N-deal with Pak could hit ties, India cautions China

[M8R]

China to make public Pak N-deal on June 24 - China - World - The Times of India
China to make public Pak N-deal on June 24
BEIJING: China will make public its plans to help Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in New Zealand on Thursday, a Chinese official has said. The announcement shows that Beijing's approach to the issue of regional security remains unchanged even after the visits by foreign minister S.M.Krishna and President Pratibha Patil to Beijing.

"The move might actually wipe out some of the progress in the India-China relationship since the Copenhagen dividend and the visits by Krishna and the President to Beijing," Srikant Kondapalli, professor of Chinese affairs at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, told TNN. "China is sending a signal that it will stick to Pakistan even at the cost of its image as a responsible nuclear power," he said.

Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has come out with a statement saying there was no need to be concerned about Pakistan transferring nuclear technology to a third country, which is something United States officials have been worrying about.

"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," he was quoted in the China Daily as saying. The US will not put much pressure on China to avoid helping Islamabad because it had signed a nuclear deal with India, he said.

There are signs Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani earned Chinese backing in the nuclear field by offering to fight Uighur separatists on the China-Pakistan border during his recent visit to Beijing. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Chinese parliament, openly sought Pakistani help to battle the separatists in its border region of Xingjian during the visit.

"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," Zhai said.

Kondapalli thinks China is trying to force international agencies to treat India on par with Pakistan when it comes to nuclear inspection. The Chinese move poses a serious risk to India's nuclear position. He expects New Delhi to watch reactions from countries that opposed the India-US nuclear deal before making its move. India has limited scope in terms of trying to block the Chinese move because it is not a member of the NSG, he said.

The European Union reacted on Wednesday saying it has no problems with the deal as long as it is within the perview of the IAEA. But there is no clear guarantee that China and Pakistan will allow the IAEA to effectively monitor the transfer of technology to Islamabad, Kondapalli said.

 

[javaman]

well stop acting like particular indian rude fellow here.. why do you think everything made by Pakistan is pirated from china secretly while on the other hand things developed in india with more than 70% foreign parts and assistance are always called Indigenous..

I know you guyz won't accept that this deal is taking place because of India-USA deal, otherwise Pakistan never had any interest in such a deal with china. We are forced to maintain the balance of power in this region which was de-stabilized because of US-India Nuk deal few years ago.

r u comparing this with india's one.even after this deal india still have reactors which are not under iaea.they can be utilised to make large number of nukes in few time.

if pak is getting this under iaea,then it's better.well all this process is under iaea scan.even reactors will be.

 

[mehru]

^^^ Humph! My net connection was not working or i would have beaten you in posting that article from 'The Hindu'...

 

[RollingStones]

China to make public Pak N-deal on June 24 - China - World - The Times of India
China to make public Pak N-deal on June 24
BEIJING: China will make public its plans to help Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in New Zealand on Thursday, a Chinese official has said. The announcement shows that Beijing's approach to the issue of regional security remains unchanged even after the visits by foreign minister S.M.Krishna and President Pratibha Patil to Beijing.

"The move might actually wipe out some of the progress in the India-China relationship since the Copenhagen dividend and the visits by Krishna and the President to Beijing," Srikant Kondapalli, professor of Chinese affairs at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, told TNN. "China is sending a signal that it will stick to Pakistan even at the cost of its image as a responsible nuclear power," he said.

Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has come out with a statement saying there was no need to be concerned about Pakistan transferring nuclear technology to a third country, which is something United States officials have been worrying about.

"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," he was quoted in the China Daily as saying. The US will not put much pressure on China to avoid helping Islamabad because it had signed a nuclear deal with India, he said.

There are signs Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani earned Chinese backing in the nuclear field by offering to fight Uighur separatists on the China-Pakistan border during his recent visit to Beijing. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Chinese parliament, openly sought Pakistani help to battle the separatists in its border region of Xingjian during the visit.

"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," Zhai said.

Kondapalli thinks China is trying to force international agencies to treat India on par with Pakistan when it comes to nuclear inspection. The Chinese move poses a serious risk to India's nuclear position. He expects New Delhi to watch reactions from countries that opposed the India-US nuclear deal before making its move. India has limited scope in terms of trying to block the Chinese move because it is not a member of the NSG, he said.

The European Union reacted on Wednesday saying it has no problems with the deal as long as it is within the perview of the IAEA. But there is no clear guarantee that China and Pakistan will allow the IAEA to effectively monitor the transfer of technology to Islamabad, Kondapalli said.

As long as strict oversight and transfer regulations are put in place, I am not sure why the Indians and the US should object to this transfer. Whatever oversights are there in the Indian deal should be there for the Pakistani deal. On the other hand, the NSG could start pondering why there should be an NSG if countries did nuclear transfer anyways. In any case, I see this as China trying to do a one up on US. I really dont think they care about Pakistan or India. It is about showing the US they can do this deal too.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Except for two things.

First, these 'interpretations' were not part of the original agreement of 1956, but were being pushed down when US got the wind that India was becoming capable of designing a nuclear devise. These 'interpretations' were ad-hoc and therefore, India was under no obligation to 'abide' by any such 'interpretations' that India hadn't agreed to when signing the dotted lines. Period.

'Interpretations', usually arise one when party chooses to conduct actions that are perceived to violate a contract - in this particular case the action was that of conducting a nuclear explosion. Again, I don't see how one party could unilaterally impose its interpretation of the contract on the other - an arbiter to determine whether India's nuclear explosion was covered or not would have been the only way to determine whether the contract was being violated by one side or the other.

Second, the heavy water was never really a major issue because there is no evidence that India had used US supplied heavy water.

'Question 5: How much plutonium has been produced by India utilizing this heavy water? What was the status of this plutonium at the time of India's nuclear explosion and what is the status subsequent to the explosion? Has the United States asked to see Indian records pertaining to this plutonium?

Answer: We have no knowledge of the status of the plutonium produced during any specific time period, either before or after the Indian explosion of 1974, and we have no basis on which to require the examination of Indian records. In any case, however, since India had available to it the quantity of heavy water necessary for operation of the CIRUS reactor without reliance on the initial US supply from about 1965 onward, only the quantity of plutonium produced prior to the mid-1960s was presumably dependent upon the US heavy water. Although plutonium production in CIRUS currently may be on the order of 10 kgs/yr under optimum operating conditions, operational problems prior to 1965 indicate that this cumulative amount probably was less than ten kilograms.

[Congressional Record; Vol. 122; 94th Congress, 2nd Session; August 30, 1976]

'This review establishes that in earlier efforts the previously indicated heavy water loss rate and certain related calculations were incorrect. Consequently, there is high probability - because of India's practice of co-mingling heavy water - that some US heavy water remained in the CIRUS reactor during the period in question. We nevertheless do not have enough information to conclusively establish that such heavy water was present at all times after 1965. A full statement of our current best understand of the situation is contained in the attached Staff Analysis. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been provide with this information.

The key factors in this matter, in our view, are that by 1965 India had produced unsafeguarded heavy water in its own Nangal heavy water plant in excess of that needed to replace the heavy water supplied by the US for the CIRUS reactor. Thereafter, Indian supplies of Nangal-produced heavy water continued to increase so that by 1974 it had produced several fold the CIRUS requirements. Thus, US heavy water was not essential to the production of plutonium to the Indian nuclear test, and our response to the Indian nuclear test took this important consideration into account.'

[Henry Kissinger's letter to Abraham Ribicroff, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, dated Aug 2, 1976]

Now what did this Staff Analysis say

'In 1962, the Nangal heavy water plant came into operation with a production capacity of some 12-15 tons of heavy water per year. [...] It is estimated that by 1965 the quantity of heavy water produced by Nangal had exceeded the 21 tons supplied by the US under our 1956 contract, and by 1966, when the CIRUS reactor achieved reliable operation cumulative production from Nangal had reached some 38 tons. The growth of the Indian inventory of heavy water is evidenced by the fact that in 1964 it returned 5 tons of the material supplied for Zerlina in the original drums and in apparently unused condition and, in 1965, loaned 12 tons of heavy water to Belgium. [...] For the reasons cited above it is technically impossible to determine the amount of heavy water initially supplied by the US in 1956 for use in CIRUS which physically remains in India today. Neither is there any conclusive basis for establishing the origin of the heavy water present in the CIRUS reactor at the indeterminate time that plutonium used in the 1974 nuclear explosive test was produced.' [Staff Analysis report]

Your first allegation that India 'stole material' was one big fat lie. Your current allegation of 'misuse and redirection' also remains unsubstantiated.

Link to that testimony please?

The heavy water claim is interesting since the '10% loss per year' figure has been doubted. Secondly, even if the Heavy Water 'loss' claim was accurate, the Plutonium was still produced using Canadian reactor technology and expertise, and was therefore still a violation of the contract in terms of the interpretation of 'peaceful' by both suppliers of technology and material to India (Canada and the US) and was therefore at the least 'misuse and redirection' of nuclear technology and materials.

Some excerpts:

At that time, I was working on legislation to reorganize the AEC into separate regulatory and promotional agencies. I had begun investigating the weapons potential of nuclear materials being used in the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, both at home and abroad. The official wanted me to know there was no need to consider remedial legislation on nuclear exports because the plutonium used in India's test came not from the safeguarded nuclear power plant at Tarapur, supplied by the United States, but from the unsafeguarded Cirus research reactor near Bombay, supplied by Canada. "This is a Canadian problem, not ours," he said.

It took me two years to discover that the information provided me that day was false. The United States, in fact, had supplied the essential heavy-water component that made the Cirus reactor operable, but decided to cover up the American supplier role and let Canada "take the fall" for the Indian test. Canada promptly cut off nuclear exports to India, but the United States did not.

In 1976, when the Senate committee uncovered the U.S. heavy-water export to India and confronted the State Department on it, the government's response was another falsehood: the heavy water supplied by the U.S., it said, had leaked from the reactor at a rate of 10% a year, and had totally depleted over 10 years by the time India produced the plutonium for its test.

But the committee learned from Canada that the actual heavy-water loss rate at Cirus was less than 1% a year, and we learned from junior-high-school arithmetic that even a 10%- a-year loss rate doesn't equal 100% after 10 years. Actually, more than 90% of the original U.S. heavy water was still in the Cirus reactor after 10 years, even if it took India a decade to produce the test plutonium---itself a highly fanciful notion.

We also learned that the reprocessing plant where India had extracted the plutonium from Cirus spent fuel, described as "indigenous" in official U.S. and Indian documents, in fact had been supplied by an elaborate and secret consortium of U.S. and European companies.

Faced with this blatant example of the Executive Branch taking Congress for the fool, the Senate committee drafted and Congress eventually enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. And the rest, as they say, is history.


CIRUS Reactor's Role in a US-India Nuclear

This would appear to argue that Kissinger was in fact covering up the US role and trivializing the impact of the US supplied Heavy Water.

 

[thinkingcap81]

China, Pakistan and the NSG

By Siddharth Varadarajan

Rather than objecting to what it can't prevent, India should back a nuclear deal for Pakistan structured around a package of non-proliferation commitments.

How would Tenzing Norgay and Edmund Hillary have reacted to the news that a 13-year-old boy recently scaled the same peak which they were the first to conquer in 1953? Would they feel a tinge of irritation at how ‘easy' the summit has now become? Perhaps. But I am sure they would not feel their own accomplishment had in any way been diminished.

Having successfully broken the back of international sanctions on its civilian nuclear programme in September 2008, India needs to ask itself how it should look upon Pakistan's desire to follow in its footsteps and access civil nuclear technology for its energy needs. Should it stand in the way and try and block Islamabad from entering base camp as some panicky members of the Indian strategic community advocate? Or should it adopt a more mature attitude and work with its international partners to ensure the orderly incorporation of Pakistan into the global non-proliferation regime?

The question is relevant because China is likely to inform the Nuclear Suppliers Group of its decision to sell two pressurised water reactors (PWRs) for the Chashma-3 and 4 power stations in Pakistan. Virtually, every member of the 46-nation cartel believes this sale would be a violation of guidelines Beijing committed itself to follow when it joined the NSG in May 2004. China, of course, disagrees. India has so far wisely confined itself to asking the Chinese side for information about the proposed transfer. On June 22, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao fielded questions from reporters on the subject with a straight bat: “We are monitoring the debate and the developments in this regard as they relate to this subject of supply of nuclear reactors by China to Pakistan,” she said, carefully choosing her words. She did not criticise the proposed transfer or object to it, nor could she have. Three months ago, when asked about the possibility of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had made it clear India has no locus standi. “Who am I to interfere with what goes on between the United States and Pakistan?” he said. “That's a matter for these two countries to consider.” The same logic should surely apply to what goes on in the civil nuclear field between Beijing and Islamabad.

NSG guidelines say members should sell nuclear equipment and material only to countries that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or who accept full-scope safeguards — that is, who agree to place all their nuclear facilities under international inspection. There are only three countries which do not satisfy this criterion: India, Pakistan and Israel. Two years ago, the NSG voted unanimously to exempt India from this restriction. In exchange, India took on a number of commitments. These included separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities and placing the former under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. India also undertook to abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing, support international efforts to negotiate a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), implement rigorous export control norms and not share enrichment and reprocessing technology with others. Prior to the NSG waiver, India finalised a safeguards agreement with the IAEA providing for indefinite IAEA supervision of its civilian nuclear sector.

Today, the NSG's restrictions no longer apply to India but they do still to Israel and Pakistan. When China became a member of the NSG six years ago, it made a “declaration of existing projects” in order to be able to fulfil supply obligations towards Pakistan that had been made prior to that. China and Pakistan signed agreements for civil nuclear cooperation in 1986 and 1991. The latter agreement has not been made public but two MoUs were signed in its wake for the construction of PWRs for the Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 power stations. China told the NSG that since these projects were ongoing, it would continue to supply fuel and equipment for them. Since it made no mention of Chashma-3 and 4 at the time, their inclusion is clearly an afterthought. If China persists with its export plan, this would arguably be the first time it openly flouts international rules it had voluntarily agreed to abide by. Chinese help for the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme is well known but virtually all of its proliferation activities occurred before it formally acceded to the NPT in 1992. Similarly, China has stuck to its NSG commitments since joining the cartel in 2004. Deviating from them now would raise questions about its willingness to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.

India is not a member of the NSG and will, therefore, not be in the room when the matter is discussed in Christ Church, New Zealand, this week. But it can respond to the new situation that is unfolding in one of three ways. First, it can go into overdrive to lobby NSG members to take on China and make sure there is no dilution of the group's rules prohibiting nuclear commerce with Islamabad. Second, it can remain quiet and do nothing. Third, it can make a virtue out of necessity and suggest the NSG start considering the need to bring Pakistan into the non-proliferation tent.

Of these, the first option is the worst from the strategic and diplomatic perspective. Trying to block something which India is in no position to prevent will exacerbate tensions with Pakistan and China and expose the weak hand the country has on this question. The only circumstance that would justify a blocking strategy is if the proposed Chinese transfer were to alter the strategic balance in the subcontinent. In fact, the supply of two safeguarded civilian power reactors will not make any difference, unlike say a transfer of unsafeguarded nuclear equipment or material or of new delivery systems for nuclear missiles. The binding constraints on the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are the enrichment capacity of Kahuta, the small size (40 MW) of its heavy water reactor at Khushab and the amount of natural uranium it has access to. None of these constraints will be affected by the two new PWRs.

Given the conservatism of Indian diplomacy, the second option of silence is the one most likely to be followed. But this option is also inferior. No country in the world, least of all Pakistan or China, will believe India has no views or concerns on the transfer. Its silence will, thus, likely be seen as an admission of impotence rather than as an expression of statesmanship and wisdom. This option is also inferior because it is not in India's interest that the international non-proliferation system be tinkered with on an ad-hoc basis. The Indian exemption at the NSG may have been pushed by the U.S. but it required the active concurrence of dozens of countries. What emerged from those bruising sessions in Vienna in August and September 2008 was a careful balance of rights and obligations which benefited both the international system and India. China today lacks Washington's hegemonic ability to change the global rules. If it breaks ranks with the NSG and acts unilaterally, the after-effects could be quite destabilising.

India should, therefore, consider the third option of encouraging the international community to discuss the contours of an agreement that would lead to the orderly induction of Pakistan into the global nuclear regime. Given its population and energy needs, Pakistan needs help in developing a diverse energy portfolio. In line with global trends, it is logical that its leaders should look favourably upon nuclear power. Thanks to its past record in proliferating weapons-related technologies, however, Pakistan will have to do much more to establish its credentials as a responsible partner in the field of nuclear commerce. Any exemption at the NSG would likely involve stricter parameters and wider commitments than were seen in the India case. And if the Indian exemption took three years and two months to fructify, it is reasonable to expect Pakistan's exemption to take twice as long. The benefits of immediate engagement are, nevertheless, overwhelming. Islamabad's opposition to the FMCT — partly triggered by irrational fears about the impact of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement on India's ability to produce fissile material — means the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to begin its work on the treaty. If Pakistan knows there is light at the end of the NSG tunnel, its attitude at the CD may change.

The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : China, Pakistan and the NSG

A rather intelligent way of putting things into perspective by the author.

 

[Marxist]

Why China struck N-deal with Pakistan 4 days after Indo-US deal

China signed a deal with Pakistan for building two new nuclear reactors just four days after India and the US formally inked an agreement for implementing their 123 agreement, a pointer to the larger geopolitics behind the deal that has created anxieties in New Delhi and Washington and a fresh dilemma for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The timing of the deal reveals a larger strategic design on the part of China to use its all-weather ally Pakistan to contain the rise of India, and turns the spotlight firmly on Beijing's determination to defy global rules, if necessary, to create a counter-balance to New Delhi in South Asia.

According to sources in the know, an agreement for the Chashma-3 & Chashma-4 twin projects was signed on Oct 15, 2008, four days after India and the US formally inked their pact in Washington.

China and Pakistan signed a contract for the project on Nov 20, 2008. Another fuel supply guarantee agreement was signed Sep 30, 2009. After firming up various facets of the deal over two years in secrecy without informing the NSG, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), China Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation (ZEC) and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed an agreement on March 31, 2010, for the validation of contract for the 340 MW Chashma Nuclear Power Plant's twin units C-3 & C-4. The deal was made public by Beijing soon after.

China is trying to justify the deal on grounds that these two additional reactors were "grandfathered" under an earlier deal that predates its entry into the NSG in 2004 and has cited Islamabad's dire energy situation as a pretext for entering into this arrangement.

The argument is specious as China and Pakistan started negotiations over new nuclear reactors four years after it entered the 46-nation NSG. In an oblique reference to the deal, the NSG's June 21-25 plenary at Christchurch, New Zealand, has rightfully called for consultations and transparency about the deal.

But it will be tough to push it through the NSG, given Pakistan's dubious proliferation record epitomized by the A.Q. Khan network, says K. Subrahmanyam, a well-know strategic affairs expert who advised the Indian government on the nuclear deal with the US.

The NSG guidelines currently bar the transfer of atomic technology to countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a reference to India, Pakistan and Israel, the three holdout states against the NPT regime. However, the George Bush administration invested huge political capital to push for a one-time exemption for India, both in the US Congress and in the NSG, citing India's impeccable non-proliferation record.

During his visit to Pakistan shortly after the landmark visit to New Delhi in March 2006, Bush had told then Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf that India and Pakistan are two different countries with different needs and different histories, thus making it clear that Islamabad couldn't hope to get a similar nuclear deal from Washington.

The geopolitics of the China-Pakistan nuclear deal goes back to this explicit rejection by the US and a perception in China's power circles that the deal was designed to contain its rise.

This accounts for Beijing's hostility to the India-US deal right from the time it was struck July 18, 2005, and manifested itself in the last-minute failed attempt to block the waiver for India at the Sep 4-6, 2008, NSG special meeting.

At that time, Beijing had couched its opposition in terms of its impact on the global non-proliferation regime and insisted that it should not be discriminatory, a euphemism for a similar deal with its trusted ally Pakistan.

Now, Beijing is trying to subvert the same NSG rules in whose name it voiced its reservations over the India-US deal by giving a similar deal, albeit a much smaller one, to Pakistan, say experts.

China, after all, accounts for over 60 percent of Pakistan's military hardware exports and is the source of cutting-edge fighter jets and missile frigates. In a $6- billion deal, China is supplying its most advanced home-made combat aircraft, the third-generation J-10 fighter jets to Pakistan.

"The reasons are two-fold: one, Beijing is trying to project itself as a power on a par with the US which can rework global games for a friendly country like the US did for India and, secondly, it wants a piece of global nuclear pie," says Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

"China does not want to miss out on the burgeoning nuclear business. It is not content to be an importer of civil nuclear technology from countries like France, but it wants to be an exporter of atomic power technology. It's lucrative business, running into billions of dollars," Kondapalli told IANS.

But the larger target is the rise of India. "China wants a counterweight to the 123 agreement and to a rising India by keeping the latter confined to South Asia," says Kondapalli.

"In their own ways each is using the other to balance India as India's disputes with Pakistan keep it preoccupied, failing to attain its potential as a major regional and global player," says Harsh Pant, a strategic expert at King's College, London.

But there are serious hitches on the way. The deal became public in April shortly before US President Barack Obama convened the Nuclear Security Summit.

It remains to be seen how China plays the NSG over its Pakistan deal if it expects to be seen as a responsible stakeholder in the international system, say experts. A concerned India, meanwhile, has tapped friendly NSG countries to oppose the deal, but has tactfully maintained that such arrangements should be transparent and conform to existing NSG norms.

Why China struck N-deal with Pakistan 4 days after Indo-US deal- Hindustan Times

 

[Jet Li]

India steps up NSG diplomacy to counter China-Pakistan deal

Indo-Asian News Service
New Delhi, July 25, 2010

The US may have come out publicly against the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, but India is not leaving anything to chance and has intensified lobbying with key members of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ahead of the nuclear cartel's next meeting in Vienna. India has not only zeroed in on
the 'Big 4' in the NSG - the US, France, Russia and Britain - but is also reaching out to other middling NSG members to project the deal's negative impact on the global non-proliferation regime and the fragile security situation in South Asia.

The government has asked its missions in these key NSG countries to convey the pitfalls of the deal and how it is targeted against India's vital interests, sources close to the government told the news agency.

The Indian group in Track II dialogue on the India-US relations on Friday met to firm up a strategy to counter the deal at various levels, said the sources. The Track II group from the Indian side includes veteran diplomats and security experts like Naresh Chandra, former Indian ambassador to the US, and Vice Admiral (retd) P.S. Das, who is also involved with India-China Track II dialogue process.

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and the joint secretaries dealing with Pakistan and with China, Y.K. Sinha and Gautam Bambawale respectively, also participated in the discussions, added the sources.

India's counter-attack strategy will revolve around three key points. First, the Chinese deal to supply two additional reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma 4, was not "grandfathered," under an earlier arrangement as China claims. China did not disclose two additional reactors at the time of joining the NSG in 2004.
Second, Indian interlocutors will argue that there is no comparison between India's deal with the US to that of China's with Pakistan as New Delhi was granted the clean waiver on account of its widely acknowledged impeccable non-proliferation record.

Thirdly, India will contend that it's not an energy deal, but a ploy to contain New Delhi by bolstering Pakistan's capacity to produce more nuclear weapons and will highlight the alleged abuse of foreign aid by Islamabad to modernize its military machine.

The NSG is likely to meet in Vienna in September where two years ago around the same time the NSG granted a one-time clean waiver to India to resume global nuclear trade.

China's contentious deal to supply two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan could figure in the discussions.

At the NSG's June 21-25 plenary at Christchurch, New Zealand, there was hush-hush over the deal, with only an oblique reference to "consultations and transparency" about non-NSG states.

India is surprised that some NSG members like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland, who were so critical of the India-US nuclear deal, have not voiced objections to the Sino-Pakistan deal despite Islamabad's dubious proliferation record as epitomized by its illegal A.Q. Khan network.

India's apprehension is that given China's growing global clout and its strong economic ties with virtually all influential NSG countries, the NSG may look the other way and let China go ahead with the deal which is clearly in violation of its existing guidelines, said the sources.

In a shot in the arm for India, the US recently said it will vote against China's proposed sale of two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan when the issue comes up before the NSG.

Lalit Mansingh, a former ambassador of India to the US, warns against complacency. "It's a positive sign. But we should not take the US for granted. The Obama administration is in the middle of an economic crisis and may not want to open another front with China on the issue," Mansingh told the news agency.

Mansingh is heading to Singapore July-end to participate in the India-China-Pakistan trialogue where the deal is likely to figure.

India steps up NSG diplomacy to counter China-Pakistan deal - Hindustan Times

 

[Marxist]

The US may have come out publicly against the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, but India is not leaving anything to chance and has intensified lobbying with key members of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ahead of the nuclear cartel's next meeting in Vienna. India has not only zeroed in on
the 'Big 4' in the NSG - the US, France, Russia and Britain - but is also reaching out to other middling NSG members to project the deal's negative impact on the global non-proliferation regime and the fragile security situation in South Asia.

The government has asked its missions in these key NSG countries to convey the pitfalls of the deal and how it is targeted against India's vital interests, sources close to the government told the news agency.

The Indian group in Track II dialogue on the India-US relations on Friday met to firm up a strategy to counter the deal at various levels, said the sources. The Track II group from the Indian side includes veteran diplomats and security experts like Naresh Chandra, former Indian ambassador to the US, and Vice Admiral (retd) P.S. Das, who is also involved with India-China Track II dialogue process.

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and the joint secretaries dealing with Pakistan and with China, Y.K. Sinha and Gautam Bambawale respectively, also participated in the discussions, added the sources.

India's counter-attack strategy will revolve around three key points. First, the Chinese deal to supply two additional reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma 4, was not "grandfathered," under an earlier arrangement as China claims. China did not disclose two additional reactors at the time of joining the NSG in 2004.
Second, Indian interlocutors will argue that there is no comparison between India's deal with the US to that of China's with Pakistan as New Delhi was granted the clean waiver on account of its widely acknowledged impeccable non-proliferation record.

Thirdly, India will contend that it's not an energy deal, but a ploy to contain New Delhi by bolstering Pakistan's capacity to produce more nuclear weapons and will highlight the alleged abuse of foreign aid by Islamabad to modernize its military machine.

The NSG is likely to meet in Vienna in September where two years ago around the same time the NSG granted a one-time clean waiver to India to resume global nuclear trade.

China's contentious deal to supply two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan could figure in the discussions.

At the NSG's June 21-25 plenary at Christchurch, New Zealand, there was hush-hush over the deal, with only an oblique reference to "consultations and transparency" about non-NSG states.

India is surprised that some NSG members like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland, who were so critical of the India-US nuclear deal, have not voiced objections to the Sino-Pakistan deal despite Islamabad's dubious proliferation record as epitomized by its illegal A.Q. Khan network.

India's apprehension is that given China's growing global clout and its strong economic ties with virtually all influential NSG countries, the NSG may look the other way and let China go ahead with the deal which is clearly in violation of its existing guidelines, said the sources.

In a shot in the arm for India, the US recently said it will vote against China's proposed sale of two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan when the issue comes up before the NSG.

Lalit Mansingh, a former ambassador of India to the US, warns against complacency. "It's a positive sign. But we should not take the US for granted. The Obama administration is in the middle of an economic crisis and may not want to open another front with China on the issue," Mansingh told the news agency.

Mansingh is heading to Singapore July-end to participate in the India-China-Pakistan trialogue where the deal is likely to figure.

India steps up NSG diplomacy to counter China-Pakistan deal - Hindustan Times

 

[FreekiN]

So... why aren't we allowed to have electricity again?

 

[Hafizzz]

India steps up NSG diplomacy to counter China-Pakistan deal

Indo-Asian News Service
New Delhi, July 25, 2010

The US may have come out publicly against the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, but India is not leaving anything to chance and has intensified lobbying with key members of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ahead of the nuclear cartel's next meeting in Vienna. India has not only zeroed in on
the 'Big 4' in the NSG - the US, France, Russia and Britain - but is also reaching out to other middling NSG members to project the deal's negative impact on the global non-proliferation regime and the fragile security situation in South Asia.

The government has asked its missions in these key NSG countries to convey the pitfalls of the deal and how it is targeted against India's vital interests, sources close to the government told the news agency.

The Indian group in Track II dialogue on the India-US relations on Friday met to firm up a strategy to counter the deal at various levels, said the sources. The Track II group from the Indian side includes veteran diplomats and security experts like Naresh Chandra, former Indian ambassador to the US, and Vice Admiral (retd) P.S. Das, who is also involved with India-China Track II dialogue process.

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and the joint secretaries dealing with Pakistan and with China, Y.K. Sinha and Gautam Bambawale respectively, also participated in the discussions, added the sources.

India's counter-attack strategy will revolve around three key points. First, the Chinese deal to supply two additional reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma 4, was not "grandfathered," under an earlier arrangement as China claims. China did not disclose two additional reactors at the time of joining the NSG in 2004.
Second, Indian interlocutors will argue that there is no comparison between India's deal with the US to that of China's with Pakistan as New Delhi was granted the clean waiver on account of its widely acknowledged impeccable non-proliferation record.

Thirdly, India will contend that it's not an energy deal, but a ploy to contain New Delhi by bolstering Pakistan's capacity to produce more nuclear weapons and will highlight the alleged abuse of foreign aid by Islamabad to modernize its military machine.

The NSG is likely to meet in Vienna in September where two years ago around the same time the NSG granted a one-time clean waiver to India to resume global nuclear trade.

China's contentious deal to supply two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan could figure in the discussions.

At the NSG's June 21-25 plenary at Christchurch, New Zealand, there was hush-hush over the deal, with only an oblique reference to "consultations and transparency" about non-NSG states.

India is surprised that some NSG members like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland, who were so critical of the India-US nuclear deal, have not voiced objections to the Sino-Pakistan deal despite Islamabad's dubious proliferation record as epitomized by its illegal A.Q. Khan network.

India's apprehension is that given China's growing global clout and its strong economic ties with virtually all influential NSG countries, the NSG may look the other way and let China go ahead with the deal which is clearly in violation of its existing guidelines, said the sources.

In a shot in the arm for India, the US recently said it will vote against China's proposed sale of two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan when the issue comes up before the NSG.

Lalit Mansingh, a former ambassador of India to the US, warns against complacency. "It's a positive sign. But we should not take the US for granted. The Obama administration is in the middle of an economic crisis and may not want to open another front with China on the issue," Mansingh told the news agency.

Mansingh is heading to Singapore July-end to participate in the India-China-Pakistan trialogue where the deal is likely to figure.

India steps up NSG diplomacy to counter China-Pakistan deal - Hindustan Times

Why does India hate China and Pakistan so much ? China and Pakistan supported the US-India nuke deal.

Also India is not an NSG member and has no right to lobby NSG members to oppose the China-Pakistan nuke deal. India is just denting her image internationally by being so anti-China-Pakistan.

Hypocrisy on the rise !!!

 

[Renegade]

So... why aren't we allowed to have electricity again?

When it comes to the Nuclear route to generate electrity, Pakistan is a special case. You know why?

There are other ways of genrating electricity you know, for e.g Hydel and Thermal.

Lastly for a country in which 60% of the electricity gets stolen (according 2002 estimates, the situation still has not improved much given the chronic power shortages that still effect Pakistan), you chaps could simply generate more by saving. Something like " a penney saved is a penny earned".

When your government has worked on these fronts, then there would be some justification in talking about why arent you allowed to have electricity.

 

[Jet Li]

^too bad NSG and sissy India can't stop us

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

India... OK that is to be expected. They are rivals after all.

But I thought the USA was "supposed" to be an ally of Pakistan?

Why is the USA voting against the energy deal?

 

[amit27]

China never supported the US-INDO nuke deal they tried to raise objections under the NSG and only US pressure and a phonecall from bush made sure the deal went through.