Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

[Raja Porus]

Panzerkiel after reacting to a post nowadays

 

[Neurath]

@PanzerKiel
How much truth is there to the claim that the AZs of the 6AD have been replaced with VT-4s?

 

[iLION12345_1]

@PanzerKiel
How much truth is there to the claim that the AZs of the 6AD have been replaced with VT-4s?

It’s confirmed, not the entire 6AD just yet though. We can say so by looking at the regimental markings of the tanks. 47 Cavalry and 6 lancers. Both have been equipped with VT-4s. Both had AZs in the past.

This doesn’t mean AZs are being retired, simply relocated. You want your best tanks at the frontline. AZ is a second line tank at this stage with So many AK-1s and VT-4s being inducted.

Interestingly this should go to show that the claims certain people make about Type 59s and 69s still being the Majority of our armor are baseless. No Type 59s In active service and so few Type 69s (3 regiments I believe) that replacing them is no longer priority.

 

[Raja Porus]

I noticed one thing that as of 2016 19inf div was was with 1 corps (along with 37 and 17). Here is the picture:
Observe the divisional flags.

Perhaps it serves as a reserve for central command.

 

[Inception-06]

 

[Raja Porus]

View attachment 754922View attachment 754923

Most of the credit for the success of Chammb ops should be given to the 2nd armd bde and it's proper handling both by GOC and its bde commander.
Btw 26th cav and PAVOs were separate from the 2nd bde right?
Also does anyone know the name of the 2nd armd bde commander?

 

[truthseeker2010]

I noticed one thing that as of 2016 19inf div was was with 1 corps (along with 37 and 17). Here is the picture:
Observe the divisional flags.
View attachment 752703
Perhaps it serves as a reserve for central command.

That's logical as well, the X corps should be solely mountain corps, with 12,23 And FCNA for Siachen till LOC north of sialkot as an AOR.

19 should be with either 1 corps although there both infantry divs are mechanised or with 30 corps Gujranwala to reinforce 8 and 15 IDs to defend IB south of LOC.

 

[Raja Porus]

the X corps should be solely mountain corps, with 12,23 And FCNA for Siachen till LOC north of sialkot as an AOR

I think it extends till Jhelum. After that its central command's AOR.

19 should be with either 1 corps although there both infantry divs are mechanised or with 30 corps Gujranwala to reinforce 8 and 15 IDs to defend IB south of LOC.

I think that it should be left uncommitted to be used only in case of a breakthrough by enemy or reinforcing a hard press div or incase 6th armd div is able to make deep enough inroads that it requires more SIBs to hold it or secure its communication lines.( All of these situations are possible only if 19 div doesn't have a pre-designated AOR)
Also, no Commander can fight a battle without reserves. Thus 19 div( if its really a reserve) should not be used until required.
Plus the Gujranwala corps is already strong enough with two inf divs(each with an integrated armd bde), one indp inf bde group and one indp armd bde grp. Also it is impossible to defend a bulge unless one retreats to a formidable defensive line or uses it to attack. Thus PA will have to use the Gujranwala bulge through the Sialkot axis (most probably) to take the battle into the Indian Territory. This will bring relief to the 30th corps and if the attack is successful then it might only be used to defend against possible counterattacks from north of Lahore corps AOR till Narowal.

 

[Raja Porus]

Zoomed image:

I noticed that to the south of Rahim Yar khan there are number of puddles or pools which extend upto Pano Aqil,this would make the terrain soft and marshy hence preventing any approach from this direction. Thus the inly way to easily attack RYK is from the North. This means that due to terrain being impassable for mech forces without large engineer support the defence of RYK may prove to be easier. Also as this type of terrain extends upto 160km southwards,it would be difficult to conduct even a wide flanking manoeuvre from the south. So only a single inf div i.e 33 ind div(from 12 corps, Balochistan) can be used to defend this sector with some armoured support. Two bdes with the armoured component( plus LAT) towards the central and northern approaches and the third one( minus a few companies) to defend against any possible incursion from the south.

 

[PanzerKiel]

View attachment 755543
Zoomed image:
View attachment 755546
I noticed that to the south of Rahim Yar khan there are number of puddles or pools which extend upto Pano Aqil,this would make the terrain soft and marshy hence preventing any approach from this direction. Thus the inly way to easily attack RYK is from the North. This means that due to terrain being impassable for mech forces without large engineer support the defence of RYK may prove to be easier. Also as this type of terrain extends upto 160km southwards,it would be difficult to conduct even a wide flanking manoeuvre from the south. So only a single inf div i.e 33 ind div(from 12 corps, Balochistan) can be used to defend this sector with some armoured support. Two bdes with the armoured component( plus LAT) towards the central and northern approaches and the third one( minus a few companies) to defend against any possible incursion from the south.

Read about SCARP and Nara desert.

 

[Raja Porus]

I was pondering over the issue of logistics in our desert sectors which inhibits actions in these region for both the armies. Whenever we discuss these regions the first and foremost issue that arises is of logistical support; that is how will either army (especially the one who attacks first and has deeper objectives) sustain its mech forces because when any force, no matter how successful it has been, out runs its logistics, will ultimately have to withdraw leaving all of its initial successes behind or will suffer severe loses if not utter destruction. In deserts, especially ours which are deep and soft, there are few roads through which wheeled logistics can move,thus hampering any broad manoeuvres.
What I want to propose is that we induct some sort of mechanised (not armoured) logistics vehicles which can move in all types of terrains as the tanks and APCs, hence ensuring basic supplies. Although economy of our scale might not be able to sustain this mechanisation on a larger scale however, limited number of these vehicles for our two mech divs(26,25) can be inducted which can atleast carry basic supplies such as ammunition and food etc. These mech supply vehs will sustain the frontline troops until a stable supply line has been established. Also, if and when we tend to retire our M113s we can take the armour out of them(except for the crew compartment) and convert them in such vehicles. Again this will be small in numbers but alteast they will provide the bare minimum. If we implement this, we can increase our axis of advance, avenues of approach and will increase the flexibility for our command.

 

[iLION12345_1]

I was pondering over the issue of logistics in our desert sectors which inhibits actions in these region for both the armies. Whenever we discuss these regions the first and foremost issue that arises is of logistical support; that is how will either army (especially the one who attacks first and has deeper objectives) sustain its mech forces because when any force, no matter how successful it has been, out runs its logistics, will ultimately have to withdraw leaving all of its initial successes behind or will suffer severe loses if not utter destruction. In deserts, especially ours which are deep and soft, there are few roads through which wheeled logistics can move,thus hampering any broad manoeuvres.
What I want to propose is that we induct some sort of mechanised (not armoured) logistics vehicles which can move in all types of terrains as the tanks and APCs, hence ensuring basic supplies. Although economy of our scale might not be able to sustain this mechanisation on a larger scale however, limited number of these vehicles for our two mech divs(26,25) can be inducted which can atleast carry basic supplies such as ammunition and food etc. These mech supply vehs will sustain the frontline troops until a stable supply line has been established. Also, if and when we tend to retire our M113s we can take the armour out of them(except for the crew compartment) and convert them in such vehicles. Again this will be small in numbers but alteast they will provide the bare minimum. If we implement this, we can increase our axis of advance, avenues of approach and will increase the flexibility for our command.

Tracked logistics vehicles are well suited to movement in the deserts due to how tracks tend to spread the weight of vehicles, it’s not impossible for them to maintain logistics in such regions. PA already employs such vehicles. Wheeled vehicles can also be used in this region, ones meant specifically for desert-use with Low-air pressure tires.
Add to that the meticulous scouting and planning to make sure the force doesn’t run into any impossible to cross terrain and you’ve basically got decent logistics already.
Then There’s also air logistics using PAAs and PAFs transport fleet.

Now the actual solution to all of this that is already in extensive use by the military…road layers. You lay a portable road within a few minutes and now you can cross any sort of terrain without getting bogged down, tanks, APCs, logistics vehicles, everything will be using those roads to cross any uncrossable terrain.

The PA has been planning and training for operations in these deserts for decades, they’ve planed this all out.

Sir @PanzerKiel can maybe explain better.

 

[farooqbhai007]

Tracked logistics vehicles are well suited to movement in the deserts due to how tracks tend to spread the weight of vehicles, it’s not impossible for them to maintain logistics in such regions. PA already employs such vehicles. Wheeled vehicles can also be used in this region, ones meant specifically for desert-use with Low-air pressure tires.
Add to that the meticulous scouting and planning to make sure the force doesn’t run into any impossible to cross terrain and you’ve basically got decent logistics already.
Then There’s also air logistics using PAAs and PAFs transport fleet.

Now the actual solution to all of this that is already in extensive use by the military…road layers. You lay a portable road within a few minutes and now you can cross any sort of terrain without getting bogged down, tanks, APCs, logistics vehicles, everything will be using those roads to cross any uncrossable terrain.

The PA has been planning and training for operations in these deserts for decades, they’ve planed this all out.
View attachment 758753

Sir @PanzerKiel can maybe explain better.

Steyr 4x4 truck

 

[Raja Porus]

I know about the road layers, but dear there is a difference between laying a temporary road that will be used to cross small part of unfavorable terrain and moving logistics of an entire mech div.The temporary aluminium pathways are laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour.But again,There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers to help a division across sand.
If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting more than two divs provided a large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles and wind. This means the roads have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.
And as far as scouting is concerned, enemy will have done similar recce of the terrain via sats etc. and henc can easily guess the avenues of approach thus reducing the feasibility of mech forces.

Tracked logistics vehicles are well suited to movement in the deserts due to how tracks tend to spread the weight of vehicles, it’s not impossible for them to maintain logistics in such regions. PA already employs such vehicles. Wheeled vehicles can also be used in this region, ones meant specifically for desert-use with Low-air pressure tires.
Add to that the meticulous scouting and planning to make sure the force doesn’t run into any impossible to cross terrain and you’ve basically got decent logistics already.
Then There’s also air logistics using PAAs and PAFs transport fleet.

Now the actual solution to all of this that is already in extensive use by the military…road layers. You lay a portable road within a few minutes and now you can cross any sort of terrain without getting bogged down, tanks, APCs, logistics vehicles, everything will be using those roads to cross any uncrossable terrain.

The PA has been planning and training for operations in these deserts for decades, they’ve planed this all out.
View attachment 758753

Sir @PanzerKiel can maybe explain better.

Sir @PanzerKiel can maybe explain better

Looking forward to it.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Tracked logistics vehicles are well suited to movement in the deserts due to how tracks tend to spread the weight of vehicles, it’s not impossible for them to maintain logistics in such regions. PA already employs such vehicles. Wheeled vehicles can also be used in this region, ones meant specifically for desert-use with Low-air pressure tires.
Add to that the meticulous scouting and planning to make sure the force doesn’t run into any impossible to cross terrain and you’ve basically got decent logistics already.
Then There’s also air logistics using PAAs and PAFs transport fleet.

Now the actual solution to all of this that is already in extensive use by the military…road layers. You lay a portable road within a few minutes and now you can cross any sort of terrain without getting bogged down, tanks, APCs, logistics vehicles, everything will be using those roads to cross any uncrossable terrain.

The PA has been planning and training for operations in these deserts for decades, they’ve planed this all out.
View attachment 758753

Sir @PanzerKiel can maybe explain better.

Just to quote one of my posts from another thread....

Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert

Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.


· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.

· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.

· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.

· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.


The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .


There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.

The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.

It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.

While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.

We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.


It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.

In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.

And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.

It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.