Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

[Sifar zero]

View attachment 728822


... Which doesn't mean the you tell here everyone on this online forum... that which equipment is standing in front of 502 gate....

... or are you comfortable telling people from other countries and our eastern neighbor as well that three SP Guns of a specific type from one of our armored divisions are in Rawalpindi at a specific place.... Such type of Intel otherwise costs alot of money and resources which you just divulged off the cuff...

Where one can sell the info??Or rate kitna hai?

 

[farooqbhai007]

Just to quote one of my posts from another thread....

Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert

Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.


· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.

· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.

· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.

· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.


The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .


There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.

The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.

It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.

While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.

We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.


It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.

In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.

And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.

It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.

Given that the assets of XII corps in Gujarat are purely defensive , the XII assets at Jodhapur and Nasirabad would be better suited at supporting the other units at Jaislamer and Bikaner no ?
Since Bikaner and Jaislamer lack rocket artillery which would be provided by XII corps Nasirabad Units , and some specialized desert warfare units are present at Nasirabad as well.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Given that the assets of XII corps in Gujarat are purely defensive , the XII assets at Jodhapur and Nasirabad would be better suited at supporting the other units at Jaislamer and Bikaner no ?
Since Bikaner and Jaislamer lack rocket artillery which would be provided by XII corps Nasirabad Units , and some specialized desert warfare units are present at Nasirabad as well.

There are three independent Artillery divisions specific for that purpose.

 

[Raja Porus]

There are three independent Artillery divisions specific for that purpose.

Given that the assets of XII corps in Gujarat are purely defensive , the XII assets at Jodhapur and Nasirabad would be better suited at supporting the other units at Jaislamer and Bikaner no ?
Since Bikaner and Jaislamer lack rocket artillery which would be provided by XII corps Nasirabad Units , and some specialized desert warfare units are present at Nasirabad as well.

-42 arty div (Jaipur/Alwar?) with 1strike corps(Bhatinda).
-41 arty div (Pune) with 21 strike corps (Jodhpur).
-40 arty div with 2 strike corps (Ambala).

 

[PanzerKiel]

-42 arty div (Jaipur/Alwar?) with 1strike corps(Bhatinda).
-43 arty div (Pune) with 21 strike corps (Jodhpur).
-40 arty div with 2 strike corps (Ambala).

40, 41, and 42.

 

[Raja Porus]

40, 41, and 42.

Oh yes 41 is 21 corps, accidentally wrote 43,edited.

 

[farooqbhai007]

-42 arty div (Jaipur/Alwar?) with 1strike corps(Bhatinda).
-41 arty div (Pune) with 21 strike corps (Jodhpur).
-40 arty div with 2 strike corps (Ambala).

41 is based at Nasirabad , ( Smerch & Pinaka )
40 is based at Ambala , ( Smerch & Pinaka )
42 has had its Smerch shifted to Eastern command , where abouts of where the Pinaka are unkown since thats not at Alwar or Jaipur

 

[Sal12]

Why Pak don't raise another corps for northern sindh. Are there other reasons except money.

 

[Raja Porus]

Why Pak don't raise another corps for northern sindh. Are there other reasons except money.

Better to have another div, though neither is needed. One inf div(33) will move to that region if required with 41 as reserve
However an IMBG would be great.

 

[khanasifm]

Why Pak don't raise another corps for northern sindh. Are there other reasons except money.

In case of need or war Quetta corps move east to cover gaps in sindh

[emoji6]

 

[Titanium100]

Some time back a member asked me if there are any armour regiments in Pakistan Army's mechanised divisions so i have some info to share.

Pakistan Army has 2 Mechanised Divisions, 25th Mechanised Division and 26th Mechanised Divisions. The 17th and 14th still carry the designation of Infantry Divisions.

Theoretically the 25th and 26th are mechanised divisions but in fact these 2 divisions are heavily armoured and have more strength (in infantry) than even 1st Armoured and 6th Armoured Divisions of Pakistan Army. The reason the 25th and 26th Mechanised Divisions are called Mechanised because naming them Armoured Divisions will cause concern to India as well as to USA that:

1. PA has stationed an Armoured Division (26th Mechanised Div) near to border in Bahawalpur, Southern Punjab. Placing an armoured division next to border is the intent of attacking an enemy otherwise armoured assets considered as offensive forces are not kept next to borders. This is another reason why the 6th Armoured Division is placed in Gujranwala and not in Sialkot, whereas its main area of action is considered to be Sialkot region.

2. PA will have 4 Armoured Divisions (1st and 6th, 25th and 26th) while IA has 3 Armoured Divisions and this will cause further alarm in India and bring pressure from USA to downsize strength. This is why the V-Corps has a few Independent Armoured Brigades and it is considered that V-Corps Armoured assets will be used under one HQ in war as an Armoured Division.

PA's Mechanised Division:

A Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

B Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

C Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

Thats 5 X Armoured Regiments and 4 X Mechanised Infantry Battalions in one Mechanised Division. I havent included Support Brigades and Divisional troops. Each Mechanised Infantry Battalion has 50 APC.

Those who consider that Rahim yar Khan is an area where IA CSD can succeed should keep in mind that the whole stretch is protected by a Division which has 220 MBT at its disposal. plus an Independent Armoured Brigade having 88 MBT.

@Ulla @Northern @django @Mentee @Khafee @tps77 @CriticalThought @Baloch Pakistani

When you actully look at the geography it gives Pakistan option because it is so long that the it becomes offensive by default which is the best defensive is offensive. It is advantageous for offensive purposes due to being so many entry point and longish in geography best defensive becomes offensive

 

[Raja Porus]

When you actully look at the geography it gives Pakistan option because it is so long that the it becomes offensive by default which is the best defensive is offensive. It is advantageous for offensive purpose due to being so many entry point and longish in geography best defensive becomes offensive

With an immediate and smooth transition to defence once the objectives have been sustained, however if the opportunity arises then it should be exploited and offensive be continued.

 

[Inception-06]

Just to quote one of my posts from another thread....

Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert

Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.


· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.

· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.

· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.

· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.


The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .


There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.

The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.

It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.

While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.

We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.


It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.

In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.

And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.

It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.

But the indians didn’t face any brighter logistical nightmare in 1965 and 1971 war.

 

[Raja Porus]

But the indians didn’t face any brighter logistical nightmare in 1965 and 1971 war.

Because no such large scale offensive was launched by either side in 71 on our eastern front.

 

[Inception-06]

Because no such large scale offensive was launched by either side in 71 on our eastern front.

@PanzerKiel who is right he or me ?