Obsessed with NASR

[Mav3rick]

scariest missile ? ... obsessed? so except nuke stuff you guys gave anything to defend.. lolz funny..

Ever heard the phrase "Hope for the best and be prepared for the worst"??

It is precisely for this reason that you want subs with Nuclear tipped Missiles, that is your preparation for the worst crisis, our's is NASR.

Rest assured it will never be used, we have successfully blunted all Indian attacks in the past when the parity b/w manpower was much larger, today it will be a piece of cake.

 

[Hellfire]

Wrong Sir Nasr was designed to fry bull brigade of armored corps by fielding sub KT to 1.5 KT warheads of neutron war heads which means single unit of Nasr missile can destroy up to 100 or more tanks stretching 5 miles square area.

Keep along the track, you will get there someday. 1 Kt is 500 m tops. So first go check the frontage of a squadron of tanks in line abreast in a conventional attack, the add to it the non-conventional posturing and then come back. Your calculations need revision.

Also calculate how many warheads you will need to eliminate 01 x armoured unit in a non-conventional deployment pattern (offensive ops under CBRN threat) and then calculate the fissile material production capacity of Pakistan. Try matching them up. You will understand why NASR is a joke.

@Sarge Your reference to Rommel and Zhukov. Both brilliant commanders of their time.

However, you might want to re-interpret the issues that, according to you, limited their military campaigns namely being understrength and under-gunned. If you will read about their histories, both had excellent logistics plan in place, and both had significant numbers to field. No army, even in Indian and Pakistani context, is available 100% for combat duties. The Sick Parade, hospital admissions, the medically downgraded etc are simply unavailable for effective combat strength even in a fighting unit.

Having said that - only briefly I will cover the two. For Rommel, he had Afrika Korps and further bolstering of the two Italian Armies in Northern-Africa in Libya by 06 x Italian Divisions. The Italians were fighting in their own territory - Libya, where the British made initial gains due to poor command decisions by Italians and also the British taking the initiative of offensive ops in the region as soon as Italy declared war on France. I am not going into the equipment, but the initial success of Rommel can clearly be attributed to:


1. better equipment (the British tanks were out-gunned; the better designs of Cromwell et al were negated effectively by the 88s of Rommel, another superb AT weapon of the time along with panzerfaust), have given you a simple link for tanks in the theatre with the British.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_the_British_Army

In short the main battle tanks used by the Germans in Africa were Panzer III and IV's which proved effective during Blitzkrieg against the Allied armour (they had problems subsequently on Eastern Front but thats beyond the scope). Since Adolf Hitler did not pay too much attention to the African Campaign, Rommel's supplies were neglected and rarely consisted of the latest equipment.

On the other side British were equipped with poorly armed and armored Cruiser Mark Is, Cruiser Mark IIs, Cruiser Mark IIIs, Cruiser Mark IVs and Crusaders which proved to be no match for the experienced German crews with their Panzer IIIs and IVs.

Only British made Mark III Matildas (Mk I had only a machine gun and Mk II added a 2 pounder main gun) and Mark IV Churchills (and its latter variants) were a match with their 40mm guns and thick armor.

British were also supplied with American tanks in later stages like M3 General Lee (American standards) , M3 General Stuart (British standards), M4 Sherman and others which were a match for German Panzers. To oppose all of those tanks the Afrika Korps relied on both Panzer III and IVs. Panzer III`s were mostly armed with either 37mm guns or 50mm guns depending on the variant.

Panzer IV were armed with short or long barreled 75mm guns that proved very effective. In early 1943 the first Panzer VI Tigers reached Africa.

The Tiger was armed with a powerful 88mm gun that was superior to any Allied tank and its thick armor made it almost indestructible to Allied anti-tank weapons.

And am not getting into the use of the venerable 88s ack-ack guns in AT role.

2. better logistics (apart from being a trained professional army, the Germans had the advantage of logistical support in terms of fighting in Tunisia and Libya, both colonies of Italy at the outbreak of war),


3. better state of manpower (in addition to Afrika Korps he had 02 x Italian Armies - a bit mauled, and 06 x fresh Italian divisions when he landed and clearly outnumbered the troops in location with the British) and

4. better trained army.


For Marshal Zhukov:

1. He had the option to move in his Army of the East in his defence of Moscow, which was a battle hardened and acclimatised body of troops who had experience in fighting in extreme weather against the Japanese.

2. He had the chance to be commanding the Soviet army on staff when the logistics of Russia were being re-assembled as the plants that were transported from Western Soviet Union were getting online in Urals and Siberia, thereby increasing the Soviet production capacity. It was also at this time that American Aid in terms of military supplies started coming in from US.

3. Just the study of Battle of Kursk will give you the idea of the troops, tanks and aircrafts that the Soviet was able to field against the Germans. 20,000 artillery pieces were lined up against the Germans in that particular Battle!

The NASR doctrine is foolishly naive. If at all, there is a push into Pakistan as a part of CSD, it will most probably be in the Punjab sector, which is also the most fertile part of Pakistan is the food bowl of the country.

The underlined part - incorrect.

 

[LaaL]

@hellfire

Short answer for your long copy pasted reply...
That is why NASR system supports multi tube launcher to engage the widespread area and roast finest Indian armory.

 

[Hellfire]

@Sarge Will start with addressing you. Allow me the leeway of knowing something about the topic that I write.

1. The Cold Start Doctrine. It is already beyond the concept and been a decade since enacted. I will assume you are a professional and a service member. If not, my apologies. However, assuming it, I will only ask you to do your research on why India removed concept of strike corps and holding corps and made it strike and pivot corps. You will get your answer. (I suspect you know it anyways).

2. Having said above, if offensive operations are carried out by the pivot corps, you know the breach will be achieved and you will require time to reinforce the area in order to reverse the same. The depth of any such breach will be less than that sufficient for you to consider employment of a nuclear warhead in tactical role.

3. You yourself have been accurately telling about the spread of the attacking armour. If I was to say the inter-se gap between two vehicles will be more than 600-700 m (not only due to increased urbanisation but also to negate a potential nuclear strike) you would agree that the figures for nukes of appropriate yield required to blunt an armoured brigade will be significantly high. It won't be a matter of a couple of nukes. So, and I ask you to consider it carefully, with your present estimated holding and your capacity of production of fissile material, do you honestly think that NASR is something we factor into our calculations?

4. Your permission for strike will be routed only through NCA with COAS giving a green light in consultation with President and PM. So the flexibility in employment of the same is severely limited even if you have the warhead in your hand.

That is all I want to say as of now. Why we won't attack you, is something that I have discussed a number of times in different threads. Its got more to do with and increased convergence of interests in fighting the spread of terror than anything else. That, we leave for another day.

@Levina Thanks for the tag. They do not require great deal of accuracy for a strike with Nasr. However, it will not be used as majority of people here envisage it. The sheer number of warheads they shall need to neutralise an armoured brigade will itself deplete their stocks. I am actually tickled when Pakistani members talk of ERWs ... as if they have discovered something new.

@a_b You are still new to the topic, so will just say - no one will use any nuclear weapon in first 30 kms of any indian ingress. that is a normal ingress by a division led attack, the same can be beaten back and reversed conventionally subsequently.

@hellfire

Short answer for your long copy pasted reply...
That is why NASR system supports multi tube launcher to engage the widespread area and roast finest Indian armory.

For the above bold portion: source my 'copy pasted answer' .. you will find @hellfire in pdf coming along ...

as for rest, since your rhetorical statement smacks of ignorance and inability to appreciate what I said, I wont waste time explaining to you about the concept of supply and demand and judicious balance of two.

Cheers

 

[ebrahym]

can be beaten back and reversed conventionally subsequently

exactly, only a strong airforce is able to counter cold start without Nasr
that is why Pakkistan is acquiring AWACS in huge numbers

 

[Hellfire]

exactly, only a strong airforce is able to counter cold start without Nasr
that is why Pakkistan is acquiring AWACS in huge numbers

Nooooo

Go and visit cold start thread. Read it and come back. AF has nothing to do with it. It is your logistical capability. You have enough forces with you. Only your logistics need to be in line. The success or failure of both sides will be on logistics of it.

Don't get into rhetoric and illogical nationalism. We have enough of that. I have been engaging you quite often .. so listen and read up the thread, you will understand. If any Q tag me into the thread and I will answer in the correct thread.

 

[ebrahym]

Nooooo

Go and visit cold start thread. Read it and come back. AF has nothing to do with it. It is your logistical capability. You have enough forces with you. Only your logistics need to be in line. The success or failure of both sides will be on logistics of it.

Don't get into rhetoric and illogical nationalism. We have enough of that. I have been engaging you quite often .. so listen and read up the thread, you will understand. If any Q tag me into the thread and I will answer in the correct thread

thanx

 

[foxbat]

The underlined part - incorrect.

Why do you say that ? I know Rajasthan has a terrain better suited for tank warfare, but so does Punjab

 

[Signalian]

@Sarge Your reference to Rommel and Zhukov. Both brilliant commanders of their time.

However, you might want to re-interpret the issues that, according to you, limited their military campaigns namely being understrength and under-gunned. If you will read about their histories, both had excellent logistics plan in place, and both had significant numbers to field.

None of them had excellent logistics plan in place. Rommel concluded that logistics problem was his quartermasters where as Zhukov faced his own problems during siege of Leningrad.

No army, even in Indian and Pakistani context, is available 100% for combat duties. The Sick Parade, hospital admissions, the medically downgraded etc are simply unavailable for effective combat strength even in a fighting unit.

never a concern on my part.

Having said that - only briefly I will cover the two. For Rommel, he had Afrika Korps and further bolstering of the two Italian Armies in Northern-Africa in Libya by 06 x Italian Divisions.
The Italians were fighting in their own territory - Libya, where the British made initial gains due to poor command decisions by Italians and also the British taking the initiative of offensive ops in the region as soon as Italy declared war
on France.

Afrika Korps compared to 8th Army had lesser troops, tanks, artillery even with Italian divisions. Rommel kept Italian formations mostly for covering retreats of german divisions. Italian M13 and other tanks were unreliable, under gunned and thin armoured. Placing sandbags didnt prove effective too. No Italian tank could stand upto British Matilda tank.

Rommel was supposed to be subordinate to Italians but he took the lead and went on offensive as opportunity showed up, so even having initial problems with Italians he still earned victories.

I am not going into the equipment, but the initial success of Rommel can clearly be attributed to:

1. better equipment (the British tanks were out-gunned; the better designs of Cromwell et al were negated effectively by the 88s of Rommel, another superb AT weapon of the time along with panzerfaust), have given you a simple link for tanks in the theatre with the British.

88's as better equipment did not give Rommel initial success. His initial success were due to pressing on offensive on the British forces.
Use of 88 's in AT role was an incredible idea by Rommel but 88's were never in massive amounts nor were 88's assigned to AT regiments. They were used in defensive role where as Rommel liked to be on the offensive most of the time.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_the_British_Army

In short the main battle tanks used by the Germans in Africa were Panzer III and IV's which proved effective during Blitzkrieg against the Allied armour (they had problems subsequently on Eastern Front but thats beyond the scope).

During Blitzkrieg, the main tanks used were Pz 38t, Pz I and PZ II. The Panzer III and Panzer IV were in short number in Blitzkrieg as well as with Afrika Korps. The allied armour was heavier even in initial days of Blitzkrieg and Panzers had no chance against French Char. B1 tanks, infact Char B1 easily destroyed Panzers III and Panzers IV during French campaign.

Since Adolf Hitler did not pay too much attention to the African Campaign, Rommel's supplies were neglected and rarely consisted of the latest equipment

.

thats why i said he had a massive logistics and replacement problem but still came on top.

On the other side British were equipped with poorly armed and armored Cruiser Mark Is, Cruiser Mark IIs, Cruiser Mark IIIs, Cruiser Mark IVs and Crusaders which proved to be no match for the experienced German crews with their Panzer IIIs and IVs.
Only British made Mark III Matildas (Mk I had only a machine gun and Mk II added a 2 pounder main gun) and Mark IV Churchills (and its latter variants) were a match with their 40mm guns and thick armor.

The earlier versions of Cruisers and Crusaders were never poorly equipped. The 40mm guns were comparable to Panzer III 37mm gun where as Panzer I with MG's and Panzer II with 20mm gun were hopeless against British tanks. Also considering that german Panzer regiment had all the tanks of the entire panzer division but still had less tanks than a British Armoured Division and then even smaller number of Panzer III and Panzer IV tilted the tank numbers heavily in British favour.

Matilda tank was unstoppable by every German tank except Panzer IV. Infact usually 88's or 105mm artillery stopped Matildas.

British were also supplied with American tanks in later stages like M3 General Lee (American standards) , M3 General Stuart (British standards), M4 Sherman and others which were a match for German Panzers. To oppose all of those tanks the Afrika Korps relied on both Panzer III and IVs. Panzer III`s were mostly armed with either 37mm guns or 50mm guns depending on the variant.

Like i have said German tanks were inferior to British tanks where as Panzer III/IV were always in short supply but even these didnt enjoy superiority over British tanks. It was Rommel's tactics in desert that made him victorious.

Panzer IV were armed with short or long barreled 75mm guns that proved very effective. In early 1943 the first Panzer VI Tigers reached Africa.

The Tiger was armed with a powerful 88mm gun that was superior to any Allied tank and its thick armor made it almost indestructible to Allied anti-tank weapons.

Tigers in Africa were too less and too late to save Germans from anything. So its armour or weaponry made no difference in African campaign.

And am not getting into the use of the venerable 88s ack-ack guns in AT role.

discussed already.

2. better logistics (apart from being a trained professional army, the Germans had the advantage of logistical support in terms of fighting in Tunisia and Libya, both colonies of Italy at the outbreak of war),

There was no advantage to logistics for Germans. Firstly, Hitler didnt give important to African theater. Secondly,read the amount of tonnage lost in sea that never made it to Africa.Rommel fully used captured British supplies to his advantage.

3. better state of manpower (in addition to Afrika Korps he had 02 x Italian Armies - a bit mauled, and 06 x fresh Italian divisions when he landed and clearly outnumbered the troops in location with the British) and

Rommel landed with one or two german divisions and started the offensive while clearly having problems with Italian leadership. The "fresh" Italian divisions were not under his command initially. He didnt score victories on strength in numbers still, the British didnt expect him to be on the offensive especially after decoding ULTRA.

4. better trained army.

More than half of Rommel's army became Italian divisions where as British, Indians, Australians, NewZealnders and South African formations were better trained as well as armed to the teeth.

For Marshal Zhukov:

1. He had the option to move in his Army of the East in his defence of Moscow, which was a battle hardened and acclimatised body of troops who had experience in fighting in extreme weather against the Japanese.

2. He had the chance to be commanding the Soviet army on staff when the logistics of Russia were being re-assembled as the plants that were transported from Western Soviet Union were getting online in Urals and Siberia, thereby increasing the Soviet production capacity. It was also at this time that American Aid in terms of military supplies started coming in from US.

3. Just the study of Battle of Kursk will give you the idea of the troops, tanks and aircrafts that the Soviet was able to field against the Germans. 20,000 artillery pieces were lined up against the Germans in that particular Battle!

Read leningrad and get the idea.

 

[danger007]

Ever heard the phrase "Hope for the best and be prepared for the worst"??

It is precisely for this reason that you want subs with Nuclear tipped Missiles, that is your preparation for the worst crisis, our's is NASR.

Rest assured it will never be used, we have successfully blunted all Indian attacks in the past when the parity b/w manpower was much larger, today it will be a piece of cake.

All India attacks? we never started war... but pakistan did.. We don't talk much about nukes, unlike pakistani officials and ak members.. 60km range missile? gives you advantage?

 

[Mav3rick]

All India attacks? we never started war... but pakistan did.. We don't talk much about nukes, unlike pakistani officials and ak members.. 60km range missile? gives you advantage?

We weren't discussing who started the war(s). And although we may have started or caused initiation of all the wars, the next war will be because of India and India alone especially if it is because of water.

 

[Ghazwa e Hind]

Nasr is not the last resort as wrongly understood by many people. Pakistan Army have many other options to halt Indian armor advance and we have several options even after the use of Nasr. A conventional war where the enemy will be visible and targets will be clear, it will not be that difficult for Pak Army to engage them. Nasr is just a warning to Indians that not get indulge in such thing with us.

 

[Hellfire]

@Sarge Excellent post.

However, want to draw your attention quickly on my statement which you missed


I am not going into the equipment, but the initial success of Rommel can clearly be attributed to:


Source: https://defence.pk/threads/obsessed-with-nasr.443009/page-7#ixzz4H2mWI8Dw

When I made the statement, it was for the initial success in stabilisation of the front in face of the British onslaught and the collapse of failing Italian armies in Libya and Tunisia.

Will get into a detailed discussion somewhere else with you on this topic. But if you read, the mandate of Rommel was to protect Tripoli .. and he was able to check the advances of British Forces (and the Tobruk incident comes into play).


I will quote:


His strategic blunder failed for two reasons - he failed to bring decisive victory, and it added another 700 miles to his already overextended line of communication. From February to May. Rommel and his Italian allies received a total of 325.000 tons of supplies. or 45.000 more than current consumption, but he was unable to bridge the enormous gap from Tripoli to the front. so his supplies piled up on the wharves while shortages arose In the front line. The Axis never solved the logistics problems due to Rommel's persistence in undertaking operations which were not logistically feasible. He never seemed to want to take the time to build up his advance bases prior to kicking off an operation.


It's an extract from 'British and German Logistics Support During The World War II North Africa Campaign' by Lieutenant Colonel John D Caviggia

You will have to look up a link if available ....

The contention of manpower and logistics was not an issue till as such time Rommel did not overlook his own mandate. His mandate was supported by the resources given, He simply did not have the resources to undertake what he did with the resources and the developing situation (namely the failure of German invasion in Battle of Britain and opening of Eastern Front by crossing Brest-Litovsk line by Germans, depriving him of much needed effort)

Pertinent to note is the British LOCs. Difference was the tendency of the latter to consolidate and fight whereas the former paid scant regards to logistics.

We will end up derailing this thread. So will carry on at some other opportune time and thread.

Thanks for your posts.

 

[Signalian]

@Sarge Will start with addressing you. Allow me the leeway of knowing something about the topic that I write.

1. The Cold Start Doctrine. It is already beyond the concept and been a decade since enacted. I will assume you are a professional and a service member. If not, my apologies. However, assuming it, I will only ask you to do your research on why India removed concept of strike corps and holding corps and made it strike and pivot corps. You will get your answer. (I suspect you know it anyways).

CSD constitutes brigade sized armour/mechanised battle groups from pivot corps to be followed up by Strike Corps. The strategy is good. However, even if cantonments are placed right next to border or IBG's from Pivot corps make their way towards the border, amassing of forces on or near the border will be picked up.

I have mentioned before in my posts, that every formation of Army (indian and pakistani) is monitored by spies on ground living in enemy countries. Any transfer/movement/transit/significant convoy movement is immediately notified, in peace as well as war time. This vigilance increases during days of increasing tension or escalation and alerts.

To counter this reporting by spies, both armies utilise different methods.

1.The formation signs on military vehicles are covered up or washed off.
2. Civilian transport vehicles are brought in to transport troops and weapons through LOG Area Command.
3. Awkward timings for convoy movement are decided like 3 am in morning when any suspecting person keeping an eye on convoy can be easily identified. General population is expected to be asleep.
4. Role of weather is brought into play. Fog, mist and rain become allies.
5. Sign boards for formation HQ's are constantly changed.
6. MP's know the correct direction and destination only, the vehicle drivers are kept in the dark. MP's standing on different way points and check points guide the convoys.

and both Armies keep cooking up new ways.

2. Having said above, if offensive operations are carried out by the pivot corps, you know the breach will be achieved and you will require time to reinforce the area in order to reverse the same. The depth of any such breach will be less than that sufficient for you to consider employment of a nuclear warhead in tactical role.

Since you mentioned breach, lets have a look at areas where breach is high possibility. There are four main areas where IA CSD forces can attack Pakistan.

1.Southern Kashmir/Northern Punjab (Sialkot-Shakargarh-narowal Area).

Terrain is armour friendly upto an extent only, reasons:
1. Agricultural area with few water systems
2. Heavily fortified by infantry

Pakistan Army Formations already present in Area:

8th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
15th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 Tanks)

Total Tanks = 176

Reinforcement readily available :
6th Armoured Division (80 km from border)
(220 Tanks)

Reinforcement available for sector:
8th Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 Tanks)
17th Infantry Division (partly mechanised to support 6th Armoured Div) (44 Tanks)
37 Infantry Division (44 Tanks)
Independent Armoured Brigade (XI Corps, Nowshera) (44 tanks)

Total tanks = 220

An IA CSD thrust here will be blocked immediately on the border and use of NASR is not possible. 6th Armoured Division can take on the offensive inside India or kept reserve to counter IA strike Corps.

Grand total (tanks) = 600 +
Still lesser than what IA will throw in this sector but numbers are good enough to cover ground.

2. Central Punjab/Lahore (Lahore-kasur-Okara Area)

Terrain is not armour friendly:

1. Heavy agricultural area
2. Lots and lots of nullahs, bund systems, mines, removable bridges, many lines of defence.
3. Limited room of manoeuvring for armoured forces.

Pakistan Army Formations already present in Area:

10th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
11th Infantry Division (partly mechanised) (44 tanks)
14th Infantry Division (partly mechanised to support 1st Armoured Div) (44 tanks)
40th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
Independent Infantry Brigade
Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 tanks)

Total Tanks = 264

Reinforcement readily available :
2nd Artillery Division (80 km from border)

Reinforcement available for sector:
1st Armoured Division
(220 Tanks)

An IA CSD thrust here will be blocked immediately on the border and use of NASR is not possible.

Grand total (Tanks) = 484
Still lesser than what IA will throw in this sector but numbers are good enough to cover ground.

3. Southern Punjab (Bahawalnagar- Fort Abbas- Rahim yar Khan Area)

This area is breach-able by IA CSD. Terrain is armour friendly , reasons:
1. very less Agricultural area
2. Lots of desert wasteland

Pakistan Army Formations already present in Area:

26th mechanized Division (44 tanks)
35th Infantry Division (44 Tanks)
Independent Infantry Brigade
Probable : Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 tanks)

Reinforcement readily available :
None.

Reinforcement available for sector:
None. 1st Armoured Division can be directed to this sector if threatened.

An IA CSD thrust can succeed in this sector and use of NASR is probable in this sector.

Grand Total (Tanks) = 176 minus (1st Armoured Div)
Lesser than what IA will throw in this sector but ground cannot be covered by PA with these numbers.

4. Sindh (South-eastern Desert Area)

The breach is achievable in desert area, in Rajasthan desert. Terrain is armour friendly , reasons:
1. Very less Agricultural area
2. Lots of desert wasteland
3. Lots of room for manoeuvring by IA armour and bypassing PA strong points.

Pakistan Army Formations already present in Area:

16th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
18th Infantry Division (44 tanks)
Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 tanks)

Total tanks = 176

Reinforcement readily available :
25 Mechanised Division (44 tanks)
Independent Infantry Brigade

Total tanks = 44

Reinforcement available for sector:
33rd Infantry Division (44 tanks)
41st Infantry Division (44 tanks)
Independent Armoured Brigade Group (88 tanks)

Total tanks = 176

An IA CSD thrust can succeed in this sector and use of NASR is certain in this sector.

Grand Total (tanks) = 396
Lesser than what IA will throw in this sector but ground cannot be covered by PA with these numbers.

There is no use saying that it will take time and SOP's and permissions to bring up nuclear weapon to battlefield, since an ordinary civilian like myself can bring up this analysis, the PA commanders already know where NASR will be used and would have brought it up already to threatened sectors. Chain of Command would already have been formed and SOP's formulated to take minimum time and permission for use.

3. You yourself have been accurately telling about the spread of the attacking armour. If I was to say the inter-se gap between two vehicles will be more than 600-700 m (not only due to increased urbanisation but also to negate a potential nuclear strike) you would agree that the figures for nukes of appropriate yield required to blunt an armoured brigade will be significantly high. It won't be a matter of a couple of nukes. So, and I ask you to consider it carefully, with your present estimated holding and your capacity of production of fissile material, do you honestly think that NASR is something we factor into our calculations?

An armoured attack with vehicle spacing of 700m eliminates its offensive power and makes it easy prey for defensive forces to pick them out without getting harassed from retaliatory fire from nearby units. Light 4X4 armed with ATGM will have a field day through ambushing lone tanks.. See, NASR has limited options for Indian Armour commanders.

The probability of use of of NASR is much more than other nuclear weapons so the resources will be diverted towards NASR. Secondly, PA has made up its mind to use NASR but striking Indian population or inside India with nuclear weapons depends upon situation with very slim chances of use. Thirdly, Pakistan already holds a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons for nuclear strike into India, so the fissile material will be spared for NASR.

4. Your permission for strike will be routed only through NCA with COAS giving a green light in consultation with President and PM. So the flexibility in employment of the same is severely limited even if you have the warhead in your hand.

Replied it above in very simple terms.

That is all I want to say as of now. Why we won't attack you, is something that I have discussed a number of times in different threads. Its got more to do with and increased convergence of interests in fighting the spread of terror than anything else. That, we leave for another day.

Fine by me.

@Sarge Excellent post.

However, want to draw your attention quickly on my statement which you missed


I am not going into the equipment, but the initial success of Rommel can clearly be attributed to:


Source: https://defence.pk/threads/obsessed-with-nasr.443009/page-7#ixzz4H2mWI8Dw

When I made the statement, it was for the initial success in stabilisation of the front in face of the British onslaught and the collapse of failing Italian armies in Libya and Tunisia.

Will get into a detailed discussion somewhere else with you on this topic. But if you read, the mandate of Rommel was to protect Tripoli .. and he was able to check the advances of British Forces (and the Tobruk incident comes into play).


I will quote:


His strategic blunder failed for two reasons - he failed to bring decisive victory, and it added another 700 miles to his already overextended line of communication. From February to May. Rommel and his Italian allies received a total of 325.000 tons of supplies. or 45.000 more than current consumption, but he was unable to bridge the enormous gap from Tripoli to the front. so his supplies piled up on the wharves while shortages arose In the front line. The Axis never solved the logistics problems due to Rommel's persistence in undertaking operations which were not logistically feasible. He never seemed to want to take the time to build up his advance bases prior to kicking off an operation.


It's an extract from 'British and German Logistics Support During The World War II North Africa Campaign' by Lieutenant Colonel John D Caviggia

You will have to look up a link if available ....

The contention of manpower and logistics was not an issue till as such time Rommel did not overlook his own mandate. His mandate was supported by the resources given, He simply did not have the resources to undertake what he did with the resources and the developing situation (namely the failure of German invasion in Battle of Britain and opening of Eastern Front by crossing Brest-Litovsk line by Germans, depriving him of much needed effort)

Pertinent to note is the British LOCs. Difference was the tendency of the latter to consolidate and fight whereas the former paid scant regards to logistics.

We will end up derailing this thread. So will carry on at some other opportune time and thread.

Thanks for your posts.

yeah better safe than sorry,no point getting banned over de-railing thread, do tag me please if you come across any such discussion. Thanks

 

[OrionHunter]

This is the scariest Missile in Pakistan's arsenal from Indian perspective as it made hundreds of millions in Indian investment in raising armored brigades null and void.

LOL! You're funny! And clueless too!

A little knowledge about nuclear weapons is a dangerous thing. But then as they say, ignorance is bliss! Now read this and get wise...


Tactical nukes? How many are you going to use to stop an Indian thrust? Here's the maths...

For a max 5KT warhead (max 5KT warhead on Nasr which is between 1 to 5 KT)

– Blast and fireball radius 500m or approx < 2 sq km

Integrated Combat Group frontage < > 10 km with two combat teams up. Depth < > 5 km. Total area covered approx 50 sq km.

How many tactical nukes would be required to destroy one CG? - 25 Nasrs (with 5KT warhead. 125 nukes with 1KT warhead).

Initial strike with 10 -15 combat groups simultaneously. Total area covered < > 500 sq km.

Minimum battlefield nukes needed to destroy the CGs > 250 Nasrs with 5KT warhead or 1250 Nasrs with 1KT warhead!

That’s a hell of a lot of Nasrs required! Remember, all tanks and personnel carriers are protected from nuclear radiation. There will be no infantry out in the open.

So, going a step further, 250x5 KT = 1250 KT ie, equal to the yield of 65 Hiroshima atom bombs on Pakistani territory (as these will be employed only after the CGs have penetrated deep into Pakistan and would be used as a last resort!!) And I haven't even got started on an Indian nuclear riposte! Add that to the mix and....Curtains!

What would be left of Eastern Pakistan?

It’s like cutting off your nose to spite your face!

Bottom line: Use of tactical nukes? Bad idea!

And by the way, has Pakistan tested this so called mini nuke known as Nasr? If so, when and where? If not, you've got a lemon!

Cheers!