Musharraf wants to create relations with Israel!

[ice_man]

APML rally: 50,000 empty seats? – The Express Tribune

APML rally: 50,000 empty seats?
KARACHI: Preparations for the All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) rally at the Quaid-e-Azam mausoleum in Karachi have been completed; however, very few supporters have turned up, reported Express News.

According to sources, more than 50,000 chairs have been set up, and police, commandos as well as the Bomb Disposal Squad are deployed at the rally where party chief and former President Pervaiz Musharraf will address a gathering through video-conferencing.

An estimate of 3,000 people have gathered at the venue currently.

The rally was supposed to begin at 1pm today (Sunday) but a delay in preparations postponed the time to 2pm. The rally has still not started due to the low presence of supporters.

The APML officials said that the rallies are on their way to the venue and it will take the supporters some time to reach. They added that the speech will be aired through video-conferencing and the screen-visibility is low in the afternoon, thus it would be appropriate if the rally starts in the evening.

Musharraf, who has spent the last three years in self-imposed exile, had earlier announced that he would return to the country in January this year.

The former dictator, who came to power in a military coup in 1999 and ruled Pakistan till 2008, is facing criminal cases in the Balochistan High Court for allegedly ordering the killing of Baloch tribal chieftain Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in 2006.

 

[Xeric]

One cable describes then Mossad Chief Meir Dagan telling U.S. under secretary of state William Burns at an August 2007 meeting that he was worried about how long Musharraf could survive: "He is facing a serious problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime," Dagan was quoted as saying.

and

In another cable at about the same time, Defense Minister Barak is quoted speaking to a visiting American delegation and describing Pakistan as his "private nightmare." If there is an Islamic extremist takeover in Pakistan, Barak reportedly said, the world might wake up "with everything changed."Relations with Israel could help Pakistan, says former president Musharraf - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

Hmm....so now i know from where all this Islamic-Bomb-Syndrome and the 'Unsafe'-Pakistani-Nukes originated from.

Right, so once again, it was a zionist school of thought or to be more precise, a zionist's very own brain child.

 

[nirreich]

One cable describes then Mossad Chief Meir Dagan telling U.S. under secretary of state William Burns at an August 2007 meeting that he was worried about how long Musharraf could survive: "He is facing a serious problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime," Dagan was quoted as saying. Relations with Israel could help Pakistan, says former president Musharraf - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

Hmm....so now i know from where all this Islamic Bomb Syndrome and the 'unsafe' Pakistani Nukes originated from.

Right, so once again, it is from a zionist school of thought or to be more precise, a zionist's very own brain child.

Still it is the truth: Pakistan is a dangerous Islamic state with its nuclear weapons and a threat to global security.

 

[Rana4pak]

Still it is the truth: Pakistan is a dangerous Islamic state with its nuclear weapons and a threat to global security.

and u guys r security risk to whole universe?

 

[Xeric]

Let me be clear, i am not exactly against Musharraf's leaning towards Israel, so keeping this in mind i would ask you that when was the first time that this very slogan of 'Unsafe Pak Nukes' was aired? Almost a decade, no? And how many instances can you quote which confirms this 'suspicion' of yours?

So, really, it's going to take alot more than the one-liner 'Pakistan is a dangerous Islamic state with its nuclear weapons and a threat to global security' Yap-Roll (i coined the new term, just now, combining 'Yapping' and Trolling' - makes it easier for me to explain many members here ) to convince the readers that Pakistani Nukes are indeed 'unsafe.'

So, i have already seen that Barak and Dagan had acted like real-life trolls when they said those things about Pakistan to their yankee slaves (post# 212), but i was expecting a better reply from their online representative, no?

 

[nirreich]

Let me be clear, i am not exactly against Musharraf's leaning towards Israel, so keeping this in mind i would ask you that when was the first time that this very slogan of 'Unsafe Pak Nukes' was aired? Almost a decade, no? And how many instances can you quote which confirms this 'suspicion' of yours?

So, really, it's going to take alot more than the one-liner 'Pakistan is a dangerous Islamic state with its nuclear weapons and a threat to global security.' Yap-Roll (i coined the new term, just now, combining 'Yapping' and Trolling' - makes it easier for me to explain many members here ) to convince the readers here.

i could see that Barak and Dagan had acted like real-life trolls when that said those things about Pakistan to their yankee slaves (post# 212), but i was expecting a better reply from their online representative, no?

Pakistan has proven what I wrote both in its history of nuclear development and nuclear proliferation. I know the truth is hard to bear but it is still the real situation: Pakistan is a problem for international security.

 

[Xeric]

Again, i reiterate one more time, that it would take a lot more than a YapRoll to get the brain-fart of unsafe-Pak-Nukes across the table.

 

[nirreich]

Again, i reiterate one more time, that it would take a lot more than a YapRoll to get the brain-fart of unsafe-Pak-Nukes across the table.

From my experience in PDF, most of the Pakistanis I came across will never admit what is wrong with their country nor listen to the criticism about it. That is the main reason why Pakistan continue to be a failed state. So it hardly matters if I explain it or not.

 

[Xeric]

From my experience in PDF, most of the Pakistanis I came across will never admit what is wrong with their country nor listen to the criticism about it. That is the main reason why Pakistan continue to be a failed state. So it hardly matters if I explain it or not.

Stop acting like a cry baby; your stubbornness speaks amply of your country's stance over various issues which are considered as the raison d'être for almost every ill this world suffers from, and try talking in terms of tangibles. Also try to understand that by airing nonsensical mind-farts, baseless and ill-founded 'suspicions' and poppycock arguments as the one explained below, would not give any subsistence to your zionist conjectures:

(The following is an email written by Kasrkin to Gregory in response to his lame extrapolations (still much better than nirreich's YapRolls) as regards to Pak's Nuke Safety)

http://www.defence.pk/forums/general-defence/31546-pakistani-nuclear-safety-queries-4.html

Dear Mr. Gregory,

My colleagues and I represent an online forum dedicated to matters relating to Pakistani defense. We were interested in piece written by you, published by the CTC Sentinel in July of 2009, regarding the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Some of our members commented positively, while others were critically inquisitive. We would like to bring to you some of the issues raised and we would be thrilled if you could address them.

The extracts in bold is commentary that was analyzed.

“The vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements mean that the risks of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear materials are real. Moreover, militants have recently attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including an August 20, 2008 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely understood to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

And,

“Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

On both these occasions it is claimed that the Wah cantonment is widely considered or understood to be a nuclear weapons assembly site. We, however, were unable to find references to this claim. The BBC article referred to as part of the second extract only notes that ‘Wah is a strategically important town normally under heavy security as it is home to a large industrial complex producing conventional arms and ammunition’ and ‘it is a sprawling complex manufacturing everything from tanks and small arms to artillery shells.’

The importance of the attack on Wah is stressed repeatedly, implying both the terrorists’ ability and inclination to strike at Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. And yet as per accounts from some of our members familiar with the site, and news reports at the time, the gates attacked were primarily used to access ordnance plants. The casualties too almost entirely consisted of low-clearance industrial workers leaving the premises during a shift change. The BBC article even talks about a local student on tour of the ordinance factories relating the event. Gaining access to the complex is not particularly hard, as can be attested by numerous civilians who’ve toured there, neither is the compound isolated or remote, thus further contrasting with Pakistan Army’s traditionally secluded strategic installations. All this seems to negate the possibility that a high level security breach was involved in regards to Pakistani nuclear assets, or that such was even the intention. Without evidence to the contrary, it is hard to see how the significance of the attack was anything more than a crude but effective attempt to inflict maximum casualties on menial workers under the payroll of the Pakistani government.

The Wah cantonment is extensive, as is the industrial complex that was attacked. The complex contains many factories producing all kinds of munitions, however the gates and the crew that became the target of the attack were still at least 300 feet from the nearest factory, and the bomb in the market obviously more so[1]. What is more, the paramilitary troops from the DSG battalions manning the check points (not to be confused with ASFC or SPD personnel, responsible for guarding Pakistan’s nuclear military and civilian installations respectively) sustained no fatalities. Therefore, while the bombings were undoubtedly expensive in terms of human life, pictures taken on the site reveal that the security parameter around the complex was not breached, despite the bomber’s ability to mingle with the crowd[2]. If the attacks revealed the security measures taken by POF to be inadequate, then the author has not elaborated on the point. As it is, Wah is a heavily protected cantonment surrounded by defenses, including anti-tank barricades, and the roads in and out of the town are permanently manned by the army. This, along with a heavy army presence nearby at Taxila and Rawalpindi, makes the chances of terrorists mustering with significant numbers and weapons inside the cantonment to be able to fight through the defenses around the POF complex and seize a factory inside remote at best.

The facility itself is a sprawling complex with more than a dozen factories. Satellite imagery shows them to be sizable blocky units however we were unable to find indications of nuclear weapons assembly from any of our sources. The closest reference to nuclear activities was that of the Wah Group (not to be confused with the Wah Nobel Group of Companies, which operates in the complex, happens to be a subsidiary of POF and hosts foreigners in its board of directors and deals with civilian contracts) who’ve been previously tasked with manufacturing industrial components used in nuclear warheads, such as the trigger mechanism, high-speed electronics, high-explosive lenses and other ultra-high precision chemical and mechanical parts. This, however, is not the same as claims of the facility, whose present links to the Wah Group are obscure at best, being Pakistan’s main site for assembling entire nuclear weapon systems. While it is conceivable that warhead or missile related components are produced in any of the dozen plus factories, there is no evidence to suggest, or so we feel, that complete warheads and/or delivery systems are produced, stationed, assembled or distributed from there. Close proximity to a sizeable civilian population resident in the cantt is also likely to discourage any critical nuclear weapons presence, not only because of a radiological threat to the populace but also to avoid easy photo-reconnaissance, sabotage or infiltration. If the author has references substantiating Wah’s purported significance as a critical joint in the manufacturing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, then we’d be pleased to note it for academic purposes. However such intelligence is still unlikely to have been available to the terrorists.

Unless very particular information is available to the contrary, we’ll have no reason to believe that the 20th August attacks were intended to be anything but an attack on Pakistan’s much lauded, and internationally recognized, munitions producing installations at Wah. Facilities that are undoubtedly supplying conventional weapons and ammunition to Pakistani forces engaged in battle with the militants in Swat and FATA. Furthermore the terrorists did not display any particular motivation, resourcefulness, capacity or intelligence that implies a vulnerability or inadequacy of Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. Therefore, is it possible that the author’s references and their implied significance can be misleading in this context?

“With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support…”

This claim was vigorously disputed, particularly by some of our Pashtun members with links to the armed forces. While there is no doubt that Pakistan’s PRP screens out potential militant-Islamist sympathizers, as has been officially acknowledged, the assertion of a bias in the PRP with regards to Pashtun officers is more questionable. This logic itself is dubious since it is widely acknowledged that the phenomenon of Islamist fundamentalism tends to transcend ethnic divisions. As it is the Punjabis and Pashtun share strong cultural and demographical links and Punjab hosts its significant share of Islamist militant activity and organizations. Punjabi political opinion too has been relatively empathetic to those Pashtuns opposed to military operations in their NWFP territories, as compared to the more insulated Pakistani ethnic groups down south who’ve been supportive in the WoT. The popular PML-N party that draws its support exclusively from Punjab, and has deep links in the Army, was vociferously opposed to Pakistan joining the war against terror.

If this logic is applied with regards to the present political and demographical realities then Punjabi officers are more likely to sympathize with the Pashtun tribal-taliban rebellion in the west than say Muhajir or Sindhi officers who hail from communities that tend to host strong anti-Pashtun and anti-Islamist tendencies. Thus the notion of Pakistan’s nuclear assets being the domain of an ‘almost exclusively Punjabi’ club of officers cannot be credited without appropriately sourced statistics or accounts, particularly since the army has worked hard over the last decade to reduce the number of Punjabi members and increase Pashtun recruitment. A Punjabi majority in the army and the country in itself cannot be used to imply an institutional prejudice with regards to the Pashtuns.

“Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila. The concern, however, is that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even within areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban militants and home to al-Qa`ida…”

Our members were all too aware of the international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program. However from a rational viewpoint it was pointed out that none of the mentioned installations are particularly close to areas hosting a significant Taliban presence; and certainly none are dominated or controlled by any of the insurrectionist elements presently confronting the Pakistani state.

“A series of attacks on nuclear weapons facilities has also occurred. These have included an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007…”

The attack in Sargodha on November 1st was actually a suicide attack on a bus carrying Air Force personnel from the Mushaf airbase to the Kirana Central Depot. These special strategic facilities are guarded by the ASFC and they were not attacked.

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Suicide bomb hits Pakistani bus

“An attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007…”

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Children survive Pakistan attack

Again, the target was a military school bus near the Kamra air base. The Bill Roggio source states ‘The Air Weapon Complex at Kamra is devoted to air-to-surface munitions, among other activities, and would probably have at least some connection with the development of air-delivered nuclear weapons…’ But is it reasonable to imply that an attack on a student bus in the proximity of an airbase should be considered an attack on or a threat to the hazy nuclear aspect of the weapons developmental complex in said airbase?

The school bus was carrying the children of PAC employees. The PAC deals with producing and refurnishing aircraft and is not to be confused with the AWC which makes strategic air to ground weapons. We were told by a source that the AWC is not based in Kamra. And even if nuclear-capable weapon systems are transferred to an active combat squadron for testing or active operations, then they’d most likely be kept in the hardened bunkers of the base, designed to withstand enemy air and artillery attacks, along with the rest of the air force’s conventional arsenal.

“The final risk, and one that is usually overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army could itself decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent, is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike…”

Identification cannot be avoided since nuclear weapons origins can be traced by the plutonium and uranium fuel used even after the thermonuclear detonation. The consequences for Pakistan’s national security would not be very different if Pakistan was to go for a direct nuclear strike and claim the terrorists did it. It is highly questionable if Pakistan would want to take the risk of nuking a foreign country, directly or indirectly, unless its territorial integrity was being threatened, in which case a direct and overwhelming nuclear strike would be the preferable option to negate the enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capacity.

I hope my (no doubt amateurish) deliberations were worth your time. I await your reply with excitement and will be posting it on the forum.

[1] http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/7636/1reference.jpg
[2] DSC_0284 | Flickr - Photo Sharing!


Kasrkin
Moderation team defence.pk

 

[nirreich]

Stop acting like a spoiled brat, rather a cry baby and try talking in terms of tangibles. And also try to understand that by airing nonsensical mind-farts, baseless and ill-founded 'suspicions' and poppycock arguments as the one explained below, would not give any subsistence to your zionist conjectures:

(The following is an email written by Kasrkin to Gregory in response to his lame extrapolations (still much better than nirreich's YapRolls) as regards to Pak's Nuke Safety)

This is not the issue of this thread, pick a suitable thread, let me know and I will see you there.

 

[Xeric]

Panga nai laina si na...

 

[StandForInsaf]

Still it is the truth: Pakistan is a dangerous Islamic state with its nuclear weapons and a threat to global security.

Yap here comes , this is the poison which was hiding behind your face , yap if we wanted you wipe you out we had and have much more time , what is stopping us to use nuke and free your tiny stupid country , you think ?

 

[nirreich]

Yap here comes , this is the poison which was hiding behind your face , yap if we wanted you wipe you out we had and have much more time , what is stopping us to use nuke and free your tiny stupid country , you think ?

The only thing that stops you is that you know that you impoverished country will vanish as well.

 

[StandForInsaf]

The only thing that stops you is that you know that you impoverished country will vanish as well.

Nope you very wrong , Pakistanis nukes are just for deterrence , to stop the aggressive forces towards its security , we have no aggressive strategy to conquer any country correct your facts and clear you mind which is full of venom against Pakistan , further more we provide only moral support to Palestinians because we think that their land has been occupied by brutal force.

 

[nirreich]

Nope you very wrong , Pakistanis nukes are just for deterrence , to stop the aggressive forces towards its security , we have no aggressive strategy to conquer any country correct your facts and clear you mind which is full of venom against Pakistan , further more we provide only moral support to Palestinians because we think that their land has been occupied by brutal force.

How nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya and North Korea (and offers to KSA, Iraq, and Syria) fit into your description Pakistan's nukes as deterrence only?