New Zealand Center for Defense: Iran likely to purchase JF-17 after arms embargo lifted

[Aspen]

why on earth would somebody wants western tech on jf17?

Yeah putting western tech on JF-17 is a terrible idea.

 

[Sineva]

Not gonna happen. Neither the arabs or iranians are going to buy jf17, Both are too proudy to buy that jet from Pak.

Pride has nothing whatsoever to do with it,at least as far as iran is concerned.
Geopolitics on the other hand.......

 

[Sineva]

why on earth would somebody wants western tech on jf17?

Even without the possibility of western components being used in the aircraft and potential legal ramifications resulting,the biggest problem for the iranians,not to mention the pakistanis[lol],would still be pakistans vassal status and the considerable degree of us influence[to put it very mildly],be it political,economic or military,that the us has in real terms over pakistan.
Realistically something like this would be a complete and total non-starter,the iranians would naturally be quite unwilling to even consider buying something like this from a us vassal with all of the real risk,if indeed not actual certainty of critical systems such as avionics being compromised,not to mention the very real risk of sanctions and embargoes disrupting the supply of critical spare parts and other vital logistics support.
As for pakistan I have no illusions whatsoever that the us would ever agree to allow something like this even if there was not a single western sourced screw,fastener or rivet let alone something more complex than these on the aircraft.

Lastly even if by some miracle this actually happened,it still wouldnt solve irans main fighter aircraft need and that is for a heavyweight fighter to augment and ultimately replace the f14 fleet.

 

[Pakistan Ka Beta]

Since Iran accepted the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it has been looking forward to the scheduled lifting in October 2020 of a UN embargo on arms transfers. This would help modernize elements of Iran’s conventional military equipment, some of which dates to before the 1979 revolution.

Iran has shown a significant ability to develop systems on its own, reducing the need for expensive imports. Its purchases will likely be limited, therefore, by both economic and geopolitical constraints, including the impact of US sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic and caution on the part of potential suppliers.

Iranian officials pride themselves on developing a military strategy that has defended their country’s territorial integrity and expanded regional influence at a fraction of the cost of the defense budgets of their Arab neighbors across the Persian Gulf. According to the latest figures, Iran had the eighteenth largest military budget in the world last year—$12.6 billion—compared to Israel’s $20.5 billion (fifteenth largest); Saudi Arabia’s $61.9 billion (fifth largest) and the largest spender, the United States, at $732 billion.

In a scathing op-ed piece published in The New York Times in 2017, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif asserted that the sale of billions of dollars’ worth of what US President Donald Trump has called “beautiful military equipment” by his administration and its predecessors to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf had not resulted in greater security for that country or the region. Iran has relied, instead, on asymmetric means, especially, militias in Lebanon, Iraq, and other countries to project influence and, raise the cost of potential attacks on itself through proxy attacks. Strategic blunders by adversaries and the dislocations caused by the 2011 Arab Spring created numerous opportunities for Iranian intervention, while discrimination against Shia in the Arab world and South Asia—and the lack of alternative employment for youth—produced a steady supply of militia recruits. Iran has managed to transfer arms to these militias despite UN and other arms embargos.

Iran has also developed significant cyber capabilities—in part, in reaction to the Stuxnet attacks on its nuclear infrastructure a decade ago—and has made advances in ballistic and cruise missiles and unarmed aerial vehicles, building on Russian, Chinese, and North Korean platforms. Many observers were stunned by the accuracy of the cruise missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq stabilization plant in September 2019, which temporarily put half the country’s daily production out of commission, and by the missile strikes against bases housing US forces in Iraq in January in retaliation for the US assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. More recently, Iran has also lifted a military satellite into orbit after several failed launches that may have been sabotaged by the United States and Israel.

Where Iran has fallen short is in the area of missile defenses—which are not covered by the UN embargo. The poor state of its ground-based air defenses was tragically demonstrated by the shoot-down of a Ukrainian passenger airliner in January, when a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) mistook it for a hostile US missile. Iran might like to purchase the Russian S-400 system but may have trouble coming up with the funds. Russia may also be reluctant to antagonize Israel by selling such advanced equipment to the Islamic Republic. Sirous Amerian, a guest lecturer at the Center for Defense and Security Studies at New Zealand’s Massey University, told this author that Iran might only seek to acquire some components of the S-400, as it did with Russian Kasta and Nebo SV radars.

Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a long-time student of Iran’s capabilities, reminded this author that Tehran and Moscow haggled for a decade over the S-300 system. He predicted that Iran would go after “niche systems to provide niche capabilities and will not seek or be able to achieve the recapitalization of the Iranian military inventory or a total makeover of the Iranian military.” Iran will look for components—navigation, guidance and propulsion technologies—to improve its indigenous drone, cruise, and ballistic missile programs, Eisenstadt added. Iran has provided some of this technology to regional partners, defying the UN embargo and other sanctions.

Amerian said Iran wants fighter jets, logistics aircraft, and helicopters. Russian Su-30SM fighters or the Chinese JF-17, which China co-produces with Pakistan, have been mentioned as possible purchases. Amerian says the latter is more likely because the JF-17 is $10 million cheaper than the Sukhoi, easier to maintain, and uses the Klimov RD-33 turbofan, which Iran already has experience working with from its fleet of Mig-29As.

Eisenstadt said Iran would also like to purchase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology so it no longer has to depend on Russia to support ground forces, as has been the case in their mutual intervention in Syria to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, Iran is looking for new radar-guided air-to-air missiles, such as the Russian R-77-1 or the Chinese PL-15 and has expressed interest in the Russian T-90 main battle tank.

Desire is one thing—reality another. Eisenstadt has estimated that it would cost Iran $100 billion to refurbish its air force, which still includes stripped-down American F-14 Tomcats manufactured in the 1970s before the shah was overthrown. That sum is equivalent to Iran’s entire hard currency reserves.

A key priority for Iran is to be able to build and revamp equipment domestically. According to Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Iran made upgrades to Iraqi Su-22 Fitters—which Iraqi pilots flew into Iran during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Iran never returned—with the help of Syrian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian experts. Nadimi wrote, recently, that the IRGC has claimed that these planes will soon be equipped with 1,500-km range cruise missiles that can hit targets in the middle of the Arabian Sea and in the sensitive Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

Iran has tried and failed, before, to revamp its conventional arsenal. In the 1990s, it sought East bloc equipment after the end of the Cold War but was stymied by US political pressure and a lack of funds. One question, now, is how influential the US will be in dissuading arms transfers given international anger at the Trump administration for unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA while Iran remained in full compliance. The Trump administration has threatened to snap back pre-JCPOA sanctions—a dubious strategy since the US quit the deal—and to use other means to block arms sales if the UN Security Council balks. Iran has threatened to leave both the JCPOA and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if those sanctions are extended.

Iran could incentivize Russia to supply new arms by granting it more access to Iranian military bases. That would risk provoking domestic opposition, however, since such access violates the Iranian constitution. Moscow’s revelation that Russian planes refueled at Iran’s Hamadan airfield en route to Syria in 2016 led to so much criticism in Iran that permission was abruptly revoked.

Retired Vice Admiral John Miller has noted that Russian “advisors” would need to be present in Iran should Tehran buy the S-400 system or Yakhont anti-ship missiles. The Yakhont system, Miller says, “would be especially troublesome to coalition maritime commanders as the system would provide anti-ship coverage over the entire [Persian] Gulf.”

It remains doubtful, however, that new conventional arms will change the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. The United States and its allies remain dominant in terms of hardware, while Iran’s asymmetric capabilities will stay its most potent weapon for the foreseeable future.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blo...rms-purchases-would-be-limited-and-selective/

Pakistan should not sell JF-17 thunder to Iran as they are involved in anti Pakistan activities and will give access to its best friend India .

 

[Jinn Baba]

The Saudis won't let it happen. Block 3 with PL15 and SOWs would present a serious danger. The Israelis may not care (F35), but the Arabs will.

Pakistan should not sell JF-17 thunder to Iran as they are involved in anti Pakistan activities and will give access to its best friend India .

IF a deal happens, it will be between China and Iran, and I'm sure the Chinese will restrict Indian access. The Iranians may betray Pak, but won't risk betraying the Chinese.

 

[Shabi1]

why on earth would somebody wants western tech on jf17?

Using western tech in JF-17 is a bad idea anyway so I don't see the problem here

The JF-17 is modular that is it can be integrated with systems from a choice of suppliers. The benefit is you can shortlist the best off the shelf options available at that time, be it Chinese, Italian, French, etc. In the long run you can get TOT for that system for local production or the Chinese could develop their product to match it.

For eg the JF-17s in PAF use, from what I know use.
Martin Baker ejection seat which is UK
Datalink/EW from Indra which is Spanish
Oxygen system from France
Selex avionics components from Italy
Targeting Pod from Turkey

Myanmar opted for a full Chinese sourcing so their JF-17s had the integration done in Chengdu after the air frames were built in PAC Kamra.

China has really good R&D and offer good systems but competition and alternative suppliers help.

 

[Mithridates]

Its purchases will likely be limited

iran operated 160 f-5s, 160 f-4s and 80 f-14s during shah era. he wanted to buy additional 80 f-14s, 300 f-16 and additional unknown numbers of f-111 and a-10s. which due to revolution he couldn't.
my point is just look how many airfields are in Iran and compare it to UAE. any possible military procurement will be in large large number.

i think iran will buy tejas from india

lol even if want to tejas has israeli and US parts.

 

[Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen]

If JF-17 Block 3 equipped with RD-33MK and AESA it is competitive.

 

[Mithridates]

IF a deal happens, it will be between China and Iran, and I'm sure the Chinese will restrict Indian access. The Iranians may betray Pak, but won't risk betraying the Chinese.

Iran won't buy damn thing from china. we still remember the pl-7 missiles.

 

[mourning sage]

Might backfire. Iran is in bed with India. They might be able to obtain crucial performance and operation secrets from Iran.

 

[Aspen]

iran operated 160 f-5s, 160 f-4s and 80 f-14s during shah era. he wanted to buy additional 80 f-14s, 300 f-16 and additional unknown numbers of f-111 and a-10s. which due to revolution he couldn't.
my point is just look how many airfields are in Iran and compare it to UAE. any possible military procurement will be in large large number.

That's what I'm saying, for Iran, its go big or go home.

If Iran buys JF-17, it's not going to be some limited acquisition.

We are probably talking somewhere between order of 100-200 JF-17.

For an order that big, it will be worth whatever it takes to sign the deal.

 

[salarsikander]

Iran will not go for jf17 they bavaar and what not flying cartons jet, plus they can trade their oild with ruusia for bog jets

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

buying something like this from a us vassal with all of the real risk,

You are little behind the decades in your analysis.

Anyway, Pakistan won't sell to Iran due to antagonistic relationship, US sanctions, and also high probability of Indian access to our aircraft.

 

[Saleet]

They rather go with india than Pak.

Let me know what does India has to serve them? Tejas ?

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

I hope Iranians buy broken Indian products, they will collapse before even reaching battlefield.