expanding from Swat into the neighbouring Buner district 60 miles from the capital Islamabad, and imposing its brutal form of shariah law. The global alarm bells that followed, particularly in Washington, embarrassed the military and government ... But stories of Taliban beheadings and cell phone images of a public flogging of a teenage girl in Swat brought the insurgency distressingly close to home. So did a spate of suicide bombings in Islamabad and the cultural centre of Lahore by followers of Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud.”

The editorial noted that the success in clearing Buner and Swat showed the military could sustain this sort of campaign. “Too often in the past, Pakistan attacks on the Taliban were brief and half-hearted, and the military soon returned its focus to the eastern border with India. This time, the military didn't rely on aerial bombing and instead put commandos on the ground.”

Press the advantage: Noting the cost of the ongoing operation was high, with casualties on both sides and an estimated three million refugees having fled the frontier regions, the editorial said: “The even better news is that Pakistanis say the army won't stop at Swat. Next should come a push into lawless Waziristan and the other tribal regions that have become terrorist sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and other groups. This will be harder than Swat, because Pakistan's government has never been able to establish its writ over those northwestern frontier regions. But now, with the Taliban retreating, is the time to press the advantage.”

app
 
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Lets see how hard can we press this situation to our advantage. Frankly speaking if arms could be curtailed to taliban and the border could be mined and fenced, the militancy in these areas could be brought to an all time low. However for that the GOP has to take a stand for not buying the international or the afghan pressure about not mining the border. It should be done with haste.
 
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Professional work by PA. Nice steps towards peace and end of terrorism in the region.
 
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This is not the first time a Jihadi mullah has led an uprising in th Swat area. This is a useful comparison of the predecessor "mad mullah" with his current counterpart:

"No one who has read a page of Indian history", declared the imperious Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, Viceroy of India (1899-1905), "will ever prophesy about the [Afghan] frontier". Doubtless Curzon was referring to the uprising on the Afghan frontier which had blown up in 1897. That frontier between present day Pakistan and Afghanistan is as everyone knows largely inhabited by various tribes of Pashtuns (otherwise known as Pathans).

That rugged, mountainous territory had come under the nominal sway of the British empire after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849. To keep the warlike tribes from launching occasional raids into the settled agricultural districts of the plains, the British employed the carrot of cash allowances (read: bribes) to the ruling Pashtun khans and the stick of punitive expeditions when they broke the peace. In the second half of the 19th century there were 62 such armed expeditions into tribal territories — about one every 42 weeks.

Ten expeditions were launched in a single three year period of the 1870s; another burst of six expeditions occurred between 1892 and 1895. The uprisings of 1897 began in the Swat Valley, when Sadullah a local holy man (the British, predictably, dubbed him the 'Mad Mullah') preached the need for jihad against the foreign government in mosques and marketplaces. In late July, at the height of summer heat, tens of thousands of armed Pathans attacked government forts.

After having ignored the trouble building up along the Frontier for several years, the authorities in the summer capital at Simla finally decided that a major response was required. Three full battalions designated as the Malakand Field Force were sent from the plains up into the hills. Accompanying them as both soldier and fee-lance reporter for London's Daily Telegraph was young Second Lieutenant Winston Churchill.

By the end of August, the force had reached the difficult and remote upper reaches of the Swat Valley. But Mullah Sadullah had evaded capture and was now raising followers in a wide area, reaching down to the Kyber Pass well to the south. Storming through the Pass, tribesmen threatened to occupy Peshawar itself — unless government forces were withdrawn from Swat.

Eventually the Raj put an even larger army of 60,000 well-armed men into the field. After bitter fighting with heavy government losses the British undertook a ruthless scorched-earth campaign in which villages, wells and orchards were levelled. The approaching winter more than British might forced the rebellious tribes to sue for peace ...

for the meantime. It is worth pondering whether anything has really changed in 112 years. Is the current uprising in the Swat Valley led by Maulana Fazlullah fundamentally different from that of Mullah Sadullah? Is the Pakistani Army responding, as is frequently claimed, to an 'existential threat', or are the forces currently engaged in bitter fighting in the lower stretches of the Valley just a modern incarnation of the Malakand Field Force, engaged in yet one more punitive expedition to once again put down rebellious tribesmen who have broken the peace? Will the Army, once the rivers freeze in winter, return as did their predecessors to their barracks on the plains? Given the close ties between the Taliban groups and Pakistan's military intelligence organisation, it is not surprising that there is scepticism in and outside of Pakistan as to whether the Army really intends to undertake anything more than a conventional punitive expedition.

That certainly appeared to be the case in 2007 and 2008 when the Pakistani Army tried, apparently without real determination, to stem the influence of the Taliban in Swat, including storming the remote headquarters of Maulana Fazlullah. In February 2009 the Pakistani government agreed to a humiliating agreement with the Taliban under which it would cease military actions in Swat, shariah law would be administered in the entire Malakhand division including Swat, and the Taliban in return would lay down their arms. Of course, the Taliban took this as confirmation of government weakness and extended their operations further south into the adjoining Buner district.

Despite the similarities with the 1890s there is at least one very significant way in which the current crisis differs sharply from those in the past. In 1897 when the Army tried to flush out the militants, they often found deserted villages. Tribesmen, their wives, children and animals had all fled from the Army to seek refuge in the inaccessible hills.

In 2009, the uprising in Swat is not general. Swat is no longer a remote, narrow fertile valley somewhere north of the Malakand Pass. Until the coming of the Taliban it was a favoured holiday destination of Pakistanis and foreigners alike, the 'Switzerland of the East'.

When the Army resumed its fight with the Taliban in May 2009 two million people fled toward, not away from, government controlled areas. It appears that the Army completely underestimated the mammoth scale of the internal migration their actions would cause and undertook little planning to accommodate the refugees. The huge numbers fleeing suddenly from the fighting in Swat has created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Pakistan, one which calls for a swift response from the international community.

The announcement by the US that it will give US$110 million for refugee relief is very welcome news. Australia needs to offer commensurate assistance to international agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF. If we do not respond urgently, the gap may well be filled by Jamaat ud Dawa, the charitable front of Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is already working in some refugee camps.

The scale of the humanitarian crisis and the much wider political objectives of the Taliban on both sides of the border suggest that this time something more than a conventional punitive expedition is required from the Pakistan government. But if there is a full-scale move against groups such as the Taliban in South Waziristan, we should prepare for a refugee tsunami. Read all responses to this article.

Source: Just another punitive expedition? - Analysis
 
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