As long as China is willing to hold on to these historical issues, the JPNese is not going to be so foolish, like our academic here, to enter into this union where JPN will inevitably be treated as second class citizen. And please do not even try to convince me and the silent readers out there that China will treat JPN as an equal.
Therein lies the issue in that there is this perception that Japan and China cannot, either by lack of ability or lack of motivation, to move past these historical tragedies.
Let me be firm and austere with you, Sir, I do not view nor do i have the position that Japan was "right" in waging war in China. In an attempt to assuage the various viewpoints in both sides , I suppose one would have to agree that Japan's violations of human rights and gross military policies in China is reason to hold some kind of disdain for Japanese atrocities.
Despite these historical grievances, both Japan and China rose above petty historical perceptions during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and all the way to the turn of the 21st century. In fact the former Prime Minister of Japan, Hatoyama, even proposed the notion of an East Asian Union , to which was also considered and greatly talked about during trilateral meetings between Beijing-Seoul and Tokyo. Tho he was unable to deliver his agenda , the fact that a man like him rose to power in Japan and the fact that his party received majority votes in Japan means that the idea of an East Asian Union with Japan and China is shared by voters, tho perhaps they do not vocalize it openly (do take into consideration that Japanese psyche focuses on internalization and keeping one's feelings to one's self).
Given Hatoyama rose to power during a very precarious situation in regional history since this was the time wherein the United States feels threatened , and with injurous movements by key politicians in Japan such as the nationalization of the Senkakus (a disputed territory). So we can understand Japan's recent mistakes in failing to understand Chinese reaction , a mistake that was done not by the majority of Japanese people or politicians, but key radical right wing politicians in Tokyo.
Despite the cooling of relations in 2012-2013, it seems to me that relations are recovering and in earnest. Its also interesting ot note that relations between Tokyo and Beijing
had to suffer , and was used as pretext for more bold changes to constitutional reform and legislative articulations in the Japanese Diet. Coupled with recent developments of a bolder, and more pro-active Japan , one that was contradictory to prior appropriations that Washington would have been comfortable with. So that in mind, I can beign to appreciate
why politicians such as Shintaro Ishihara were allowed purchase the island since this would force the Government to nationalize it, wherein then would lead to Chinese protest, thereby used as a catalyst / pretext to increase national defense capabilities and to erode the constrictive article 9 in the constitution.
In fact, it would later lead to the commencement for creating a new constitution as introduced by the LDP , then later supported even by the DPJ, Komeito parties. In other words -- one has to understand that Japan used China (as much as China used Japan) to make deployments avid and thus restore the classical understanding of East Asian dialogue and interoperability. Furtheremore, one cannot ignore the Futenma base closure and even the failure to build the new base in Henoko, thus necessitating the US' considering of redeploying some 9,000 soldiers in Okinawa to Guam. This is one of the reasons why , i suppose, Abe has not been to harsh on Governor Onaga (of Okinawa prefecture).
I believe that the leadership in Tokyo had some architectural influence in regional happenings to further reduce and erode US presence and influence in Japan. Afterall it was Hatoyama who once opined on the ill effects of US presence in Japan and their removal. In fact during the first term of Abe, he had also held similar notions of Hatoyama; i doubt these notions and feelings were exterminated, rather, hidden to enable maneuverings. Gradually , i hope to see less dependence on the United States. And I think this will be a healthy policy change for Japan, and the East Asian Region.
As I said China and Japan are far from build an honeymoon relation such issue as you mentioned the Yasukuni Shrine and some history issues still unsolved but that doesn't not prevent both to create an NEAU to defend our current interest and to tackle some future issues that affect both our nation's interest such trade or financial that give American the unfair advantage.
As China nuclear, Japan has the very right to be suspicious and to be under US nuclear umbrella if they wish, when question China nuclear, they should also realized who was the first to use Nukes on their soil despite the fact that US was on the other side of the world. In Korea war US was threaten to nuke China, so we need to find the right answer to the threat. Once a journalist from US came to China in 1980s and asked the general why we're aiming the nukes at US, the general give him the straight answer "you aim at us, we aim at you...period"
Sure no one ask to alter US-Japan relation or change the status quo but NEAU will just a bonus for China and Japan which I agree with
@Nihonjin1051 regarding this thread because it's in China and Japan's interests...it can't be worst.
Of course in such a union , there will be instances of disagreements. However if we view recent inter-legislative, inter-academic, inter-ministerial, inter-defense exchanges between Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul --- these are prepatory for eventual greater , committed organizational frameworks. Academics like myself and
@TaiShang are not over-polishing the reality, but rather introducing a thinking that is rarely talked about here in PDF, but is actually greatly written about, researched about in the echelons of academia, specifically Japanese , Chinese and Korean academic settings.
The first step to this integration is economic, the second part is political, and the last part is security. It seems to me that despite regional 'sensibilities' the first part unfolding. Afterall China and Korea have recently signed their FTA. Second part now is Japan, Korea and China engaging in a wider spectrum through the CJK Trilateral FTA, which is undergoing talks as we speak.
This is a gradual , mature, process. Wherein participating powers will be tested beyond reasonable doubt , but illustrates their respective commitment for regional stability and inclusive within the CJSK spectrum.
