Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz opens Pandora Box on Kargil issue

[Cherokee]

If your Minister's statement about RSS was a political stunt then why this can't be?

Because he is not participating in Elections or politics .

 

[Bang Galore]

For pakistan: Kargil as an initial tactical infiltration was success....tactical support on both military and political fronts and the withdrawal were big disasters....

That's a bit like saying you managed to get your d**k out of your pants before it was then cut off..........

 

[KS]

I think you are getting delirious.

Mush drank Scotch every night and slept with his poodle dogs at night.

That is not a profile of an Islamic Fundamentalist.

Get a grip on reality my friend.

Whiskey moulvi like disco moulvi !

 

[KRAIT]

If your Minister's statement about RSS was a political stunt then why this can't be?

Yup. it may possibly be. After Musharraf's interview and his support to Qadri earlier did swing emotions of Pakistanis who are so angry at Pakistani govt. and politicians that they may turn to Musharraf too.

That's why I am asking, what's the present social temperature regarding Musharraf.

Personally, I think its politically motivated.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

@ Bang Galore,

The Posts that you have posted on this thread just jogged my memory of some comments that I made on the "Airpower at 18000" thread. Let me put that here since that includes some views of military professional (mainly from Pakistan) and some of my comments as well.

Prelude to Kargil.

Brig. Shaukat Kadir a retired officer of the PA (in “An Analysis of Kargil” –RUSI Journal) explains the prelude to the operation thus:
“ Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad somewhere towards mid November 1998, then commanding 10 Corps sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Aziz. When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan.

They sought permission to execute a plan, which had been made earlier, as military plans often are, and shelved. The plan essentially visualized occupying terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, which the Indians were known to vacate every winter, and reoccupy at the advent of summer. The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement. The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations, but confine the knowledge of this plan to the four people present, for the time being.”
“While preparations for executing the plan began in November/ December 1999, the subject was casually broached with the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, some time in December, presenting the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these territories, left unoccupied by the Indians during winters. It would also repay them for their incursion into Siachin.
In fact, it would hurt them more. Nawaz Sharif, being the kind of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. Nor did the military leadership, as it is supposed to, present a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, with a political aim, and how the military operation would achieve the political aim.”
“Thus far, the rest of the army was unaware of the operation, as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) and the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS).”
“Personally, I do not think that the operation was intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, and finally were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square kilometers over a front of over 100 kilometers and depth ranging between 7 to 15 kilometers. They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes6. Whereas, the total number occupying these posts, never exceeded 1000 all ranks, but four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the operation. While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local Mujahideen assisting as labour to carry logistical requirements.”

Comment: As that account shows, the Mujaheddin connection to the Kargil Op. was tenuous and only to the extent of being used as “beasts of burden” in the logistical train.

Shaukat Kadir continues: “It was at this stage, in March 1999, that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfill a political objective.

Given the fact that they were evolving a plan to justify an operation already underway, the response was no less than brilliant. Given the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was about 2 ¼ : 1, the MO concluded that the initial Indian reaction would be to rush in more troops to ***, further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan.”

Comment: The rest of the GHQ staff was co-opted much later (by Shaukat Kadir’s account) to give a post-facto Strategic “flesh” to the Tactical “ skeleton”- which happened to be a Military Operation already underway! And it was named as Operation Badr (from Ghazwa-e-Badr).
The information above is substantiated by Hassan Abbas in his book- “Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism” wherein he says: “So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation”. Hassan Abbas had served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1994-1995) and Gen. Parvez Musharraf (1999-2000).

More from Shaukat Kadir; “While the political aim spelt out was, “To seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir”, the military aim leading up to the political aim was, “To create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness”. The operational plan visualized the Indian’s amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication, at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. Thus creating an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat, this would force India to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial execution, tactically brilliant.The only flaw was that it had not catered for the “environment“.

Comment: In the underlined part; Brig.Kadir is being generous to the original architects as well as the GHQ, PA (which worked on the ‘post-facto’ Strategic Operational Plan) to a fault; as will be demonstrated later.

This plan (sic) was part of a presentation that was made to the PM and other Service Chiefs in April 1999.

In Brig.Kadir’s words:
“Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the
benefit of the Prime Minister (of Pakistan) in April, in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS was on a visit abroad, the navy’s reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war.He also voiced the view that in the event of war; the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might be seeking.”

Thus Brig. Kadir explains the setting of the scene for Kargil. Since Kadir has mentioned the PAF CAS’ view; it will be relevant to mention the views of a PAF insider: that of then Director Air Operations, later Air Cmde. (R) Kaiser Tufail.

Air Cmde.Kaiser Tufail writes about that time in his blog “Aeronaut”. While he writes clearly that the PA (specifically 4 officers) seemed to working on some Operational Plan, nowhere was that Plan discussed with the PAF. Only some information was sought from the PAF (in March 1999) about: “fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc”. That was it.

Later on 12th May, a PAF team was sent 10 Corps HQ to attend a Briefing on what was termed as the ‘Kashmir Contingency’.
That seems to be the extent of PAF involvement in drawing up the plans for Kargil.

Kaiser Tufail describes that briefing thus: “Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in Kashmir’ at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a ‘protective manoeuvre’, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of ‘providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir’ was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. “I have Stingers on every peak,” he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud’s reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our offensive elements.”

Comment: The PA’s (or at least, the Plan’s proponents&#8217 view on the lack of need for PAF involvement or association with the Operation is summarised in the underlined part above.

While, the questions posed by the PAF team’s Air Cmdes. Nawaz and Tufail clearly apprehended (and even actually predicted) the possible use of IAF air-power and IA’s Artillery power in response to Operation Badr (Kargil Ops).

Also read the fallacy of Lt.Gen. Mehmud’s assertion when he replied to Air Cmde. Tufail: “ that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our offensive elements.”
This assertion by Mehmud was eventually proved to be hollow when the Indian Army moved up Artillery Guns (of which 130 guns alone were the Bofors FH-77 155 mm Howitzers) and MBRLs into the very same Dras-Kargil Sector in large numbers and unleashed an unrelenting Artillery Barrage on the ridges, peaks and valleys across; eventually expending approx. 250,000 rounds. On one day alone, 9000 shells were lobbed at Tiger Hill!
Seemingly, in the words of one Indian Army officer: “the (Indian) infantry started taking Bofors (howitzer) as their section weapon.”

On the other hand; it was the Pakistani Army GHQ that was unable to move up any sizeable reinforcements since it could not deplete formations engaged on the Indo-Pak borders elsewhere, as it had no control or any clue on the future direction that the conflict would take (as was proved later).
Plus GHQ, PA had already stymied itself (“shot itself in the foot”, so to speak) by peddling the story that it was not involved in Kargil, thus confining itself to launching an Operation; and then being forced to stand by, “twiddling its thumbs”!

An instance of how poorly the architects had thought through the Operation Badr Plan.

In the account of the briefing held at 10 Corps, the key to the importance of Operation Badr is let out in the recount of Lt.Gen. Mehmud’s statement:
“Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold”.
The intention of the operation seems to have been to choke off the Indian supply line to Siachen which originated out of Kargil. Apart from interdicting the main supply route to Ladakh (NH 1A).

Then Kaiser Tufail sums up the PAF’s view as follows:
“Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with.”

Comment: It can thus be said that the PAF seemed to be more prescient and sanguine as to how the ‘planned operation’ was likely to turn out in its consequences.

This intention of the PA to keep PAF out of the loop, seems to be an echo of an earlier Operation Gibraltar launched by PA in 1965; where the PAF was similarly treated- a fact attested to by many including AM (R) Nur Khan as well as ACM (R) M. Anwar Shamim in his book “Cutting edge PAF”.
It is another matter that after Operation Gibraltar collapsed and Operation Grand Slam ground to a halt in 1965, the PAF was still able to pull the PA’s ‘chestnuts out of the fire’.

In Kargil, the PAF just had no chance to do so.





The Architects of Kargil

It will be relevant in some measure to reproduce Brig.Kadir’s (subjective as it might be) ‘pen-picture’ of the 4 architects of Kargil:

“Gen Pervez Musharaf (then COAS): A sharp and intelligent, artillery officer, who has commanded infantry formations from brigade upwards, and held a large variety of staff and instructional appointments. A bold commander, who takes pride in being decisive, quick to take decisions (a fact he took pains to highlight after his takeover, but cannot be accused of it in political matters) and, therefore, a good commander of troops and keen to assume responsibility.

Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (then GOC, 10 Corps): Again an artillery officer, with a wide variety of experience. He is sharp and intelligent, with a touch of arrogance that kept growing till it became overwhelming towards the end of his career, and a strong sense of right and wrong. A strong, forceful, decisive and highly ambitious individual, who was secular, but “discovered” the force of Islam late in life. Consequently he tends to see everything in life is starkly either, black or white. On those occasions, as dangerous as any other “who believes himself to be incapable of going wrong”.

Lt Gen Muhammed Aziz (then CGS): More than anyone else, he has been painted the villain, and the “fundo”, which he is not. Deeply religious, but very balanced, he is born Kashmiri, and has served in some of the most rugged reaches of it, at various stages of his career. Strongly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of Kashmir, but not to the extent that it might jeopardize Pakistan. He is intelligent, sharp, very balanced, progressive and dynamic.

Major General Javed Hassan (then GOC, FCNA): A highly intelligent and well-read officer, who is more an academician than a commander, and bears that reputation. He was the only one, with a point to prove.”

Another view (which may also be subjective) of the 4 architects of the “Kargil Plan” appears in Hassan Abbas’ book quoted earlier, but it is telling nonetheless:
“The third and final operational plan for Kargil was put forward by its inspirational father, Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of the general staff (CGS). Himself a Kashmiri, he was fully committed to the cause of Kashmiri freedom, and not the sort of man who held any commitment lightly. He is very religious and not known to be a hypocrite.

The tactical parents of the Kargil plan were two. The first was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, the commander of 10th Corps, in whose area of operations the objective lay. He was a comparatively weaker personality than Aziz, with a romance about history. It is believed that he was convinced by the conviction of Aziz, which, combined with his own historical dream, made him a hostage to the Kargil idea.

The second parent of the plan was Major General Javed Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern Areas (Force Command Northern Areas, FCNA) who would actually have to carry out the operation. He had one of the best minds in the army and even more ambition. He gave his unstinting support to the operation, less through any sense of conviction and more because of the promise that such a position held of bringing him into General Pervez Musharraf’s charmed inner circle.
(Gen.)Musharraf was taken in by the enthusiasm of two of his closest generals, and being eternally levitated by an irrepressible streak of unreal optimism, he became the strongest advocate of the operation. The absolute secrecy that was one of the preconditions of the success of the operation, to secure it against any possibility of leaks, also made it proof against any possibility of a second opinion, and thus against any collusion with a sense of reality.”

The above view of Hassan Abbas regarding the absolute secrecy and lack of any critical appraisal of the Plan is supported by Kaiser Tufail’s assessment of Kargil:
“In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures”.

Comment: It will be pertinent to note that Gen.Parvez Musharraf as a Brig. had served in Siachen and had authored as well as led an unsuccessful Plan. In September 1987, while he led the Special Services Group in Khiplo near Siachen, he planned to take back Quaid Peak at Bilafond Pass in which he badly failed. Hence the supposition (in some quarters) that Kargil was a reaction to Siachen.

Another account of a high level briefing for the Pakistani PM explains:
“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif summoned General Pervez Musharraf in a high level meeting on Wednesday the 2nd June during which many secrets of the Kargil Operation plan came into light. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, Secretary Defense Lt. Gen. (retired) Iftikhar Ali Khan, Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, the then Naval and Air chiefs and Director-General ISI were also present in the meeting.
On this occasion, Secretary Defense Lt. Gen. Iftikhar Ali said: “On the strength of my military training, studies and experience, I can only say that there could only be two results of this military operation: full scale war or an insulting and crushing defeat. It is my national obligation to inform you about the future dangers.”
(Urdu Digest, August 99 edition page 37).

Pakistani Forces used at Kargil
The forces earmarked for OPERATION BADR were: 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Also included were Mujaheddin (in the role as mentioned earlier) and members of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) since Officers from 1 and 3 Special Services Group were also killed. Along with elements from the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts. It is estimated that about 5,000 troops were involved, while the troops actually occupying the vacant Indian posts were approx. 1800.. Since officers from several other regiments were also identified – 24 Sind, 13 Azad Kashmir, 1 and 63 Frontier Force, 60 Baluch – it might be tempting to assume other battalions were involved. More likely that these officers probably were on deputation to the NLI.
These forces were provided with fire-support by at least 18 batteries of PA Artillery.

Operation Badr- a summation

In summation, Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on exploitation of the large gaps that existed in the defences in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (LOC). The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from the main roads towards the LOC. During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall making movement almost impossible. Zoji La, the only mountain pass connecting the Kargil area to the Kashmir Valley, normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not have been possible till then. Pakistan Army calculated that even if the intrusions were discovered in early May, as they were, the Indian Army's reaction would be slow and limited, thereby allowing them to consolidate the intrusions more effectively. However, Zoji La was opened for the induction of troops in early May itself. The incursions, if effective; would enable Pakistani troops to secure a number of dominating heights from where the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A could be interdicted at a number of places. The intrusions would also draw in and tie down Indian Army reserves. These intrusions would, further, give Pakistan control over substantial tracts of strategic land area across the LOC, thereby, enabling Islamabad to negotiate from a position of strength. The intrusions would irrevocably alter the status of the LOC, since the LOC is the de-facto border between the two states in the disputed area of Jammu & Kashmir.

Comment:In the light of all the above, the ‘Idea’ behind Kargil’s “Operation Badr” was brilliant in its conception and audacious in its intent. The problem however was that it did not encompass much more than that ‘kernel of an idea’ so that it could be grown in to a ‘ripe fruit of a well-thought out and thought-through Plan’ of action.
An ‘Idea’, however great it may be; cannot be a synonym for a ‘Plan’ nor can it be passed off as a Plan. To don the mantle of a Plan, thought and reasoning has to be added around the ‘Idea’. All possible possibilities and contingencies have to be thought of and thought through to give a Plan any reasonable chance of success. It is vital to weigh the pros and cons of a military offensive in terms of understanding the possible ramifications and enemy reactions before embarking on a military Operation. All that can be considered to be “environment” (the expression used by Brig.Kadir).

For instance, the plan paid little attention to the “environment”. The “environment” included (but was not limited to) the possibility that the response from India could even be escalatory in nature, which in the event; it actually was!
That was something that the planners of Operation Badr had not considered with any seriousness and finally as demonstrated by subsequent events; were simply even unable to cope with!

Did the planners smugly believe that such a response was not even likely? It seems so.
Contingencies had little (if any) part of their attention while drawing up the plan.

And Brig. Kadir could just blandly say, as he did: “While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial execution, tactically brilliant. The only flaw was that it had not catered for the “environment”.

How “good” is a Plan that has eventual failure intrinsically built into it?
It is amazing that the 4 architects of the plan (who had been instructors in various Military Institutions in their respective service careers) had overlooked such finer points.

What compounded the flaws in Op.Badr was that it seems not even to have been explained in any detail to the Political Leadership in Pakistan. Because the consequences of any Military action directed towards a neighbouring country must have a diplomatic ‘fall-out’ which of necessity would have to be dealt with by the Political Leadership. In this instance, the Political Leadership (and consequently the Pakistani Diplomatic Establishment) were grossly unprepared.

About how the Diplomatic Establishment of Pakistan was kept in the dark about Kargil; Ambassador Zafar Hilaly (Pakistani FO) had this to say in “Comment-Military Dictation on Foreign Policy”:
“Kargil, of course, was yet another disaster over which the military consulted no one, not even its own, what to speak of the FO. And, instead of being court-martialled for his folly, Musharraf was given a long lease of life in office followed by an honourable send-off.”
Though there has been a great deal of acrimony about this matter; whether this (the explanation) was done or not – has been a continuing squabble between the two main ‘Honchos’ on the Pakistani side, viz. PM Nawaz Sharif and COAS Parvez Musharraf since then up to the present time.

Whatever may be the truth, the fact is that once the plan was set rolling and the dismal results came in eventually (and somewhat inevitably) there was a huge disconnect between the Political leadership and the Military leadership about the campaign and its conclusion, and in the end; both Political and Military leadership in Pakistan were simply reduced to a state of dysfunction- something that just added to the chances of a disastrous conclusion of the plan!

 

[Rizwan Alam]

Because he is not participating in Elections or politics .

He who?? Your Minister represents a whole party.

 

[Cherokee]

He who?? Your Minister represents a whole party.

Retired Gen Aziz

 

[JanjaWeed]

It's not just Gen Aziz. Even other Generals at the time had similar views. Don't know if you guys have followed Gen Jamhed Gulzar Kayani's interview... it was pretty damning indictment of Musharraf's failure. It's also true that this general died soon after this interview...

 

[IND151]

Lt Gen Shahid Aziz has a personal vengeance against Musharraf

This is pure political topi drama

Pakistan's only aim in Kargil was to sucessfully capture the super strategic Point 5353 which they did with ultra ease and two months of Indian efforts to recapture that peak was not sucessfull.

Thus this was a huge tactical and strategic victory which has left the very presence of Indian Army in J&K untenable..and since this was a huge victory the fighters were all NLI commandoes and Pak Army bravehearts -- not non-state actors.

Musharraf scored a huge coup (lol no pun intended) in terms of internationalizing the Kashmir dispute - the jugular vein of Pakistan.

==

Ok have I missed anything else ?

kindly elaborate this

 

[Porus]

No other saying can explicitly delineate the true character of Musharraf than this one, "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel". He is a man of low intellect, he was definitely ambitious and hungry for military glory but terribly lacked all those skills needed to make those dreams come true. For some reasons this man cannot keep his mouth shut, when Indian retired army generals or politicians hardly appear on Pakistani news channels this man loves to get interviewed by them. The Kargil operation had many weaknesses and the biggest of them was logistic, even a bloody civilian like me cannot overlook it. You were operating 20 km within the enemy territory and in any counter attack the enemy just needed to cut that supply line, which he also did and the rest is history.

I respect all those soldiers who fought valiantly against all odds, but have nothing but sheer contempt for the clowns like Musharraf.

 

[Rizwan Alam]

Retired Gen Aziz

You know what, statements are also for sale here in Pakistan.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

The civilians will have to take some blame for it. Nawaz Sharif forced a highly capable & well regarded General (Jehangir Karamat) to resign & appointed the "commando". What is it that they say about Karma being a b.......

Nawaz Sharif did'nt know $hit about military matters. All that he knew and worked for was to ascend the "Gaddi" and remain there.
Unfortunately for him (and eventually Pakistan) Musharraf had similar ideas. That is how it was. And that was why they were at each others throats.
But who lost in the bargain?

 

[Irfan Baloch]

if this war would have led to Indian withdrawal from Siachin etc then even Nawaz sherif would have got his memory back and would have claimed the credit and his son would have claimed that he saw his father making all the plans while having Nehari

 

[Irfan Baloch]

I hope Some Pakistani Does not call his own Retired General "Indian Stooge" or Discredit him on his viws just becuase it does not go with the popular one in Pakistan .

you can live in hope buddy
people can have difference of opinion here even retired generals

Our Gen Nasir Ullah Baber was very Anti Zia and he joined PPP he is the same general who during 1965 war flew into the centre of an Indian brigade and made them to surrender by fooling them that they were surrounded

Gen Zia Udlin Butt is also known to have personal grudges against Musharraf and someone has quoted his name in saying that Musharraf was looking after Osama.

your own military men have confessed that they have beheaded Pakistani soldiers and they see that as pride while your media is warmongering and crying rivers of tear over alleged brutality of Pakistan army. so yea you can get differing points of view from time to time among military and civilian leadership in Pakistan. even US Gen Mac Crystal had to resign due to his views published in Rolling stone.. got the drift or red mist is blinding your thought process? make a good response with mention of 1971 please

 

[Capt.Popeye]

if this war would have led to Indian withdrawal from Siachin etc then even Nawaz sherif would have got his memory back and would have claimed the credit and his son would have claimed that he saw his father making all the plans while having Nehari

What is new in that IB? Even Musharraff Has spun so many yarns about Kargil, Both of them have fervent reasons to hope that people in Pakistan just forget about Kargil!
That is why, even fiction matters more than facts.