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Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

One or two Army regiments (Bde might do too), complimented with 2K or so well trained Swat Scouts and the 10K+ police force would be a very good force to keep the elements in check. Overall command should be with a Brigadier.

If you suggest an Army-FC-Police nexus to take control of the area and this would do just right, but when we talk of a dedicated cantonment or some military presence to put it mildly then there has to proper designated area just for the Army, and the FC would automatically fit in. There are areas in Pakistan where these two co-exist, and in this case the flag bearer is FC and a nominal presence of Army is there to supplement it.

In any case if there has to be a permanent military foot print in Swat, the danda thus revealed should be potent and strong enough to take grip of matters as these terrorist thugs have quite some meat over their buttocks!
 
All these operations against unconventional targets like rag tag militia of Taliban. How about a much needed operation against drones? Or simply having GoP to order a stop to drone strikes. Someone is showing selective courage here...
 
7 militants killed in Swat

MINGORA - Security forces killed seven militants when they were trying to enter Swat from Dir here in tehsil Kabal, military sources told on Sunday.

According to military sources, the security forces were on routine patrolling at Dherai area in the outskirts of Mingora on late Saturday night where they noticed some militants. They asked them to stop for identification on which they started firing leaving two security personnel injured.

The security forces retaliated in the same tone and killed all of them on the spot. Weapons including six Kalashnikovs and eight hands grenades were recovered from their possession.

The militants were identified as Dir Alam s/o Namroz, Sherzada s/o Jalandar, Abdur Rahman s/o Bunerai, Saleh Rahman s/o Shams-ul-Qamar, Fazal Tawab s/o Fazal Wahab, Faqir Jan s/o Mian Jan, Shams-ul-Haq s/o Amir Habib.

Reportedly they all escaped from the ongoing operation in Mohmand Agency and were trying to enter Swat through Dir. The security forces took all the dead bodies into their custody and later handed over them to the heirs after identification.
 
Slow government development threatens Swat military

By Rebecca Conway

MINGORA | Fri Apr 15, 2011

MINGORA (Reuters) - Almost two years after Pakistan's army swept through the Swat Valley to drive out a terrifying Taliban regime, the valley's residents fear that slow economic recovery in the area could undo military gains and allow a militant return.

The idyllic tourist haven 133 km (83 miles) northwest of Islamabad is considered a success story in Pakistan's fight against a home-grown insurgency, so any roll-back in the gains because of poor development would be a major setback to Pakistan's weak civilian government.

"If a person is hungry and cannot feed himself and his kids then the risk is there. The government should help us. The Taliban might come back if the army leaves and we don't get help here," said Mohammad Rafique, a 45-year-old villager from Shakardara in the town of Matta.

Any instability in Swat after an army withdrawal would further test a government already battling militant insurgency inside Pakistan, and the threat of militants finding a haven again means Pakistan's value as a partner in the United States' struggle with Islamist militants would be in question.

"If the military had to withdraw and there were no alternative political structures in place ... then yes, that is an environment in which the militants can actually come back," says Kamran Bokhari, Middle East and South Asia Director for global intelligence firm Stratfor.

Those at the helm in Swat, like Colonel Tarique Qadir, admit militant activity persists, citing the lawless Afghan border as no barrier to fighters returning from Afghanistan.

"We have asked those ISAF forces in Afghanistan to watch out for this," he said. Qadir also says any army pullout will be a government decision, and does not know how long the army will stay in Swat.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO-led alliance fighting to crush the Taliban in Afghanistan.

MILITARY PRESENCE

Incursions in the area are still occurring. Recently, Pakistani troops killed seven militants attempting to re-infiltrate into Swat.

And the longer the army stays in Swat, some analysts say, the longer it may have to pull troops from other areas.

"Naturally it locks up troops for a long period of time - those troops could have been used elsewhere, too," said former army general and defense analyst Talat Masood.

Masood said the civilian administration must address social and economic development in Swat, or risk creating the same environment of deprivation that encouraged the area to fall to the Taliban in 2007.

The occupation of Swat is untenable in the long-term, says Bokhari.

"It's not the job of the army to develop the political institutions and the civil institutions required to build or rebuild the area in any counter-insurgency," he said.

But two years after the operation, the civilian administration does not appear ready to take over.

Hotels still house army troops and the military is clearly and visibly supporting the local police force. Tourism and agriculture, Swat's two economic pillars, have been devastated with no clear plan for recovery.

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province Minister for Environment Wajid Ali Khan, from the Awami National Party, which heads the provincial coalition, says there is no militant risk and points to the police as demonstrating the ability of the civil administration to regain control in Swat.

"The situation has improved in Swat and there is complete peace in the area. The security forces have eliminated all no-go areas in Swat and people can go everywhere," he said.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

People here face formidable hurdles as they try to rebuild their homes, businesses and agricultural land they abandoned when they fled Swat as the army moved in.

Landowner Nawab Ali Khan estimates it will take up to seven more years to redevelop land the militants took over after they began extending control in Swat in 2007, and that better job training would boost economic opportunity and insulate against militancy.

He blames slow recovery on government mismanagement, and says a government scheme run by the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PARRSA) to deposit assistance money into personal bank accounts is failing, with many accounts yet to receive deposits.

Government initiatives are not completely lacking, says Adnan Khan, spokesman for the PARRSA, but the red tape involved in determining who is eligible for government compensation from the army operation and last year's floods leads to slow payments and stunted rebuilding.

Adnan Khan says, though, that assistance programs by NGOs and training schemes are helping Swat's residents, and that both the provincial and federal administration are actively working to ensure Swat's redevelopment.

There is still deep dissatisfaction at the economic assistance available, however.

"The money is not being given to the people in a fair way," Nawab Ali Khan says. "About 50 percent of people have not gotten any help."

Stratfor's Bokhari says ultimately, the main problem is a lack of leadership from political parties. Without economic development and political reintegration, public anger with the government will grow over the next six months to a year.

"The operation began in April 2009 and we're now in April 2011," he said. "Two years later and the question is: How long can this military-led effort continue? It's definitely not sustainable in the long run."

(Created by Rebecca Conway; Editing by Chris Allbritton and Sugita Katyal)
 
UPPER DIR: At least 26 militants were killed in Upper Dir in joint operation by the security forces and local tribal militia. - AFP
 
KP asks Afghanistan to take action against terrorists

PESHAWAR, June 04 (APP): The provincial cabinet of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Saturday condemned the terrorist attack in Upper Dir and demanded of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to keep eye on the elements using the soil of Afghanistan for terror activities and take effective measures against such elements.

This was stated by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister for Information, Mian Iftikhar Hussein while briefing media regarding 36th meeting of the provincial cabinet held here at Chief Minister’s Secretariat with Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti in the chair.

The meeting reviewed law and order situation in the province and particularly the attack of terrorists in Dir Upper few days back. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) gave detailed briefing regarding law and order in the province.

The meeting urged the federal government for using diplomatic channels to call explanation from the government of Afghanistan on the incident to remove concern of the province.

He said that under a standard national policy, the provincial government is following a policy of live and let other to live. He said that neither they will allow any one to interference in the affairs of other from our soil and nor will allow other to interfere in our internal affairs.

The provincial minister said that interference in Pakistan from Afghan side in presence of NATO forces has two kinds of explanations that either NATO forces are incompetent or it was occurred on their whim. “In both situations we will not accept interference from the soil of the brotherly country,” he maintained.

He said that the cabinet has termed public support in war against terrorism inevitable and encouraging of the constitution of local lashkars (peace committees) in Chitral, Bajaur and Dir and decided to support such committees through provision of food and weapons to them.

Mian Iftikhar said that in light of the experiences of the Lashkars it decided to include pious, good character and patriots in them and discouraging of the inclusion of the criminals in such forces.

He said that the security of the national frontiers is the responsibility of the armed forces. Therefore, he said the provincial cabinet had demanded the repatriation of the platoons of Frontier Constabulary (FC) from Islamabad to fill the deficiency of the security personnel in the province.

Mian Iftikhar, who is also the official spokesman of the provincial government demanded of the federal government for the approval of the recommendations of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regarding amendments in Anti-Terrorists Act to make it part of the constitution and strengthen our hands against terrorism and take this war against anti-state elements to logic end.

The provincial cabinet, he said has also decided that a grand jirga of the elders of Chitral, Lower and Upper Dir would be convened to prepare proposals and recommendations regarding law and order situation and then evolved a line of action against foreign interference and anti-state elements inside the country.

The provincial cabinet, he said also decided in principle for announcement of relief package for the elders affected by terrorism and in this connection approved a package for the heirs of Shaheed Muzaffar Khan of ANP Matta.

To a query regarding anti-terrorist courts, he said that presently three such courts are functioning in the province, whose number he said should be 30 to 35. He said that in amendments in anti-terrorist act increase in the number of courts has also been recommended.

The approval of the act, he said besides the province will also strengthen the hands of federal government and guarantee speedy trial in the courts.
 
Swat after the Taliban
By Zafar Hilaly
Published: July 13, 2011

As a rule, I only go to places I have never visited before but on this occasion the invitation to Swat was too interesting to pass up because the army had organised a seminar on deradicalisation. Their concern for the psychological well-being of their enemy seemed a rare and intriguing departure from traditional army demeanour and hence I thought it would be well worth a look. After all, awakening sleeping minds and taming obstinate and presumptuous ignorance is always a worthy endeavour. On the whole, I am glad I went because one visit proved to be worth a hundred reports.

In preparation for the visit by the army chief and the prime minister, Swat was teeming with soldiers. Schools had been closed, exams postponed and some shops preferred to stay shut. So pervasive was the military presence that it seemed we were visiting a cantonment.

About the first thing one discovers after talking to the locals and junior members of our forces alike is that the Swat operation was a self-inflicted disaster. It need never have occurred had the Swatis, especially the poor, been treated with a bit of respect and sympathy. If they had been able to obtain prompt and cheap justice; the educational system had functioned with a modicum of proficiency; the poverty alleviation schemes had been undertaken honestly; and the local and provincial administration displayed a mite of efficiency and acted promptly when confronted by Taliban infiltration, many of those killed would have been alive today.

What occurred in Swat deserves to be probed as it raises many questions. Why, for example, were the Taliban allowed to enter these areas unarmed and unimpeded and then ferret in vast quantities of arms under the noses of the local administration? Why were they allowed to occupy dominating heights and passes; to set up an informal military system including training and logistical support centres and to move around with impunity? Why were they indulged to such an extent and their open defiance of the law condoned? Why was the provincial government permitted to enter into agreements with the enemy? Why was the pro-Taliban deputy commissioner of Swat, who grovelled before the Taliban and fawned on their leaders, promoted to the rank of commissioner? How could the Taliban build field hospitals and establish a military headquarters undetected and, if not undetected, then unimpeded in preparation for their war against the state? Why was their stopping and searching of army vehicles tolerated; indeed, where were the law enforcers when homes were looted, women raped and forcibly married off, journalists murdered and innocents slaughtered?

And finally, how could one of the world’s largest standing armies — funded annually by a lion’s share of the federal budget — of a poor economy ever think of succumbing to the dictates of a horde of barbarians who were openly flouting the country’s sovereignty by operating within its territory to eventually strike at Islamabad?

Until these questions that vex the Swatis are properly answered, doubts about the sincerity of the central and provincial governments will remain. In fact, it is unfathomable to the ordinary Swati why the army stood by idly in 2007, and Islamabad took as long as it did to send in the army. The excuse that the government needed to wait for public opinion to gel behind the army action is, they say, laughable. Public opinion has nothing to do with the enforcement of the law. It is not essential whether public opinion would like something to be done or not, the simple test is whether it ought to be done and whether the law demands that it be done.

The deradicalisation centres were impressive; more for the hope they seemed to hold out for the brainwashed and, frankly, brain-dead pupils incarcerated within, rather than anything else. The adult inmates appeared repentant although most had been turned in by relatives and informers — though a few had come of their own accord. The vocational training imparted at the centres, one of them told me, would enable him to earn a living as an electrician. One can only hope he is right given the number of engineering graduates who are out of work and clamouring to go abroad even as labourers to do menial work.

The child suicide bombers were a pitiable lot. Their stories of torture at the hands of their Taliban mentors were gruesome. Apparently, the Taliban take the stupidest of them as suicide bombers, the next tier are those that serve as foot soldiers while the cleverest are trained to be extortionists. Most come from large families and two-thirds of them were from families where the fathers had left Swat to find work elsewhere. We were informed that when these children are finally released after the deradicalisation process has been completed (none have been released yet), they will be kept under surveillance.

Frankly, Swat must reinvent itself if it is to secure its long-term survival. To begin with, fundamental changes are needed in the local, judicial and administrative systems. The space made available to terrorists was enormous because of the failure of these systems to serve the basic needs of the population. In contrast to the interminable delays these days in resolving a property dispute, such cases were settled in days, if not hours, during the reign of the wali of Swat.

Swat’s economy needs to be kick-started, which could be done by rebuilding the road linking the main population areas with Kalam. This will also help to revive local tourism. There is no better way, especially in our current financial crunch, to generate resources for jobs.

The army and particularly the Inter Services Public Relations deserve credit for organising the seminar. It highlighted what is being done to reclaim Swat but, more importantly, what more must be done. It demonstrated that the army thinks as much, if not more, for the public interest as its own, negating allegations to the contrary. But if the knowledge gained from the seminar is to make a difference, sustained action must follow. Having liberated Swat, the army and the government working closely together must now ensure that those who died did not do so in vain.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 14th, 2011.
 
Thankyou for posting this.

Though i know, your intentions were probably mal, but then it served the purpose the other way round.

The article amply highlights the plight of this Pakistani Nation and its Leaders. Once again, i am greatful to you for bringing this the fore.

Anywaz, i have some points to contest, or sort of.

What occurred in Swat deserves to be probed as it raises many questions. Why, for example, were the Taliban allowed to enter these areas unarmed and unimpeded and then ferret in vast quantities of arms under the noses of the local administration? Why were they allowed to occupy dominating heights and passes; to set up an informal military system including training and logistical support centres and to move around with impunity? Why were they indulged to such an extent and their open defiance of the law condoned? Why was the provincial government permitted to enter into agreements with the enemy? Why was the pro-Taliban deputy commissioner of Swat, who grovelled before the Taliban and fawned on their leaders, promoted to the rank of commissioner? How could the Taliban build field hospitals and establish a military headquarters undetected and, if not undetected, then unimpeded in preparation for their war against the state? Why was their stopping and searching of army vehicles tolerated; indeed, where were the law enforcers when homes were looted, women raped and forcibly married off, journalists murdered and innocents slaughtered?
The answer is simple;

One, the (Pakistani) Nation was in a denial mode back then. They never foresee what this 'laxity' to the Mullahs would eventually get them into.

Two, the LOCALS (the Swatis) themselves wanted the Shariah (or the twisted version of it, to be precise) to prevail. Why? Well, primarily because of the failure of our Justice System and the failure of the govt to provide speedy justice. As the Swatis would say back then; 'everyone in the village knows who killed someone, but the Judge (of govt courts) was the one who would not know of it.'

So, as things in Yankistan are done according to the public perception (or alternatively the public perception is molded to fit in the governmental actions), similarly, here in Pakistan, it's quite difficult (though not as difficult as in the US) to go against the public understanding. Apropos, an outright rejection of the Swati demands was not a wise thing to do back then. Only, when the water was over their heads (the flogging of that girl, the screw up of the agreement/deal by the TTP etc), it was decided to finally end the drama.

And finally, how could one of the world’s largest standing armies — funded annually by a lion’s share of the federal budget — of a poor economy ever think of succumbing to the dictates of a horde of barbarians who were openly flouting the country’s sovereignty by operating within its territory to eventually strike at Islamabad?
The writer is a liar in this case.

He either doesnt know, or does not want to know the reality.

Here, may this would help him:

1-The share of Pakistan Defence Budget (for the Tri-Services and the Min of Defence) has been between 13-18% of the National Budget since 2000.

2-60-70% of National Budget goes to Debt Servicing and PSDP (so it is not the military that takes away the 'big' fcuking chunk of the tax payers' money).

3-Our PSEs' make Pakistan to bear an annual loss of Rs 200-300 Billion (approximately equaling the defence budget). So, they need to be corrected FIRST before fashioning the hue and cry over the military taking away huge amount of tax monies.

Also:
http://www.defence.pk/forums/general-defence/112938-pakistan-inside-military-budget.html
Until these questions that vex the Swatis are properly answered, doubts about the sincerity of the central and provincial governments will remain. In fact, it is unfathomable to the ordinary Swati why the army stood by idly in 2007, and Islamabad took as long as it did to send in the army. The excuse that the government needed to wait for public opinion to gel behind the army action is, they say, laughable. Public opinion has nothing to do with the enforcement of the law. It is not essential whether public opinion would like something to be done or not, the simple test is whether it ought to be done and whether the law demands that it be done.

The deradicalisation centres were impressive; more for the hope they seemed to hold out for the brainwashed and, frankly, brain-dead pupils incarcerated within, rather than anything else. The adult inmates appeared repentant although most had been turned in by relatives and informers — though a few had come of their own accord. The vocational training imparted at the centres, one of them told me, would enable him to earn a living as an electrician. One can only hope he is right given the number of engineering graduates who are out of work and clamouring to go abroad even as labourers to do menial work.

The child suicide bombers were a pitiable lot. Their stories of torture at the hands of their Taliban mentors were gruesome. Apparently, the Taliban take the stupidest of them as suicide bombers, the next tier are those that serve as foot soldiers while the cleverest are trained to be extortionists. Most come from large families and two-thirds of them were from families where the fathers had left Swat to find work elsewhere. We were informed that when these children are finally released after the deradicalisation process has been completed (none have been released yet), they will be kept under surveillance.

Frankly, Swat must reinvent itself if it is to secure its long-term survival. To begin with, fundamental changes are needed in the local, judicial and administrative systems. The space made available to terrorists was enormous because of the failure of these systems to serve the basic needs of the population. In contrast to the interminable delays these days in resolving a property dispute, such cases were settled in days, if not hours, during the reign of the wali of Swat.

Swat’s economy needs to be kick-started, which could be done by rebuilding the road linking the main population areas with Kalam. This will also help to revive local tourism. There is no better way, especially in our current financial crunch, to generate resources for jobs.

The army and particularly the Inter Services Public Relations deserve credit for organising the seminar. It highlighted what is being done to reclaim Swat but, more importantly, what more must be done. It demonstrated that the army thinks as much, if not more, for the public interest as its own, negating allegations to the contrary. But if the knowledge gained from the seminar is to make a difference, sustained action must follow. Having liberated Swat, the army and the government working closely together must now ensure that those who died did not do so in vain.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 14th, 2011.

Rest, for more insight (for the poster and the writer):

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/112944-rehabilitating-militants-road-redemption.html

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/112025-swat-story.html
 
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATION RAH-E-RAST


The operation with the name of Thunder-I commenced on 27 April 2009 in Lower Dir at Maidan. The stronghold at Lal Qila was captured with huge casualties of militants. On 29 April 2009, heliborne forces landed at Daggar the Headquarters of District Bunir, while ground troops advanced on two axes. At Ambella pass intense battle was fought with security forces confronting 13 suicide vehicles.

On 3 May 2009, Security forces launched the operation in Shangla sector. On 17 May 2009, SSG landed at Peochar, the stronghold of militants and headquarters of Fazal Ullah. Here forces came across hard core militants’ extensive training facilities, bomb and IEDs making factories, 100 feet long tunnels and huge cache of arms and ammunition.

Security forces, by this time, had surrounded militants from four directions, Lower Dir, Bunir, Peochar, and Shangla. Then security forces captured Banai Baba Ziarat, the training centre of militants, and at the same time, launched operation from Khawazakhela towards Matta and Durekshela. Simultaneously, security forces opened Chakdara front and after securing Chakdara advanced towards Barikot. By this operation, all entry and exit routes of militants were sealed. Now with security forces entering and securing Matta from east and entering Takhtaband and Kunju from west and Sultanwas from south and Peochar from north tightened the noose.

Later on 27 May 2009, forces entered Mingora; while a prong secured Malam Jabba. Security Forces moving street to street successfully secured Mingora. At the same time, Charbagh and Kanju were secured after tough resistance followed by Kabbal. Later, other stronghold of terrorists at Tutan Bandai and Sirsanai were secured after intense battle. The security
forces then secured Sakhra Valley in the north and established link up with the forces operating at Peochar. After this link up the last stronghold of terrorists in the north the Biha Valley was secured on 22 June 2009 and in the west area of Shamozai was secured on 23 June 2009.

At present security forces have completed the clearance of all areas which were under control of militants. Search and sweep operations are being conducted to ensure complete clearance of the areas. Terrorists in group or of two and three are present in different areas but any organised resistance as of now is not possible. By the grace of Allah security forces have secured Malakand and Swat from all directions and very soon the dislocated people of these areas will be going back to their homes.

In South Waziristan, Security forces have only conducted preliminary operations to secure main supply routes and have responded to terrorist attacks and occupation of heights. The pre-positioning of forces has been completed and security forces are all set to launch the operation when ordered. Bajur is fully secured except Charmang Valley. Only 30 % of area of Charmang Valley is to be cleared and for that operation is in progress.

By June 29, 2009, the operation commencing from different directions was linked up at critical Junctions and with securing of Biha
valley in the North and Shamozai in the West, main areas occupied by terrorists have been cleared. Their command structure has been totally dismantled, their training centres discovered and destroyed, their recruits either killed or driven away/ran away, their ammunition dumps destroyed and their Headquarters at Peochar, Chaprial, Matta, Khawazakhela, Mingora, Kabal, Banai Baba Ziarat, Sakhra Valley, Saidu Sharif and Biha have been destroyed. Security forces operating in Swat successfully established link up at Khel Kandao, while operating at Bunir and are consolidating their positions in areas around Dangram, Kukarai
and Jambil. Security forces secured area around Khazana, Zarra Khela and Garai and are consolidating secured areas of Kabbal, Dhadara, Akhun Khalle, Rangeela, and Zarra Khela. Security forces commenced clearance and search from Shalkosar towards Jukhtai and Balasur towards Shah Dheri.

Rawalpindi: Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), June 24, 2009.
N.B: Summary is slightly edited by IPRI Factfile Editor.

The Operation Rah-e-Rast: Terrorists’ Casualties - 27 April-30 June 2009
Date........... Killed..... Wounded/Apprehended
27April 2009. 20.......... 0
29April 2009. 50.......... 0
30April 2009. 4............ 0
01 May 2009. 60.......... 0
02 May 2009. 16.......... 0
03 May 2009. 80.......... 4
04 May 2009. 7........... 0
05 May 2009. 0........... 0
06 May 2009. 37.......... 0
07 May 2009. 10......... 0
08 May 2009. 160........ 0
09 May 2009. 55.......... 0
10 May 2009. 200......... 2
11 May 2009. 52........... 5
12 May 2009. 0............. 0
13 May 2009. 3............. 2
14 May 2009. 54........... 0
15 May 2009. 55........... 1
16 May 2009. 46........... 4
17 May 2009. 25........... 0
18 May 2009. 27........... 0
19 May 2009. 16........... 0
20 May 2009. 80........... 0
21 May 2009. 13........... 7
22 May 2009. 17........... 4
23 May 2009. 17........... 0
24 May 2009. 10........... 14
25 May 2009. 4............. 8
26 May 2009. 29........... 14
27 May 2009. 12........... 0
28 May 2009. 5............. 4
29 May 2009. 28............ 7
30 May 2009. 25............ 3
31 May 2009. 9............. 0
01 June 2009. 18........... 13
02 June 2009. 21........... 18
03 June 2009. 03........... 0
04 June 2009. 10........... 6
05 June 2009. 10........... 4
06 June 2009. 17........... 0
07 June 2009. 4............. 0
08 June 2009. 21........... 0
09 June 2009. 27........... 22
10 June 2009. 23........... 0
11 June 2009. 47............ 9
12 June 2009. 39............ 0
13 June 2009. 6.............. 2
14 June 2009. 1.............. 0
15 June 2009. 5.............. 6
16 June 2009. 13............ 3
17 June 2009. 22............ 17
18 June 2009. 39............ 7
19 June 2009. 4.............. 2
20 June 2009. 6.............. 6
21 June 2009. 8.............. 14
22 June 2009. 22............. 5
23 June 2009. 0............... 3
24 June 2009. 7............... 7
25 June 2009. 0............... 3
26 June 2009. 0............... 2
27June 2009. 0................ 0
28June 2009. 0................ 3
29June 2009. 18.............. 0
30 June 2009. 18............. 23
Total........... 1635........... 254
Rawalpindi: Compiled from Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) data received on 24 June
2009, & Press Releases of ISPR from 24-30 June 2009.

The Operation Rah-e-Rast: Military Casualties - 27 April-30 June 2009
.................Killed (Shaheed)........Wounded
Total........ 168.......................... 454
 
A take on the withdrawal of the Army from Swat by a Native of that area ! :tup:


Horrors of 2007 in Swat: We need the Army
June 14, 2013

Yesterday I was reading The Express Tribune, when my eye caught an interesting statement made by the new elected chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K-P).

He was boldly talking about pulling out the Pakistan Army from the Swat. I will refrain from criticising any party directives or policies here; all I want to do is to provide a clearer picture of the situation in Swat, and let the people be the jury of such an action.

I remember when the Pakistan Austrian Institute for Hotel and Tourism Management (PAITHOM) was targeted by the Taliban in the Swat valley in August 2007. This kind of Taliban was generally a lesser known entity at that time. PAITHOM was a joint venture by the Republic of Austria and Pakistan to promote the tourism industry in the Swat valley. I was working at PAITHOM as an assistant teacher at the time. Although the school was only producing alumni based on tourism and hotel management, it was soon labelled as promoting ‘secularism’ because the name was linked to Austria.

One day, a friend of mine asked me what we were really doing in the school. I explained to him that it was a normal school like any other school in the country. The only difference was that we had a new curriculum of tourism and hotel management. However, the Taliban propagated PAITHOM as promoting secularism and maligned it as a place for selling alcohol and promoting other immoral activities.

In August, 2007, we first received a letter from the Taliban to stop dressing in ‘Westernised’ clothing. Even though the Taliban were not the force of terror they are today, we took the letter quite seriously and advised the students to come to class in traditional attire.

However, the threat was just the beginning.

As many students were accommodated inside the school building it was vital that we took initiative to provide security. This was because the school was located 12km away from main Mingora city and there was no nearby police station. Therefore, we asked the police to provide us with the necessary security for our school.

This ended as a fruitless venture as they apologised saying, they did not have enough resources to provide us with such assistance.

We then turned to the Frontier Constabulary (FC) to help us. The FC agreed to provide security to our school and finally made a compound at the entrance.

One day, I went to a nearby mosque and I saw some long-haired suspicious looking people carrying arms. I ran back to the school in a state of complete panic and told everyone that we were no longer safe. Not only was the school in danger, but Swat valley as a whole could be lost to the Taliban too. They had continually propagated an agenda for jihad and this time they were ready for action.

A few days later, I got a phone call from a colleague who was residing at PAITHOM itself as he had travelled from Lahore. The phone call sent chills down my spine; he told me that this night could be his last. He wanted to talk to each one of us before he left this world. I could hear the noise of the gunfire in the background.

I asked him what had happened, fearing I knew the answer. He said the Taliban had finally attacked our school. I called up the police in a state of panic and horror, however, they had already been informed about the situation, but were waiting on a certain helicopter that was meant to come from Peshawar. Until the next morning, no action had been taken by the police. They did not even try to save the FC personnel.

When I went to the school the next morning, I saw blood everywhere. Pages of the Holy Quran were scattered and desecrated; we we collected these with our hands.

Our students and associates were safe as they were hiding in the underground compound. The blood was from the FC personnel who had bravely done their duty to provide security. The Holy Quran also belonged to those martyrs.

In September, 2007, I left Swat to pursue further studies in Austria.

My own words to the people of Swat still haunt me; the Taliban would destroy their homes, and so far they had. We saw (and still see) the Taliban terrorising our school children and demolishing schools.

This is a point that deserves your attention, dear Chief Minister.

The people of Swat feel safe with the help of the Pakistan Army. Why would you want to pull-out now? Have they completed their job yet? Are the people of Swat safe yet? They are our country’s army, here to protect our people. What’s the guarantee that the Taliban will not return?

There are plenty of other problems to address rather than putting the people of Swat into further distress.

We do not want another Malala getting shot. Please don’t make it happen. Please listen to us.

SOURCE - Horrors of 2007 in Swat: We need the Army – The Express Tribune Blog

' @fatman17 @Last Hope @F.O.X @S.U.R.B. @Marshmallow @Talon @Hyperion @Secur @TaimiKhan @Pukhtoon @Xeric @Icarus @alimobin memon @DESERT FIGHTER @Spring Onion @chauvunist @Developereo @HRK @KingMamba93 @dabong1 @Windjammer @Oscar @genmirajborgza786 @balixd @farhan_9909 @AstanoshKhan @W.11 @WebMaster @Dreamreaper @Pak-one @Luftwaffe @Aeronaut @Farah Sohail @Rajput_Pakistani @nuclearpak
 
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@Armstrong, I am not in favor of pulling out of The Army but I would want a reliable stable local body Government installed in Swat not based on mullahs so there should be a good coordination & help between local Government and Army.

Many malalas' have died all over Pakistan specially in KPK and Balochistan.

Job of Army is not completed this is my personal observation we are expecting Army to go here and there so far we can't even clean layari/90/katipahari and other political gang Areas and we are looking to eliminate the larger enemy of Pakistan? Where the hell is law enforcement, intelligence agencies/rangers Karachi has become a difficult mess in the past 12 Years. I must commend and appreciate the people of sindh how they live under daily pressure from terrorists like mqm-ppp-anp-talibans-gangs.
 
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In September, 2007, I left Swat to pursue further studies in Austria.

I wonder what is the current situation in Swat.
We can't depend on the army permanently as a law enforcement force; the civilian rule has to take over at some point.
I suspect, as others mentioned, that heavy intelligence presence would remain in the area for some time anyway.
 
We do not want another Malala getting shot

Malala got shot in the presence of Army in the swat. You cant keep army as gaurds in swat forever, and it is impossible for army to gaurd each and every inch of swat and stop every kind of attack or bomb blast from happening......PTI is going in right direction to solve TTP problem through peace talks.....
 

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