One of the documents retrieved from the hard disks of computers at the Information and Support Unit of the General Staff strongly indicates that the Turkish military still includes individuals who seek to stage a coup détat against the democratically elected government when conditions are favorable.
According to the document, the existing conditions were not favorable for a coup, but the pro-coup junta nested within the TSK could work to make them favorable. The document said the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) managed to win the hearts of people and increase its popularity among voters over time and that the military should avoid any action that may be interpreted as interference in politics in the short run. The atmosphere was not favorable to remove the AK Party from power, either, with or without the use of weapons, according to the document.
The document also said the ruling party was in harmony with global powers such as the US administration, the EU, Germany and France.
The document states that those powers support the AK Party, either willingly or unwillingly, in line with their own interests, but that the TSK was not in harmony with those powers. Any action [coup] to be taken without harmony with those powers will heavily damage the TSK, cautions the document.
Below you will find the full version of the document.
Some precautions that may be taken by the Information and Support Unit in the coming period
1: Below are some factors that may impact the methods of operation [psychological warfare] in the upcoming period:
a. Turkish people love and trust the TSK, and they do not want it to lose its power and prestige. But they do not approve of methods of operation [adopted by the TSK] that may be interpreted as interference in politics. Therefore, the TSK should avoid any action that may be considered interference in politics in the coming period.
b. Due to their low level of education and such reasons as poverty and unemployment, the Turkish people do not have a full perception of the TSKs fight against religious fundamentalism, and they do not lend their support to this fight. [In other words, the TSKs strategy of fighting against religious fundamentalism has failed to secure the full support of the people due to the peoples poor economic and social conditions.] People think the TSK acts radically and takes harsh actions in its strategy to fight religious fundamentalism. The strategy should be revised and transformed into a form that pays more attention to the sensitivities of the people. [There is no need to make a change in the essence of the strategy. We may make changes to the methods (of fighting as part of the strategy.) With this point in mind, we may make some structural changes in order to render all propaganda carried out against the TSK ineffective. We had better differentiate between acts of religious fundamentalism and religious activities.]
c. The AKP (as the AK Party is referred to by its critics) was swept to power once again [in 2007] by securing public support because it has brought economic stability to the country.
The economic stability in Turkey since 2003, however, does not stem from the AKPs success in the field of economy but from the cooperation it has developed with global capital. [The power that has brought and administered economic stability in Turkey is global capital.]
The AKP will lose the support of the people only if its cooperation with [the powers that hold] global capital is damaged or if global capital loses its power in Turkey as it has done worldwide. It would not be appropriate to directly target the AKP unless the party loses the peoples support.
ç. Conditions are not favorable for removing the AKP from power either with or without the use of weapons (as on Feb. 28 [1997]). The AKP was brought to power in accordance with the rules of democracy (legitimate methods) on July 22, 2007. The harmony of the AKP with powers that have influence over Turkey (such as global capital, the US administration, the EU and the EUs engines Germany and France) is very strong. These powers support the AKP, either willingly or unwillingly, in line with their own interests.
The TSK, however, is not in harmony with these powers, and it does not act in cooperation with these powers, either.
Any action to be taken without harmony with these powers will bring heavy damage to the TSK. (The administration of the economy in Turkey is under the control of central powers, and the economic structure does not have a mechanism to defend itself. An action to be taken without harmony with those central powers may destroy all economic data within a day, and the value of one dollar may triple or quadruple and so may interest rates. In such an event, the public support that seems to be behind the TSK may drop to 5 percent.)
2: Under such conditions, the most proper strategy to be pursued as part of the psychological operation in the coming period is to wait for the destruction of the harmony between the AKP administration and the central powers and for global capital to lose its power. (When this happens, peoples support for the AKP will vanish.) The TSK should maintain its existing power and structure during this period of transition.
3: Measures that may be taken by the Information and Support Unit in this period of transition:
a. The perception [among the people] that the TSK is the owner and guardian of the state and that it considers itself above political parties should be weakened. (The TSK is thought to be intervening in politics, and effective measures cannot be developed to invalidate this thought.) The TSK should focus on such issues as security and defense, and its discourse and opinions should focus on these two topics.
b. Keep in mind that ministries, state bodies and institutions with which the TSK is supposed to cooperate are legal entities and act accordingly. Do not pay attention to the fact that those institutions may be politicized, engage in acts to discredit the TSK or the people at those institutions with which we are supposed to work with or cooperate may be engaged in activities of religious fundamentalism. (The relations with those institutions and people should be formal and not based on personal sentiments such as anger, sympathy or otherification. In other words, respect should be paid to institutions [not to individuals]. In this way, we will display a stance that the TSK acts with the seriousness required in state matters.
Do not display a different attitude toward certain people when cooperating with these ministries, state bodies and institutions, (do not act in a manner that could be perceived as the TSKs opposition to some institutions) and do not develop any personal ties with men of the bureaucracy other than holding official meetings with them.
Display a similar attitude with the Presidents Office, too; respect should be paid to the office itself, not to the man who sits in the chair of the president. (Cut the meetings with the president as short as possible and avoid criticizing or protesting the president.)
c. The TSK should continue to defend its own rights but should avoid any act that could be interpreted as a conflict with the political power or as interference in politics.
ç. Do not attend formal receptions or meetings where headscarf-wearing women are also invited; provide a legitimate excuse instead. If you happen to see any headscarf-wearing woman at any event you attend, give an excuse and leave the place. Civilian guests should be asked to attend events [sponsored by the military] without their spouses in order not to face provocative attempts such as the participation of headscarf-wearing women in those events. Guests may be allowed to bring their spouses to events that are only hosted by members of the TSK, and the media should be made to cover those events in their reports. For example, families of all TSK officers residing in Ankara may visit Anıtkabir (the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Citizens may also be urged to participate in this visit.
d. The AKP looks like a coalition party that is not homogenous but has members who defend different opinions. We should initially differentiate between groups and individuals within the AKP that have opinions against the TSK and act accordingly.
Different relationships may be developed with those groups and individuals, either directly or indirectly. Their opinions may be directed or shaped through the use of proper methods.
e. We should also differentiate between people who have religious identities but do not have anti-TSK attitudes or opinions and those who have pro-religious fundamentalist thoughts and anti-TSK opinions. We should prevent cooperation between these two groups against the interests of the TSK. The second group should be targeted and left alone, and the first group should initially be made to remain neutral. Then, we should urge the second group to act in favor of the TSK. (The most effective method to adopt is to make opinion leaders inside the opposing group change sides and then use them as a weapon against their original group.)
f. It would not be right to directly react to those who make provocative statements against the TSK.
Such a reaction would lead those people to be considered addressees or interlocutors for the TSK. Media outlets that publish such statements will focus on reactions coming from the TSK, and the intensity of the provocation will grow. Those who make statements to provoke the TSK are simple hitmen. The real instigators should be considered the real target, and the TSK should focus on them.
We may make statements, from time to time, as those statements are being followed by the TSK.
People who make those provocative statements should be noted down so that we can keep track of their activities. They may become targets of counter-attacks [by the TSK] in line with a loss of political power by the AKP.
g. It would be wiser to make use of opinion leaders instead of making direct attempts to invalidate campaigns to curb the power of the TSK.
Those opinion leaders should be supported indirectly, and they should be promoted in society. (For instance, writers, academics and artists loved and appreciated by students at military colleges may be invited for seminars or conferences.)
h. Indirect relations should be established with political parties other than the AKP -- to make them adopt and defend opinions also defended by the TSK. (We may use Nationalist Movement Party [MHP] Adana deputy retired Brig. Gen. Kürşat Atılgan in this sense.) Policies pursued by those political parties should not be criticized in the media.
ı. We should decide how to act on some issues that are used in campaigns to curb the power of the TSK (such as establishing gangs, participation in gangs, corruption and exorbitant spending). For example, staff who are accused of involvement in gangs or corruption should be condemned in the media and by people as is done by the Security General Directorate, and statements should be made that they have been suspended from office or sent to court [for legal action]. This would help the TSK to render the propaganda at the hands of its enemies ineffective.
i. Retired military staff should not be used in order to decrease the effectiveness of campaigns to discredit the TSK in the eyes of the people and shape public opinion in line with the opinion of the TSK. The experience of retired staff should be made use of at occasions organized and hosted by various civil society groups, but they should not be brought to the forefront in the media. (Retired military staff should be supported financially for them to be respected by civil society groups.)
Instead, the TSK should use civilian opinion leaders, and these leaders should be directly or indirectly supported.
j. The media in Turkey is under the control and monitoring of central powers. Therefore, the media is not an effective means to direct public opinion.
Despite these drawbacks, it would be a good idea to establish friendly relationships with the media. The TSKs relationships with the media are not in compliance with the principles of communication. The relationships should be restructured. (Issues that are worth being reported cannot be effectively conveyed to the media. We should consult the opinion of civilian journalists on this matter.)
k. We should make use of the power of civil society organizations to impact public opinion. We should use favorable civil society organizations in appropriate projects instead of setting up such organizations to be run directly by the TSK. (Contact with those favorable organizations will be established through trustworthy people.)
l. Civilian websites should be set up and used as part of gray and black propaganda campaigns. The appropriate staff should set up the websites, and the reputation of the TSK should not be risked.
Covert and indirect support may be given to some websites and newspapers that have also adopted black and gray propaganda methods.
m. Opinion leaders that act in line with the interests of the TSK may be supported and promoted in society. The support may either be material or moral as well as direct and indirect.
n. Famous actors and directors may be asked to shoot films or soap operas to direct and impact public opinion about the TSK.
o. A news agency may be set up not to be fully controlled by the TSK but used as part of efforts to launch gray and black propaganda campaigns. (The cost to set up and run the agency will not be high. Required measures should be taken not to risk the reputation of the TSK.) The news agency may work over the Internet (with a website). Reports that contain gray and black propaganda elements and that fail to be published in the media may reach target groups in this way.
ö. People who broke away from target groups or were kicked out of those groups for various reasons and who have the ability to impact public opinion may be supported by various means. Public opinion may be shaped or directed in this way. For example, a man who broke his ties with religious fundamentalist groups may be urged to appear on [TV] programs in the media or write books. His books may be purchased to support him.
p. Some writers who have the ability to impact public opinion may be urged to write books to promote the image of the TSK in the eyes of the people.
r. Some scientists (researchers) may be urged to carry out public opinion surveys to impact the opinion of the people.
s. Teams of enlightenment may be established in order to render counter-propaganda attempts ineffective and protect (TSK) staff and their families from those attempts. Members of these teams may be picked from among colonels.
ş. Activities to inform the public can be more attractive.
t. Symposiums, meetings and commemoration events in which some opinion leaders also participate may be held to impact public opinion.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-303194-no-coup-in-sight-but-we-may-prepare-conditions-for-one.html
Documents reveal how military carried out internet campaign
Documents retrieved from computers of the Information and Support Unit of the General Staff clearly reveal how a pro-coup junta nested within the Turkish military, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), has engaged in propaganda to discredit the government and faith-based groups in the eyes of the people.
The documents are currently being examined by a group of computer experts at the İstanbul 13th High Criminal Court, which is involved in a trial against anti-government websites allegedly established by the military. The General Staff recently sent hard disks of its computers, used by the Information and Support Unit between 2005 and 2009, upon a request from this court. After examining the documents, the computer experts prepared a preliminary report about their findings and sent it to the İstanbul court. The court is now awaiting a final report from the experts.
Weekly news magazine Aksiyon has devoted its latest cover story to details emerging from the preliminary report. According to the report, the documents show that the pro-coup junta carried out three kinds of propaganda against the government and faith-based organizations: white, gray and black. In military terms, white propaganda seeks to inform people. Black propaganda, on the other hand, works to discredit something or someone. And gray propaganda is a mixture of the two.
Special unit to fight ‘harmful elements’
According to the documents, the TSK set up a unit to carry out the propaganda campaign against groups or individuals that the military thought were harmful to its existence. This unit was established in the 1950s and had branches both in the Special Warfare Department of the TSK and the General Staff’s department of intelligence. The documents said the unit did not initially work effectively in the years after it was established, but it began to be more active as of 1980 when the military staged a coup d’état and set up some institutions, such as the National Security Council (MGK), to put the civilian will under the control of the armed forces. The unit was called the Information and Support Unit in 1995. “Even though the unit carried out some effective operative and tactical activities at those times [after 1995] when acts of terror and religious fundamentalism reached their peak, it failed to turn into an establishment to act in line with the national strategy and in the light of science. And its scope of psychological warfare has been further narrowed since 2002 as part of plans to curb the role and effectiveness of the TSK in the social and administrative areas. And the psychological warfare unit [or the Information and Support Unit] has become a formation taking passive measures [against acts of terror and religious fundamentalism] and failing to even protect the dignity of its name,” according to the documents.
The latest activity of the Information and Support Unit of the General Staff’s Mobilization Department is the setting up and running of a number of websites to support the unit’s propaganda campaigns against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government and civilian groups. A deepening investigation into the websites shows that the unit, led by jailed Col. Dursun Çiçek, established 42 websites to back their psychological warfare campaign against civilian groups they deemed “religious fundamentalist,” “separatist,” “pro-AK Party” and “anti-TSK.” Former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. İlker Başbuğ was arrested in 2012 as part of the investigation.
Documents retrieved from the hard disks of the General Staff also included information gathered by the military staff about the Hizmet movement inspired by internationally renowned Turkish and Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. According to one such document, the movement is well respected among the people in Turkey because “its followers stay far away from conflicts or clashes with others, serve peaceful purposes, live in harmony with other groups and do not seek to work against the interests or welfare of others.” “There is a widespread conviction [among people] that the Gülen group [as the Hizmet movement is referred to by some circles in Turkey] poses no threat to Turkey,” said the document.
In the documents, the General Staff’s Information Support Unit discussed how to bring the financial sources of the Hizmet movement under control so that the movement would be unable to work. The documents also suggested that a conflict that would emerge for leadership after Gülen dies would lead the movement to collapse.
In attempts to prevent the Hizmet movement from working, the General Staff suggested that its harmony with the US and other countries should be damaged. “The US should end its policy of supporting moderate Islam, documents and required information should be seized and shared with the media to show the real faces of Gülen followers to the people, and a widespread conviction should be created in Turkey and Muslim countries that the movement is controlled by the US and serving the purpose of imperialism,” the document notes and adds that schools and other educational institutions currently operating in roughly 50 countries worldwide should be shut down.
The documents seized from the hard disks also feature plans by the General Staff to launch a propaganda campaign to allege that the Hizmet movement and its followers are the driving force behind some ongoing trials in Turkey that aim to cleanse the country of anti-democratic formations.
“Propaganda should be spread that the news [of anti-coup investigations] is leaked to the media by Gülen followers who are nested in the police force and that there is a large number of senior officers in the police force,” according to one of the documents. The same document also reveals plans to discredit the investigations against clandestine networks nested in various state bodies, an alliance that is often referred to as the “deep state.” “We should spread claims that people captured as part of the ongoing fight against the deep state are indeed too weak to be members of the deep state and that the deep state in fact has nothing to do with those weak people, that Gladio is controlled by the US, that the deep state [in Turkey] was rooted out with Turkey’s alliance with NATO, that groups, individuals and institutions that seek to protect national rights have become [by their opponents] a center of accusations and that the US has helped the pro-Gülen formation infiltrate the police force.”
The General Staff, at this point, sought the help of some media outlets to help it spread those claims. Officers at the General Staff wrote news stories and columns to downplay the investigations launched against coup plotters and the deep state and sent them to some newspapers to publish them as if staff members at those newspapers wrote them. “The said campaigns are being carried out by sending documents to columnists, newspaper administrators, editors-in-chief and civil servants via e-mails that feature an imaginary username and e-mail addresses,” one of the documents retrieved from the hard disks of the General Staff indicates.
‘Less than psychological warfare’
Such activities were, however, not psychological warfare, according to the General Staff. “Having a place in the media [creating news reports and columns published by some newspapers] does not mean launching psychological warfare. Carrying out psychological warfare requires us to make our activities in a manner to impact the opinions, feelings and stance of the target group.”
In one other document, the General Staff complains that websites are not an effective means to carry out a propaganda campaign because it is very easy for computer experts to find out who set up and administered the websites. “The virtual network is an area where covert and semi-covert psychological warfare methods may effectively be applied. It is not appropriate for open methods. For this reason, we are carrying out white propaganda campaigns on our websites. And this decreases the yield we may derive from the websites [and propaganda campaigns]. Websites run by us are subject to bureaucratic transactions, and we always face the risk of being exposed as the administrators of those websites.”
The documents go on to state that the General Staff sought to cooperate with secularist civil society groups and individuals who also oppose the trial against Ergenekon, a clandestine criminal network accused of working to overthrow the government, in attempts to discredit the trial in the eyes of the people. The documents indicate the General Staff should prepare books and brochures about the risk of rising religious fundamentalism in the country and send them to those civil society groups. “In addition, important writings and opinions [denouncing the Ergenekon trial] could be sent to opinion leaders, editors-in-chief of newspapers, leading columnists, civil society organizations and websites of those organizations and deputies,” the documents add.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-303195-documents-reveal-how-military-carried-out-internet-campaign.html
According to the document, the existing conditions were not favorable for a coup, but the pro-coup junta nested within the TSK could work to make them favorable. The document said the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) managed to win the hearts of people and increase its popularity among voters over time and that the military should avoid any action that may be interpreted as interference in politics in the short run. The atmosphere was not favorable to remove the AK Party from power, either, with or without the use of weapons, according to the document.
The document also said the ruling party was in harmony with global powers such as the US administration, the EU, Germany and France.
The document states that those powers support the AK Party, either willingly or unwillingly, in line with their own interests, but that the TSK was not in harmony with those powers. Any action [coup] to be taken without harmony with those powers will heavily damage the TSK, cautions the document.
Below you will find the full version of the document.
Some precautions that may be taken by the Information and Support Unit in the coming period
1: Below are some factors that may impact the methods of operation [psychological warfare] in the upcoming period:
a. Turkish people love and trust the TSK, and they do not want it to lose its power and prestige. But they do not approve of methods of operation [adopted by the TSK] that may be interpreted as interference in politics. Therefore, the TSK should avoid any action that may be considered interference in politics in the coming period.
b. Due to their low level of education and such reasons as poverty and unemployment, the Turkish people do not have a full perception of the TSKs fight against religious fundamentalism, and they do not lend their support to this fight. [In other words, the TSKs strategy of fighting against religious fundamentalism has failed to secure the full support of the people due to the peoples poor economic and social conditions.] People think the TSK acts radically and takes harsh actions in its strategy to fight religious fundamentalism. The strategy should be revised and transformed into a form that pays more attention to the sensitivities of the people. [There is no need to make a change in the essence of the strategy. We may make changes to the methods (of fighting as part of the strategy.) With this point in mind, we may make some structural changes in order to render all propaganda carried out against the TSK ineffective. We had better differentiate between acts of religious fundamentalism and religious activities.]
c. The AKP (as the AK Party is referred to by its critics) was swept to power once again [in 2007] by securing public support because it has brought economic stability to the country.
The economic stability in Turkey since 2003, however, does not stem from the AKPs success in the field of economy but from the cooperation it has developed with global capital. [The power that has brought and administered economic stability in Turkey is global capital.]
The AKP will lose the support of the people only if its cooperation with [the powers that hold] global capital is damaged or if global capital loses its power in Turkey as it has done worldwide. It would not be appropriate to directly target the AKP unless the party loses the peoples support.
ç. Conditions are not favorable for removing the AKP from power either with or without the use of weapons (as on Feb. 28 [1997]). The AKP was brought to power in accordance with the rules of democracy (legitimate methods) on July 22, 2007. The harmony of the AKP with powers that have influence over Turkey (such as global capital, the US administration, the EU and the EUs engines Germany and France) is very strong. These powers support the AKP, either willingly or unwillingly, in line with their own interests.
The TSK, however, is not in harmony with these powers, and it does not act in cooperation with these powers, either.
Any action to be taken without harmony with these powers will bring heavy damage to the TSK. (The administration of the economy in Turkey is under the control of central powers, and the economic structure does not have a mechanism to defend itself. An action to be taken without harmony with those central powers may destroy all economic data within a day, and the value of one dollar may triple or quadruple and so may interest rates. In such an event, the public support that seems to be behind the TSK may drop to 5 percent.)
2: Under such conditions, the most proper strategy to be pursued as part of the psychological operation in the coming period is to wait for the destruction of the harmony between the AKP administration and the central powers and for global capital to lose its power. (When this happens, peoples support for the AKP will vanish.) The TSK should maintain its existing power and structure during this period of transition.
3: Measures that may be taken by the Information and Support Unit in this period of transition:
a. The perception [among the people] that the TSK is the owner and guardian of the state and that it considers itself above political parties should be weakened. (The TSK is thought to be intervening in politics, and effective measures cannot be developed to invalidate this thought.) The TSK should focus on such issues as security and defense, and its discourse and opinions should focus on these two topics.
b. Keep in mind that ministries, state bodies and institutions with which the TSK is supposed to cooperate are legal entities and act accordingly. Do not pay attention to the fact that those institutions may be politicized, engage in acts to discredit the TSK or the people at those institutions with which we are supposed to work with or cooperate may be engaged in activities of religious fundamentalism. (The relations with those institutions and people should be formal and not based on personal sentiments such as anger, sympathy or otherification. In other words, respect should be paid to institutions [not to individuals]. In this way, we will display a stance that the TSK acts with the seriousness required in state matters.
Do not display a different attitude toward certain people when cooperating with these ministries, state bodies and institutions, (do not act in a manner that could be perceived as the TSKs opposition to some institutions) and do not develop any personal ties with men of the bureaucracy other than holding official meetings with them.
Display a similar attitude with the Presidents Office, too; respect should be paid to the office itself, not to the man who sits in the chair of the president. (Cut the meetings with the president as short as possible and avoid criticizing or protesting the president.)
c. The TSK should continue to defend its own rights but should avoid any act that could be interpreted as a conflict with the political power or as interference in politics.
ç. Do not attend formal receptions or meetings where headscarf-wearing women are also invited; provide a legitimate excuse instead. If you happen to see any headscarf-wearing woman at any event you attend, give an excuse and leave the place. Civilian guests should be asked to attend events [sponsored by the military] without their spouses in order not to face provocative attempts such as the participation of headscarf-wearing women in those events. Guests may be allowed to bring their spouses to events that are only hosted by members of the TSK, and the media should be made to cover those events in their reports. For example, families of all TSK officers residing in Ankara may visit Anıtkabir (the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Citizens may also be urged to participate in this visit.
d. The AKP looks like a coalition party that is not homogenous but has members who defend different opinions. We should initially differentiate between groups and individuals within the AKP that have opinions against the TSK and act accordingly.
Different relationships may be developed with those groups and individuals, either directly or indirectly. Their opinions may be directed or shaped through the use of proper methods.
e. We should also differentiate between people who have religious identities but do not have anti-TSK attitudes or opinions and those who have pro-religious fundamentalist thoughts and anti-TSK opinions. We should prevent cooperation between these two groups against the interests of the TSK. The second group should be targeted and left alone, and the first group should initially be made to remain neutral. Then, we should urge the second group to act in favor of the TSK. (The most effective method to adopt is to make opinion leaders inside the opposing group change sides and then use them as a weapon against their original group.)
f. It would not be right to directly react to those who make provocative statements against the TSK.
Such a reaction would lead those people to be considered addressees or interlocutors for the TSK. Media outlets that publish such statements will focus on reactions coming from the TSK, and the intensity of the provocation will grow. Those who make statements to provoke the TSK are simple hitmen. The real instigators should be considered the real target, and the TSK should focus on them.
We may make statements, from time to time, as those statements are being followed by the TSK.
People who make those provocative statements should be noted down so that we can keep track of their activities. They may become targets of counter-attacks [by the TSK] in line with a loss of political power by the AKP.
g. It would be wiser to make use of opinion leaders instead of making direct attempts to invalidate campaigns to curb the power of the TSK.
Those opinion leaders should be supported indirectly, and they should be promoted in society. (For instance, writers, academics and artists loved and appreciated by students at military colleges may be invited for seminars or conferences.)
h. Indirect relations should be established with political parties other than the AKP -- to make them adopt and defend opinions also defended by the TSK. (We may use Nationalist Movement Party [MHP] Adana deputy retired Brig. Gen. Kürşat Atılgan in this sense.) Policies pursued by those political parties should not be criticized in the media.
ı. We should decide how to act on some issues that are used in campaigns to curb the power of the TSK (such as establishing gangs, participation in gangs, corruption and exorbitant spending). For example, staff who are accused of involvement in gangs or corruption should be condemned in the media and by people as is done by the Security General Directorate, and statements should be made that they have been suspended from office or sent to court [for legal action]. This would help the TSK to render the propaganda at the hands of its enemies ineffective.
i. Retired military staff should not be used in order to decrease the effectiveness of campaigns to discredit the TSK in the eyes of the people and shape public opinion in line with the opinion of the TSK. The experience of retired staff should be made use of at occasions organized and hosted by various civil society groups, but they should not be brought to the forefront in the media. (Retired military staff should be supported financially for them to be respected by civil society groups.)
Instead, the TSK should use civilian opinion leaders, and these leaders should be directly or indirectly supported.
j. The media in Turkey is under the control and monitoring of central powers. Therefore, the media is not an effective means to direct public opinion.
Despite these drawbacks, it would be a good idea to establish friendly relationships with the media. The TSKs relationships with the media are not in compliance with the principles of communication. The relationships should be restructured. (Issues that are worth being reported cannot be effectively conveyed to the media. We should consult the opinion of civilian journalists on this matter.)
k. We should make use of the power of civil society organizations to impact public opinion. We should use favorable civil society organizations in appropriate projects instead of setting up such organizations to be run directly by the TSK. (Contact with those favorable organizations will be established through trustworthy people.)
l. Civilian websites should be set up and used as part of gray and black propaganda campaigns. The appropriate staff should set up the websites, and the reputation of the TSK should not be risked.
Covert and indirect support may be given to some websites and newspapers that have also adopted black and gray propaganda methods.
m. Opinion leaders that act in line with the interests of the TSK may be supported and promoted in society. The support may either be material or moral as well as direct and indirect.
n. Famous actors and directors may be asked to shoot films or soap operas to direct and impact public opinion about the TSK.
o. A news agency may be set up not to be fully controlled by the TSK but used as part of efforts to launch gray and black propaganda campaigns. (The cost to set up and run the agency will not be high. Required measures should be taken not to risk the reputation of the TSK.) The news agency may work over the Internet (with a website). Reports that contain gray and black propaganda elements and that fail to be published in the media may reach target groups in this way.
ö. People who broke away from target groups or were kicked out of those groups for various reasons and who have the ability to impact public opinion may be supported by various means. Public opinion may be shaped or directed in this way. For example, a man who broke his ties with religious fundamentalist groups may be urged to appear on [TV] programs in the media or write books. His books may be purchased to support him.
p. Some writers who have the ability to impact public opinion may be urged to write books to promote the image of the TSK in the eyes of the people.
r. Some scientists (researchers) may be urged to carry out public opinion surveys to impact the opinion of the people.
s. Teams of enlightenment may be established in order to render counter-propaganda attempts ineffective and protect (TSK) staff and their families from those attempts. Members of these teams may be picked from among colonels.
ş. Activities to inform the public can be more attractive.
t. Symposiums, meetings and commemoration events in which some opinion leaders also participate may be held to impact public opinion.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-303194-no-coup-in-sight-but-we-may-prepare-conditions-for-one.html
Documents reveal how military carried out internet campaign
Documents retrieved from computers of the Information and Support Unit of the General Staff clearly reveal how a pro-coup junta nested within the Turkish military, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), has engaged in propaganda to discredit the government and faith-based groups in the eyes of the people.
The documents are currently being examined by a group of computer experts at the İstanbul 13th High Criminal Court, which is involved in a trial against anti-government websites allegedly established by the military. The General Staff recently sent hard disks of its computers, used by the Information and Support Unit between 2005 and 2009, upon a request from this court. After examining the documents, the computer experts prepared a preliminary report about their findings and sent it to the İstanbul court. The court is now awaiting a final report from the experts.
Weekly news magazine Aksiyon has devoted its latest cover story to details emerging from the preliminary report. According to the report, the documents show that the pro-coup junta carried out three kinds of propaganda against the government and faith-based organizations: white, gray and black. In military terms, white propaganda seeks to inform people. Black propaganda, on the other hand, works to discredit something or someone. And gray propaganda is a mixture of the two.
Special unit to fight ‘harmful elements’
According to the documents, the TSK set up a unit to carry out the propaganda campaign against groups or individuals that the military thought were harmful to its existence. This unit was established in the 1950s and had branches both in the Special Warfare Department of the TSK and the General Staff’s department of intelligence. The documents said the unit did not initially work effectively in the years after it was established, but it began to be more active as of 1980 when the military staged a coup d’état and set up some institutions, such as the National Security Council (MGK), to put the civilian will under the control of the armed forces. The unit was called the Information and Support Unit in 1995. “Even though the unit carried out some effective operative and tactical activities at those times [after 1995] when acts of terror and religious fundamentalism reached their peak, it failed to turn into an establishment to act in line with the national strategy and in the light of science. And its scope of psychological warfare has been further narrowed since 2002 as part of plans to curb the role and effectiveness of the TSK in the social and administrative areas. And the psychological warfare unit [or the Information and Support Unit] has become a formation taking passive measures [against acts of terror and religious fundamentalism] and failing to even protect the dignity of its name,” according to the documents.
The latest activity of the Information and Support Unit of the General Staff’s Mobilization Department is the setting up and running of a number of websites to support the unit’s propaganda campaigns against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government and civilian groups. A deepening investigation into the websites shows that the unit, led by jailed Col. Dursun Çiçek, established 42 websites to back their psychological warfare campaign against civilian groups they deemed “religious fundamentalist,” “separatist,” “pro-AK Party” and “anti-TSK.” Former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. İlker Başbuğ was arrested in 2012 as part of the investigation.
Documents retrieved from the hard disks of the General Staff also included information gathered by the military staff about the Hizmet movement inspired by internationally renowned Turkish and Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. According to one such document, the movement is well respected among the people in Turkey because “its followers stay far away from conflicts or clashes with others, serve peaceful purposes, live in harmony with other groups and do not seek to work against the interests or welfare of others.” “There is a widespread conviction [among people] that the Gülen group [as the Hizmet movement is referred to by some circles in Turkey] poses no threat to Turkey,” said the document.
In the documents, the General Staff’s Information Support Unit discussed how to bring the financial sources of the Hizmet movement under control so that the movement would be unable to work. The documents also suggested that a conflict that would emerge for leadership after Gülen dies would lead the movement to collapse.
In attempts to prevent the Hizmet movement from working, the General Staff suggested that its harmony with the US and other countries should be damaged. “The US should end its policy of supporting moderate Islam, documents and required information should be seized and shared with the media to show the real faces of Gülen followers to the people, and a widespread conviction should be created in Turkey and Muslim countries that the movement is controlled by the US and serving the purpose of imperialism,” the document notes and adds that schools and other educational institutions currently operating in roughly 50 countries worldwide should be shut down.
The documents seized from the hard disks also feature plans by the General Staff to launch a propaganda campaign to allege that the Hizmet movement and its followers are the driving force behind some ongoing trials in Turkey that aim to cleanse the country of anti-democratic formations.
“Propaganda should be spread that the news [of anti-coup investigations] is leaked to the media by Gülen followers who are nested in the police force and that there is a large number of senior officers in the police force,” according to one of the documents. The same document also reveals plans to discredit the investigations against clandestine networks nested in various state bodies, an alliance that is often referred to as the “deep state.” “We should spread claims that people captured as part of the ongoing fight against the deep state are indeed too weak to be members of the deep state and that the deep state in fact has nothing to do with those weak people, that Gladio is controlled by the US, that the deep state [in Turkey] was rooted out with Turkey’s alliance with NATO, that groups, individuals and institutions that seek to protect national rights have become [by their opponents] a center of accusations and that the US has helped the pro-Gülen formation infiltrate the police force.”
The General Staff, at this point, sought the help of some media outlets to help it spread those claims. Officers at the General Staff wrote news stories and columns to downplay the investigations launched against coup plotters and the deep state and sent them to some newspapers to publish them as if staff members at those newspapers wrote them. “The said campaigns are being carried out by sending documents to columnists, newspaper administrators, editors-in-chief and civil servants via e-mails that feature an imaginary username and e-mail addresses,” one of the documents retrieved from the hard disks of the General Staff indicates.
‘Less than psychological warfare’
Such activities were, however, not psychological warfare, according to the General Staff. “Having a place in the media [creating news reports and columns published by some newspapers] does not mean launching psychological warfare. Carrying out psychological warfare requires us to make our activities in a manner to impact the opinions, feelings and stance of the target group.”
In one other document, the General Staff complains that websites are not an effective means to carry out a propaganda campaign because it is very easy for computer experts to find out who set up and administered the websites. “The virtual network is an area where covert and semi-covert psychological warfare methods may effectively be applied. It is not appropriate for open methods. For this reason, we are carrying out white propaganda campaigns on our websites. And this decreases the yield we may derive from the websites [and propaganda campaigns]. Websites run by us are subject to bureaucratic transactions, and we always face the risk of being exposed as the administrators of those websites.”
The documents go on to state that the General Staff sought to cooperate with secularist civil society groups and individuals who also oppose the trial against Ergenekon, a clandestine criminal network accused of working to overthrow the government, in attempts to discredit the trial in the eyes of the people. The documents indicate the General Staff should prepare books and brochures about the risk of rising religious fundamentalism in the country and send them to those civil society groups. “In addition, important writings and opinions [denouncing the Ergenekon trial] could be sent to opinion leaders, editors-in-chief of newspapers, leading columnists, civil society organizations and websites of those organizations and deputies,” the documents add.
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