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Pakistan's 'Top Gun' Base
Mike Downing, Air Forces Monthly, April, 1992

SARGHODA, situated 50 miles north of the famous textile city of Faisalabad in north central Pakistan, and within 150 miles of the Indian border, is the home of the Combat Commanders School which has earned it the reputation of the 'Top Gun' base of the Pakistan Air Force.
It first came to prominence during the Indo-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971 during which it provided a pivotal role in the air war with India.

During the 1965 War S/L MM Alam became Pakistan's air ace. Flying the F-86, he shot down five Indian aircraft in one mission. Sarghoda was also a key target for the Indian Air Force during that time. In recognition of its efforts during these conflicts, Sarghoda has had the privilege of initially hosting all the new types of aircraft purchased by the air force, including the F-86, F-104, F-6, Mirage and F-16.The only exception being the F-7P.

The base, under the command of its popular commander, Air Commodore Majeeb, is now the home of the No 38 Tactical Fighter Wing which comprises two squadrons 9 Griffins Squadron and 11 Arrows Squadron flying the F-16A and B, and the Combat Commanders School with two Squadrons, the Skybolts with the Mirage 5PA, and the Dashings with F-6s.

The school is under the command of G/C Riat, a veteran of the '71 Indian conflict during which he flew the F-86. The school and its instructors (which would also have a role to play in the event of a war) is run on a very similar infrastructure to the USAF DACT Training Bases, even including the school buildings themselves.

The aims of the school are as follows:-

1 . Application of flying tactics.
2. Utilisation of weapon systems.
3. Standardisation and evaluation of various units.
4. Research and development in the field of tactics.


Pilots are selected by Air HQ in Rawalpindi normally after nine to twelve years of service. The successful graduates would hope to command a squadron in the rank of wing commander. The courses are tough and some selectees inevitably fail to make the grade. There are three courses, the combat commanders course lasting for 4/5 months, a 3 month weapons course, and a 4/5 week fighter integration course.

The CCS DACT course is unique throughout the world in its freedom as all combat missions are flown at tree top levels. All course pilots are fully responsible for the entirely independent formulation and execution of their mission plans and then drawing their own conclusions after the flight.

The importance of CCS at Sarghoda is highlighted by the fact that all foreign chiefs of air staff visiting Pakistan on exchange visits always include Sarghoda in their itinerary. This was the case recently when the RAP Chief of Air Staff Sir Peter Harding visited the school with his wife during a seven day exchange visit to Pakistan from October 11-18, 1991 {see AFM March News). He was most impressed with what he saw, and showed surprise at the freedom allotted to the student DACT pilots. An F-7P was flown in to Sarghoda from Rafiqui Air Base during his visit in which he was given a 30 minute fliaht.​
 
Pakistan’s Missiles, Why We Test Them?



Admin PSF
February 18, 2021


Explained: Pakistan’s Missiles, Why We Test Them?

Explained: Pakistan’s Missiles, Why We Test Them?

As defense analysts, this question is a no-brainer. Our missiles are an essential component of our defense strategy and provide us with round-the-clock strategic capabilities to protect our sovereignty against all aggression from the outside. So, it is only natural that this vital capability is kept in tip-top shape and our soldiers are trained down to the second to execute the sophisticated series of actions required to use these systems. But, keeping in mind the recent controversy and propaganda against Pakistan testing its missiles from our eastern neighbor we will take a closer look at why we test these systems, why is it critical for Pakistan’s national security and strategic posturing, and why India wants us to stop.

For a country with a perpetual regional security threat like Pakistan, our missiles basically serve the sole purpose of delivery systems, i.e., they can deliver any type of weaponized payload over huge distances in a very short amount of time and deliver them accurately enough to whatever target we choose. In our country’s case, we rely on these marvels of engineering to provide us with Pakistan’s critical strategic capabilities which are the most essential tool for our security.

They also assure the unimpeded defense of Pak Sarzameen, day in and day out. These machines are huge, highly complex and delicate pieces of technology that we absolutely must ensure work perfectly through the complicated series of events to activate them and are designed to the last nut-and-bolt to strike assuredly into the heart of our enemies if our country and way of life is under threat on the darkest day our nation will ever see.

Obviously with the consequences associated with an Indian aggression warranting a strategic response, we pray that day never comes but we must also always remember to hope for the best but be prepared for the worst in line with the age-old military proverb, Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war), especially considering the ever-increasing trends of aggression and threats at the highest level of the Indian state in the strategic stability paradigm of South Asia.

These missiles are our last and only assured line of defense, and will one day act as such which is why we must ensure the nation’s enemies see the might of our of strategic capabilities and that they work as perfectly as possible; and as they say “practice makes perfect”. Which is why periodically our strategic forces test these weapon systems to gather data, to train the soldiers that will one day operate them, to verify their accuracy and range and to make sure they will work as required when we need them most.

It is absolutely essential we keep on testing these missiles for two main reasons, the first one we have outlined above and the second one is to send a strong and resolute message of deterrence, of strength, of resolve to our enemies. We have been observing for many years how at every major missile capability test in the last 5 years, there has sprung a coordinated print, TV, and social media propaganda campaign from the other side of the border against these tests. This manifested most strongly in 2018 and 2017 when almost the entirety of Indian media simultaneously claimed the Babur III SLCM launch that occurred had not been successful and the video of the launch had been doctored.

They only stopped their lies when multiple experts from the international media disputed their fake claims to their faces. Similarly, just a week ago in 2021 when Pakistan tested ballistic missile Shaheen-III we again saw a coordinated social media campaign originating from India where they first spread fake news and started propaganda that the missile had failed and when this was not successful then they said the “warhead” had exploded in Balochistan, both claims equally ridiculous. This is part of a coordinated effort by the Indians to create a sense of mistrust in the regional community regarding our strategic capabilities.

Any student of strategy recognizes that this is a very dangerous action, seriously destabilizing strategic stability as India tries to change the status quo after it is extremely humiliating defeat in the Pakistan-India clashes of 2019. We must not allow this to happen. Our missiles need to be tested so that we can accurately evaluate the various systems being developed for the three services of our armed forces. Numerous subsystems need to be thoroughly tested before being operationalized including the guidance and navigation units, software, flight systems, reentry vehicle(s), solid or liquid fuel, communication systems, rocket motors and several hundred other things.

Testing also provides the added usage of invaluable training to the soldiers and simulates real-world scenarios where this capability will be used. So, with keeping in mind the severely critical nature of this capability, we must hone it perfectly with no space for errors so that it is used as intended, when intended. It is obvious India would try their best to stop us from doing this, but we believe that we as a nation can rise above such petty and pathetic attempts to malign our strategic capability’s reputation in our own country and beyond.

We are a peace-loving nation, that is our stated policy. We do not wish for conflict, and this is evident in our many ignored peace overtures in 2018. The Indians, unfortunately for all of us in South Asia, chose a belligerent regime to lead them that saw these peace overtures as a sign of weakness rather than as sign of statesmanship and a mature, responsible nation. If they decide to walk down the path of threatening Pakistan, we will feed our enemies with fire and fury, and all the time we will also try to diffuse the situation like all responsible nations should do.

The Indians, for their part, must remember: if you play stupid games, you will win stupid prizes.
 
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Pakistan Reorientates its Air Power

By John Fricker


Since partition in 1947, Pakistan had traditionally looked towards India as its principle military threat, and has fought two wars in 1965 and 1971 with its considerably larger neighbor over territorial disputes which resulted in the loss of its eastern wind, now Bangladesh. For the past six years, however, Pakistan has had to face military and political pressure on an entirely different direction, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve in December 1979, and subsequent anti-guerilla operations by some 115,000 Russian troops, in conjunction with the Afghan army. In the course of these, Pakistan has experienced innumerable violations and air attacks across its mountainous northern and western borders by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. Attempting to interdict the supply routes of the rebel mujahideen based in the tribal territories of the North-West Frontier Province, these aircraft have in the process from time to time bombed and destroyed villages within Pakistani territory.

Repeated protests over these attacks by the Islamabad government have been ignored in Kabul, but a more effective response has since been achieved by Pakistan through the strengthening and reorientation of its north-western defences. On 17th May last year, their effectiveness, together with that of the PAF’s recently-received General dynamics F-16, was decisively proved when two Pakistani Fighting Falcons intercepted four Afghan jet fighters (believed to be Sukhoi Su-22s although some reports claim that they were Soviet-flown Su-24s) when they crossed the border into Kurram Province, and shot down at least one of the intruders near Parachinar, about nine mile (14 km) inside Pakistani territory. A second Afghan aircraft was also claimed to have been hit during this encounter, in which the F-16s used their “all-aspect” AIM-9L Advanced Sidewinder AAMs, but this was the first time that PAF fighters had been successful in destroying an intruding aircraft from Afghanistan, despite countless border violations in the past six years. As a Pakistan government spokesman said at the time, air violations from Afghanistan “were running at about two and a half times what they were in 1985, exceeding 500 in the first six months of 1986, but we only protest when there are casualties”.

Since then, reports of similar violation have been somewhat fewer, but the threat from Afghanistan remains, and would be intensified by an eventual Soviet victory in that country. American fears of further Soviet expansion in that region, however, resulted in the resumption in 1981 of large-scale US military aid to Pakistan-previously limited by the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which vetoed help to countries believed to be developing nuclear weapons. Pakistan has long been accused by India-itself rated as a nuclear power since its test explosion in 1974-of “being in the process of producing atomic weapons”, and to be “very close to the completion of at least five such weapons” from its “excessive” facilities for uranium enrichment.

This has been consistently denied in Islamabad, and these reports did not prevent the US from approving in late-1980, a six-year $3.2bn aid package, of which almost exactly half comprised military equipment credits. These were intended to help with the modernization of Pakistan’s armed forces to counter Soviet military aid to both Afghanistan and India, and included the provision of 40 GD F-16s and associated weapons for the PAF, naval MDC Harpoon anti-ship missiles, as well as 100 M-60A3 tanks, GD Stinger infantry SAMs, 20 Bell AH-1S anti-tank helicopter and supporting TOW ATMs for the Pakistan army.

Most of this equipment has now been delivered and is operational in Pakistan, but agreement was reached with Washington in early-1986 for a new six-year $4.02bn aid program to run between October 1987 and September 1993, subject to Congressional approval. Included in this total was $1.74bn in military sales credits, at 5% annual interest, for further purchases of American arms and equipment, which are expected to include additional F-16s, AH-1s and various defensive missiles. Following receipt of its first 40 F-16s, the PAF had expressed a requirement for a similar second batch, to equip a further two tactical fighter squadrons, but Pentagon sources are dubious that sufficient funding could be allocated for more than 12-24 of these aircraft.

The PAF also has a long-standing requirement for four Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft to improve radar coverage of its mountainous northern borders, but this request was originally rejected by the US on the grounds that they could be used to detect and designate Indian naval targets. Various alternatives, including the Lockheed P-3 AEW & C version of Orion, the installation of suitable mission avionics in its Lockheed C-130s, Westinghouse balloon-mounted radar systems, and the provision of a USAF- crewed Boeing E-3A AWACS have since been studied by the PAF. By late last year, the AWACS has emerged as the PAF favorite and in October, Pentagon sources indicated that the Reagan Administration was now disposed to allow the sale of one or more E-3s to Pakistan, with a USAF-crewed aircraft possibly but this situation has been eased by the grant since 1981, prompted by the US government, of a $500m loan, at low interest rates and repayable over 50 years, from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan for military equipment procurement.

Chinese military aid


Further military assistance has been received for many years from the People’s Republic of China, starting with the supply from 1966 of Shenyang-built MiG-19SFs, as the F-6, of which the first 60 or more were reportedly donated to the PAF, with a further 120 or so following from 1978 at (very low) cost. China also donated an F-6 Rebuild Factory, plus all its equipment, for the complete overhaul of the PAF’s aircraft at Kamra, where Pakistan has established an embryo aircraft industry centre. In PAF service, the F-6 has been developed into an effective Mach=1.4 superiority and ground attack aircraft, with the provision of some Western avionics, equipment and systems, plus the ingenious integration of AIM-9B Sidewinder AAM (of which at least 450 have been converted to AIM-9J standard by the Radar and Missile Rebuild Factory, Kamra). As a result, the F-6 has been effectively the mainstay of Pakistan’s air power in equipping four or five first-line squadrons.

Further reinforcement of the PAF, from early 1983, resulted from the initial deliveries from China of a first batch of 42 Nanchang A-5 III (A-SC) dedicated ground-attack aircraft-a development of the F-6-to re-equip three tactical squadrons (Nos 7, 16 and 26) of the PAF. Although restricted to strictly visual roles, the A-5s equipped mostly with Western avionics, Martin-Bakers ejection-seats and new systems, provided Pakistan with the numerical tactical jet strength it needed at minimum cost, since, with a reported fly-away unit price of mere $1m, the A-F was sufficiently affordable for the PAF to order a further 100 or so examples to equip a further three squadrons by early 1987.

Continuing its close defense liaison with Pakistan, China is now widely, although unofficially, reported to be in the process of supplying a further batch of low-cost fighters in the form of 60 Xian F-7M Airguard versions of the Chinese-built MiG-21, following evaluation of the basic F-7 by the PAF in mid-1984. Compared with the original F-7, the F-7M is powered by the 13,448 lb st (6100 kgp) Wopen WP-7BM twin-spool six-stage turbojet, has a second 23-mm cannon on the port side and additional outer wind weapons pylons, but its main differences concern the installation of Western systems in a program managed by GEC Avionics from the UK. These include a type 956 HUDWAC, Type 7M (Skyranger) ranging radar, AD3400 UHF/VHF multi-function communications radio, XS-6A beacon receiver, WL-7 radio compass, Type 602 IFF, a new air data computer and solid-state inverters. Most of this is of GEC Avionics manufacture, although the Chinese have included the 0101 HR A/2 radar altimeter from Smiths Industries, also in the UK.

Once again, the export price of the F-7M is being quoted at the extraordinarily low figure for a Mach=2 fighter, of “less than $4m”, and with its PL-5B AAMs (derived from the AIM-9L Sidewinder) also supplied from China, the Airguard would prove a potent addition to the PAF’s combat inventory. Further unofficial reports indicate that the Chinese government has agreed help with the establishment of full-scale manufacturing facilities for the F-7M at the F-6 Rebuild Factory at Kamra, licensed production being the scheduled from 1989 onwards to follow initial deliveries of Chinese-built Airguards to the PAF from early 1987. Contracts are also reported to be pending from Pakistan to Boeing and Grumman to study the feasibility of replacing the WP-7BM turbojet the FE F404 or PW1120, for additional performance improvements. Consideration is further reportedly being given to avionics, to Northrop F-20 standards, for the PAF’s F-7S.

In the meantime, the F-6 Rebuild Factory at Kamra is being expanded to undertake the airframe and systems overhaul of all the PAF’s Chinese-built aircraft, including the FT-5 and FT-6 jet trainers, as well as the more recently-purchased Nanchang A-5S, although zero-timing of their WP-5 and WP-6 series power plants will continue to be done at the PAF’s Faisal Shaheed maintenance base near Karachi. F-6 overhauls at Kamra did not start until 1980, because of delays resulting from an earthquake near the parent Shenyang factory in the PRC, but current output is meeting the PAF’s requirement for 24 rebuilt aircraft per year.

This represents a major advance, since the F-6 airframe has a TBO only 600 hours, and the lead time for each aircraft returning to PRC for this operation averaged 18 months. The Kamra factory also manufactures about 4,000 F-6 line item spares, including cockpit canopies and 250-Imp gal (1 140-1) alloy drop tanks, and has supervised the design by the PAF of a 165-Imp gal (750-1) aerodynamic belly tank for the F-6.

Enter the F-16

As the PAF’s principal operational element, Air Defense Command was formed in 1975 with HQ at Chaklala, Rawalpindi, to maintain 24-hour surveillance of national airspace, and to control and co-ordinate, through regional sector HQs, all early-warning, interceptor, SAM and AAA components. Mobile observer units supplement the radar warning and control system, which is now linked with four PAF missile squadrons, each pf two flights, equipped with Thomson-SCF/MATRA Crotale low-level all-weather SAMs ordered in 1975 for air base defense. Apart from the defense of PakArmy armored units, the PAF is responsible for the operation of all defensive missile systems in Pakistan, reportedly including Chinese CSA-1 (SA-2 Guideline) SAMs and 40-mm anti-aircraft artillery.

Re-equipment of the F-6 squadrons that have comprised the spearhead of ADC started in January 1983, with delivery of the first two GD-16As and four F-16B two-seat trainers, diverted from USAF production allocations in Europe, to No. 11 Squadron at Sargodha, which now compromises the Operational Conversion Unit for six PAF pilots and 87 technicians, the PAF now handles its own F-16 conversions, for which it has received a total of 12 F-16B trainers (instead of the six originally planned) and only 28 single-seat F-16As.

These were all delivered by mid-1986, and also equip No.9 Squadron, which converted from the Mirage 5PA and 5DP in July 1984, and also operates from Sargodha. PAF F-16 equipment includes ALQ-131 ECM pods and the ALR-69 radar-warning receiver, and in addition to ALM-9L Sidewinder AAMs (of which 1,500 were included in the PAF package), armament provisions includes Thomson-CSF ATLIS laser designator pods containing a TV-type tracking system linked with a laser illuminator. Two ATLIS pods were supplied by Thomson-CSF to General Dynamics for six month qualification trials on the F-16, one being mounted on the lateral fuselage stores pylon of two-seat F-16B for use with laser-guided bomb and missiles. The PAF’s F-16s were the first non-French aircraft to be equipped with ATLIS, which entered service with French air force Jaguars, in conjunctions with Aerospatiale AS-30L air-to-surface missiles and MATRA laser-guided bombs, and has also been ordered by Egypt for its Mirage 2000s.

PAF Mirage strength


Before the resumption of US military aid, Pakistan turned to France for the procurement of new high-performance fighters, in the form of Mach=2 Dassault Mirage IIIs and 5s for multi-role strike, interception and reconnaissance. These now equip five or six PAF squadrons, using aircraft from a total of 96 delivered in four batches, starting with a 1967 order for 18 Mirage IIIEP strike-interceptors, three IIIRP tactical-recce aircraft and tree IIIDP two-seat trainers. These initially equipped No. 5 Squadron at Sargodha, armed with MATRA R 530 and 550 Magic AAMs and were followed in 1970 by 28 non-radar-equipped Mirage 5PA ground-attack aircraft and two more IIIDP two-seat trainers. In 1975, orders were placed by the PAF for a further 10 Doppler-equipped Mirage IIIRDP reconnaissance fighters, increasing overall procurement of this variant to 13, while 1979 saw the final and largest single Pakistani Mirage order in the form of 30 SPA2/3s and two two-seat 5DPA2 trainers.

As indicated by their designations, these last Mirages were more advanced versions of the M5 series, the 5PA2s incorporating Thomson-CSF Cyrano IV fire-control radar, with a range of 26 nautical miles (48km), for air-to-air and air-to-ground roles, and the FPA3s having the Thomson-CSF Agave attack radar for use in conjunction with the Aerospatiale AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile for maritime strike missions. Mirage deliveries were completed to Pakistan at the end of 1982, and PAF units currently operating this type include Nos 5, 8, 20, 22 (OCU) and 33 Squadrons, plus the Combat Commander’s School at Sargodha, alongside the F-6.

In the early 1980s, the first batch of Mirage IIIs underwent an update program with the installation of new systems, including the Litton LW-33 INS. Since May 1978, the PAF has also undertaken its own major overhauls of the Mirage, its Atar 09C-3 turbojet and over 400 other mechanical and electronic system components, at the Mirage Rebuild Factory in the Kamra Aeronautical Centre. Overhaul life of the Mirage airframe is currently quoted as 11 years or 1,000 flying hours, while the Atar has a 600-hour TBO (compared with only 100 for the F-6s Wopen WP-6), and the Kamra Rebuild Factory is currently zero-timing about eight PAF Mirage per year.

A small batch of airframe forgings has recently been supplied to Dassault-Breguet for evaluation with a view to Kamra’s qualification as a sub-contractor, and the Mirage Factory’s Atar engine rebuild plant is earmarked for future expansion following a decision to overhaul the Pratt & Whitney F100 power plants of the PAF’s F-16s there. F-16 airframe and systems support and overhaul will, however. Be undertaken at the PAF’s main operational base of Sargodha, near Lahore.

Other PAF combat types

Unique in the PAF is No 2 (Composite) Squadron, based at Masroor-formerly knows as Mauripur, near Karachi-which operates a miscellany of now-ageing US aircraft on mostly second-line, target-facilities and support duties, although it is part of No 32 Fighter Ground-Attack Wing. These types include the last half-dozen of the 26 Martin B-57B/RB-57B and B-57C Canberras supplied to Nos 7 and 8 squadrons of the PAF from 1955 onwards, which played an active part in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India; and a few Lockheed T-33 jet trainers, plus the sole surviving Lockheed RT-33 equipped for non-combat tactical reconnaissance.

Nos 7 and 8 Squadrons remain, as they have done for many years, at Masroor, although now equipped as tactical attack units with Nanchang A-5s (plus two FT-6s) and Mirage 5PA3s, respectively, and operate alongside No 19 Air Superiority Squadron with F-6s and No 22 Squadron, which is the Mirage OCU, with 5Pas, 5DPs and IIIDP trainers. Like most PAF bases, Masroor also has its own SAR unit, which is No 84 Squadron, with locally-assembled Alouette III helicopters, and this composition is typical of Pakistan’s half-dozen or so combat wings, with a total of about 16 first-line squadrons, under the overall command of Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmed Khan as Commander-in-Chief.

These units include No 29 Squadron, operating since the mid-1970s from Sharah-e-Faisal (formerly Drigh Road) along-side naval Sea King units. Although wearing “Pakistan Navy” markings and including naval personnel among its aircrews, this squadrons flies its ex-Aeronavale Breguet Atlantics on maritime surveillance as part of the PAF, with which it is the sole flying component of No 31 Wing. With No 8 Squadron’s Mirage 5PA3s from Masroor, it also shares anti-shipping strike roles, being similarly armed with Aerospatiale AM-39 Exocet air-launched sea-skimming missiles. In recent years, replacement maritime patrol aircraft have been considered by the PAF, including surplus USN P-3A/B Orions and Fokker F.27MPAs, but this requirement appears to have been deferred by the recent refurbishment and overhaul of the Atlantics in France.

Transport and trainers

Transport support for the PAF is provided by a force of Lockheed C-130s, of which Pakistan has received 20 since the early 1960s, comprising seven C-130Bs through MAP funding, interspersed with four C-130Bs and five C-130Es from Iran, two former PIA-operated civil L-100-20s and two ex-USAF C-130Bs, although at least seven of these have since been lost in accidents. The surviving C-130Bs and C-130Es have been modified by Lockheed-Georgia Co at Marietta to extend their fatigue lives and to have Allison T56-A-15 turboprops, bringing them approximately up to C-130H standard. They are mostly operated with in No 35 Air Wing at Chaklala, near Rawalpindi, by No 6 Tactical Transport Squadron on re-supply flights to the mountainous northern regions, and on tactical support roles.

A few C-130s are also operated on training duties from Chaklala by the Transport Conversion School, formerly designated No 3 Squadron, while the base is further shared with No12 Squadron, equipped with Fokker F.27 and a Dassault Falcon 20 for government and VIP personnel transport. Although not yet formally designated, No 12 Squadron will probably supplement its strength with the three Boeing 707-320 jet transports in the process of being transferred from Pakistan International Airlines to the PAF, of which the first example was handed over last July, and the second was due to follow in September. Both these aircraft were in the cargo configuration and may eventually be adapted as aerial tankers for flight-refueling roles, but the third 707, due for transfer in mid-1987, will be delivered for VIP transport.

While these ex-civil aircraft will provide a small boost to Pakistan’s long-range military airlift capabilities, replacements for the PAF’s ageing Hercules are required over the longer term, Licensed production of a medium tactical transport is one of the projects under consideration for the Aeronautical Centre at Kamra, but funding allocations are again likely to be problematical. Decisions on any new manufacturing program for Kamra will be mainly dependent on Pakistan’s troubled economy, and since the number of aircraft needed by the PAF will inevitably be small, joint ventures, coupled with industrial offsets and technology transfers, will almost certainly be the most ambitious targets sought by the Aeronautical Complex.

For its personnel training, the PAF has its own School, College Academy and now University and its primary and basic flying courses for many years have been undertaken at Risalpur. This now houses the PAF University, as well *** the Primary and Basic Flying Training Wings, each with two squadrons. In the primary stage, 44 hours are flown on the Kamra-built MFI-17B Mushak, with an average dual-to-solo time of 15-17 hours, while a further 120 hours are flown in the basic syllabus on Cessna T-37B/C jet trainers to wings standard.

All Pakistani pilots are then required to undertake fighter training at No.1 Fighter Conversation Unit, where 102 sorties are flown in 75 hours on the Shenyang FT-5 two-seat development of the MiG-17, which replaced the Lockheed T-33 as the PAF’s advanced trainer from early 1975. Lower-graded trainers are then transferred to transport or helicopter courses, while the remainder proceed to an operational conversion unit for a 60-hour course on the two-seat FT-6 version of the MiG-19, and the single-seat F-6 itself, with either No.14 Squadron at Mianwali or No25 Squadron at Sargodha. First-tour jet pilots are then posted to F-6 or A-5 squadrons, the latter also having a couple of FT-6s on strength for instrument and continuation training.

Training facilities are offered by the PAF for Arab students from many Middle Eastern countries, and Pakistan also maintains training missions with the air forces of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Training procedures are currently being reviewed, mainly because of the growing requirement for replacement of the Cessna T-37s in the early 1990s, and most of the leading international basic trainers, including the Aerospatiale Epsilon, EBRAER Tucano, Fairchild T-46, Pilatus PC-7 and PC-9, RFB Fantrainer and SIAI-Marchetti S.211 have been evaluated by the PAF, although no decision is expected for a couple of years.

Apart from performance and cost considerations, the PAF is particularly interested in ensuring that the selected type should be built under license at the Kamra Aeronautical Centre, where the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory has now completed more than 140 MFI-17 Mushak piston-engine trainers and liaison aircraft for the PAF and the Pakistan Army. Construction of Kamra’s aircraft production facility began in 1979, and, by September 1983, it had flight-tested the first of an initial batch of 92 MFI-17s assembled from kits supplied by SAAB-MFI in Sweden.

Since then, the Manufacturing Factory has progressively taken over component production, as well as the MFI-17 project itself, and the entire airframe is now locally-built, Kamra is currently producing about 15 Mushaks per year, and although no export sales have yet been secured, Pakistan’s national requirements are estimated to sustain this output for at least another year, with a minimum of a further 40 expected off the line. Plans are also in hand to develop the MFI-17 and improve its short-field performance, for which trials are being conducted with detachable mainplane extensions and the installation of turbo-supercharged 210 hp Continental TSIO-360 engine. Evaluations of this version are being undertaken by the Pakistan Army to assess the improvement in hot-and-high field performance.

Further work is being generated at Kamra by Mushak major airframe repairs, and export customers in the Middle and Far East are being sought at a fly-away unit cost of about $150,000. Other production at the plant includes GRP and transparent panels for PAF and Pakistan Army Alouette IIIs, and the Army’s UH-1H helicopters, and the machine-tools and presses selected to equip the factory are capable of forming much larger and more complex airframe parts than those for Mushak.
 
A Sword For Hussain
By: Air Cdre Kaiser M. Tufail

Commitments under the newly signed pact with Egypt, as well as the prevailing atmosphere of anti-Israeli rage in the Arab world forced King Hussein bin Talal's hand at the outbreak of the Six Day War of 1967. Any doubts that he may have had about Jordan entering the war were overcome by a misleading telephone call he received from the Egyptian President at mid-day on 5th June. In a bizarre 'all is well' report, Nasser assured Hussein that scores of Israeli aircraft had been downed and that Egyptian armored columns were pushing across the Negev Desert for a link-up with Jordanian forces in the Hebron Hills. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian Air Force lay in smoking ruins after the Israeli Air Force had delivered a knockout blow! Oblivious of the factual position, King Hussein ordered his armed forces to attack immediately after Nasser's call.

Parked on the flight lines at Mafraq Air Base were Hunters of No 1 Sqn, the only fighter outfit of the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF). Strapped in the cockpits since morning, the pilots were eagerly awaiting a go-ahead for strikes against Israeli airfields at Kfar Saba, Kfar Sirkin and Natanya. The past few days had been occupied with preparation of maps and low-level flight profiles. The excitement and tension had reached a pitch and all pilots were ready to get into action.

Flt Lt Saif-ul-Azam of the Pakistan Air Force, who had been on secondment with the RJAF since w November 1966, was to lead one of the strike missions. At about 0900 hrs, he was told to hand over the lead to a Jordanian pilot and rush to a Hunter that had been readied for an air defence mission. Saif hurriedly strapped into the other aircraft and, along with his wingman Lt Ihsan Shurdom1, stood on standby eagerly waiting for the hooter to sound the 'scramble.'

A few days earlier, Saif and his other PAF colleague, Flt Lt Sarwar Shad had been called by the RJAF Commander to ascertain their position in case of war. Both promptly offered their services, while suggesting that the opinion of the Government of Pakistan be obtained for further details. It was tentatively decided that they would fly as 'volunteers' in Jordanian uniforms. Official Pakistani clearance to fly only air defence missions was received just in time, which had required Saif to hurriedly switch roles on the tarmac. After half an hour of impatient waiting in the cockpit, Saif belatedly learnt that the Israeli Air Force had struck Egyptian airfields. Sitting helplessly on the ground waiting for orders was nerve racking and, all pilots squirmed in their cockpits to seek revenge. Mafraq was sure to be attacked, as everyone guessed, so it was some relief when two formations finally took off at 1150 hrs and headed west. A short while later, in a show of solidarity, a formation of six Iraqi Hunters over flew Mafraq on their way to Lydda airfield in Israel. The heightened air activity reached a crescendo when orders were relayed for all aircraft to scramble as fast as they could. Saif and his wingman Ihsan were the first to get airborne in the fervent melee, followed by four more Hunters. ATC announced the bad news that one of the Hunters flown by Major Feras had been strafed and had caught fire. The unfortunate pilot could not get out of the burning aircraft.

After take-off, Saif contacted the radar for further instructions. The radar controller announced a vector and the interceptors headed in the required direction. Soon, another vector was announced and the pair changed heading. It was not long before the controller declared that there were too many aircraft and it was difficult to make out who was who. Saif was, therefore, asked to be on his own. Noting the controller's dilemma, Saif called out to his wingman to stay close. The visibility in the hot, dusty desert was barely a mile and there were no signs of enemy aircraft. Saif rechecked with the controller if there were any aircraft approaching Mafraq. His fears were confirmed when he received a reply in the affirmative.

Turning around, Saif headed for the Base. About four miles short, he spotted four aircraft flying in battle formation at low level. The camouflage of the aircraft seen through haze seemed similar to that of the Iraqi formation that had passed overhead some time ago, so Saif was led to believe that they must have been returning after the raid. Following them for a while, he watched with amazement as they changed into echelon formation, getting ready for an attack! Realizing his mistake in recognizing the Israeli Mysteres, which looked similar to Hunters from a distance, Saif promptly maneuvered behind the trailing attacker, the No 4 of the formation. As the aircraft was turning for the attack, Saif closed in and let off a smugly-aimed fusillade from the Hunter's four immensely powerful 30mm cannon. The Mystere2 caught fire and its pieces started to fly off; Saif had to pull up to avoid hitting the debris. Moments later, the aircraft crashed near the perimeter fence of the Base, with the pilot Capt Hanania Bula still inside the stricken aircraft.

Looking around for other attackers that he had lost during the shooting, Saif noticed the smoke trail of two Mysteres charging off towards the west at full power. As Saif turned hard for them, Ihsan, called a bogey on the right. Saif directed Ihsan, who had tenaciously stuck around during the tight maneuvering, to break off and go after the singleton while he went for the pair on the left.

Saif managed to get behind the trailing Mystere, which had started thrashing about to spoil his aim. During the frantic turn reversals, Saif fired four times but his bullets stayed off the mark. Desperate for a kill, Saif was at wits end when he noticed his quarry loosening the turn and straightening out for home. Closing in to about 600 feet, Saif squeezed the trigger for a fifth time. The Mystere started to trail smoke from its right wing as the Hunter's guns scored hits. The aircraft ducked down and, before Saif could confirm if it had been terminally dispatched, he saw the leader of the enemy pair turning to attack him. Low on fuel and ammunition, Saif wisely decided to disengage and turn for Mafraq. Reckoning that Mafraq runway had been rendered unfit for use, Saif called all aircraft to hold north of the airfield while he checked the feasibility of landing there. His call for joining instructions was surprisingly answered by a welcome clearance and, the controller followed it up by declaring the runway fit for landing. A sharp eared Ihsan suspected something wrong and instantly broke into Arabic to check the identity of the controller. He also wanted to know the name of Ihsan's dog, which was some sort of a crosscheck code. The Jordanian controller then came up on the radio and warned them not to land at Mafraq. Ihsan's presence of mind saved the pair from the trap of an Israeli spoofer, who had cleared them for a landing that was certain to be an unqualified wreck.

All the airborne aircraft diverted to Amman International Airport, which had not yet been visited by the Israelis. The pilots were lucky to have landed shortly before the Israeli Air Force struck the airport. Their aircraft, however, could not escape destruction as they were caught parked in the open. The pilots helplessly watched as Mysteres delivered attacks with a new type of rocket-boosted 'dibber' bomb, which penetrated deep into the runway surface and cratered it badly. The attacks were delivered from shallow dive angles, which minimized exposure to AAA guns. Civilian facilities on the airport were strafed and badly damaged. Several transport aircraft and helicopters were also destroyed. After an eventful morning, the pilots gathered at the Operations Headquarters in Amman to exchange notes about the encounters that had taken place. Ihsan had claimed a Mystere while his leader was busy chasing the exiting pair. One of the Hunter pilots, Capt Wasfi3, had ejected near Amman after having been shot down by an Israeli Mirage. RJAF's sole fighter squadron had put up a spirited fight, though the pilots felt dejected over the losses suffered. The worst blow was the destruction of 20 Hunters on the ground at Mafraq and Amman International. Many of these were being serviced on the flight lines after their morning missions; invaluable expertise in the shape of many technicians was thus lost as well. Sadly, the small RJAF had been virtually wiped out.

An hour later, the pilots were surprised to have in their midst, King Hussein, who had come to cheer them up for their brave effort in Jordan's first major air war. He was cognisant of his decision that had brought upon the Jordanians the tribulation that they now faced. He explained the circumstances in which he had decided to go to war. His message was that of faith and hope in the face of adversity. PAF's Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations), Air Cdre A Rahim Khan, who was visiting Jordan at that time, was also there to express his solidarity with the RJAF personnel. As if to unburden himself of the debt he owed to the pilots of No 1 Sqn, King Hussein again visited them in the evening. Turning to Saif, he told him to get into his car, a privilege that was extended only to the most honored compatriots. They drove off to the main hospital to see PAF's Flt Lt Shad who was convalescing after an appendicitis complication. Later, the King along with Saif drove off to Mafraq, about 40 miles from Amman. Saif recalls that during the drive, King Hussein kept reassuring him like a younger brother. He said that it was a minor setback in a battle and not a defeat in a war, words that were most encouraging and inspiring for Saif. The King was hopeful that more could be done as the war had not yet ended. With young men like Saif around, all was not lost and the fight could go on. After all Saif had been, quite literally, a sword for Hussein. Thus armed, the King was unwilling to give up easily.

During the drive from Amman to Mafraq Air Base, King Hussein had told Saif that he had talked to President Abdal-Rehman Arif and offered the services of his pilots to carry on the war from Iraq. President Arif had agreed to provide the aircraft, and soon orders were issued for a move to Iraq. Around midnight, an expedition consisting of RJAF pilots and support personnel moved in a road convoy, on their way to the cryptically named H-3 Air Base5 located about 40 miles inside Iraq's western border. The night in the desert was cold and the ride was rough. The past 24 hours had been turbulent and the physical and mental strain was showing. Partly dozing, partly awake, everyone seemed anxious to get to his destination and become part of the war effort again.

The seemingly endless drive continued as it dawned on the morning of 6th June. The quiet of the desert was broken only by the noise of vehicles and an occasional Iraqi military convoy heading west. Tired and hungry, the party prepared for a roadside breakfast halt. A large number of military transports were dispersed on both sides of the road and, Iraqi troops were resting before their onward journey to the Israeli border. All of a sudden, a formation of four Vautour6 light bombers, escorted by a pair of MirageIIIC fighters roared overhead, flying east along the road towards H-3. The RJAF convoy promptly halted and everyone dispersed in the desert, just in case the returning raiders decided on a shot of opportunity at the gathering.

As expected, about fifteen minutes later the egressing Israeli aircraft pulled up and started strafing the Iraqi vehicles. After a single pass, they continued onwards with their egress7. Two vehicles caught fire and several soldiers were injured. It took some time for everyone to gather again. There were outbursts of rage and, some questioned the wisdom of traveling during daytime. One senior commander suggested a 24-hour halt in the desert, but the young pilots did not like the idea at all. There was much grumbling and disagreement.

Saif, being the lone foreigner, kept out of the discussion, but two young pilots approached him and wanted to know his intentions. Saif said that since he was from the PAF he was obliged to obey orders to reach H-3 at the earliest and, if the party decided otherwise, he would take a ride on Iraqi transports plying up and down. He was in a bit of a quandary too, as he could not interfere with the contingent commander's decision. While discussions were going on, a group of youngsters suddenly appeared and asked Saif to take over command of the contingent! Embarrassed about the situation he found himself in, he argued that a coup d'etat in the middle of the desert that too during war was the last thing he could contemplate. He was, however, firmly told that since they had decided to arrest and even shoot the commander, it was logical for the next senior to take charge. It took some persuasion on Saifs part to cool things down.

Saif met the commander separately and tried to explain that the youngsters were rearing for a return bout with the Israeli's, and their emotional state had to be understood. He also explained that under the circumstances, a certain amount of risk had to be taken. The commander was quick to grasp Saifs argument and ordered everyone to board the transports. A serious situation was thus averted.

The RJAF contingent reached H-3 safe and sound. The Iraqi Air Force personnel were effusive in welcoming them. Before they could move off to their billets, however, the Base Commander revealed a change in plans. It was decided that in view of the vulnerability of H-3, as demonstrated in two previous raids, operations would be undertaken from Habbaniyah Air Base, about 50 miles west of Baghdad. H-3 was to be used as a staging base.

Habbaniyah Air Base, with the meandering Euphrates on one side and the picturesque Lake Habbaniyah on the other, had been host to three Hunter squadrons, including a conversion Unit. A nearby satellite airfield, commonly known as 'Plateau,' housed a Tu-16 bomber squadron. Both Bases were under the command of Col Hamid Shaban8.

After setting course in the afternoon, the contingent reached Habbaniyah at 2100 hrs. For about two hours, nobody seemed to know what to do with the new arrivals. Finally, arrangements were made to house them and some time later, food was served. As it happened, the Base had learnt of their arrival only a short while ago, and messing arrangements for a large contingent took some time. True to Arab tradition, the food was sumptuous and sizzling and the Iraqi hosts were most friendly and hospitable. After a hearty fill, the exhausted and drowsy visitors retired, somewhat hesitant of what lay in store for the next day.

A gentle nudge and a whispering voice woke up Saif early at dawn on the morning of 7th June. Looking around, he found the same Iraqi Lieutenant who had met him the night before. The young officer conveyed the Base Commander's message, "He needs four pilots to volunteer for the first mission to take-off shortly and you are requested to lead!" Saif had heard of such detailing of volunteers as party jokes in the PAF but this was the first time it was being played on him. Once at the Base Headquarters, the RJAF pilots were hurriedly introduced to the senior commanders and other officers. There was no time to be wasted. Intelligence information (more plausibly, simple guesswork) had indicated that a large formation of Israeli planes was expected to repeat a strike on H-3. Saif was, therefore, to lead a four-ship formation to intercept the raiders.

Saif immediately got down to briefing the pilots. His formation consisted of Lt Ihsan Shurdom, his trusted wingman of RJAF, along with Lt Samir and 2nd Lt Mohammad of Iraqi Air Force. It was a truly international group, meeting for the first time over a cup of tea. Not knowing much about each other's experience and operational training standards, they were committed to be comrades-in-arms. They were ready to engage the enemy, a desire sustained by their common Faith. While they were having late breakfast, they received a message9 to take-off immediately. Within minutes, the four ship Hunter formation was on its way to H-3. Climbing to 25,000 ft, the formation members maintained radio silence till the controller announced, "Expecting enemy attacks on H-3." Moments later, he called out confidently, "Leader, there is a big formation pulling up over H-3, descend and engage it."

The Israeli formation consisted of six aircraft. A section of four Vautours was led by the Deputy Squadron Commander Maj. Shlomo Keren in a two-Beater, with Capt Alexander Meltz as his navigator. The other members were Col. Yehezkel Someh (Base Commander of Ramat David Air Base Capt Yitzhak Golan and Lt Avshalom Friedman in single seaters10. Two Mirages doubled up as armed escorts, each carrying two bombs; Maj. Ezra Dotan led the pair, with Capt Gideon Dror as wingman.

The Hunters were five miles short of H-3 when Saif started diving down towards the airfield and called out for arming the guns. Soon, he spotted two Vautours approaching from the west. "Right boys, follow me and let us descend faster." Ihsan chipped in, "Sir, how about punching the drop tanks?" Saif realized his mistake and ordered all to jettison their 230-gallon tanks. Engrossed in spotting the aircraft, Saif had overlooked a vital check but was relieved to know that his formation members were alert.

As Saif maneuvered to get behind the Vautours, Samir called out, "Two Mirages behind you." Looking back, Saif saw the pair about 4,000 feet behind, turning for them. In an instant, Saif decided to split his formation, with himself and Ihsan (No 2) going for the Mirages while Samir and Muhammad (Nos. 3 & 4) went for the Vautours. Turning hard to the right, Saif cramped the Mirages for maneuvering space, forcing them to pull up for a 'yo yo.' Reversing his turn, Saif noticed one of the Mirages still turning right, apparently having lost sight of the Hunters. Saif managed to turn inside the Mirage and started to catch up fast. At the extreme limits of range, the Mirage could not light up its fuel guzzling afterburner, or else it could have easily out-run the subsonic Hunter. In the event, the Mirage had to face the Hunter's lethal cannon. Uttering 'Bismilla11,' Saif pressed the trigger for about two seconds. The bullets landed squarely on the wings, as sparks flew off the metal skin. Suddenly, the Mirage was engulfed in a big ball of fire; the pilot, Capt Dror, ejected in full view of the Base personnel watching from the ground. "Leader, you have finally won the bet, it's a Mirage," called Ihsan on the radio. "You bet it is, but stop the fun and look out for more," responded Saif. Several months ago, Saif had a dream in which he saw that he had shot down an Israeli Mirage. When he narrated his dream in the squadron, the pilots seemed so impressed that instead of laughing it off as a joke, they got into an animated discussion on the basics of air combat. Ihsan had then bet that if Saif ever shot down a Mirage in real life, a precious gift and a grand party would follow. Now, in the middle of air combat, Ihsan had not lost his wit and humor one bit!

Breaking off to the right after downing the Mirage, Saif spotted a Vautour coming head-on, about 2,000 feet below. Without batting an eyelid, Saif inverted his aircraft and pulled through for a 'split-S.' The maneuver can go awry if there is insufficient clearance from the ground, but Saif pulled back on the control stick to the point of almost blacking out. When he leveled off, he found himself behind the Vautour, charging in with a very high rate of closure despite the speed brakes opened and throttle pulled back to idle. The distance was now only 200 feet, too close for the safety of his own aircraft were the much larger Vautour to explode like his previous victim. Deciding not to miss the chance, Saif opened fire and after three bursts of his cannon, saw parts of the aircraft fly off. His own aircraft juddered as if hit by something; Saif had to look around to be sure he was not being shot at.

Capt. Golan lost control and ejected from his disintegrating Vautour. Saif called up the ATC tower to spot two white parachutes, which he thought to be those from a two-seat Vautour. Actually, the chutes were those of Dror, who had ejected from the Mirage at a higher altitude a little earlier, and Golan who escaped low from the Vautour Both now found themselves parachuting in formation, ironically, Dror still escorting Golan!

Low on fuel, Saif was planning to exit when he heard Samir call out excitedly, "Leader, l have shot him, I have shot a Vautour, I have shot a Vautour." Saif had to quieten him down, lest he block vital communication on the radio. In the melee, Ihsan also called that he had shot a Vautour.

As Saif started to gather the formation, he saw a Mirage (flown by Maj Dotan) chasing a Hunter right over the airfield. It was Muhammad's Hunter and, it was trailing smoke. Turn by turn everyone called him on the radio to eject but he did not respond. The aircraft went into a shallow dive and hit the abandoned oil tanks near the airfield. The sad incident overshadowed the otherwise successful mission.

Everyone's fuel was marginal after such heavy demands on the engines. Samir's fuel state was most critical so he decided to land at H-3, despite some damage to the runway. Saif and Ihsan made it to Habbaniyah, but only after a cruise at high altitude. Spotting the airfield in unfamiliar area was, luckily, not a problem as the road to Habbaniyah was conspicuous in the desert. Allowing Ihsan to break-off and land first, Saif followed through a straight-in approach.

A large crowd had gathered at the flight lines. As Saif switched off and came out of the aircraft, he was lifted up and paraded all over the place. Everyone was shouting, "Death to Zionism, Death to Israel." Saif had tears of joy in his eyes. He recalls thanking Allah for the success and also prayed for young Muhammad, whom he had met barely for half an hour before the fateful mission.

Some airmen had also gathered around Saif's Hunter and, were expressing their amazement at the nerve of the intrepid pilot who had rammed into the Israeli aircraft when he ran out of ammunition! They could not have been blamed for their mistake because the Vautour's flying debris had damaged the Hunter's wingtips and, some metal pieces were embedded in its fuselage after the close-range shooting.

When Saif reached the squadron, he was told that two Israeli aircrew had been captured at H-3 and were under despatch to Baghdad. He was more interested in his wingman Ihsan who was nowhere to be seen, despite the fact that he was supposed to have landed earlier. No one seemed to give him a satisfactory reply, except that Ihsan would be there shortly. Saifs concern was short-lived, as Ihsan arrived after about fifteen minutes with a grin on his face. Saif discovered the truth when Ihsan confessed that he had landed at the nearby 'Plateau' airfield instead of Habbaniyah. The epilogue to the raid on H-3 was a report received from Saudi Arabia confirming the crash of a two-seat Vautour-IIN on its northern border with Iraq. Both the pilots had been found dead. Capt Keren and Capt Meltzer12 had tried to nurse the stricken aircraft back through a safer route after being hit over H-3, but their luck ran out. If one were to go by Lt Samir's radio calls alone, his claim of a Vautour could easily prevail but, in all earnestness, it could also have been Ihsan's kill. In either case, one of the two pilots' claim could additionally qualify as a 'damage' of yet one more Vautour.

The plethora of accomplishments by the Israeli Air Force did not prevent a scathing indictment of the conduct of operations over H-3, in the post-war debrief. Col Eleizer Cohen, in his book Israel's Best Defense alludes to it by stating, "The damage to H-3 was peripheral, and the losses a killed pilot and navigator, two pilots captured and three aircraft downed were heavier than at any other base." Maj Gen Mordechai Hod, the Commander of the Israeli Air Force is said to have remarked that the critique of H-3 fiasco made him feel almost as if he had lost the war. Whatever factors may have been discussed during the debrief, there is little doubt that the Israelis were aware of the H-3 rout being the handiwork of a determined team, under the able leadership of a first class PAF pilot. That Mossad was ignorant of this fact would be under-rating the capabilities of a notoriously efficient intelligence outfit.

Saif-ul-Azam's exploits in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War were a display of true grit in an otherwise dismal showing, which made him a hero in several countries. The Government of Jordan conferred the prestigious Wisam-al-Istiglal (Order of Independence) on him, while the Iraqi Government conferred the Now al-Shuja'a (Medal of Bravery). The Pakistani Government rewarded him with a Sitara-i-Basalat (Star of Courage). Earlier, in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, he had shot down an Indian Gnat" for which he was awarded the Sitara-i-Jur'at (Star of Valour). He has the unique achievement of downing four different types of aircraft while flying with three different Air Forces. He eventually donned the uniform of yet another Air Force when he transferred to his new homeland, Bangladesh in 1972.

1. Shurdom later rose to be the Chief of Staff of RJAE
2 The aircraft was the Mystere IVA, though it has been erroneously mentioned in some writings as a Su.per Mystere.
3. Wasfi was shot down near Amman by a Mirage-IIIC flown by Capt Oded Sagee after a long chase, following RJAF's raid on Kfar Sirkin airfield.
4. Saif means 'sword' in Arabic.
5. A chain of pumping stations for an oil pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq, to Haifa in what is now Israel, was denoted by Hseries during the time of British Mandate, hence the nearby Air Base named thus.
6. Vautour means 'vulture' in French.
7. This minor incident narrated by Flt Lt Saif-ul-Azam is also described from an aerial vantage point by Maj Herzle Bodinger, the leader of the Vautour formation, in Israel's Best Defense by Col Eliezer Cohen (page 235). Bodinger later rose to be the Commander of Israeli Air Force.
8. Shaban later rose to be the Commander of Iraqi Air Force.
 
Pakistan Armed Forces Goodwill Delegation to China in 1968. The deputation comprised of General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, later President of Pakistan), Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan, Brigadier Mohammad Akram, Commodore M. Shariff, and Air Commodore M. Zafar Masud. Upon arrival at Beijing / Peking on November 8, 1968, the officers were given a “rousing welcome.” On November 10, 1968, Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) met all members of the delegation. Present on the occasion were Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng (Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Wu Fa-hsien, Sultan M. Khan (Pakistan Ambassador to China), and other Pakistani diplomatic officials of the Pakistani Embassy in China."



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Space Warfare as New Domain of War


Admin PSF
March 11, 2021


Space Warfare as New Domain of WarSpace Warfare as New Domain of War


Over the last few years, the domain of Space Warfare has come to the center stage with Implications that can allow one country to dominate their territory. United States of America has put forward its first step and highlighted the importance of Space Warfare by becoming the first Country to make a special force concerning with “Space Warfare”. Highlighting the concerns such as protecting their national space assets and emphasizing the necessity of such a Space force for peaceful engagement of keeping the space peaceful and secure for every nation on the planet, these tangible actions were justified upon.

However, an in-depth analysis refers to the fact that such actions might result in a developing sense of military tactics that might render the opposition useless by keeping a real time, highly accurate close inspection of the opposition’s highly sensitive areas, the “Space Warfare” might become the most lethal weapon in the future.

A look into history suggests that early footprints of Space Warfare were in place even decades ago. United States of America was able to identify the Nuclear Development Secrets of Multiple Nations using Satellites, but they were not only able to pinpoint such sensitive facilities and therefore, implement sanctions on the respective countries. But, in some cases, destroying such sensitive assets by pin-point accuracy to keep those countries from achieving the ever so important arsenals. Such phenomena have only increased and with the ever-growing Space Setup with military satellites in the space that can endure for longer durations and with highly refined accuracy rate, combined with the use to AI to detect enemy’s sensitive equipment are posing the ever so growing threat of Increased Military Presence in Space by every single nation.
But the scale of such domains is not going to be limited to aspects such as Spying and collecting data about such locations.

Modern Weapons are especially directed towards Space Warfare where such Laser Weapons, Molten Metal Cannons, Armed Asteroids whom working prospects and causes of destruction can expand multiple folds higher than the Conventional Weapon Attacks. For Example, A Conceptualized Weapons known as “Kinetic Bombardment” which will be developed around the idea of telephone size tungsten rods which could theoretically reach 10 times the speed of sound and they will be able to go hundreds of depths into the surface of the earth which will render any secret hideout, any secret bunker into a useless state. These are some of the possible weapon concepts specializing in space that can play a vastly bigger role in changing the outcome of a conflict.

In acceptance to that, there is mirror aspect that is also growing with the perspective of Space Warfare in focus and that are the “Anti-space Weapons”. Already, a few countries have tested ASATs (Anti-satellite Weapons) to make sure that they are able to effectively neutralize the Satellite scope of warfare by destroying them through their Anti-satellite Weapons and they are also further improving such weapons for the future aim of targeting higher satellites residing in the Higher Earth Orbit (HEO) & Center Earth Orbit (CEO).

However, such weapons have a repercussion of their own, and they can result in increasing the space debris (space garbage) to a very critical level that can actually result in damages to the entire planet due to such debris coming back to Earth with very high velocities which could result in damages throughout the planet. Furthermore, larger debris falling into the seas and oceans can result in larger natural disaster such as hurricanes and tsunami which are portraying very dire consequences which could ultimately result in a non-recoverable state of the planet.

Overall, the prospects of Space Warfare as a new domain of war are increasingly inevitable, increasingly developing and increasingly dangerous that might pose the greatest set of weapons that the world has ever witnessed. With such prospects in mind, It is only right to jointly neutralize the use of Weapons in Space Warfare Domain and deem them as dangerous as the phenomenon of Atomic Bomb or Hydrogen Bombs whom lethality was understood after the tragic use of such weapons and it should be made sure that these weapons are maintained in a controlled environment elsewise the participation of every nation in space exploration and development will not be possible and damage on the planet will most likely be, “Inevitable.”

Author: Muhammad Fahad
 
PAF Flying Training
By F/L Alastair Hawes


Chinese PAF trainers in formation, top to bottom; an FCU FT-5, OCU FT-6 and F-6 and another FT-5.
When The PAF was formed in 1948 its flying training was basad on that of the RAF's. Many similarities still remain. Cadets begin training at PAF Risalpur at the Air Force Academy which was modelled on the RAF Cranwell College for cadet entrants. Elementary flying training lasts for 18 months and starts on the Saab MFI-17B Mushshak and basic flying training is completed on the T-37. Cadets are awarded their wings and commissioned at the same time.



They then move to PAF Mianwali for the Fighter Conversion Unit (FCU) and Operational Conversion Unit (OCU). The FCU serves the same function as an AFTS (Advanced Flying Training School) and the OCU the same function as the RAF's Tactical Weapons Unit (TWU) at RAF Brawdy and RAF Chivenor. Student pilots spend five months/85 hours at the FCU flying the FT-5 and another five months/75 hours flying the FT-6 at the OCU.

PAF training is almost solely geared to producing fighter pilots, although a few pilots may be streamed to fly transport aircraft and helicopters. On completion of the OCU, most will go on to fly the F-6 (-19) or A-5 for their first tour. After two to three years pilots may remain on the same type or go on to fly the F-1 6A, the Mirage III/V, the F-7P Skybolt, or they become instructors.

The Mushshak performs the same role as the Bulldog/Chipmunk. The aircraft has the same engine as the Bulldog and similar handling qualities and performance. It is still being built at low cost at the Kamra Aeronautical Centre by a factory supplied by Saab of Sweden. The T-37 has the same role as the Jet Provost, although its performance is somewhere between the JP3 and the JP5. It is simple to operate and pleasant to fly.

The FT-5 and FT-6 have the same roles as the Hawk T.1 and T.1A. The FT-5 has basic instrumentation and avionics, good turning performance and stability, but is less responsive in handling than the Hawk. It has a much shorter range and a slower climb rate. The FT-6 has a better performance, is a demanding aircraft to fly and a good test of piloting skills.

The PAF train about 50 pilots a year. Many thousands of applicants are screened and graded at joint Army, Navy and Air Force selection centres all over the country. This process lasts one day. Successful applicants attend a five day course at one of three aircrew selection centres. Subsequently they have to pass a four-day medical board.

After spending two years at the Academy, cadet pilots fly 10 hours on the Mushshak to test their piloting aptitude. If considered satisfactory, the cadets then have to wait another two years before they can begin their flying training. If a pilot should fail the course he will almost certainly be retained by the Air Force for employment in another flying or ground role.

Compared to European air forces, the PAF recruits its pilots at a very young age (it varies from 12 to 16 years of age). Recruits come from a variety of backgrounds, some may come from distant villages and only possess a rudimentary understanding of mechanical objects. The Air Academy at PAF Risalpur aims to give all its cadets a good grounding in science, military and officer training, discipline, general education, and flying. All students have to learn English as soon as they arrive.

During training, they are not allowed to speak Urdu, the national language, or any other dialects. Cadets all graduate with a degree, the Academy being affiliated to a University. Flying training does not begin until alter four years at the Academy. At BFTS the students are still treated as cadets and spend a lot of time studying for their degrees.

Training in Pakistan at EFTS and BFTS follows the same lines as the RAF although there are some differences in emphasis mainly due to climate. There is not a great deal of instrument flying training, as the weather is generally clear. Some training stations do not have radar and in the north of the country there are mountains over 20,000ft high in the local area and understandably, the PAF is reticent about operating from training stations in cloudy weather.


The wind is rarely as strong as in the UK so the teaching of circuits and Practice Forced Landings (PFLs) is simpler. Students are taught to achieve particular ground patterns at certain key heights in order to fly successful circuits. Circuit patterns and teaching have been influenced by the American flying training system following the purchase of the T-37 twenty years ago. There is also less low level flying training although the PAF does have an important ground attack role, their pilots will probably have to operate in a simpler low level environment, in terms of weather and threat, than in Europe.

The FCU and OCU are based at PAF Mianwali which has an excellent weather factor and a large local flying training area. Courses are aimed to produce single-seat fighter pilots after 10 months of training. There is a greater amount of formation flying with considerably less low level navigation training and slightly less weapon firing at the OCU than at an RAF TWU, and no air-to-air gunnery. Students do not have to fly many sorties as leader and are not expected to plan, brief and lead composite sorties.

Throughout the course students still have academic studies, English lessons, parades and PT. All Instructor Pilots have to have a minimum of 350 hours on fighters and maintain an operational role at the OCU.

It takes about 6 and 1/2 years to train a PAF pilot from joining the Academy to his acceptance on a front line Squadron. Overall the failure rate is about 40%, slightly more than the RAF.

The primary role of the SIF (School of Instructor Flying), based at PAF Risalpur, is to train Air Force, Army and Navy instructors. Some instructors from friendly nations are also trained including Sri Lanka, Uganda, Turkey, Malaysia and various Middle Eastern Muslim states. Considerable emphasis is given to theory, briefs and lectures. The trainee instructors fly the Mushshak or T-37, and those posted to the FCU have to complete the basic instructional course. A secondary role of SIF is pilot standardisation and recategorisation.

The flying rate at SIF and BFTS is high, with instructors achieving 40 to 45 hours a month.
In common with most air forces there are some problems with relatively low pay and consequent retention problems. For example, the national airline PIA will pay about ten times the salary of a PAF pilot. There is time promotion to Squadron Leader after 9-10 years but no equivalent of the RAF specialist aircrew system. In Pakistan it would not be so acceptable for an experienced pilot to be working under a more junior officer without a loss of pride.

The PAF training aircraft are well suited to their tasks. The Mushshak aircraft are still being manufactured both for the PAF and in the hope of obtaining export orders. The T-37 is about 20 years old. Its life could be extended for another 20 years, however the PAF is considering replacing it with the K-8 jet trainer.

The Chinese supplied the FT-5 and FT-6 at very low cost in the 1970s and whilst they are basic in design they achieve their training task quite cheaply and satisfactorily. The Hawk might be considered as a replacement for the advanced trainers but it would be expensive even though it could have a useful secondary operational role.

Overall the PAF are a highly professional air force and this is reflected in their high standards of instruction and flying training.
 
Offence Vs. Defence: A Conversation

by Ejaz Haider

July 9, 2021


Friend and fellow writer Mosharraf Zaidi has responded to my July 2 article, “Pakistan Needs a Proactive Afghanistan Policy,” by disagreeing with my proposition that given the evolving situation in Afghanistan and threats emerging from there, Pakistan should change its defensive mindset and develop proactive counterterrorism capabilities. In other words, as Zaidi has accurately put it, “[Haider] wants Pakistan to strike at terrorist targets – early, often, and when needed, on [the] Afghan soil.”

Before anything else, I must thank Zaidi for taking a very important conversation forward.

I shall presently get to his three-point disagreement with my argument, but let me first identify where he seems to agree with me. Most importantly, he agrees that “Pakistan’s big picture goals in Afghanistan, while laudable, are silent on the most urgent and most important issue that emerges from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan: how to engage in effective counterterrorism.”

In other words, he appreciates that post-US/NATO withdrawal, the situation in Afghanistan sans an intra-Afghan peace and power-sharing deal poses a major threat to Pakistan. Extrapolating from that, it is clear that Pakistan needs to prepare itself to counter the threat. That is a function of determining which approach Pakistan should take: defensive or offensive — i.e., should Pakistan wait until the threat materialises (defensive) or pick up threats early and preempt them away from its soil (offensive).

Zaidi argues for the defensive approach; I argue for the offensive approach as the best defence. Two other points need to be made before going further. In complex situations involving multiple actors, no one can come up with neat solutions, the human desire to find such a solution notwithstanding. As I have written before in these pages, “understanding the structures of social (as opposed to scientific-technical) systems is not entirely possible and having information on outcomes which are the result of interactive complexity is even more difficult.” So, neither Zaidi nor I or for that matter anyone, governments included, can claim to have the solution.

Secondly, while Zaidi has selected one point from my article that refers to developing offensive counterterrorism capabilities, my article argued for that as part of a broader policy. For instance, I wrote that “at this point, Pakistan needs to distance itself from taking any clear positions with reference to the various actors in that country while retaining and further honing the intelligence capabilities and reach-out to all relevant actors.” I also made the point, clearly, that “preparing for the worst does not mean Pakistan dropping the politico-diplomatic option. As noted earlier, it must remain engaged with the various actors inside Afghanistan. But it should wait and see which way the internal chaos goes. This means a policy which, while sticking to its broad parameters, can be tactically tweaked as the situation unfolds on the ground.” (italics added)

In other words, Pakistan has to deploy multiple strategies, not sequentially but simultaneously. I have argued for years that the use of force in and of itself cannot achieve much. It must translate into utility of force. And utility of force is a function of employing force as part of a broader policy and for creating space for non-kinetic approaches to work.

Pakistan could have a regional consensus on how to deal with such threats. In the end, however, Pakistan itself is responsible for countering the threats to itself
Let’s now get to Zaidi’s three points: he objects to the idea of offensive capability by arguing that (a) Pakistan must not entertain the idea of cross-border raids and the minimisation of the sovereignty of another country; (b) cross-border raids into Afghanistan would serve to galvanise anti-Pakistan sentiment; © any operations across the Durand Line will validate and mobilise ethno-national Pashtun sentiment.
Of these, I consider the first the most important. I had written that “An Afghanistan with a nominal, contested government unable to control its territory cannot mount the argument about sovereignty.” Zaidi has challenged that by reminding me that “national sovereignty is a red line that has informed Pakistani domestic and foreign policy for over seventy years.” He is right. Since he has also referred to R2P, it’s important to remind the reader that Pakistan was the first victim of that concept when it lost East Pakistan. So, yes, the issue of sovereignty does form the backbone of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy approaches and that is the position Pakistan should maintain under all normal circumstances.

Equally, it’s important to point out that in a practical sense, Pakistan has, on a number of occasions, deviated from it, especially in extraordinary circumstances. When George W Bush’s administration came knocking at Pakistan’s door after 9/11, Islamabad agreed to host (bases) and facilitate (air corridors/GLOC etc) an invading power against a government which it had recognised. In doing that, Pakistan became an active partner in an invasion that violated its (if not the international community’s) understanding of Afghanistan’s sovereignty.

Two, Afghanistan challenged (and continues to) Pakistan’s sovereignty repeatedly by laying claim to areas up to the Indus. It launched overt and covert campaigns to foment trouble in Pakistan. Kabul continues to reject the internationally-recognised border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, referring to it as Durand Line (surprisingly, Zaidi also uses that term). This is not just history. As late as September 7, 2020,

Afghanistan’s First Vice President, Amrullah Saleh, tweeted: “No Afghan politician of national stature can overlook the issue of Durand Line. It will condemn him or her in life & afterlife. It is an issue which needs discussions & resolution. Expecting us to gift it for free is unrealistic. Peshawar used to be the winter capital of Afghanistan.”

Let me also mention for the record that there have been frequent artillery and small arms fire exchanges between Pakistani and Afghan troops. But leaving this aside, it’s important to juxtapose the traditional notion of sovereignty with the fast changing conduct of war. That would necessitate a major rethink on how states would respond to an array of threats.

Take, for instance, info-tech and cyber attacks. The capabilities (as also the contest) are essentially trans-border. When Indian hackers recently mounted major attacks in Pakistan (I refer here to the recent presser by the government), their attacks were undeclared and in the digital domain. When EU Disinfo Lab unearthed an Indian disinformation operation against Pakistan so vast and complex that it boggled even the investigators, the Indian actors were deploying a capability that transcends traditional notions of war-fighting, boundaries and sovereignty. It also informs us that today’s hostile operations do not require declarations of war. States are (Pakistan certainly is) at war even when there’s no overt war going on.

While info-tech and cyber capabilities are non-kinetic, they can lead to disruptions, coercion, violence and even destruction of infrastructure. Are they different from covert, physical attacks, despite their subversive potential? In that, while we must develop trans-border capabilities to counter hostile actions in the digital domain, we must approach sovereignty as a notion carved in stone when it comes to covert actions by state and non-state actors, even when a state — which is where Afghanistan is likely headed — has no real government and legitimacy itself is being contested between or among many actors? These are important questions and given the emerging technologies will come into sharper salience in the coming years.

Zaidi also likened my approach to Rumsfeld’s or Rice’s. I beg to differ. One, as I noted above, Pakistan does need to maintain its overall approach to the issue of sovereignty; two, unlike the US, Pakistan must use offensive CT capabilities very selectively and only when they are direly needed; three, as I had implied in my previous article, employing such capabilities is not necessarily a unilateral endeavour. A chaotic Afghanistan will pose a threat to multiple states in the region. Pakistan could have a regional consensus on how to deal with such threats. In the end, however, Pakistan itself is responsible for countering the threats to itself.

Let’s also note that the debate over offensive CT capabilities has gone much beyond the case of the US. Events in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sahel etc and the number of states that are involved in those conflicts directly and indirectly are forcing a shift in how sovereignty is defined. The law has a lot of catching up to do.

I also talked about the conversation Pakistan could (should) have with the United States and also Turkey. In fact, just before signing off, Zaidi seems to agree with me completely! “[Pakistan needs] a wise, multi-layered, resolute, alliance-driven and proactive counterterrorism strategy for the post US withdrawal Afghan theatre.” (italics added)

I also agree with him with reference to the “feel-good autonomy of ‘absolutely not’”. Strategy is about increasing one’s options, not reducing them. A likely terrorist threat emerging from Afghanistan is a threat no one wants. On that score, the US, Russia and China (as also other regional states) are in agreement. That should make this conversation easier to have.

Finally, a quick word about Zaidi’s concerns over anti-Pakistan sentiments and ethno-national Pashtun sentiment. Both are in abundance already and exacerbated by the Afghan regimes during the US/NATO presence. I mentioned Saleh above; the Afghan National Security Advisor, Hamdullah Mohib’s statements are already on the record. Similar sentiments are voiced by a fringe on this side too. While it is important to address such sentiments through other strategies, employing necessary CT capabilities is not about garnering votes or winning popularity contests. Plus, this is just the kind of defensive mindset that bogs Pakistan down. States cannot afford to act blindly and reflexively like Laertes, but neither can they handicap themselves like procrastinating Hamlet.

The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He tweets @ejazhaider


Ejaz Haider
 
Doctrine, Policy, and Strategy

Which Mahathir should Imran follow?!

Saad Masood
May 10, 2021




Imagine these conflicting accolades for one person a moderniser and a dictator, a visionary and a short-term tactician, a racist and father of the nation, a healer and a strongman. This is how history will regard Mahathir Mohammad! Love him or hate him, and there aren’t many in-between, anyone would be hard pressed to refute Mahathir’s fierce love for Malaysia.


At this critical juncture for Pakistan, Imran Khan has a choice to make – does he follow the Mahathir of the past or the Mahathir of the present?


In 2018, and as a 92-year-old, Mahathir again was elected as Prime Minister of Malaysia! In doing so he became the world’s oldest elected leader another feather in his cap. Starting back in 1964, his political career spans around 40 years, the biggest chunk of which was spent as Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003. Considering his long service towards Malaysia, why then is he such a divisive figure? And which Mahathir yesterday’s or today’s can be a good role model for Pakistan and Imran Khan? Consider the following hypothesis.


No wonder that Mahathir has been a polarising figure, in the world generally and Malaysia specifically! For every person who loves him there is one who loathes him!


Mahathir’s biggest achievement was to urgently transition Malaysia from a poor farming nation to an infrastructure led country. To many, he is known as the father of modernisation! This shift was also in line with the growing globalisation phenomenon of the late 80s and early 90s. That is how Mahathir became the poster-boy for the emerging Asian tigers, at the bottom end of the 20th century. Mahathir is also credited with privatising government enterprises, in certain cases loss-making ones, including airlines, utilities and telecommunications. This led to much desired governmental funds which resulted in elevating many compatriots above the poverty line.

In addition, Mahathir worked diligently to shift Malaysia’s economy away from natural resources and agriculture and towards manufacturing and exports. This manifested in substantial job creation at a national level leading to a burgeoning middle class and subsequent economic success. The upshot? From 1988 to 1996, Malaysia grew by 8 percent and per capita income doubled from 1990 to 1996. Thus, the country experienced rapid economic growth under Mahathir because of the impact of globalisation, a bout of privatisation and recalibration of the economy. Looking ahead, and to turn Malaysia into a fully developed nation by 2020, in 1991 Mahathir released an economic plan called The Way Forward or Vision 2020.

In recent times, the 92-year Mahathir has acknowledged that his aggressive plans for Vision 2020 have failed. Unfortunately, this policy only became a mere reflection of the 90s where development was carried out based on an influx of foreign investment but couldn’t be sustained in the long run. In that, Vision 2020 was more rhetoric than reality. This laudable admission by Mahathir showcases perhaps his biggest failure of his first stint as Prime Minister.

There are others though! Although Mahathir started as a moderate political figure but became increasingly more authoritarian with time. For this, the biggest tool at his disposal became the Internal Security Act which was passed in 1987. This allowed him to arrest activists and opponents, close down newspapers and harangue religious leaders. Mahathir also took on the judiciary, forced many high-ranking judges to resign and changed the Constitution to limit the powers of the Supreme Court. Cronyism and nepotism also made the headlines during his first tenure as PM culminating in the severely criticised rise of his son, Mukhriz. Mahathir’s ‘look-East’ policy may have been apt for the times but irked the Western world. This, in conjunction with banning of The Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, meant that he had a trying relationship with at-least the US and UK.


In recent times, the 92-year Mahathir has acknowledged that his aggressive plans for Vision 2020 have failed


No wonder that Mahathir has been a polarising figure, in the world generally and Malaysia specifically! For every person who loves him there is one who loathes him! In contrast to the Mahathir of yesterday described above, the Mahathir of today is one who is more realistic, circumspect and has calmed down his ambitions for Malaysia and for himself. This is evidenced by the recently launched Shared Prosperity Vision 2030. Gone are the notions of grandeur, bigger-is-better and expansion at any cost. Instead, the level of focus is more down to earth! As the name suggests, the cornerstone of this endeavour is the policy of inclusiveness and the strategy of income inequality.

Curbing of discrimination and corruption is also high on the agenda. For the first time, social well-being is being given the crucial important it deserves especially in an effort to be pluralistic in nature. There are plans to develop indices to measure unity, integrity and anti-corruption, harmony, public health, climate and environmental change. Realistic goals for poverty measurement and poverty alleviation are also enumerated. Now the emphasis is on a knowledge-based economy underpinned by technology, thus reducing the reliance on oil. On a political and personal front, and with Mahathir’s previous succession plans not working out too well, he has said that he doesn’t want to stick around for too long and would like a new generation of politicians to take over. Therefore, reducing but not eliminating the clamour of dynastic rule.


Mahathir’s biggest achievement was to urgently transition Malaysia from a poor farming nation to an infrastructure led country


Since coming to power, Imran Khan has repeatedly quoted Mahathir as a role model. Also, recently the Pakistani Prime Minister has said that both countries face similar set of challenges. At this critical juncture for Pakistan, Imran Khan has a choice to make does he follow the Mahathir of the past or the Mahathir of the present? Considering the evidence at hand and the aforementioned comparison, he will do well to follow in the footsteps of the Mahathir of today.
 
Rude, but Proper!
By Air Cdre M Kaiser Tufail



The year was 1978. It was a clear spring morning on the picturesque Potohar plateau. Rohtas fort provided the perfect backdrop for a breathtaking view. An old bed of river Jhelum meandered nearby, with a trickle of troops and vehicles roughing up its dry surface. I enjoyed a spectacular vantage point from the air – from an F-6 cockpit, to be precise – while trying to size up the situation. As a young Flying Officer, I had been privileged to be, so I believe, the first one to fly the newly introduced 1140 litres drop tanks. It was the extended range imparted by these tanks that had brought me this far. The smaller 760s had kept us ‘Cobras’ almost confined to the environs of Peshawar. So the change in scenery was most welcome.

‘Tango’ was visible from a couple of miles, hence alignment was easy. A brisk spacer run got the ball rolling. If the calls of the Forward Air Controller were anything to go by, the troops hadn’t seen a fighter in years. They must get a good demonstration of a ‘shoot’, I thought, and set about serious business. Prompt ‘visuals’ with the target, careful pipping and smart exits were the order of the day. But with so much fuel, it had started to become a little monotonous – these repetitious runs. The radio had also been handed over to a Havaldar it seemed, since my calls were being met by an unenthusiastic, confused voice at the FAC end. Just when I had completed my nth run, a very eager call crackled in my headphones: “Cobra-89, confirm Abdalian?” There was a rush of adrenaline, a gasp of amazement at how small the world can be. So who could it be? Qasim? Ehtisham? Rana? The bloke had recognised me in the cockpit so the least I could do to reciprocate his fraternal feelings was to offer a salute the fighter pilot way!

Sleeves were rolled back, the small of the back was engaged in the kidney pad and the throttles pushed up for good measure. I hadn’t quite decided what to do but by the time I had rolled in for the level run, an aileron roll spurred my imagination. Yes, it would suitably impress the troops since the manoeuvre had that frolicky ‘something’ about it. As I sped up and descended to the treetops, my peripheral vision confirmed a flurry of activity on the ground, which I interpreted as the troops’ rush for the grandstands. I reckoned that my class fellow out there would look bigger amongst his men if I could round off the shoot with a well-executed ‘gulaati’. The next thing that happened remains spine chilling to this day. As the nose was picked up and roll applied, the aircraft waggled like a fat duck and barrelled; the ground whizzed past in a terrifying blur of stone and scrub.

The aircraft miraculously righted itself and I shakily regained level flight. There was something being uttered on the radio, which my senses were too numb to register. I changed the radio channel, saving myself the embarrassment of being praised for what was actually an awful violation of SOPs. As if to atone for the transgression, I followed a very proper joining procedure and made a rather tame recovery at Base. A DCO was signed off in the Flight Authorisation Book and the Flight Commander was even debriefed about the sluggish roll performance with the big tanks! Lucky that the FAC did not ring back in the Squadron to share his enthralment with my Squadron Commander, another Abdalian. (Hope he isn’t reading.)

Well, the mission evokes strange feelings to this day and I have a lesson or two for those who care to listen to an old hand. Many a fighter pilot has literally bitten the dust because he succumbed to an impulse generated by a sudden turn of events around him, without analysing the consequences – and remember, it is usually difficult to carry out a rational analysis at 780 kph over the tree tops.

The response in most cases is a reactive one and the pilot is unable to think beyond the next 15-20 seconds, as all his senses are focused on responding to the stimulus provided by, say, a silly radio call, a riot of colour next to the village pond, etc. While I am at it, let me tell you how I dealt with the issue of solo low-level missions when I was the Squadron Commander. I almost always sent up a pair, just to be sure – and I am aware of at least one instance where the FAC requested a low pass at the end of the mission and the leader told him to go to hell. Rude, but I think proper!
 
Improvise and Modernise

Resolving the deadlock with the USA over embargoed F-16 has left Pakistan’s air force without new fighters.
Paul Lewis/ISLAMABAD
The news that Washington had agreed to refund Islamabad $464 million for 28 undelivered Lockheed Martin F-16A/B’s was greeted with mixed reactions by the Pakistan Air Force. The settlement brings to a close a decade-long dispute with the USA but has left Pakistan devoid of new fighters and facing a long-standing antagonist which has lost no time in modernizing its forces.
“I’m not totally happy, but it’s something out of nothing”, reflects Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi, chief of the air staff. “If we had gone for litigation, even though we had a very strong case, it is quite possible it would have taken much longer and we wouldn’t have got as much eventually because of legal fees.”
With the embargoed fighters now destined for New Zealand, the Pakistan Air Force must soldier on with the 32 Block 15 F-16A/B’s surviving from an 1983 order. This is a far cry from the force of 110 F-16’s it had planned to field by the turn of the century, with an option to acquire another 50.
In the interim, Pakistan’s traditional foe India, has bolstered its inventory of 1,000 fighters with the delivery of 49 Dassault Mirage 2000 H/HT’s and , more recently – and of much greater concern to Qureshi – the initial eight of 50 new Sukhoi Su-30MK’s. The net result has been a marked erosion in what Pakistan has traditionally regarded as its qualitative edge over the India air force’s 3:1 advantage in numbers.
India and Pakistan have clashed twice since partition 51 years ago. In both the September 1965 and December 1971 wars, Pakistan is generally regarded to have acquitted itself well, despite a less than favourable outcome on the ground in the latter conflict. The two neighbours continue to spar over the disputed territory of Kashmir and the 15,750ft-high Siachen Glacier, while last year’s tit-for-tat round of nuclear testing has added an altogether new dimension to the continuing regional insecurity.
Qureshi says: “As far as quality is concerned, we’ve always had the edge and we would have maintained that had the F-16’s been fully inducted. General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) kept telling us: ‘Don’t worry, it’s just a matter of time before the aircraft are released.’ So we lost time. Now it’s been almost 10 years that we’ve not inducted anything and India has got a head start on us.”
Pakistan is intent on catching up, but it is clear that its $325 million cash rebate and $120 million-worth of wheat from the USA will not go far by itself. The air force has asked for additional funds from the government, which, in turn, has acknowledged the need to acquire new fighters. But, given the country’s high level of foreign debt and limited foreign reserves, the source of the extra money is unclear.
BACK BURNER MIRAGES
The air force would ideally like around 80 new front-line fighters, sufficient to equip four squadrons, and had all but struck a deal with France when the economy took a further turn for the worse. Qureshi confesses: “We were going for the Mirage 2000-5 ... but that has been put on the back burner. Maybe if we get a bit delayed we’ll look at the Rafale or Eurofighter [EF2000], depending on our economic health. It’s just a question of allocating a budget. I would like it to have been done yesterday.”
The air force acknowledges that, even if all the needed funds were available, 80 new fighters would still fall far short of the numbers needed to replace its fleet of more than 100 Chengdu F-7P/FT-7’s, 60 Nanchang A-5C strike aircraft and, in the longer term, its 180 mixed Mirage III/5’s. Accordingly, Pakistan is pursuing the parallel development of the Chengdu Super 7/FC-1 lightweight multirole fighter in partnership with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force.
The planned development has been the subject of some delay and the latest revised timetable calls for the first of the single-engined fighters to fly in 2001, with production deliveries to start around 2003. In an effort to expedite the Super 7 programme, Islamabad and Beijing signed a memorandum of understanding on collaboration in late 1996 but a detailed agreement has yet to be inked.
AVM Hamid Khawaja, Pakistan air force Super 7 chief project director suggests: “ When two governments have an agreement, that means something and this has accelerated the programme quite a lot. A lot of work has to be done before you can enter into a detailed contract and we’re both working at it. I would say we’re in the final stages of fixing up a contract for signature.”
In addition to reaching an airframe agreement with China, Pakistan also needs to finalise the selection of a Western risk-sharing avionics partner and a weapons package for its own planned Super-7 variant. Jockeying for the yet to be selected multimode pulse-Doppler radar and avionics contracts are Alenia, Marconi and Thomson-CSF (Flight International, 13-19 January, P.18).
Pakistan plans to arm the aircraft with precision-guided munitions, Raytheon AIM-9L dogfight missiles and its first beyond visual range (BVR) weapon to counter India’s acquisition of Vympel AA-12 Adders and, possibly, the Rafael Python 4. Among the active-guided BVR options being examined are the Matra-BAe Mica, Chinese PL10 and the Denel T-Darter, the latter of which Khawaja describes as “very impressive on paper”.
Pakisan has been co-operating with South Africa for years, including purchasing frequency-hopping radios to retrofit to its F-7’s, A-5’s and Mirages and the suspected acquisition of the Multi Purpose Stand-Off Weapon. Qureshi acknowledges that “…we’ve a very good relationship with South Africa. We’ve bought some things from them and some things we’ve developed ourselves which could be an improvement of what we bought from them.”
Qureshi says: ”We’re looking for a fighter that does not go beyond $15million a piece, but, at the same time, carries most of the equipment we need. It will not be a real high-tech fighter, but definitely it will have a better avionics capability than what we have with the F-16 A/B today.” He adds, pointedly: “It will be something we can really rely on and with which we will not have the problems of sanctions.”
China’s record on industrial collaboration has not been entirely problem free, though. The Pakistan air force concedes that negotiations to finalise the Super 7/FC-1 deal are running at least 18 months behind schedule as it struggles to avoid the problems into which the earlier Nanchang/Pakistan Aeronautical Complex K-8 Karakoram trainer programme has flown.
Development of the tandem-seat jet was completed at least three years ago, but it has never been ordered into production. The Chinese air force is reluctant to order the trainer until a substitute powerplant can be integrated to replace the US-supplied AlliedSignal TFE731-2A. This, in turn, has stalled Pakistan’s plans to purchase any more K-8’s beyond the six pre-production models in service, leaving the Cessna T-37B/C’s basic trainers to soldier on at its Risalpur flight academy for a few more years.
Qureshi suggests: ”Our requirement would be for no more than 60-70 of them and to support this number alone would be too expensive. We’re hoping that the Chinese would also need a trainer aircraft and, if they decide to induct it, their requirement would be nothing less than 250-300 aircraft and then it would be much more viable."
STATED REQUIREMENT
Pakistan has stated form the outset a requirement for 150 Super-7’s and, in spite of reports to the contrary, claims to have elicited a firm commitment from Beijing that the Chinese will order a similar number. While coinciding the present situation with the K-8 is “unfortunate”, Qureshi categorically states with regards to the Super 7 that there is a total commitment from China … if that was not the case, it would be a no-go situation.”
With a Super 7 initial operational capability at least five years away, the air force plans an interim purchase of around 50 improved F-7MG’s to complete the replacement of its final two squadrons of AIM-9-armed Nanchang F-6’s. The order is subject to the successful completion of low-level flight trials of the MG’s updated Marconi Super Skyranger pulse-Doppler radar, which attempts to redress the F-7M/P’s shortcoming as an interceptor (Flight International 20-26, P8).
As a counter proposal on the F-7MG, Alenia is offering a further refinement of its Fiar Grifo 7 radar with a wider +-20 degree azimuth scan capability. It would provide some commonality with the more limited +-10 degree azimuth version of the radar, which is the subject of a long running integration effort on Pakistan’s F-7P’s. The air force says that the radar software has now been frozen and, once flight trials are completed, the Grifo 7 is to be fitted to 100 F-7P’s, irrespective of its F-7MG radar decision.
A senior official says: “We don’t want to digress it, we want to finish it. We thought we had a fully developed radar from what they had done in Singapore with the Grifo-F (on a NorthropF-5E/F upgrade). What we thought was that it would be a simple adaptation for the Mirage III and miniaturisation of the same to fit into the F-7. Obviously, it doesn’t work that way ... it’s more like a development programme.”
Mirage III flight trials of the larger Grifo M variant have similarly not been without problems in “certain parameters ... and errors in certain modes”, but should be complete by mid-year says the Pakistan air force. Planning then calls for the radar to be retrofitted to 33 ex-Australian Mirage IIEA/DA fighters, as a follow on to the earlier Sagem-integrated Project ROSE (Retrofit of Strike Element) avionics upgrade.
“They will serve us very comfortably until 2010 and beyond,” says Qureshi. “We’ve extracted another 15 years out of these old aircraft by not spending too much money. I think we’re very satisfied, though, personally, if the money was available, I would always go for new aircraft rather than upgrading.”
Pakistan today boasts the world’s largest fleet of Mirage III/5 fighters, comprising 13 different single and tandem-seat margues. In addition to 34 Mirage IIIEP/DP/RPs and 32 Mirage 5PA/DPAs acquired directly between 1967 and 1982, the air force managed to refurbish 45 of the 50 Australian fighters bought in 1991. The service is also planning a ROSE upgrade, with an enhanced night-attack capability, for half of the 40 surplus French air force Mirage 5EF/DF’s now being delivered.
The air force is working to improve and extend the operational life of its 15-year old F-16’s, but this has been made more difficult by a US embargo on spares sales in response to Pakistan’s nuclear tests.
“Embargos are troublesome and they become expensive, but they are never fool-proof,” argues Qureshi. “I’m quite hopeful that it is a matter of time before the embargo is lifted,” he says, but adds: “The world is a big place and there are many people prepared to sell.”
Looking forward early into the next century, Pakistan is planning for a front-line strength of around 400 aircraft comprising F-16’s, upgraded Mirage III/5’s, Super 7’s and a yet to be specified new type. “I would like a balanced force of, say, around 80 high-technology fighters, about 150-160 good strike/penetration aircraft and 150 medium-technology air-defence aircraft,” says Qureshi.
To support these aircraft, the air force would acquire force-multiplier-type capabilities, including aerial refueling tankers to expand its radius of action, and electronic warfare and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft.
AEW commands the highest air force priority and Pakistan came close to ordering the Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye in the late 1980’s, towards the end of the Afghanistan War. The conflict saw repeated armed cross-border incursions, as well as defections, during which Pakistan claims to have downed nine Afghan and Soviet aircraft, including three Sukhoi Su-22s and two Mikoyan Mig-23s.
Pakistan air force attention has since switched to the Ericsson Erieye electronically scanned radar, but its preference is for a platform larger than either the Embraer EMB-145. “AEW is something that we need more than anyone else,” says Qureshi. “Our terrain is such that, to the south we’ve the sea, then undulating hills and very high mountains to the north. For ground-based radar it creates problems and we don’t have much depth. We need more visibility across the border.”
 
Improvise and Modernise


Resolving the deadlock with the USA over embargoed F-16 has left Pakistan’s air force without new fighters.
Paul Lewis/ISLAMABAD
The news that Washington had agreed to refund Islamabad $464 million for 28 undelivered Lockheed Martin F-16A/B’s was greeted with mixed reactions by the Pakistan Air Force. The settlement brings to a close a decade-long dispute with the USA but has left Pakistan devoid of new fighters and facing a long-standing antagonist which has lost no time in modernizing its forces.
“I’m not totally happy, but it’s something out of nothing”, reflects Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi, chief of the air staff. “If we had gone for litigation, even though we had a very strong case, it is quite possible it would have taken much longer and we wouldn’t have got as much eventually because of legal fees.”
With the embargoed fighters now destined for New Zealand, the Pakistan Air Force must soldier on with the 32 Block 15 F-16A/B’s surviving from an 1983 order. This is a far cry from the force of 110 F-16’s it had planned to field by the turn of the century, with an option to acquire another 50.
In the interim, Pakistan’s traditional foe India, has bolstered its inventory of 1,000 fighters with the delivery of 49 Dassault Mirage 2000 H/HT’s and , more recently – and of much greater concern to Qureshi – the initial eight of 50 new Sukhoi Su-30MK’s. The net result has been a marked erosion in what Pakistan has traditionally regarded as its qualitative edge over the India air force’s 3:1 advantage in numbers.
India and Pakistan have clashed twice since partition 51 years ago. In both the September 1965 and December 1971 wars, Pakistan is generally regarded to have acquitted itself well, despite a less than favourable outcome on the ground in the latter conflict. The two neighbours continue to spar over the disputed territory of Kashmir and the 15,750ft-high Siachen Glacier, while last year’s tit-for-tat round of nuclear testing has added an altogether new dimension to the continuing regional insecurity.
Qureshi says: “As far as quality is concerned, we’ve always had the edge and we would have maintained that had the F-16’s been fully inducted. General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) kept telling us: ‘Don’t worry, it’s just a matter of time before the aircraft are released.’ So we lost time. Now it’s been almost 10 years that we’ve not inducted anything and India has got a head start on us.”
Pakistan is intent on catching up, but it is clear that its $325 million cash rebate and $120 million-worth of wheat from the USA will not go far by itself. The air force has asked for additional funds from the government, which, in turn, has acknowledged the need to acquire new fighters. But, given the country’s high level of foreign debt and limited foreign reserves, the source of the extra money is unclear.
BACK BURNER MIRAGES
The air force would ideally like around 80 new front-line fighters, sufficient to equip four squadrons, and had all but struck a deal with France when the economy took a further turn for the worse. Qureshi confesses: “We were going for the Mirage 2000-5 ... but that has been put on the back burner. Maybe if we get a bit delayed we’ll look at the Rafale or Eurofighter [EF2000], depending on our economic health. It’s just a question of allocating a budget. I would like it to have been done yesterday.”
The air force acknowledges that, even if all the needed funds were available, 80 new fighters would still fall far short of the numbers needed to replace its fleet of more than 100 Chengdu F-7P/FT-7’s, 60 Nanchang A-5C strike aircraft and, in the longer term, its 180 mixed Mirage III/5’s. Accordingly, Pakistan is pursuing the parallel development of the Chengdu Super 7/FC-1 lightweight multirole fighter in partnership with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force.
The planned development has been the subject of some delay and the latest revised timetable calls for the first of the single-engined fighters to fly in 2001, with production deliveries to start around 2003. In an effort to expedite the Super 7 programme, Islamabad and Beijing signed a memorandum of understanding on collaboration in late 1996 but a detailed agreement has yet to be inked.
AVM Hamid Khawaja, Pakistan air force Super 7 chief project director suggests: “ When two governments have an agreement, that means something and this has accelerated the programme quite a lot. A lot of work has to be done before you can enter into a detailed contract and we’re both working at it. I would say we’re in the final stages of fixing up a contract for signature.”
In addition to reaching an airframe agreement with China, Pakistan also needs to finalise the selection of a Western risk-sharing avionics partner and a weapons package for its own planned Super-7 variant. Jockeying for the yet to be selected multimode pulse-Doppler radar and avionics contracts are Alenia, Marconi and Thomson-CSF (Flight International, 13-19 January, P.18).
Pakistan plans to arm the aircraft with precision-guided munitions, Raytheon AIM-9L dogfight missiles and its first beyond visual range (BVR) weapon to counter India’s acquisition of Vympel AA-12 Adders and, possibly, the Rafael Python 4. Among the active-guided BVR options being examined are the Matra-BAe Mica, Chinese PL10 and the Denel T-Darter, the latter of which Khawaja describes as “very impressive on paper”.
Pakisan has been co-operating with South Africa for years, including purchasing frequency-hopping radios to retrofit to its F-7’s, A-5’s and Mirages and the suspected acquisition of the Multi Purpose Stand-Off Weapon. Qureshi acknowledges that “…we’ve a very good relationship with South Africa. We’ve bought some things from them and some things we’ve developed ourselves which could be an improvement of what we bought from them.”
Qureshi says: ”We’re looking for a fighter that does not go beyond $15million a piece, but, at the same time, carries most of the equipment we need. It will not be a real high-tech fighter, but definitely it will have a better avionics capability than what we have with the F-16 A/B today.” He adds, pointedly: “It will be something we can really rely on and with which we will not have the problems of sanctions.”
China’s record on industrial collaboration has not been entirely problem free, though. The Pakistan air force concedes that negotiations to finalise the Super 7/FC-1 deal are running at least 18 months behind schedule as it struggles to avoid the problems into which the earlier Nanchang/Pakistan Aeronautical Complex K-8 Karakoram trainer programme has flown.
Development of the tandem-seat jet was completed at least three years ago, but it has never been ordered into production. The Chinese air force is reluctant to order the trainer until a substitute powerplant can be integrated to replace the US-supplied AlliedSignal TFE731-2A. This, in turn, has stalled Pakistan’s plans to purchase any more K-8’s beyond the six pre-production models in service, leaving the Cessna T-37B/C’s basic trainers to soldier on at its Risalpur flight academy for a few more years.
Qureshi suggests: ”Our requirement would be for no more than 60-70 of them and to support this number alone would be too expensive. We’re hoping that the Chinese would also need a trainer aircraft and, if they decide to induct it, their requirement would be nothing less than 250-300 aircraft and then it would be much more viable."
STATED REQUIREMENT
Pakistan has stated form the outset a requirement for 150 Super-7’s and, in spite of reports to the contrary, claims to have elicited a firm commitment from Beijing that the Chinese will order a similar number. While coinciding the present situation with the K-8 is “unfortunate”, Qureshi categorically states with regards to the Super 7 that there is a total commitment from China … if that was not the case, it would be a no-go situation.”
With a Super 7 initial operational capability at least five years away, the air force plans an interim purchase of around 50 improved F-7MG’s to complete the replacement of its final two squadrons of AIM-9-armed Nanchang F-6’s. The order is subject to the successful completion of low-level flight trials of the MG’s updated Marconi Super Skyranger pulse-Doppler radar, which attempts to redress the F-7M/P’s shortcoming as an interceptor (Flight International 20-26, P8).
As a counter proposal on the F-7MG, Alenia is offering a further refinement of its Fiar Grifo 7 radar with a wider +-20 degree azimuth scan capability. It would provide some commonality with the more limited +-10 degree azimuth version of the radar, which is the subject of a long running integration effort on Pakistan’s F-7P’s. The air force says that the radar software has now been frozen and, once flight trials are completed, the Grifo 7 is to be fitted to 100 F-7P’s, irrespective of its F-7MG radar decision.
A senior official says: “We don’t want to digress it, we want to finish it. We thought we had a fully developed radar from what they had done in Singapore with the Grifo-F (on a NorthropF-5E/F upgrade). What we thought was that it would be a simple adaptation for the Mirage III and miniaturisation of the same to fit into the F-7. Obviously, it doesn’t work that way ... it’s more like a development programme.”
Mirage III flight trials of the larger Grifo M variant have similarly not been without problems in “certain parameters ... and errors in certain modes”, but should be complete by mid-year says the Pakistan air force. Planning then calls for the radar to be retrofitted to 33 ex-Australian Mirage IIEA/DA fighters, as a follow on to the earlier Sagem-integrated Project ROSE (Retrofit of Strike Element) avionics upgrade.
“They will serve us very comfortably until 2010 and beyond,” says Qureshi. “We’ve extracted another 15 years out of these old aircraft by not spending too much money. I think we’re very satisfied, though, personally, if the money was available, I would always go for new aircraft rather than upgrading.”
Pakistan today boasts the world’s largest fleet of Mirage III/5 fighters, comprising 13 different single and tandem-seat margues. In addition to 34 Mirage IIIEP/DP/RPs and 32 Mirage 5PA/DPAs acquired directly between 1967 and 1982, the air force managed to refurbish 45 of the 50 Australian fighters bought in 1991. The service is also planning a ROSE upgrade, with an enhanced night-attack capability, for half of the 40 surplus French air force Mirage 5EF/DF’s now being delivered.
The air force is working to improve and extend the operational life of its 15-year old F-16’s, but this has been made more difficult by a US embargo on spares sales in response to Pakistan’s nuclear tests.
“Embargos are troublesome and they become expensive, but they are never fool-proof,” argues Qureshi. “I’m quite hopeful that it is a matter of time before the embargo is lifted,” he says, but adds: “The world is a big place and there are many people prepared to sell.”
Looking forward early into the next century, Pakistan is planning for a front-line strength of around 400 aircraft comprising F-16’s, upgraded Mirage III/5’s, Super 7’s and a yet to be specified new type. “I would like a balanced force of, say, around 80 high-technology fighters, about 150-160 good strike/penetration aircraft and 150 medium-technology air-defence aircraft,” says Qureshi.
To support these aircraft, the air force would acquire force-multiplier-type capabilities, including aerial refueling tankers to expand its radius of action, and electronic warfare and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft.
AEW commands the highest air force priority and Pakistan came close to ordering the Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye in the late 1980’s, towards the end of the Afghanistan War. The conflict saw repeated armed cross-border incursions, as well as defections, during which Pakistan claims to have downed nine Afghan and Soviet aircraft, including three Sukhoi Su-22s and two Mikoyan Mig-23s.
Pakistan air force attention has since switched to the Ericsson Erieye electronically scanned radar, but its preference is for a platform larger than either the Embraer EMB-145. “AEW is something that we need more than anyone else,” says Qureshi. “Our terrain is such that, to the south we’ve the sea, then undulating hills and very high mountains to the north. For ground-based radar it creates problems and we don’t have much depth. We need more visibility across the border.”
FYI all...remember when I said the PAF was probably aiming to push the F-16 fleet to 150+ (pre-Pressler)? @SQ8 @JamD @Falcon26 @Bilal. @Akh1112 @kursed It doesn't mean much today re: the F-16, but do keep this in mind should the PAF induct the J-10CE. BTW, also note the PAF's preference for putting the Erieye on a platform larger than the EMB-145; imagine (just hypothetical) fitting the Erieye-ER to the E190-E2?
 
FYI all...remember when I said the PAF was probably aiming to push the F-16 fleet to 150+ (pre-Pressler)? @SQ8 @JamD @Falcon26 @Bilal. @Akh1112 @kursed It doesn't mean much today re: the F-16, but do keep this in mind should the PAF induct the J-10CE.
~130 is also the number of Mirage 3/5 in service. Which also match up quite nicely with what you are saying.
 

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