North Korea US Tension - News & Discussion
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Stuttgart001
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There are more than tens of thousands of guns deployed in bunkers underneath in a hundreds of squared kilometers zone ,it's hard to eliminate them in once attack before they could counter attack.
They have some SA-3 and SA-6 SAMs and indigenous replicas .
Nike
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hmmm, one thing. South Korean had thousands artillery pieces too, and credible Air Forces to protect them
Stuttgart001
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SOK is really scared of such guns, cause quite a part of Seoul is in their range.
But fighter jets could not shoot down projectiles.
These artilleries are used to make sure a mutual destruction with SOK.
$@rJen
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no use... 60s tech against Growlers
Stuttgart001
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Suppressing AD combat need time which is enough for DPRK to launch a attack at Seoul with the artilleries.
If war is really started, DPRK would not stand a chance to win. All he can do is to jeopardize SOK or Japan as hardly as possible.
tonyget
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Didn't happen during first Korea War
$@rJen
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100% agreed... that's one of the main reason there's no war in Korea.
Carlosa
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Hell yes, the artillery concentration in the DMZ is massive, nothing like that has been seen since the second world war at the Russian-German front, but no problem, NK civilians will hear the shelling and they'll flock towards the fighting like mosquitoes to a light during the night because they have a death wish. Yeah, sure, I'm also an alien from Mars.
Tshering22
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South is already overcrowded and won't be able to accommodate more North Koreans without having significant more land and resources of the Northern part of the peninsula.
With the kind of demented regime where running out fo the country is considered treason, NK citizens have little choice but to stay and fight.
gambit
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Why not southward ? The DMZ. Plus there is a large Korean population in Manchuria.
https://www.nknews.org/2014/10/manchuria-the-third-korea/
Carlosa
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Could North Korea Annihilate Seoul with Its Artillery?
By Kyle Mizokami
April 26, 2017
For most armies, artillery is just one component of an all-arms force consisting of infantry, armor and artillery. But North Korea’s curious strategic location, with the enemy capital within striking range, has turned the country’s arsenal of howitzers and rocket launchers collectively into a weapon of mass destruction, capable of reducing Seoul to rubble within days. Or does it? Has the threat to the capital by North Korea’s “King of Battle” been overstated?
During the Cold War, North Korea built up an oversized army—and artillery corps—as part of its goal of re-invading South Korea. The North Korean People’s Army Artillery Command is responsible for 12,000 pieces of tube artillery and 2,300 pieces of multiple launch rocket artillery over 107-millimeters. The majority of tube artillery are 122-, 130-, 152- and 170-millimeter units, and on the rocket side the majority are 240-millimeter units.
Artillery is particularly useful in Korea. The hilly, forested terrain common on much of the peninsula restricts line of sight, shortening direct fire ranges. Indirect weapons, such as howitzers, rocket launchers and mortars, can be useful for striking targets on the other side of a mountain or in a valley. Moreover, mountainous terrain may also block units from receiving long-range artillery support, making it vital for smaller units to have enough artillery firepower to conduct their own local attacks.
During peacetime, North Korean artillery is organized under the Artillery Command, which in turn falls under the Fourth Department of the General Staff’s Department’s Operations Bureau. In wartime, however, independent artillery units—where most of the heavy artillery is located—would be allocated to corps commanders responsible for carrying out the invasion.
North Korean units are generously supplied with artillery starting at the regimental/brigade level. Each infantry regiment, for example, not only has three infantry battalions but one battalion of eighteen 120-millimeter heavy mortars, another battalion of eighteen 122-millimeter howitzers, and a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battery of nine 107-millimeter or 140-millimeter weapons. This ensures that regiments can act independently on the battlefield, carrying out attacks without support from headquarters if necessary.
At the next level up, a North Korean division typically has three artillery battalions, including one battalion of twelve 152-millimeter howitzers, two battalions with eighteen 122-millimeter howitzers and a MRL battalion of twelve 122-millimeter Katyusha truck-mounted MRLs. The result of all of this is a frontline combat division that has considerably more, on a tube-by-tube basis, firing units than a U.S. or South Korean division.
North Korea is known for some very big guns and MRLs, and these are allocated at the corps level. Each corps has twelve artillery battalions, or about twice as much as what could be expected to be allocated to a typical U.S. corps, split between six cannon and six MRL battalions. The cannon battalions are equipped with eighteen of the infamous 170-millimeter Koksan self-propelled howitzers, while the MRL battalions are equipped with eighteen 240-millimeter rocket launchers. During wartime, these are split into two or more Corps Artillery Groups and their firepower lent to support to critical operations—such as breaching the DMZ.
The world got a rare look at the preparedness of North Korean artillery units in November 2010, when the country conducted a surprise artillery attack on the southern island of Yeonpyeongdo. In preparation for the attack a battalion of twelve 122-millimeter MRLs was believed to have been moved onto the Kangnyŏng peninsula near Yeonpyeongdo. Such rocket launchers are division-level artillery and, according to 38North, this battalion is believed to have belonged to the nearby 33rd Infantry Division.
On November 23, the island was hit by two barrages totally 170 rounds of 122-millimeter rockets—and possibly some rounds from nearby 76.2-millimeter coastal artillery units. Republic of Korea (ROK) return fire was limited by an inoperative counter battery radar, which was repaired in time to direct a strike on North Korean rocket launcher units. Two civilians and two ROK Marines were killed in the attacks. Curiously, the rocket battalion should have been able to fire a total of about 288 rockets, but only 170 actually landed near the island. Of those 170 rockets, only 80 landed on the island itself, the rest in surrounding waters.
North Korea has also managed to turn its heavy artillery, particularly corps level170-millimeter Koksan guns, 240-millimeter heavy rockets and new 300-millimeter MRLs into weapons of mass destruction. Since the 1990s, right about the time the Clinton administration decided not to undertake military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, the general consensus has been that Pyongyang had enough artillery to turn nearby Seoul, home to approximately 25 million South Koreans, into a “sea of fire” that could see up to one million civilians killed. This apocalyptic scenario has been a trump card against strong military action against Pyongyang, with fears it could order a bombardment of the city as an act of retaliation.
A 2011 study by the Nautilus Institute throws a considerable amount of cold water on this scenario. While the sheer number of artillery tubes could theoretically kill a large number of civilians, operational issues complicate matters and push the number of civilian casualties greatly downward. Despite the thousands of artillery pieces, only 700 heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLs, have the range to strike Seoul. Only a third would normally be fired at once, and notional rates of fire would be slowed tremendously by the need to withdraw guns into their hardened artillery sites (HARTS) to shelter them from counter battery fire.
Other factors reduce the projected loss of life in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. The city has extensive air raid shelters for civilians that will quickly reduce the exposed population density. The North will struggle to keep these heavy artillery units supplied with shells, particularly with its aging supply system. Finally, U.S. and ROK forces will quickly begin hunting down units participating in the bombardment, causing their numbers to drop almost immediately.
Finally, the North would face a strategic dilemma. Artillery used to bomb Seoul could not be used to soften up border defenses for a general invasion, and in wartime it would be critical to capture the enemy capital quickly as possible. An all-out bombardment of the South Korean capital might very well leave Pyongyang without the ability to actually capture it, while at the same time ensuring a U.S./South Korean counteroffensive that would spell the end of the regime of Kim Jong-un. Even if a million civilians were killed in Seoul it would ensure Kim’s untimely demise, and from his perspective that is still almost certainly a very bad trade.
North Korean artillery will undoubtedly play a very large role in any future conflict. While the Korean People’s Army certainly has a large amount of cannon and rocket artillery, recent experience suggests that it falls short of its actual potential. Furthermore, while an artillery attack on Seoul would undoubtedly cause a great deal of civilian casualties, there are numerous factors involved that would give the North pause before unleashing such a scenario. This should not necessarily embolden hawks to use force against North Korea; the ideal future is still one in which the country’s plentiful artillery is not used at all.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
This article appeared originally at The National Interest.
By Kyle Mizokami
April 26, 2017
For most armies, artillery is just one component of an all-arms force consisting of infantry, armor and artillery. But North Korea’s curious strategic location, with the enemy capital within striking range, has turned the country’s arsenal of howitzers and rocket launchers collectively into a weapon of mass destruction, capable of reducing Seoul to rubble within days. Or does it? Has the threat to the capital by North Korea’s “King of Battle” been overstated?
During the Cold War, North Korea built up an oversized army—and artillery corps—as part of its goal of re-invading South Korea. The North Korean People’s Army Artillery Command is responsible for 12,000 pieces of tube artillery and 2,300 pieces of multiple launch rocket artillery over 107-millimeters. The majority of tube artillery are 122-, 130-, 152- and 170-millimeter units, and on the rocket side the majority are 240-millimeter units.
Artillery is particularly useful in Korea. The hilly, forested terrain common on much of the peninsula restricts line of sight, shortening direct fire ranges. Indirect weapons, such as howitzers, rocket launchers and mortars, can be useful for striking targets on the other side of a mountain or in a valley. Moreover, mountainous terrain may also block units from receiving long-range artillery support, making it vital for smaller units to have enough artillery firepower to conduct their own local attacks.
During peacetime, North Korean artillery is organized under the Artillery Command, which in turn falls under the Fourth Department of the General Staff’s Department’s Operations Bureau. In wartime, however, independent artillery units—where most of the heavy artillery is located—would be allocated to corps commanders responsible for carrying out the invasion.
North Korean units are generously supplied with artillery starting at the regimental/brigade level. Each infantry regiment, for example, not only has three infantry battalions but one battalion of eighteen 120-millimeter heavy mortars, another battalion of eighteen 122-millimeter howitzers, and a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battery of nine 107-millimeter or 140-millimeter weapons. This ensures that regiments can act independently on the battlefield, carrying out attacks without support from headquarters if necessary.
At the next level up, a North Korean division typically has three artillery battalions, including one battalion of twelve 152-millimeter howitzers, two battalions with eighteen 122-millimeter howitzers and a MRL battalion of twelve 122-millimeter Katyusha truck-mounted MRLs. The result of all of this is a frontline combat division that has considerably more, on a tube-by-tube basis, firing units than a U.S. or South Korean division.
North Korea is known for some very big guns and MRLs, and these are allocated at the corps level. Each corps has twelve artillery battalions, or about twice as much as what could be expected to be allocated to a typical U.S. corps, split between six cannon and six MRL battalions. The cannon battalions are equipped with eighteen of the infamous 170-millimeter Koksan self-propelled howitzers, while the MRL battalions are equipped with eighteen 240-millimeter rocket launchers. During wartime, these are split into two or more Corps Artillery Groups and their firepower lent to support to critical operations—such as breaching the DMZ.
The world got a rare look at the preparedness of North Korean artillery units in November 2010, when the country conducted a surprise artillery attack on the southern island of Yeonpyeongdo. In preparation for the attack a battalion of twelve 122-millimeter MRLs was believed to have been moved onto the Kangnyŏng peninsula near Yeonpyeongdo. Such rocket launchers are division-level artillery and, according to 38North, this battalion is believed to have belonged to the nearby 33rd Infantry Division.
On November 23, the island was hit by two barrages totally 170 rounds of 122-millimeter rockets—and possibly some rounds from nearby 76.2-millimeter coastal artillery units. Republic of Korea (ROK) return fire was limited by an inoperative counter battery radar, which was repaired in time to direct a strike on North Korean rocket launcher units. Two civilians and two ROK Marines were killed in the attacks. Curiously, the rocket battalion should have been able to fire a total of about 288 rockets, but only 170 actually landed near the island. Of those 170 rockets, only 80 landed on the island itself, the rest in surrounding waters.
North Korea has also managed to turn its heavy artillery, particularly corps level170-millimeter Koksan guns, 240-millimeter heavy rockets and new 300-millimeter MRLs into weapons of mass destruction. Since the 1990s, right about the time the Clinton administration decided not to undertake military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, the general consensus has been that Pyongyang had enough artillery to turn nearby Seoul, home to approximately 25 million South Koreans, into a “sea of fire” that could see up to one million civilians killed. This apocalyptic scenario has been a trump card against strong military action against Pyongyang, with fears it could order a bombardment of the city as an act of retaliation.
A 2011 study by the Nautilus Institute throws a considerable amount of cold water on this scenario. While the sheer number of artillery tubes could theoretically kill a large number of civilians, operational issues complicate matters and push the number of civilian casualties greatly downward. Despite the thousands of artillery pieces, only 700 heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLs, have the range to strike Seoul. Only a third would normally be fired at once, and notional rates of fire would be slowed tremendously by the need to withdraw guns into their hardened artillery sites (HARTS) to shelter them from counter battery fire.
Other factors reduce the projected loss of life in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. The city has extensive air raid shelters for civilians that will quickly reduce the exposed population density. The North will struggle to keep these heavy artillery units supplied with shells, particularly with its aging supply system. Finally, U.S. and ROK forces will quickly begin hunting down units participating in the bombardment, causing their numbers to drop almost immediately.
Finally, the North would face a strategic dilemma. Artillery used to bomb Seoul could not be used to soften up border defenses for a general invasion, and in wartime it would be critical to capture the enemy capital quickly as possible. An all-out bombardment of the South Korean capital might very well leave Pyongyang without the ability to actually capture it, while at the same time ensuring a U.S./South Korean counteroffensive that would spell the end of the regime of Kim Jong-un. Even if a million civilians were killed in Seoul it would ensure Kim’s untimely demise, and from his perspective that is still almost certainly a very bad trade.
North Korean artillery will undoubtedly play a very large role in any future conflict. While the Korean People’s Army certainly has a large amount of cannon and rocket artillery, recent experience suggests that it falls short of its actual potential. Furthermore, while an artillery attack on Seoul would undoubtedly cause a great deal of civilian casualties, there are numerous factors involved that would give the North pause before unleashing such a scenario. This should not necessarily embolden hawks to use force against North Korea; the ideal future is still one in which the country’s plentiful artillery is not used at all.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
This article appeared originally at The National Interest.
F-22Raptor
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Washington (CNN)The US anti-missile system designed to mitigate the threat of North Korea's missiles will soon be operational, the top US commander in the Pacific said Wednesday.
US Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris told the House Armed Services Committee that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system would be "operational in the coming days to be able to better defend South Korea against the growing North Korea threat."
The South Korean Defense Ministry said Wednesday that parts of the system had been moved to the planned deployment site.
The THAAD system has been moved to South Korea in response to North Korea's increased missile and nuclear tests, but it has drawn sharp opposition from China and Russia, who see it as also equalizing their nuclear deterrents.
Harris said it was "preposterous" that China would take economic steps to try to stop South Korea from receiving a defensive system, which the US insists does not pose a threat to Beijing.
He added that China appears to be working to deter North Korea, as President Donald Trump has pushed his Chinese counterpart to do.
"I'm reasonably optimistic now that China is having an influence, and they are working in the right direction with regards to North Korea thanks to the efforts of our president and theirs," Harris said.
The Pacific commander said that he was taking Kim Jong Un at his word that the North Korean leader is determined to develop a long-range nuclear missile that could strike the US and that should "provide us all a sense of urgency" to ensure US forces in the Pacific are prepared.
He said providing "credible combat power" was the best way to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
"We want to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees," Harris said.
The Pacific commander cited the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group deployment to northeast Asia as such a deterrent against North Korea's rising threats, saying it was now in the Philippine Sea and "in strike range and power projection range of North Korea if called upon to do that."
The Vinson is headed north after initial confusion earlier this month about the location of the carrier, a miscommunication Harris accepted responsibility for.
"That's my fault on the confusion, and I'll take the hit for it," Harris told the panel.
He said it was his decision "to pull the Carl Vinson out of Singapore, truncate the exercise it was going to do south of Singapore, cancel its port visit to Australia and then proceed north."
He added, "Where I failed was to communicate that adequately to the press and the media. So that is all on me." Harris did not address what, if any, communications took place with the White House.
As another deterrent, Harris pointed to the USS Michigan -- a guided-missile submarine -- that arrived in South Korea Tuesday, saying it was an important show of force.
"We have a lot of preemptive options," Harris said.
At the same time, Harris talked up his command's unfulfilled needs. He said he only had 50% of the submarines he sought for the region -- "We need more submarines," he said bluntly -- and that he saw a need for more interceptors deployed in California and Alaska to defend against potential North Korean missiles.
He also said he'd be interested in deploying missile-defense radars to Hawaii -- and possibly missile interceptors -- to help better defend the islands from North Korea's missiles.
Harris' testimony comes ahead of two congressional briefings on North Korea Wednesday afternoon, where Defense Secretary James Mattis, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats will brief the full House and Senate.
Senators are headed to the White House for the briefing, where President Donald Trump may drop in.
While the briefings are being held in a classified setting, House Armed Services Chairman Mac Thornberry of Texas said Harris' testimony was important for reassuring the public.
"I think the public is nervous, and they need to know that we have the military capability to prevail should a conflict come," Thornberry said ahead of the hearing.
Harris is testifying in three congressional hearings this week, but he's doing so without Gen. Vincent Brooks, the head of US Forces Korea, who was supposed to testify but remained in the Pacific due to the increased tensions.
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/polit...stem-north-korea0438PMN/ALink&linkId=36924660
US Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris told the House Armed Services Committee that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system would be "operational in the coming days to be able to better defend South Korea against the growing North Korea threat."
The South Korean Defense Ministry said Wednesday that parts of the system had been moved to the planned deployment site.
The THAAD system has been moved to South Korea in response to North Korea's increased missile and nuclear tests, but it has drawn sharp opposition from China and Russia, who see it as also equalizing their nuclear deterrents.
Harris said it was "preposterous" that China would take economic steps to try to stop South Korea from receiving a defensive system, which the US insists does not pose a threat to Beijing.
He added that China appears to be working to deter North Korea, as President Donald Trump has pushed his Chinese counterpart to do.
"I'm reasonably optimistic now that China is having an influence, and they are working in the right direction with regards to North Korea thanks to the efforts of our president and theirs," Harris said.
The Pacific commander said that he was taking Kim Jong Un at his word that the North Korean leader is determined to develop a long-range nuclear missile that could strike the US and that should "provide us all a sense of urgency" to ensure US forces in the Pacific are prepared.
He said providing "credible combat power" was the best way to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
"We want to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees," Harris said.
The Pacific commander cited the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group deployment to northeast Asia as such a deterrent against North Korea's rising threats, saying it was now in the Philippine Sea and "in strike range and power projection range of North Korea if called upon to do that."
The Vinson is headed north after initial confusion earlier this month about the location of the carrier, a miscommunication Harris accepted responsibility for.
"That's my fault on the confusion, and I'll take the hit for it," Harris told the panel.
He said it was his decision "to pull the Carl Vinson out of Singapore, truncate the exercise it was going to do south of Singapore, cancel its port visit to Australia and then proceed north."
He added, "Where I failed was to communicate that adequately to the press and the media. So that is all on me." Harris did not address what, if any, communications took place with the White House.
As another deterrent, Harris pointed to the USS Michigan -- a guided-missile submarine -- that arrived in South Korea Tuesday, saying it was an important show of force.
"We have a lot of preemptive options," Harris said.
At the same time, Harris talked up his command's unfulfilled needs. He said he only had 50% of the submarines he sought for the region -- "We need more submarines," he said bluntly -- and that he saw a need for more interceptors deployed in California and Alaska to defend against potential North Korean missiles.
He also said he'd be interested in deploying missile-defense radars to Hawaii -- and possibly missile interceptors -- to help better defend the islands from North Korea's missiles.
Harris' testimony comes ahead of two congressional briefings on North Korea Wednesday afternoon, where Defense Secretary James Mattis, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats will brief the full House and Senate.
Senators are headed to the White House for the briefing, where President Donald Trump may drop in.
While the briefings are being held in a classified setting, House Armed Services Chairman Mac Thornberry of Texas said Harris' testimony was important for reassuring the public.
"I think the public is nervous, and they need to know that we have the military capability to prevail should a conflict come," Thornberry said ahead of the hearing.
Harris is testifying in three congressional hearings this week, but he's doing so without Gen. Vincent Brooks, the head of US Forces Korea, who was supposed to testify but remained in the Pacific due to the increased tensions.
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/polit...stem-north-korea0438PMN/ALink&linkId=36924660
Solomon2
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USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is deployed near the Korean Peninsula, along with vessels from the Japanese navy. Photo: US Navy
ASIA UNHEDGED
China wouldn’t respond to a US strike on North Korea – how did we get here?
Chinese state media argued on Saturday that China should not respond militarily to a surgical strike on North Korean nuclear facilities, and that should come as a surprise to no one
By CHRISTOPHER SCOTT APRIL 26, 2017 4:15 AM (UTC+8)
As the potential for another nuclear test looms in North Korea, and President Trump continues to blast the Kim regime with weaponized Twitter bravado, pressure on Beijing is mounting. China is well aware, as the only grownup in this equation, that it is up to them to prevent catastrophe on their northeastern border.
While this escalation of tensions echoes countless moments of provocation and brinksmanship in the history of a divided Korea, it doesn’t just feel different this time – it really is. There has been an unsettling shift in the calculus of all parties involved.
No, China doesn’t have North Korea’s back
On Saturday, Chinese state-run news outlet Global Times published an opinion piece outlining China’s limited options for preventing war on the Korean peninsula. Shockingly, the Chinese communist party mouthpiece, known for its harsh criticism of the US, argued that China: 1) should drastically limit oil supply to their northeastern ally if they conduct another nuclear test, and 2) should NOT respond militarily in the event that the US carries out a surgical strike on North Korean nuclear facilities.
Before we explore what has brought us to this moment, let us pause and reflect on that point. Officially, Beijing is an ally of North Korea. A Chinese state media outlet, known for its hawkish stance toward US foreign policy, argues that China should not intervene on North Korea’s behalf should the US carry out a military strike on the Kim regime. That should be mind-blowing, but if we look at what has happened to the China-North Korea relationship over the past several years, it becomes clear why China is willing to align itself with the US and South Korea on the North Korea issue.
China’s hopes dashed
It is safe to say that Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korea’s youthful leader Kim Jong-un got off on the wrong foot when they took power, one shortly after the other. Relations between the two countries were amicable with former president Hu Jintao at the helm of China, while Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, was still in charge of North Korea. After the former supreme leader’s death in 2011, however, things went south, figuratively and literally.
Former Chinese president Hu Jintao (right) shares a glass of wine with former North Korean leader, and father of Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il. Photo: Korea Central News Agency
Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power was a moment of great uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula, but it also represented an opportunity for positive change. Some saw Kim’s uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who had helped mentor the young leader during his transition to power, as the key to closer relations with Beijing and economic reform in China’s image. Jang had been involved in the establishment of a joint economic zone set up with China and was seen as a figure with close ties to Beijing.
Those hopes were dashed quickly. Following a North Korean rocket launch in April 2012, Beijing uncharacteristically – for the time – backed a UN Security Council statement condemning the launch, which many speculate China had warned against through private channels. Soon after, China memorably ignored Kim Jong-un’s request to visit Beijing during the handover of power to Xi Jinping that same year.
And then came a dramatic blow to Beijing’s hopes of progress for the desolate kingdom of Kim.
The last man seen as a glimmer of hope for North Korean economic reform, the aforementioned uncle, Jang Song-thaek, was executed by his nephew. His alleged crimes included committing “irregularities” related to the joint economic zone set up with China and taking control of “major economic fields of the country,” according to North Korean state media.
People watch television news showing Jang Song-thaek in court before his execution on December 12, 2013. Photo: AFP
Pivot to South Korea
Perhaps the most significant moment in Beijing’s turn away from Pyongyang came when Xi Jinping visited Seoul in the summer of 2014. The move, which broke a long-standing tradition of Chinese leaders visiting their ally to the north first, marked a seismic shift in Northeast Asian regional politics. It garnered significant positive media attention in China, and fed a narrative, which first grew out of then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s earlier visit to Beijing, that a new friendship had bloomed between the two countries.
China was determined to diminish US influence in the region and the visit sparked concern in Washington and Tokyo that Beijing was succeeding. The love affair between Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye didn’t last, as we saw most recently with the row over South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. But many in Beijing still see stronger relations with South Korea, at the expense of relations with the north, as being in China’s strategic interest.
Former South Korean president Park Geun-hye greets Chinese President Xi Jinping with a smile during his state visit to Seoul. Photo: Wikipedia Commons/Korea.net
The volatile compound of Kim and Trump
Three years later, with a new US president in power, China is in a sticky situation. The current administration in Washington is less predictable than any in recent memory. That is even true for analysts in Washington – just imagine the head scratching that is going on in Beijing every time Trump posts a new thought to Twitter.
The young leader in North Korea is as boxed in strategically as he ever was. The nuclear program has been presented to the North Korean public as the crowning achievement of the Kim regime. How could he abandon part of his claim to legitimacy as a successful leader?
China does not want the US to conduct a surgical strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. In fact, by all accounts, no one at the Pentagon would risk that either. Washington and Beijing are in agreement that further advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program needs to stop. China, if the Global Times is any reflection of the mood in Beijing, is also willing to go further than it ever has before by limiting oil supplies to North Korea should they conduct another nuclear test.
Chinese leaders will hope to stop short of threatening the ultimate collapse of the Kim regime. The question is – how far is too far?
F-22Raptor
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Adm. Harris on North Korea's threat to the Vinson strike group:
Although Harris expressed concern about North Korea's future capabilities, he downplayed some of its current threats to U.S. forces in the Pacific.
He voiced confidence that the United States could defeat any North Korea missile attack on an American aircraft carrier strike group, saying threats from North Korea overstated Pyongyang's capabilities.
"The weapons that North Korea would put against the Carl Vinson strike group are easily defended by the capabilities resident in that strike group," Harris said.
"If it flies it will die, if it's flying against the Carl Vinson strike group."
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-harris-idUSKBN17S21G
Although Harris expressed concern about North Korea's future capabilities, he downplayed some of its current threats to U.S. forces in the Pacific.
He voiced confidence that the United States could defeat any North Korea missile attack on an American aircraft carrier strike group, saying threats from North Korea overstated Pyongyang's capabilities.
"The weapons that North Korea would put against the Carl Vinson strike group are easily defended by the capabilities resident in that strike group," Harris said.
"If it flies it will die, if it's flying against the Carl Vinson strike group."
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-harris-idUSKBN17S21G
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