Question: Does India have sufficient leverage to stare down the NSG and its enhanced restrictions on ENR, heavy-water, and "sensitive" equipment for India? (See article from The Hindu below)
Answer: Probably not. Mighty China (a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT and not subject to any restrictions) was blocked by U.S. political pressure from obtaining a legally-purchased MOX plant from Germany in 2003. (See second article below)
It has required another 8 years for China to indigenously research and master "nuclear fuel reprocessing technology." Another ten years is needed to solve the production problems associated with industrial-scale nuclear fuel reprocessing. Due to U.S. interference, China's use of MOX/reprocessed fuel has been delayed by 18 years. (See third article below)
Today, India is encountering a similar problem in acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies. Once again, the U.S. has blocked the acquisition of dual-use nuclear technologies via the Hyde Act and newly-enhanced restrictions at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The interesting question is whether India can meet the NSG challenge. Mighty China has a track record of demonstrating the futility of imposing technological embargoes on China. For example, the U.S. blocked Israel's sale of Phalcon AWACS to China. In reply, China built the indigenous KJ-2000 AWACS.
Can India develop ENR, heavy-water, and other "sensitive" equipment on its own? How many years or decades will the Indian effort require?
----------
The Hindu : News / National : "NSG decision not the end of the road"
"
“NSG decision not the end of the road”
Special Correspondent
NEW DELHI, July 4, 2011
India has exuded confidence that it can leverage and work on its strength in the wake of the recent decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) placing restrictions on transfer of sensitive technology, while describing the development as a “dynamic process” which is not yet “set in stone.”
“… Let me say that these guidelines have not been published in open text yet. We need to study that more fully and we need to draw our conclusions … you have to look at this as a dynamic process, Let me say one thing very clearly … that the international nuclear order will change in India's favour. And I am sure of that,” Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said on television programme “Devil's Advocate'.”
On the recent decision of the NSG not to sell enrichment reprocessing technologies to countries that had not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Ms. Rao said nothing had been “set in stone” and asserted that the sanctity of the 2008 NSG decision providing India clean exemption must be maintained and upheld.
India and its various partner-countries had entered into full bilateral civil nuclear cooperation commitments which must be taken forward and the United States, France and Russia recognised these points, she said.
“A dynamic process”
While New Delhi did not welcome the development, it was something it knew and fought against, but she disagreed with the interviewer Karan Thapar that India failed to prevent it. “It is not a question of failure. You have to look at this as a dynamic process … the international nuclear order will change in India's favour.”
Refusing to go with the description [of the NSG decision] by the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, as a betrayal since India had already obtained the waiver, Ms. Rao said that as a professional engaged in this process, the latest decision was not the “end of the road. It is not set in stone.”
Mutual reciprocity
Hinting that India had leverages to exert, she said: “There is a balance of interest, there is a balance of commitments, there is mutual reciprocity … The whole issue of full bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, the fact that India has the potential to develop 60,000 MWe of electricity from nuclear energy by 2030 … is a great attraction to the rest of the world … we will defend our interests to the hilt.”
The Foreign Secretary was confident of India's strengths. Stating that people had the tendency to proclaim defeat at every such turn, she re-emphasised that eventually New Delhi's strength and leverage would prevail."
----------
CNS - Controversy in Germany: Siemens Sale of MOX Plant to China - December 12, 2003 - Research Story of the Week
"
Controversy in Germany: Siemens Sale of MOX Plant to China
By Stephanie Lieggi[*]
December 12, 2003
[German Chancellor] Schröder (left) and Siemens Chief von Pierer (middle) in China. [Src: DPA (Deutsche Presse-Agentur)]
During a recent state visit to China, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder held discussions with Chinese government and business leaders about the proposed sale of a mothballed German mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant to a Chinese nuclear company. The plant in question, Siemens Hanau Fuel Element Factory (Hanauer Brennelementefabrik), was completed in 1991 but never put into operation. The sale of the facility would be a financial relief to Siemens, but the deal has caused a politically charged debate between the Chancellor and his government coalition partners -- the Greens. Green Party leaders disapprove of the sale for a number of reasons, including fears that the facility could be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons.
History of Hanau
The Hanau facility (located in the state of Hesse) would have been the biggest mixed oxide fuel production plant in Europe upon completion. Mixed oxide fuel consists of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide mixed or combined together. Uranium can be mined from mineral deposits in the earth. However, because plutonium is relatively short lived, i.e., decays rapidly compared to geological time, it has to be produced in nuclear reactors, which transform uranium into plutonium. The Hanau facility does not contain its own nuclear reactor. Spent nuclear fuel from reactors is reprocessed to extract the produced plutonium, which would be further manipulated at a MOX fuel elements production site, such as Hanau. Plutonium oxide at Hanau would be combined with depleted uranium into MOX fuel elements, to be used as fuel for nuclear power plants.[1] The facility was not meant to process weapons-grade plutonium; however, the facility could produce fuel rods for fast breeder reactors, which in turn could potentially be used for obtaining weapons-grade plutonium.[2]
Although the plans for the facility were approved by local and national officials at the start of construction, by the time the facility was near completion, the political climate in both the state and federal governments had changed. Green Party politicians, including Joschka Fischer (Hesse's environment minister in the late 1980s and early 1990s; now German Foreign Minister) began an effective campaign against nuclear power, culminating in the 1998 agreement to phase out nuclear energy in Germany. As a result of these changes in the German nuclear energy policy, the Siemens facility never went on-line.
In the late 1990s, the Russian Federation and Siemens proposed that the still unused facility be exported to Russia as a means of disposing of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. (The stockpiled fissile material from decommissioned warheads would be transformed into MOX fuel and used for nuclear energy reactors.) While this deal garnered significant criticism from within the German government, the main issue hindering its success was ultimately financial. The deal, which was to be funded by G-8 countries, never materialized, and Siemens reportedly "[ran] out of patience." In September 2001, Siemens decided to dismantle the facility.[3]
Schröder's Trip to China
In the first week of December 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a state visit to China, accompanied by a large business delegation. Included in the Chancellor's delegation was Siemens CEO Heinrich von Pierer.[4] Prior to the trip, talks had begun with Chinese nuclear industry officials about the possible transfer of the dismantled Hanau facility to China, and Siemens had already started the export license process. The deal is rumored to be valued at about 50 million Euros, although neither Siemens nor China's nuclear industry has given any specific details about the sale. When the deal became public during Schröder's trip, the Chancellor voiced support for the deal, and claimed there was no legal barrier to the transfer occurring.[5]
Many from Schröder's coalition government, particularly Green Party politicians, were disturbed by the announcement and potential sale. Germany's Green Party championed the phasing out of nuclear energy in Germany and views the sale of the Hanau facilities (and all other nuclear related transfers) to be hypocritical in light of the German government's renouncement of nuclear energy. However, many politicians opposing the deal also argued that the transfer would pose a significant proliferation risk. Green Party politician and German Minister for the Environment, Jurgen Tritten, claimed that the plant would enable China to produce more weapons-grade plutonium.[6] Green Party leader Reinhard Buetikofer warned that the plant could be used for military purposes.[7]
China's Nuclear Program
Much of the criticism of the proposed sale focuses on the reported incongruities between China's civilian nuclear capabilities and the capabilities of the Hanau plant. Since the report of the deal first broke, German politicians and experts have claimed that Beijing's intentions were dubious since the Hanau facility would have little civilian value to China. The MOX fuel elements produced by the Siemens facility can be burned in both breeder reactors and light water reactors (LWR). According to claims from a number of German politicians, China does not have sufficient breeder technology nor can their LWRs burn the MOX elements created by the facility, which contain plutonium. In an interview, one German nuclear expert claimed that purchasing the plant for civilian use made no sense and that China could only use the plant for military purposes.[8] In the same article, a Greenpeace expert argued that since the fast breeder technology has been proven economically untenable for energy generation, China's interest in the plant could not be based on its civilian program. The fear from these opposition voices is that China intends to use the Hanau facility to produce large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, enabling Beijing to build a larger nuclear arsenal.
In closer examination of China's civilian and military nuclear programs, the claims that China has no civilian use for the Siemens plant appear unsubstantiated. Many of the arguments ignore the well-documented increase in China's energy needs over the last 10 years, and estimates that the substantial increase in consumption will continue. To meet these needs, Beijing has begun to invest heavily in developing their nuclear energy program, including gaining assistance from foreign firms. China currently has 8 reactors in operation, 3 more under construction and another 26 in the planning stages.[9] Of the 11 reactors either in operation or near completion, 8 are pressurized light water reactors. According to a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, China's nuclear power industry believes MOX has great economic benefits.[10] China has planned for some time to use MOX fuel for its light water reactors and its proposed fast breeder reactors.[11] While China's facilities are not currently using MOX fuel, there are no significant technical barriers keeping Chinese light water reactors from burning this fuel. As for fast-breeder technology, although German nuclear industry gave up on this technology, many countries, including China, Japan and France, still believe this technology has viable civilian uses, and development of this technology for civilian programs is on-going.
Proliferation Risk?
China unofficially froze production of fissile material in 1991.
Most recent estimates put the number of Chinese nuclear warheads at over 400.[12] Although hard data on China's military program is sparse, experts estimate that China has stockpiled approximately 4 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and between 9 and 14 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium, an amount sufficient to increase its arsenal by at least 400 warheads.[13] A more recent independent estimate is that China produced 2 to 5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.[14] Taking into account the large uncertainties, the two estimates are compatible with each other.
China's sizable stockpile suggests creation of more weapons-grade plutonium is not a high priority for Beijing.
China has made great efforts in the last few years to portray itself as a responsible power in the international arena. As part of this effort, China recently released a White Paper detailing its activities in the field of nonproliferation and particularly on the issue of export controls.
Although China continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, Beijing has little incentive for using the imported civilian facility for a military nuclear program. China has assured the German government that the facility would only be used for civilian purposes and using it for any other reason would be strategically embarrassing to the Chinese government. A deception would be hard to hide. Facilities receiving German nuclear exports are required to have IAEA safeguards agreements. Beijing also voluntarily submits all nuclear imports to safeguards. With these controls in place, diversion of fissile material from the Siemens plant to China's military stockpile would be difficult.
If the Chinese authorities were once again to produce weapons-grade materials in order to increase China's existing stockpile, they would be much more likely to rely on the existing nuclear weapons facilities, which are not subject to IAEA checks.[15] China has a viable indigenous fuel cycle, with abundant supplies of uranium and adequate reprocessing capabilities. Moreover, the Hanau facility itself is not sufficient to produce weapons-grade fissile material. As mentioned above, the facility does not contain a nuclear reactor, which would be required to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and it cannot be used to make highly enriched uranium, which is the other type of fissile material useful for nuclear weapons. Mixed oxide fuel produced at the Hanau facility, as it is currently configured, would not provide suitable fissile material for nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Hanau plant would require further modifications to be able to process weapons-grade plutonium.[16]
Although it might be feasible for China to modify the Siemens facility to supplement military supplies, it is more likely that China would use existing facilities to increase fissile material stockpiles rather than reconfigure the Siemens plant, which is much more valuable to China as a civilian facility.
The Green Party has grounds to protest the export of the MOX facility, particularly in light of its own country's rejection of nuclear energy for safety and environmental reasons. However, despite claims to the contrary,
Beijing's interest in the Hanau facility is consistent with planned increases in nuclear fuel consumption in the coming years, and is unlikely to add to China's stockpile of fissile material that could be used for production of nuclear weapons. While some German politicians may have well-founded political and ethical reasons for wanting to deny the sale of the Siemens facility to China, fears that the deal will contribute to nuclear weapon proliferation appear to be overblown.
[*] The author would like to thank Dr. Charles Ferguson for lending his technical expertise during the drafting of this paper.
[1] Kerstin Krupp, "China Can Use MOX-Facility for Weapons Program: Experts Think Civilian Use Unlikely," Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), 4 December 2003, translated in FBIS EUP20031203000490. Also, for a good explanation of MOX fuel, see "Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)" on the World Nuclear Association website, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf29.htm>.
[2] Christop Podewils, "China Works on Fast Breeder: Plutonium Plant from Hanau Able to Fulfill Two Functions, One of Them Military," Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), 10 December 2003, translated in FBIS EUP200312010000002.
[3] "Siemens Wants Hanau Site Evacuated By Next October," NuclearFuel, 3 September 2001, Vol. 26, No. 18.
[4] Kevin McElderry, "China in Delicate Talks on Buying German Plutonium Plant," AFP (via
Military Space News, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense) 02 December 2003. Siemens has a large presence in China, with over 21,000 employees according to the Siemens China website, <http://www.siemens.com.cn>.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Joerg Michel, "Nuclear Export Splits Red-Green" Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), 5 December 2003, translated in FBIS EUP20031204000474.
[7] Dagmar Dehmer, "Points for Style Can Be Given Later," Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), 6 December 2003, translated in FBIS EUP20031205000400.
[8] Krupp, Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), 4 December 2003.
[9] World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in China," Information and Issue Briefs, December 2003, < http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63.htm>.
[10] "German Nuclear Facility Will Be Used for Peaceful Purposes: China," AFP, 9 December 2003.
[11] "Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction)" China WMD Database, NTI website, <http://www.nti.org/db/china/reproc.htm>.
[12] Robert S. Norris and Hans M Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, Iss. 6 (Nov/Dec 2003).
[13] David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, SIPRI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 76-77 and pp. 129-130.
[14] David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Estimating China's Production of Plutonium for Weapons," Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, 2003, pp. 61-80.
[15] As a recognized nuclear weapon state under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear weapons facilities in China are not required to have safeguards agreements. However, China does submit all its civilian facilities to IAEA safeguards.
[16] "Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)," World Nuclear Association website, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf29.htm>."
----------
China: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Technology Has Been Mastered
"
China: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Technology Has Been Mastered
CHRISTOPHER BODEEN | 01/ 3/11 11:16 AM | AP
BEIJING — Chinese scientists have mastered the technology for reprocessing fuel from nuclear power plants, potentially boosting the supplies of carbon-free electricity to keep the country's economy booming, state television reported Monday.
The breakthrough will extend by many times the amount of power that can be generated from China's nuclear plants as fissile and fertile materials are recovered to be new fuel, CCTV said.
Several European countries, Russia, India and Japan already reprocess nuclear fuel – the actual materials used to make nuclear energy – to separate and recover the unused uranium and plutonium, reduce waste and safely close the nuclear cycle.
The CCTV report gave no details on whether or when China would begin reprocessing on an industrial scale.
China overtook the United States as the world's largest energy consumer in 2009, years before it was expected to do so, according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency.
But it is heavily dependent on coal, a major pollutant. It has 13 nuclear power plants in use now and ambitiously plans to add potentially hundreds more.
Reprocessing nuclear fuel costs significantly more than using it once and storing it as waste. It is also controversial because extracted plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, although China has long had a nuclear arsenal.
U.S. commercial reprocessing of plutonium was halted by then-President Jimmy Carter because of nuclear proliferation worries. Then-President George W. Bush proposed a resumption, but the National Research Council found it not economically justifiable. President Barack Obama scrapped the Bush effort.
Recovered plutonium and – when prices are high – uranium can be re-used. Some reactors can use other reprocessed components, potentially multiplying the amount of energy that results from the original uranium fuel by about 60 times."
