AIR WAR OF 1965 REVISITED: THE FIRST ENCOUNTER (1 SEPTEMBER 1965)
BACKGROUND
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was the result of a series of border skirmishes, which started in April 1965. The escalation ladder then started growing and spiraled out of control in September 1965. The threat of an imminent attack by the Indian Army on the International Border was never a surprise. Starting from the successful military encounter with India in the Rann of Kutch, the military situation escalated further after the Indian Military initiated ‘Operation Ablaze’ in May-June 1965. This was an offensive posture by the Indian Army along the Indo-Pak Border after the Rann of Kutch skirmish. Under ‘Operation Ablaze’, all Indian Army Formations, earmarked for Punjab were placed on ‘Red Alert’.
OPERATION DESERT HAWK (APRIL 1965)
It all started in February 1965, down south, in the wastelands of Rann of Kutch which is a large area of salt marshes that span the border between India and Pakistan. Indian military forces captured a Pakistani post and village and occupied the northern part of the Rann of Kutch which was under the administrative control of Sindh, in Pakistan. Although the land was barren with little to no vegetation, however at that time unknown to many, the area was thought to have huge hydrocarbon reserves. The likelihood of the abovementioned possibility is also mentioned in John Fricker’s book ‘Battle for Pakistan’ which states, “The Indian occupation of the Rann of Kutch took on a different aspect, however, following exploration of the area with Soviet assistance, around Vigiokot, Karim Shahi and Khavda, in February 1965. This led to reports confirming the likelihood of oil in the region, which may possibly have been one of the main reasons for Indian attempts, within the next few weeks, at the complete occupation of the Rann of Kutch.”
Today in 2021, it has been proven that the area is part of an active petroleum province and numerous successful oil and gas wells have been drilled in the vicinity by national and multinational companies, but in 1965 it was just a speculation which led to the skirmish between Pakistan and India. After formal protests in the International Community, Pakistan decided to hit back in the same language which was used by the Indians. The Indian military build-up at Chhad Bet was countered by a counter military build-up by Pakistan which soon turned out to be more formidable than their adversary. On 6th April 1965, 8 Infantry Division HQ received the following directive from Pak Army, “Failing satisfactory response (to the Pakistani demand for an Indian withdrawal from the Rann of Kutch) all necessary measures to be taken to deny Indian offensive activities and to assert our claim, including occupation of such few positions in the disputed territory as would place our forces in a favorable situation to negotiate for closure of the newly established Indian posts…If Indians react unfavorably to our defense action enumerated above, our forces to take necessary counter measures including action in the disputed territory in de facto control of India.”
A shooting war started between both the armies, which increased in intensity with each day. Although diplomatic channels were open for negotiations both parties could not come to any conclusion. On 14th April 1965, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), Air Marshall Asghar Khan, telephoned his counterpart of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to make the extraordinary suggestion that both air forces should stay out of this dispute in order to avoid escalation. Although the exact details are unclear, it appears that the suggestion was accepted by his Indian counterpart with the caveat that the air forces would be permitted to supply front line troops. Explaining the aftermath of this incident, Farooq Bajwa in his book ‘From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965’ states, “Whether this suggestion of Asghar Khan had been cleared with Ayub or GHQ in Rawalpindi is doubtful, and it is interesting that Asghar Khan does not mention this episode in his book about the war, ‘The First Round: India-Pakistan War 1965’. This offer was apparently unknown to General Musa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.”
The air situation during this period remained silent. On a few occasions it was reported that IAF Vampire fighter jets flew low over our troop’s position, however it later transpired that they were photo reconnaissance missions. Discussing the air situation, John Fricker in his book ‘Battle for Pakistan’ states, “As it happened, there were no air operations of any significance during the Rann of Kutch dispute, but as a result of Desert Hawk, the PAF was poised for instant action. Armed combat air patrols and reconnaissance sorties by F-86Fs from Mauripur, reinforced by two F-104A Starfighters, on detachment from Sargodha, initiated from 17 April onwards, were kept well behind the disputed frontier, to avoid provocation, although it seems that the IAF was less careful in this respect.“
Meanwhile situation on ground was becoming grim. When diplomatic negotiations failed between both sides, a major military encounter became inevitable. The Pakistani forces led by General Tikka Khan were ready to attack and liberate the areas under Indian occupation. According to Farooq Bajwa, the author of ‘From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965’, “By 17 April, Tikka Khan’s plan for dominating the border area was complete and the objective was the removal of the Indian posts close to the Pakistani positions and also to bottle up the Indian forces in Rann by cutting off the only road available to them. This military operation was ambitious enough to threaten all-out war as it was aimed at nothing less than the capture and/or destruction of the two Indian brigades inside Kutch, which India was unlikely to accept without some retaliation in Punjab or Kashmir.”
On 23 April General Musa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, gave the green light for the operation. This was potentially a large-scale concentrated military push for the capture/destruction of Indian troops within Kutch. Sera Bet was captured relatively quickly and without any resistance from the Indian defenders. Biar Bet was the next Indian stronghold to be attacked. Although a company of the Indian 3 Paratroopers held Biar Bet, the Pakistani assault using both tanks and artillery was too much and by 0730 hours, 26 April, Biar Bet was captured along with a large quantity of arms and ammunition left behind by retreating Indian soldiers. John Fricker writes in his book ‘Battle for Pakistan’, “Operations reached their peak on 26 April 1965. Elements of 8th Division ordered up earlier by the Pakistan Army C-in-C, General Muhammad Musa, under the codename Operation Desert Hawk, were then reinforced by a squadron of tanks for an attack on the Indian occupied post of Biar Bet. Located approximately midway between Ding and Chhad Bet, this was overrun and captured by Pakistani forces after a fierce battle at 0630 hours the following morning. 8 Division lost only one ammunition truck amongst its vehicles and claimed to have inflicted heavy causalities on the retreating enemy.”
Situation was getting tense when there was a situation when PAF and IAF aircraft came dangerously close to each other and a shoot down was imminent. On 24 April, a single blip was observed to be intruding Pakistan air space. Two Sabres were scrambled from Mauripur to intercept the aircraft which was now deep inside Pakistan air space. As the Sabres moved in to intercept they made a head on pass, apparently rattling the Indian pilot. The aircraft which was identified as an IAF Ouragan fighter-bomber, lowered its undercarriage and flaps in surrender, and made a forced landing near the village of Jhangshahi. Apart from ripping off its landing gears the Ouragan received minor damage on landing. The Indian pilot Flight Lieutenant Rana Sikka of No. 51 Auxiliary Squadron, Jamnagar, was soon captured unhurt, after attempting to pass himself off as a pilot of the PAF. According to Fricker, “although the Ouragan was fully armed, it seemed that its pilot had strayed across the border by mistake and he was returned to India in August.”
This was the first time that the whole PAF was mobilized and transferred its assets as per their war plans. Discussing the air situation further, John Fricker in his book ‘Battle for Pakistan’ states, “Although air operations therefore played little part in the Rann of Kutch dispute, this was of considerable significance to the PAF in rehearsing its transfer to a war footing and in underlining some of its deficiencies in its planning and organization.”
This was Pakistan Army’s first real complete victory which resulted in the rout of the Indian Army present in the area. According to Farooq Bajwa, the author of ‘From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965’, “India was humiliated in the fighting and now had to decide its next move with public opinion calling out for some reaction to the latest Pakistani offensive. Pakistan’s GHQ now felt that they had the measure of the Indian Army – purely on the basis of a limited border clash involving no more than a couple of brigades on either side. Ayub was now made aware through Western channels of growing Indian public anger and the likelihood of all-out war if the offensive military operation was carried to its planned conclusion, and therefore ordered all plans for further advance movements in Kutch to cease with immediate effect. Ayub was effectively cancelling the military operation without the public of either India or Pakistan even being aware of its existence.”
Further hostilities were stopped by diplomatic intervention from the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, resulting in an unofficial cease-fire on 27 April. This came into formal effect by 1 July, but the Rann of Kutch affair was all over barring some sporadic shooting by the end of April 1965.
OPERATION ABLAZE (MAY-JUNE 1965)
On 29 April 1965, the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had given his approval for military action against Pakistan at a time and place to be chosen by the Army, and that General Chaudhary had indicated that offensive operations could start by 10 May 1965. The Pakistan Armed Forces counter mobilized their forces. Formations of Pakistan Army took to their battle stations, while PAF swiftly made preparations for a swift reaction keeping in view the threat posed by the IAF. Pakistan Navy followed suit with their only submarine Ghazi being deployed for offensive operations inside enemy waters.
THE JUNE 1965 PLAN
In June 1965, the first air doctrine by Air Marshal Asghar Khan had been clearly envisaged and was discussed in detail, the magnitude and weight of the India air threat, in case of a war. The main topic of concern by Air Marshal Asghar Khan and his operational staff was the preponderance of the Indian Air Force with over 500 aircraft that it could carry out relentless attacks against the main bases of Sargodha and Peshawar in the north, and Mauripur in the south. Special concern was the main radars at Sakesar and Badin. Consequently it was apprehended that destruction of these vital targets would ground the PAF.
The PAF strategy and the tactical execution were worked out with professional diligence under Air Marshal Asghar Khan with Air Commodore A. Rahim Khan, Chief of Operations as the head of implementation team. The entire planning delved in the minutest detail and the target panacea was determined that their destruction by a pre-emptive action became the core of the PAF’s air strategy. The plan had been given due coverage in John Fricker’s ‘Battle for Pakistan’ as well as PAF History 1988. The PAF History 1988 states, “The aim of the PAF was to neutralize selected vital elements of the IAF by strikes in strength against them in order to reduce the margin of superiority of the IAF, thereby preventing it from gaining superiority and interfering effectively in the land battle. The plan envisaged a situation in which PAF would so react that it had the initiative to strike at IAF airfields and radar installations, to redress the unfavorable balance between the two air forces and, in so doing also to ensure PAF’s availability for any subsequent land-air operations.”
The original strike plan therefore covered almost all the forward air bases of the IAF which posed a threat to the Pakistan Army and the PAF. These included the IAF bases at Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara, Ambala, Bhuj, Jamnagar and the Early Warning Radar Stations at Amritsar, Ferozepur, Patiala, Ambala and Porbunder.
Usually for such strikes, the best suitable timings are either immediately after dawn, or just before dusk. The ingenuity of the plan had been visualized that if opportunity would allow, dusk strike was the best choice. The strike elements would have the cover of darkness to safely recover at their airfields, since the Indian Air Force did not have the capability to carry out night fighter sweeps. This would allow the PAF, time to recover and repeat the assigned attacks at dawn next morning by the strike elements based at Sargodha and Mauripur, making 15 minutes before sunrise as their TOT. For strike action from Mauripur against Jamnagar the next morning, four T-33s were to supplement the F-86 force. Peshawar was excluded from dawn attack and was to be given its target next day.
B-57 Bombers had the responsibility to pin down the enemy bases throughout the night. A commando raid on all three forward bases of the Indian Air Force i.e. Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, had been thoroughly rehearsed. This was rather a novel and difficult mission, but it was contingent upon the rightly predicted success by the dusk strikes to be carried out by PAF Sabres. One of the striking features of the plan was to keep one of the F-86 squadrons to be earmarked for urgent air support requested by the army.
However in an unexpected reversal, on 30 June 1965, there was an agreement that the Kutch dispute was to be referred for arbitration. Under this, both sides agreed to carry out certain troop withdrawals. In July 1965, the armies of both sides stood down, and formations returned to their peacetime stations. At least war had been averted for the time being. However, the PAF retained its operational readiness.
OPERATION GIBRALTAR (AUGUST 1965)
Situation however escalated further after the miscalculation in Kashmir, under the code name ‘Operation Gibraltar’. The original plan for the operation was conceived and prepared as early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario. The operation was backed by General Musa (Army Chief) and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Foreign Minister). According to Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination amongst the military services on the impending operation. Pakistani author Pervez Iqbal Cheema notes that General Musa was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action. Many senior Pakistani military officers and political leaders were unaware of the impending crisis, thus springing a surprise not only India, but also Pakistan itself. Some of the senior officials also were against the plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which they wanted to avoid.
Air Marshall Asghar Khan was deliberately kept out of the Kashmir de-freeze plan. President Ayub Khan’s closest bureaucrat and the master mind of ‘Decade of Reforms’ Altaf Gauhar did not mince his words when he wrote that it was a government conspiracy to keep the Air Force C-in-C in the dark and to let him retire quietly after completing 8 years, from fear that he would dissent with the idea for lack of preparation, inferring that if time was given for proper preparations he would make the operation decisive.
General Musa in his book, ‘My Version’ makes a very strange remark that several thousand youth from Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan were trained into guerilla warfare. Ho Chi Minh’s bones must have rattled at the idea of training guerillas from out-side the affected region under a depot. Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, the operation was set in motion. However the operation went awry from the outset due to poor coordination, poor planning, and poor intelligence. Operation Gibraltar failed as expected.
After the fall of strategic posts at Haji Pir Pass and Kargil, Pakistan Army had no other option but to commence Operation Grand Slam. The aim was to ease the pressure on the 12th Division, which was defending against repeated Indian attacks, and to guard against the threat to the city of Muzaffarabad. However this required a ‘green signal’ from the President.
Meanwhile AVM Nur Khan, till 29 August 1965, was under strict orders by the President, not to provoke the Indians in the air. This permission finally came, and very luckily on 30 August 1965, when a senior minister along with a ‘Top-Secret’ file had to fly to Saidu Sharif (where the President of Pakistan was lounging, while ‘Operation Grand Slam’ was awaiting his green signal). It was that place where he signed the letter which allowed the PAF to take only defensive action if provoked by the IAF. The clearance message for ‘Operation Grand Slam’ was extremely ambiguous (as reproduced in the best seller ‘Flight of the Falcon’ and was addressed enigmatically to the Foreign Office and GHQ). D-Day was set at 1 September 1965, while H-Hour was set at 0500 hours.
John Fricker in his book, ‘Battle for Pakistan’ states, “On the eve of the opening of Operation Grand Slam, late on 31 August, at a meeting between Pakistan Army Commander-in-Chief and his PAF opposite number, with their respective staffs, AVM Nur Khan pointed out that this operation ‘could mean war’. In anticipation of possible reaction against the Pakistan Army Offensive, which involved heavy armor, heavy guns, etc., the AVM proposed a PAF strike against the nearest enemy airfields to precede the Pakistani thrust across the CFL (Cease Fire Line) into Indian-Held Kashmir. While this was militarily the optimum option, it presented certain political problems in conferring Pakistan the possible role of an aggressor, and received a Presidential veto against the proposal, after a discussion in person.
Personally convinced that a successful attack across the cease fire line by Pakistan would mean all-out war with India, AVM Nur Khan took the necessary steps to prevent a successful surprise attack on his bases. Apart from outnumbering the PAF it had to be assumed that the IAF was an efficient, well organized and highly motivated force and given the opportunity would strike a surprise blow. With President’s decision, the initiative passed to the Indians to add to the advantages that they already had. In these circumstances Nur Khan was deeply concerned over the possibility of a sudden attack on his bases on the IAF’s terms rather being allowed to follow his own plans.”
PAF moved into its highest state of alert, as AVM Nur Khan had anticipated the eminent clash between the IAF and the PAF. One factor that pops up in the mind that since June plan agreed by the authors of Story of Pakistan Air Force 1988, under the heading ‘June Plan’ that it was a well debated and all contingencies invasively ferreted out. Yet, when discussing the plan just before the war, it mentions that AVM Nur Khan appointed a committee under F.S. Hussain, the incomparable ace but who had not been associated with PAF war strategy at any stage. His only staff appointment had been Air Secretary according to the historical record and later as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (ACAS –Training). While the ACAS Operations the intrepid Air Commodore Rahim Khan who had been integral to the PAF plenary sessions was left out, needs some answers. The recommendations by the new appointed committee were mere paraphrasing of the June Plan and interpolation of original composition, with some changes which were to impact the war effort extremely adversely in the opening vital shots on 6th and 7th September, as will stand out when the missions on those days are recounted. Was this done to give credit to AVM Nur Khan for the PAF Air War Strategy and to the exclusion of the ACAS operation, is quite baffling. My understanding, after discussion from highly regarded star officers has been that Phase 3 declared on 1st September should have been according to the implementation of June Plan; and squadron moves to be initiated according to the plan. Not following the June Plan for inexplicable rationale cost the PAF unavoidable loss and failure of its pre-emptive.
OPERATION GRAND SLAM (SEPTEMBER 1965)
On D-Day, at 0330 hours, Pakistan Army began its counter offensive by carrying out a massive artillery bombardment against Indian positions in Chamb Sector. Operation Grand Slam took the Indians by complete surprise. Attacking with full force, Pakistan made swift gains against Indian forces, which were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The area was lightly defended by four Indian infantry battalions and a squadron of tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks were no match for the Pakistani M47 Patton and M48 Patton tanks. Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions. Feeling that Akhnur will fall very soon, the Indian Army sent an S.O.S. to the Indian Air Force, requesting immediate air support at 1100 hours. However the IAF Chief could not launch any aircraft as he had to take clearance by his Ministry of Defense, until after 1600 Hours (Ironically, Indian Historians as expected have exaggerated and written that IAF was launched immediately by AM Arjun Singh. 5 hours hardly justify the claim of immediate response).
At PAF HQ, a sense of expectation prevailed since morning. The intensity of the battle on the border confirmed the fact that the IAF will soon join the battle. When positive reports regarding Pakistan Army’s progress started to come in, there had been no valuation from observation by senior military personnel. Thus AVM Nur Khan decided to see for himself what was happening in the Chamb sector. He flew from Chaklala to the nearest airstrip to the Chamb front at Gujrat in A Cessna T-37 trainer. He then set off to make a personal reconnaissance of the battle area from a Cessna L-19 of Pakistan Army Aviation flown by an Army Aviation pilot.
Meanwhile No. 12 Divisions’ armored thrust had overrun the enemy stronghold at Chamb. The Indians fell back leaving behind 15 intact AMX-13 tanks, 13 heavy guns and a large quantity of other military equipment. Unable to withstand No. 12 Divisions’ armored thrust and still lacking sufficient supplies, the Indian Army started retreating from Chamb-Jaurian Sector. Pakistan Army M47 and M48 Patton Tanks had been assigned to defeat any remaining enemy forces there and to move forward to occupy Akhnur. In desperation the Indian commander again asked for help from IAF to provide cover for its retreating troops. Clearance from the Indian Ministry of Defense to launch air attacks against the invading Pakistan Army finally came after 1600 hours.
At almost the same time, AVM Nur Khan was flying overhead the battle zone, between 300-400 ft. in a Pakistan Army Aviation L-19 aircraft. However when he crossed the battle line around Tawi River, he was astonished to see a ‘tremendous’ mass of Pakistan Army units consisting of troops, tanks, guns and vehicles saturated along a narrow track. This was a lucrative target for any enemy air force in the world, and a dedicated enemy air attack could change the outcome of this attack. As soon as he landed back at 1 Corps HQ at 1630 hours, he rang up to warn ‘Theatre’ about the ground position, the threat perceived and ordered the CAP, operating out of Sargodha, to be extended from their original deadline of 1700 hours.
Meanwhile at Pathankot, which was the nearest airbase from the ground battle, twenty six aircraft (12 Vampires and 14 Mystères) had been armed to the teeth, while their pilots were waiting since morning for the ‘go-ahead’ by the Air HQ. As soon as they received the green signal, the first formation comprising of four Vampires took off at 1650 hours. This was followed shortly by a second and a third formation, with four aircraft each.
THE FIRST DOGFIGHT
It was almost 1700 hours (PST) when two F-86F Sabres took off from Sargodha as they climbed in the evening haze with a dazzling rate of 9,000 ft./min. The pair was led by Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui, OC No. 05 Squadron. His wingman was Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Ahmed Bhatti, No. 15 Squadron. Upon reaching their CAP station at 20,000 ft. over Gujrat, both Sabres were asked to go in a holding pattern until further orders.
Meanwhile the first formation of four Vampires had by now reached overhead the battle zone. While the Vampires picked up the fierce battle raging below him, it was difficult to pick out the identification of the tanks in the fast fading light. However in their over enthusiasm, they commenced their attack on the ground forces below irrespective of their origin. Flabbergasted at this latest development, Pakistan Army placed an urgent demand for air cover.
Both PAF fighters had been circling the area for about ten minutes, when suddenly the controller’s voice came on the radio: “Enemy aircraft attacking our troops. Engage.” Both the pilots pressed their throttles and banked fast towards the battle zone. As soon as the Sabre Jets reached overhead, Bhatti spotted the enemy aircraft, “Two bogies approaching 9 o’clock” he called out to his leader. Rafiqui immediately acknowledged ‘contact’. The Sabres were perched 3000-4000 ft. above the enemy aircraft, which were now identified as Vampire fighters. Both Sabres punched drop-tanks as they peeled down to engage the enemy fighters
During the dive, Bhatti spotted another pair of Vampires, (which he mistook for Canberra bombers) glistening in the evening sun (these were Vampires from first formation egressing after completing their mission). He was tempted to go after them as they presented an easy target when suddenly two more Vampires joined the battle as they positioned behind Rafiqui’s jet. However both the Indians were unaware that another Sabre is well placed behind them for a kill. The situation was that two Vampires in close wingman formation were being chased by Sarfraz Rafiqui, who himself was followed by two more Vampires in close wingman formation, while Bhatti was perched right behind them in their blind zone.
After some basic maneuvering Rafiqui was now well placed for a gun-kill. Within seconds the first Vampire started filling his gun-sight. As soon as it came within range, Rafiqui fired a two-second burst. The flashes round the enemy Vampire confirmed the bullets striking home as the enemy aircraft caught fire instantly. Suddenly it blew up in full view of both the armies watching this dogfight. The Pakistan Air Force had opened its account in Indian Aircraft. The Indian pilot went down alongside his stricken aircraft. However with three more aircraft lurking in the vicinity it was not over yet, as the Indians were not willing to give up without a fight. Without wasting any time, Rafiqui rolled behind the second Vampire which started thrashing in order to spoil Rafiqui’s aim, but Rafiqui being a seasoned pilot remained behind him waiting for him to steady.
Bhatti who was getting a panoramic view of the dogfight, had the leading Vampire of the second formation in his gun-sight, but waited for Rafiqui to finish off his target as he was also in his line of fire. Suddenly the Vampire which was targeted by him, closed in on Rafiqui too dangerously. ‘Break Left,’ he yelled on the radio. Within the next moment Rafiqui fired a long and sustained burst. The aluminum and balsa wood structure of the Vampire could not handle the immense fusillade of the Sabre’s 6 x M3 Browning Machine Guns, as the enemy aircraft exploded in mid-air killing its occupant. Rafiqui broke hard in order to avoid debris damage and simultaneously responding to Bhatti’s call.
Within seconds he took position behind Bhatti and called out, “No.2, your tail is clear.” Bhatti looked in his gun-sight and saw his target still within range. He moved in closer to get a pointblank shot and squeezed the firing button. As soon as the bullets clattered the Vampire, the aircraft caught fire as it wavered out of control flight. Suddenly the aircraft exploded in a blinding flash. As the flash settled the soldiers below saw three distinct fireballs falling down. The last Vampire decided to bug out as he by now had realized that their Vampire jets are no match for the Sabres. In order to shake off his pursuers he banked hard right trying to spoil the aim of his attacker. However the Sabre turned much tighter and soon Bhatti got him in his gun-sight as he fired a lengthy burst. Although the enemy aircraft was hit, it was still flyable, trailing black smoke. The Vampire dived down in a tight spiral as the dogfight descended to treetop height. Bhatti fired another burst but the Vampire ducked just above the trees, managing to escape at deck level in the fast fading light.
In the course of combat, contact with the PAF ground controller had been lost through the descent to low level, but as the Sabres regained altitude, Squadron Leader Rafiqui checked in with Group Captain Butt and asked, ‘Did you mean us to shoot to kill or to frighten?’ ‘To kill’, said the GCI controller, ‘And you’ve done it’. Squadron Leader Rafiqui replied in affirmative as both the PAF Sabre Jets dived down in a parting salute to the Pakistan Army below before returning back to their base. Both the Indian and the Pakistan Army witnessed the dogfight. However the morale of the Pakistan Army was bolstered when they saw four columns of fire after the dogfight, three on their side and one on the other side. Brigadier Amjad Chaudhary, Commander Corps Artillery, wrote in a letter to the PAF Commander in Chief, “Your very first action in Chamb left no doubt in our mind that we did not have to worry much about the enemy air force. The pattern was set there and then. We will never forget that spectacle – it lifted our spirits and gave us a flying start.”
Later on Brigadier Amjad Chaudhary stated in his book “September ’65 – Before and After”, “When we saw the bombers from our command post, we were apprehensive because our tanks and infantry surrounding Chamb were in the open, in close formations and were very vulnerable to air attack. The bombers went into action and came low to drop their bombs. Before they could do much damage, there was a flash in the air on top of these bombers and before we could comprehend what had happened, the Indian bombers came down in three columns of smoke.”
AFTERMATH
As the PAF Commander in Chief arrived at Sargodha, after returning from his visit from the battlefront, he was met with the news of the first air engagement. He congratulated in person, both the PAF officers responsible for downing the Indian Vampires. After a detailed debriefing session, both Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui, and his wingman Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Ahmed Bhatti were credited with two Vampires each (however it has been cleared that Rafiqui downed two Vampires, while Bhatti destroyed one Vampire and damaged another which was recovered. The fourth Vampire was destroyed by Indian Army’s AAA, its pilot managing to bail out). Both of them were awarded with Sitara-i-Jur’at each.
The deceased IAF pilots were identified as Squadron Leader Aspi Kekobad Bhagwagar, Flight Lieutenant Vijay Madhav Joshi, and Flight Lieutenant Satish Bharadwaj. The Indian pilot, who ejected after being hit by own AAA was identified as Flight Lieutenant Shrikrishna Vishnu Pathak. The Indians were so much unnerved by this dogfight that they withdrew 132 Vampires and 36 Ouragans from frontline service. This constituted to 30% of their combat strength. Throughout the 1965 aerial campaign these aircraft were never reported being engaged by our army and air force. The same has also been reflected in the book ‘History of the 1965 Indo-Pak War’ by B.C. Chakravorthy that, “Neither Vampires nor Ouragons were effectively used in operations after this, reducing IAF’s effective strength by about one third at a single stroke. Although it was an unhappy start and a big shock to the Indian Air Force, the IAF steeled its determination to fight back in the following days.” This aerial combat marked the beginning of a full fledge aerial campaign in which both PAF and IAF would be facing each other in a full blown war.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Most of our air war historians, while covering this dogfight and failed to mention that as soon as the Sabres left the area, four more Vampires came in and attacked whatever they could spot in the fast fading light. Once they had left, four more formations, each formation comprising of four Mystères each, carried out a single attack each. All of these sorties remained unopposed as all IAF jets returned back after delivering their ordinance, without a scratch. IAF claimed that it destroyed 14 tanks and 30 vehicles, however it later transpired that it was just a propaganda (which is still bragged about by some of the Indian War Historians even today), and however all they could get was one man and one artillery gun. It is absurd to claim such large number, in diminishing visibility, and that too in 26 attacks (one attack each carried out by their aircraft).
The first wave of the Vampires of the IAF however did hit some tanks, but those belonged to the India’s own 20 Lancers and 3 Mahar. Major General Sandhu in his book ‘History of Indian Cavalry’ recounts how the first Vampire strike of four, “leisurely proceeded to destroy three AMX-13 tanks of India’s own 20 Lancers, plus the only recovery vehicle and the only ammunition vehicle available during this hard pressed fight. The second flight attacked Indian infantry and gun positions, blowing up several ammunition vehicles.” The Indian Army AAA however exacted instant retribution as they managed to shoot down one of their own Vampires, its pilot managed to bail out . However IAF missed the golden opportunity in blunting the counter offensive of the Pakistan Army, as these strikes were launched quite late. Had these 28 aircraft been launched earlier, they might have inflicted significant damage to the Pakistan Army.
Coming towards PAF, the first thing that occurs to the mind of a keen reader is that since IAF had earlier sent eight fighters, what were the factors which deterred ‘‘Theatre’’ not to send further CAP missions towards Chamb. India launched 20 more strikes until dusk. The ‘History of the 1965 Indo-Pak War’ by B.C. Chakravorthy clearly mentions that IAF had sent obsolete and purely ground attack aircraft without providing some superior fighters to give top cover. It is not difficult to assume that had PAF scrambled more aircraft immediately after the first dogfight, they would have had a field day over Chamb, shooting down scores of enemy aircraft laden with bombs and rockets, which arrived after Squadron Leader Rafiqui left the area. Not only we would have destroyed a large number of IAF aircraft in the air but also would have shattered the morale of the Indians, on the very first day of the initiation of hostilities. However, this was not to be. Instead congratulatory atmosphere permeated while the operational need of that moment got lost in the bon homie at Sargodha. The IAF missed the initiative by reacting very late. They sent vulnerable ground attack aircraft and paid the price accordingly. PAF missed the initiative by not scrambling additional fighters in the area, to notch up more kills. Such opportunities should be grabbed if one has to perform exceptionally well in combat.
Copyright 2021 Sarmad Hassan Sharif. All
