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For India to emerge as a regional power and a global player, there is need for an attitudinal change. India has the wherewithal to protect its interests and assert its rights and claims. With political will, the country will forge ahead without encumbrances. The stakes are high and time is running out. India cannot remain static marking time expending energy wastefully while others zoom ahead consolidating and enhancing comprehensive national power. The location of uncommitted reserves up to Corps level and the Strategic Reserve/Mountain Strike Corps opens avenues that need courageous leadership and the will to be exploited to protect and enhance the country’s interests.
“We should implement the military strategy of active defence for the new period, and enhance military strategic guidance as the times so require. We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyber security. We should make active planning for use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.”
—Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress, March 2013
Building Up A Case
The Indian Army had, for some time, been war-gaming the need for dedicated uncommitted force(s) for its Northern Borders. The Kargil War exposed the weakness of the existing set up in Ladakh in the tactical and operational realms. The Division headquarters located at Leh had been unable to generate adequate reserves and sufficient firepower to meet the threat by Pakistan or to dislodge the intruding elements from Indian territory. Nor was it structured to take under command additional forces and firepower resources that were inducted into Ladakh as also control two fronts. Its responsibilities in Eastern Ladakh dictated the requirement of maintaining adequate force presence and dominate that sector to counter any collusive venture by China.
Along the rest of the International Boundary/Line of Actual Control (IB/LAC), the political terms of reference – ‘not an inch of territory to be lost’ necessitated the defensive deployment of forces. The terrain in the mountains literally ‘eats up troops’. This twin compulsion has resulted in holding ‘every inch of the boundary’ leaving no uncommitted reserves. The recently raised Divisions in the Eastern Sector have got absorbed in a defensive role. Therefore, the requirement of a strategic reserve dedicated for the Northern Borders is an imperative in dealing with the existing military weakness and the prosaic doctrine for defence propounded.
On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), approved the creation of a “Mountain Strike Corps” leading to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issuing the “Government Sanction Letter” (GSL) on November 19, 2013. This has paved the way for the Army to begin the process of inducting manpower required for the new raisings, initially by side-stepping, subsequently through normal induction as they become available under the recruitment process. The GSL authorises these new formation headquarters and units to commence the process of demanding the weapons, equipment and to requisition funds as entitled. Ipso facto, in theory this “Corps” should be operationally effective on the ground in the next seven to eight years. As some strategic analysts and China watchers claim that there is the window of opportunity available up to 2020 for India to bridge the gap between India’s Armed Forces and the PLA. This operationalisation will be co-terminus with such a window, if it exists and will enable the Armed Forces to project a degree of credible ‘dissuasion’. Delay in operationalisation will increase the gap between the capabilities of the forces of the two countries.
Battlefield Milieu
In his report to the 18th CPC National Congress, Hu Jintao also stated that – “We should closely follow the new global military revolution that is gathering pace, advance reform of our national defence forces in a both active and prudent way, and deepen military transformation with Chinese characteristics. With innovative military theories taking lead, we should enhance our capacity for innovation in defence-oriented research and industries, modernise the military organisational structure, and build a system of modern military forces with Chinese characteristics.” It will be imperative that these statements are analysed and future developments factored into our own planning process.
A force the size of a Corps held as a ‘strategic reserve’ will be committed for operations based on the reading of the battle as it unfolds and the location and the possible commitment of the reserves held by the PLA. The PLA doctrine of “Limited War Under Hi-Tech Conditions and Informationalisation” would be executed as a “War Zone Campaign”. That, war could be initiated by offensive operations which are likely, to be restricted to “non-contact” type of operations.
The “non-contact’ phase could include an onslaught of offensive cyber operations and electronic warfare disrupting India’s military and civilian communication network, radar surveillance grid and cause collapse of all essential services – banking, stock exchange functions, rail, airline reservation and the electricity grid. China could also target Indian satellites. It could declare the air space over Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ and the Tawang area may be covered under effective ‘Area Denial/Anti Access’ stratagem. When such measures are adopted against India, even if the origins of such cyber or anti-satellite attacks cannot be pin-pointed and attributed to any country, the Government will be faced with the challenge of response. It is a moot point whether such acts should be constituted as ‘act of war’ even though no exchange of fire has taken place on ground, sea or air between the two forces. Strategic pre-emption or a pro-active response is presently not the policy option that India believes in. India will need to factor in the changing forms of conventional threat and consider a declaratory policy of military assertion if the threat disrupts the fundamental functions of governance. However, in such a contingency issuing a mere diplomatic demarche will be an act of extreme passivity.
In the past, India has responded to threats to its security on the borders through diplomacy and refrained from the use of its military option ab initio. Consequently, there is a predominant measure of ‘restraint’ as the underlying sinew of the national security strategy. Therefore, the response to the scenario illustrated above will entail a reactive posture at all levels of operations. Reactive operations have a constraint of operational imperatives. Firstly, since the initiative is with the attacker, the resources for a defensive battle are allocated such that there is a semblance of strength all along the defensive deployment. Secondly, the attacker will concentrate his strength and effort at the point of attack, which, inevitably will lead to penetrating the defences. Thirdly, as a consequence there will be loss of territory. Fourthly, reserves will invariably be sucked into the battle to restore the situation. Fifthly, the situation may be so badly degraded that it may not be feasible to launch the strategic reserves to wrest the initiative by operations elsewhere. Sixthly, the attacker can dictate the timing and manipulate international pressures for the termination of the war with a favourable end state for him.
Committing Strategic Reserves
In a conventional reactive war in the mountains, the potential of strategic reserves can be brought to bear contingent on the operational situation. The tactical battle will be fought to stem the enemy assault. In the process the local reserves, up to the Corps (holding the defences) level will inevitably be drawn in to restore an adverse situation. It could be also possible that due to lack of bold military and political leadership the strategic reserves too, get sucked into the same sector or theatre of operations in a graduated response. The severe constraints of the terrain obtaining along the Northern Boundary, to a lesser extent in Ladakh, impose immense time penalty and restricts deployment of forces to exploit the considerable combat potential available.
If however, a portion of this reserve is located well forwarded, on the first indication of conflict, a riposte can buttress the defensive battle. Additional forces of the strategic reserves can then exploit the success of the riposte. Alternately, Brigade group or Division minus size force can be launched in a quid pro quo manoeuvre through an altogether different sector. This effort will require to be reinforced before its culmination. Successes by this force will compel the enemy to recoil thus achieving a favourable end state. In another scenario, when the enemy offensive has been blunted after he has committed his reserves, a strong counter offensive can be launched into the enemy’s vulnerable sector without or with minimum assistance from India’s strategic reserve.
True to its name the ‘Strike Corps’ can the wreak havoc deep in the enemy territory targeting its strategic centre of gravity, bringing about the termination of the war with an end-state favourable to India. The sine qua non for such operations will be deep surveillance, strategic and tactical mobility, commensurate infrastructure, logistic war fighting stamina and bold leadership.
Theoretically, full combat potential of the ‘Strike Corps’ would have resulted in exponential dividends had the terrain constraints been eliminated. The reality presents a formidable unassailable operational mosaic. The classic politico-military objective and centre of gravity seems desultory. The avenues astride axes available are few and predictable. The capacity of these axes is limited and resultant build-up time consuming and vulnerable to interdiction and attrition. Outflanking or bypassing is restricted to the tactical level forces employed self-contained for up to 96 hours. The arc of the manoeuvre and depth of the tactical operation is proportional to the range and quantum of the fire support assets available.
In the India-China context, the battle areas astride the IB/LAC in the Himalayas are along the watershed at altitudes ranging from 13,000 to 17,000 feet Above Mean Sea Level. The geographical reality of the width of the Himalayan Range necessitates forward deployment of even the long range heavier calibre artillery assets including rocket artillery and their equally heavy ammunition supply chain. The infrastructure will require considerable upgradation to make this possible. The rarefied air at high altitudes along the watershed imposes additional restrictions. Acclimatisation of troops is a medical necessity which if curtailed will entail heavy non-battle casualties. Weapons and equipment performance is also affected at these altitudes.
The effective range of weapons increase, blast effect radius is reduced, battery life of surveillance devices and electronic equipment is degraded and recharging is difficult as generating equipment cannot be located forward due to the haulage problems and noise which is a tactical taboo. Rotary wing aircraft performance is drastically affected. Payload capacity is reduced significantly, armed and attack helicopters are unable to operate at these altitudes. Moving forward or side-stepping of reserves is a mighty challenge.
The depth of the enemy’s tactical battle zone presents limited targets for Special Forces Operations, those that will impact the course of the defensive battle or that which can be exploited by the riposte/quid pro quo effort. While these forces can be inducted by a drop from a fixed wing aircraft their extrication is left to their own ingenuity. As a result, they are available for single missions only. Considering these imperatives, successful launching of the ‘Strike Corps’ will be determined by effectively factoring in these multifarious challenges. China too will face the heavy degradation of her potential due to terrain friction on the conduct of operations South of the watershed. Effect of altitude on men and equipment and peculiar logistics requirement are major constraints on China’s offensive designs. Any ill-considered misadventure will extract a price she cannot afford to pay.
Western Kameng
The Theatres of War
To comprehend the enormity of the Himalayan battlefield, a basic understanding of the IB/LAC would be in order. India’s IB with China begins at the tri-junction of the boundaries of India-Afghanistan-China at the Wakhan peninsula of Afghanistan. It does not include the 106 km of boundary common with only Afghanistan. It extends up to a point West of the Karakoram Pass thence traverses South as the LAC up to Gaya Peak South of Chumar in Ladakh. It again runs as the IB in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand till the Western tri-junction of the boundaries of India-Nepal-Tibet. The IB in Sikkim begins from the Eastern tri-junction of the boundaries of India-Nepal-Tibet to the Western tri-junction of the boundaries of India-Bhutan-Tibet. In Arunachal Pradesh, the LAC begins from the Eastern tri-junction of the boundary of Bhutan and the McMahon Line running along the Himalayan watershed to the tri-junction with the boundaries of India-Myanmar-Tibet. In all, a gargantuan length of 4,056 km.
The India-China boundary dispute relates mainly to Eastern Ladakh, some pockets in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and the some areas in Arunachal Pradesh along the McMahon Line where the interpretation differs, besides the Chinese claim of 90,000 sq. kms. of territory in Arunachal Pradesh.
The PLA does not have the capability of posing a viable threat in all these locations simultaneously. It cannot ascribe a war aim as “teach a lesson”– because it is more likely that China may be taught a lesson or two in the bargain. The rise of China has been seen as a threat by most of her neighbours. However, expectedly, China has often refuted this and has stated that its rise is peaceful and not a threat to any country.
China is compelled to maintain her credibility as a responsible power, and take cognisance of the pressure of international diplomatic repercussions that will inevitably be generated in the event of a war. As a result, China is likely to activate the IB/LAC in the Ladakh sector, where she is defending her surreptitious gains and Arunachal Pradesh sector, where she stakes a large unsubstantiated territorial claim. This leaves China with limited options of suitable military objectives to achieve her possible political aims.
In Ladakh, the PLA could launch a pre-emptive to deny launch pads for any offensive by India, thereby curtail the latter’s options. Whereas in Arunachal, China will try to capture maximum territory since her claims are central to the conflict. Capturing Tawang will be the decisive geographical area that will allow her to achieve her political aim to change the status quo substantively.
On the other hand, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) has its ‘Centres of Gravity’ very deep in TAR. Opening up areas of conflict beyond these sectors and crossing the IB at any place would be counter-intuitive to India’s non-violent pacifist image and her world-view from the political and diplomatic high moral ground. Re-constituting Tibet as a buffer between India and China is beyond India’s capability. Consequently, this new Corps as a strategic reserve will automatically be drawn into “fire-fighting” missions of limited nature, more so in the reactive scenario.
However, collateral fallout, obviously not unintentional, of the availability of the “Mountain Strike Corps” is its ability to countervail against any collusive support by China in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict. In addition, elements of this force can be detached to bolster the offensive capability of the Army across the Line of Control (LC) into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir anywhere between Chenab and Shyok Rivers. There are opinions that suggest use of such a force being employed for Out of Area Contingencies. It is unlikely that the Indian Government will resort to employing this force as such.
It is a non-sequitur considering India’s strongly held political belief of non-interference in the internal affairs of any country and adherence to non-alignment as being the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. Considering these realities, it is a moot point to consider raising additional forces to be pre-positioned, as reserves. This will make available uncommitted units with Brigades deployed in defences; similarly an uncommitted Brigade at Division level and independent Brigade group at the Corps level. Additional forces being side-stepped can be held as strategic reserves under the newly raised Corps. Commensurate combat support and logistic support would need to be provided by new raisings/induction.
Operationalising the Strategic Reserve
Chinese government reaction to the new ‘Strike Corps’ has been measured and somewhat detached, with their officials reiterating that they were “willing to join hands” with India to maintain peace and stability in the border areas. However, the PLA would be deliberating on the operational level implications of this development and in due course will, in all probability, modify PLA’s modernisation to evolve a doctrinal and organisational counter. As may be deduced from Hu Jinato’s report to the National Congress in March 2013, where he emphasised that – “We should strengthen the development of new and high-technology weapons and equipment, speed-up the complete development of modern logistics, train new type of high calibre military personnel in large numbers, intensively carry out military training under computerised, conditions and enhance integrated combat capability based on extensive IT application.”
Consequently, any relocating, regrouping or reorientation of its Rapid Reaction Forces and Group Armies in its Military Area Commands will need to be closely watched to appreciate the likely pattern of operations that PLA will undertake. PLA’s operations will be suitably disguised behind the cover of strategic deception and political subterfuge. On the other hand, deception in the Indian context is viewed as superfluous and treated in a perfunctory and often cursory manner both by the Armed Forces and the Government. Borne by conventional training, the Army relies on set-piece operations coupled with heavy attrition.
Asymmetric warfare, skirmish order attacks, small team operations and hybrid wars by the 4th Generation Warfare warriors are issues yet limited to officer-level discussions. Incorporating it into the Army’s plans and preparing forces to implement these as future war-fighting methodology are still a long way off. As it is because of the quantum difference in the educational standards of the officer and the soldier there is a yawning gap in the quality of planning and its subsequent execution. Planning is officer-centric while, per force, execution is decentralised to the command level of the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) and the Non Commissioned Officers (NCO), where there is a command weakness in independently conducting operations without detailed orders and supervision. It is certain that a similar situation, probably more acute, exists in the PLA. In the Army, per se, authority and responsibility needs to be institutionalised at the level of JCOs and NCOs particularly in the Infantry.
It is not the case here to list out any specifics of weapon systems and equipment that will be suitable for this formation in carrying out its varied and wide range of tasks that can be assigned to it. Suffice it to say that state-of-the-art weapon systems and war-waging equipment need to be authorised. These will not come cheap, nor can these be picked off a Walmart shelf. No country is willing to part with cutting-edge technology and even systems a rung or two lower in technological terms, will come at enormous cost to the exchequer. Moreover, tactics are designed around weapons, systems and equipment available. Organisations are then built around these. On consolidation, a war-fighting doctrine is drawn up. Therefore, last minute acquisitions and induction of weapon systems and equipment fail to exploit the true technological potential of the systems; they become mere replacements of existing weapon systems or equipment.
The pivotal role of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) cannot be over-emphasised. These organisations have to be geared for progressive Research and Development (R&D) and creating assembly lines for new systems for production to meet the requirement of the Armed Forces. The DRDO needs to continue research for product development and innovative technology. Presently, it is funded only on receipt of specific orders from the Armed Forces, which, ipso facto, places the onus of R&D of weapons, systems and equipment on the user rather than the scientists – an amusingly quaint situation.
Further, setting up of an assembly-line can begin only after the final prototype has been successful. Manufacture of hi-tech weapon systems and equipment require equally hi-tech machines for their manufacture. Designing and manufacturing these machines itself involve immense effort in R&D and expenses. Thus, setting up the assembly line would take anything between three to four years. Unfortunately, their orientation is more towards wasteful brick and mortar asset additions. The reality is that the DRDO-DPSU combine is not in a position to deliver.
A well developed infrastructure is the sine qua non for the effective launch of such an equipment heavy force. The slow pace of progress in the construction of projects is due to multiple set of obstacles encountered. These range from self-inflicted overstretch by the Border Roads Organisation to unsavoury squabbling by the civilian hierarchy of this General Reserve Engineer Force seeking to control turf. In the process, induction of modern road construction equipment has been stalled or inordinately delayed. The prolonged delays in obtaining environment and forest clearance have added to the woes. India’s unaccountable bureaucratic monolith continues to hinder in newer ways as if the onus of India’s security rests solely with the Armed Forces.
A future war of any scale cannot be fought by individual Services seeking independent objectives for a common political aim. Strategically, it appears ludicrous. The ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ was one such unilateral hypothesis. Any Service claiming to win a major war sans the other two Services is operating in some bygone era. There were protests by analysts of wasted expenditure in raising an Infantry dominated ‘Strike Corps’ for the mountains. Their arguments favoured a substantial development of the Navy as its strategic dividends of a ‘force in being’ were more credible.
Hi-tech precision munitions and domination of air space and sea lanes can only coerce an enemy to submission when exploited by ‘boots on ground’. The need is to synergise the potential of the three Services and the Para Military Forces guarding the IB/LAC as also those earmarked for the rear areas so that the combat power generated is a multiplication of the individual potential and not just their sum.
China’s diplomatic pronouncements on policies of ‘peaceful development’, ‘harmonious world’ and its stance of ‘non-interference and non-intervention’ in the internal affairs of other nations have been negated by the developments in East and South China Seas. There is a school of thought amongst the strategic analysts that the by creating this new strategic reserve India’s military strategy against China is graduating from the current ‘dissuasion’ to ‘deterrence’. In the accepted context, dissuasion is related to a superior force taking a string of measures to ensure that a potential adversary does not develop as a future challenge or begins an arms race. It does not fit the India-China dyad. Militarily, a strong deployment in those sensitive border areas may preclude localised action by the adversary. However, it may not overall result in dissuasion at the strategic level. As regards deterrence, it would be more relevant to see it at the political level. Since the decision to go to war is a political one, deterrence is affected between governments more than military to military. Here, then all elements of national power need to be synergised to defeat the enemy.
For India to emerge as a regional power and a global player, there is need for an attitudinal change. India has the wherewithal to protect its interests and assert its rights and claims. With political will, the country will forge ahead without encumbrances. The stakes are high and time is running out. India cannot remain static marking time expending energy wastefully while others zoom ahead consolidating and enhancing comprehensive national power. The location of uncommitted reserves up to Corps level and the Strategic Reserve/Mountain Strike Corps opens avenues that need courageous leadership and the will to be exploited to protect and enhance the country’s interests.
Mountain Strike Corps: A Strategic Audit » Indian Defence Review
