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Lone wolf: The West should bide its time, friendless China is in trouble

You haven't seen the internet war between indonesian and vietnamese forumer here lmao
True. Our conflict is tiny, both respect each other while we cant live peacefully with sick CN who willing to bow down to Jap ( who massacred 10 millions Cnese ) just for some cheap Yen in 1978.

Btw, we both happy to see more companies leaving CN ,making more Cnese jobless and chose VN-ID to open their factories.
 
True. Our conflict is tiny, both respect each other while we cant live peacefully with sick CN who willing to bow down to Jap ( who massacred 10 millions Cnese ) just for some cheap Yen in 1978.

Btw, we both happy to see more companies leaving CN ,making more Cnese jobless and chose VN-ID to open their factories.
The chinese doesnt have time for u little froggies, vietnam and indoensia. They r focused on the bigger, global picture
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https://www.theage.com.au/business/...less-china-is-in-trouble-20200709-p55adj.html

Lone wolf: The West should bide its time, friendless China is in trouble

The ledger is brutally clear. Xi Jinping's regime has no allies of global economic weight or credibility.

@KAL-EL @Joe Shearer @T-123456 @F-22Raptor @Gomig-21 @VCheng @Hamartia Antidote @Vergennes @gambit

This op-ed reminds me of the many dire predictions about the U.S. economy I have seen over the years. They have been good for laughs. Now, it's fashionable to predict Chinese demise as well. But, decade after decade both countries keep on marching ahead of everyone else. China's meteoric rise given the length and height of its expansion only points to likelihood of something deep structurally which benefits all. Therefore, no, we are not likely to see either the US or China suddenly crash no matter who says what.

Here is why:
1. The assumption the writer makes: His unspoken assumptions is that China wants to be the police man of the world and take over this role from the US. No, they do not. Even POTUS wants to get rid of this burden as it's not cheap. China just wants to be free from encroachments of the MNCs (The New East India co.) originating from places not friendly to them and hybrid war funded by NGOs; so, they can have a seat on the table as an equal. Even India has been wary of the NGOs and MNCs for decades including its restrictions of Amazon as being the latest example. Chinese have worked hard for this one thing and they don't have to "win it all" to meet their objectives of being treated fairly as part of the existing world order; neither do they want to be the USSR. They have done more than enough to earn the respect and may be open to an offer which treats them equally and does not ask them to constrain their own growth.

2. The points provided to boost the OP's case are strong, pointing to some of China's weaknesses even if they are one-sided and ignore China ability to "manipulate" many levers within China to meet its sole objective of being free. Let's look at the OPs points one by one for their accuracy:
i. BRI is Neo-colonialism. China is saying it wants to create a win-win situation. This is probably true. USA also did something similar as a rising power against Great Britain in the early 1800: promising to create a win-win relationships in exchange for friendships. Many aspects of BRI are win-win. However, the Chinese companies are very cut throat and focused on profitability; they are also backed by their government. This gives BRI a tinge of Neo-colonialism. At the same time they have offered to address such concerns unlike their competition. This means countries receiving BRI investments will have to learn to do their own homework: prioritize projects and negotiate the price down. China may need them as much as they need China to reduce its dependence upon the currently Rich countries as the writer points out.
ii. The Rich countries are coalescing into a united front against China: The writer does not quantify nor provide trends which shows slowdown in activity with China on the whole. We are only left to ponder examples of constraining Huawei, China Mobile and others. In this case both parties will lose; MNCs also risk losing access to a large and fast growing middle class in China. So far investment in China is only increasing as it is containing the virus. Remember, China does not need to "win it all" to meet her objective of being free and be treated equally. Some of their tech is as much as two generations behind but they will close the gap or at least be "good enough".
iii. Article 34 is undemocratic: I am not up to speed on HK's internal politics but UK had a similar ban on protests against Queen's rule by HK residents. External interference does not leave China much choice and it's opting for stability. It's noteworthy of lack of similar coverage of Kashmir's lock-down which is far worse of a humanitarian disaster going on one-year. For afar, China seems very cohesive. Even the HK and Taiwanese immigrants I know well, point out the false hype in the media.
iv. China is not sufficiently developed: This could be a real Achilles-heel for China. The writer points out China's own assessment of exhaustion of "low hanging fruits" but does not provide any metrics on the next level activities in China or why such a gap is insurmountable other than China being undemocratic. Being a one-party rule hasn't stopped China so far and has been noted to be a reason of their success where India is pointed to having failed. USSR succeeded in high-tech such as engines while being fully communist and autocratic. Remember unlike the former USSR, China does not have a competing world order to build so it has less of a burden of lifting up allies; instead, it's in a co-dependent relationship with the Rich. Anecdotal reading of the current news shows China continuing to advance in aerospace, passenger planes and electrical cars industires. Perhaps China's Vision 2025 will adequately address the gaps. But, such a possibility is not adequately addressed by the OP.
v. China needs unfettered global access: While this is another weakness; this needs to be looked at in terms of the three divisions of the current global economy. Industrial: China is not likely to experience a wholesale blockage due to risk of supply chain disruptions and other MNCs also losing out to China's growing market anytime soon. In-fact luxury brands and Teslas of the world are counting on China for future growth. Unlike Indians, many Chinese like to spend and show-off. Internet: The OP talks about the internet decoupling of apps as one such implementation. This will be the one area where we see the cleanest break and creation of two Internets. China would lose more here in the long term because the innovations it provided for the marketplace could be most easily copied (such as TikTok's) without as much apparent risk as comes with decoupling of the supply chain. Apparent risk is loss of jobs by TikTok in India. Real loss is hidden: loss of investments in the startup scene provided by Chinese internet companies over the next couple of decades of millions of dollars. Financial decoupling: Financial market access is another area for decoupling but the OP didn't go into. Complete financial decoupling will cause Rich investors to miss out on Chinese innovation and hard work so the likelihood of such decoupling is low.
vi. China is aging and workforce is expected to shrink by 200M over 30 years. This seems to be another Achilles heel because of such a huge burden when you have to provide for them. But, the aging of the population is not even across the country and was probably planned that way. Also, 30 years is a long time if they wanted they could add just 100 millions additional population of working age in a country of 1.3B+ by 2050. Barring that, friendly BRI countries can be leveraged as fall back to continue the benefits which come with China centered supply-chain. BRI creates a buffer and spreads risk for China in addition to other benefits because they are business deals and not military alliances. Aging population may also cap the rise of China's mix of some economic metrics but this may make them less threatening and lead to an accommodation.

3. What the author misses: First is China has shown the ability of relentless pursuit of their key objective because their deep state cares about the nation and not the MNCs. If they make a mistake, they can get back on their feet pretty quickly just like the US does but with less drama due to one party control. Second, with Covid-19 thrashing world economies, China's growth is going to be the key driver of friendships. China's continuous growth offers a buffer for friends although not as much in the near term until Covid-19's impact to China itself is addressed. Third, BRI investments in foreign countries is China's way to create the circumstances to help it consolidate its gains. And, a win-win investment is always welcome especially in a coming slow down if some predictions are right.

My prediction: since China is not interested in upsetting the existing world order, just to be considered an equal, the Rich countries will come to an accommodation with China before the decade is out and increase their relationship even more than they do today.

What should other countries do: Learn from China on their focus and hard work. Keep the two poles happy enough but meet their own objectives. Stay away from the hype in what will likely be a temporary battle before world's focus shifts elsewhere when the Rich realize it's a fait accompli and dive into PARTY!!
 
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Therefore, no, we are not likely to see either the US or China suddenly crash no matter who says what.

Well the article is not talking about some complete collapse of China, just it will not be smooth sailing anymore and it very likely wont achieve a supremacy-at-scale like many of its major proponents claim it will.

Rather it will be a multi-polar world long term...and ceterus paribus, many large pop developing countries in general will be in some kind of middle-income trap overall given the scale of their population, aging of population...all relative to the innovation speed of the frontiers of GDP potential (this ceiling comes into view more).

For massive wealth per capita, there is no (existing) way any developing large population country can continue trajectory in the 20k 30k+ per capita GDP levels ...not without massive changes in human activity and innovation threshold....given the scale of energy that need be consumed by populations like China, India, developing asia and Africa etc simply not existing in the current framework of energy technology thats largely tied to fossil fuels still.

If we develop/innovate energy forms at scale that are much more closer to infinite, it unlocks much much more...but this remains to be seen....hopefully we can see it this century....otherwise large pop countries get crunched at middle income somewhere....and stay there till enough pressure released over time.
 
Well the article is not talking about some complete collapse of China, just it will not be smooth sailing anymore and it very likely wont achieve a supremacy-at-scale like many of its major proponents claim it will.

Rather it will be a multi-polar world long term...

Yes, your point is right on mark. This realization will just be a cheap thrill for China's detractors. Realistically, China is not even looking to be the "Supreme" and that's the biggest weakness of the OP. Chinese know it's best to work within the system and trying to create co-dependency is a calculated move they decided on a long time ago. They probably "gamed" this very thoroughly. That's why I said the OP was making an incorrect assumption:

1. The assumption the writer makes: His unspoken assumptions is that China wants to be the police man of the world and take over this role from the US. No, they do not. Even POTUS wants to get rid of this burden as it's not cheap. China just wants to be free from encroachments of the MNCs (The New East India co.) originating from places not friendly to them and hybrid war funded by NGOs; so, they can have a seat on the table as an equal. Even India has been wary of the NGOs and MNCs for decades

Becoming "Supreme" is not possible even if China wanted to because the US isn't going anywhere no matter what anyone says. Only possibility is a multi-polar world order down the line. China is not even there yet.

Caving in is not an option for China either: Japan has not recovered for over 30 years despite being buddy buddy with today's "Supreme" after allegedly making a deal not in its best interest.

Real choice the Chinese see: Become self-reliant or have negative interest rates and provide endless stimuli to prop up the economy like Japan. China's situation will remain much better than that don't you think even if they don't ever get a fair deal?

We get to see how the events play out.
 
https://www.theage.com.au/business/...less-china-is-in-trouble-20200709-p55adj.html

Lone wolf: The West should bide its time, friendless China is in trouble

The ledger is brutally clear. Xi Jinping's regime has no allies of global economic weight or credibility.

Some 53 countries backed China's treatment of Hong Kong in the UN Human Rights Council, a body now under the thumb of Beijing. They make up just 4 per cent of the world's GDP. Most are authoritarian statelets locked into the neo-colonial infrastructure nexus of China's "belt and road" initiative.

The only G20 member to have lined up on China's side was Mohammad bin Salman's Saudi Arabia, a struggling middle-income autocracy running out of places to sell its oil.



The list offers a revealing view of the strategic order emerging in the early 2020s. The rich Western and Asian democracies, which still control the international economic system, are coalescing into a united front. China is starting to pay the exorbitant price for its wolf warrior diplomacy. Xi has given us a nasty foretaste of what the world will be like if the Communist Party ever attains global mastery.


This week he went so far as to extend extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Article 34 sedition law in Hong Kong to anybody, anywhere in the world. Professor Donald Clarke, from George Washington University, says the intent is simply "to put the fear of God into all China critics the world over".

Yet China is not a sufficiently developed economic and technological superpower to pull this off. One is tempted to say that Xi has jumped the gun, except that there is no such thing as a linear path to Chinese supremacy. Modern post-Mao China has in a sense peaked and is now in incipient decline.

The "second derivative" was already turning as far back as 2007. That was the year when the all-conquering Chinese economy, armed with a suppressed currency, racked up a mercantilist current account surplus of 10 per cent of GDP and $US4 trillion ($5.7 trillion) of foreign reserves, a weakness that some mistook for strength. Its voracious industrial expansion was driving a commodity super-cycle, absorbing half the world's iron ore output.

But then China made its great mistake. Communist Party strategists falsely concluded that the Lehman crisis had permanently wounded the US and discredited free-market liberalism. It tempted the politburo into clinging too long to a growth model past its sell-by date, plagued by reliance on Leninist state capitalism and the productivity-killing, state-owned entities.


Premier Li Keqiang warned against this miscalculation eight years ago in a report by his brain trust, the Development Research Council. It said the low-hanging fruit of state-driven industrialisation was largely exhausted and that catch-up growth driven by imported know-how had hit the limits.

It concluded that Beijing would have to embrace pluralism and relax its suffocating grip on society if it was to reach the tech frontier where the air is thinner. Delay would consign China to a middle-income trap that had ensnared Latin America or North Africa.

Li Keqiang was right. China's total factor productivity growth has collapsed from an average rate of 2.8 per cent in the early 2000s (according to the World Bank) to just 0.7 per cent over the last decade. China is longer on the "convergence" trajectory carved out by Japan and then Korea as they reached take-off and vaulted into the elite tier. It risks stalling long before it is rich.

The Huawei saga has exposed just how much the country still lags, a surprise to some who have bought into the media narrative of Chinese hi-tech ascendancy. China is not yet capable of making the advanced semiconductor chips used for telecommunications or programmable FPGA circuits.


It has yet to crack the materials science required to make the latest microscopic chips and lacks the critical raw material needed to sustain its ambitions for global dominance of 5G mobile and the coming "internet of things". The US controls the world's semiconductor ecosystem, working tightly with Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

All Washington had to do in May was to flick its fingers and Taiwan's TSMC instantly cut off chip supplies to Huawei, dooming the company's 5G global quest at a stroke. Britain does not have the option of sticking with Huawei even if it wants to do so. The US Congress is not going to allow an arm of the Chinese state - serving Xi's doctrine of civil-military fusion - to acquire global control over a key technological choke point.

China's economy looks stronger than it really is because output has been flattered by the illusion of a systemic credit bubble. This has pushed the public-private debt ratio to 330 per cent, leading to a forest of malinvestments and an ever-diminishing macro-economic return on loans. State control over the banking system probably ensures that this will not end in a Minsky moment or a classical financial crisis. It will end instead in stagnation.

China is now in trouble. It needs unfettered global access for its companies to reach the critical break-through achieved by Japan and Korea. It is instead being shut out by one country after another as they respond to provocations. India banned TikTok and 58 other Chinese apps last week, ostensibly on security grounds. The US has frozen out China Mobile.


Xi is obviously not going to back down over Hong Kong but the cost of escalating commercial conflict is no longer negligible for China. Punitive action against Australia and Canada has been a disaster for Beijing's global credibility. Lashing out at British interests would compound the damage. Each episode accelerates the creation of a containment alliance, soon to be led with much greater statecraft by a multilateral president Biden.

"If we make China an enemy, China will become an enemy," says Liu Xiaoming, China's ambassador in London, playing on the theme of the Thucydides Trap. This historical analogy purports to show that conflict becomes inevitable when a status quo power (Sparta) tries to hold down the rise of a rival (Athens).

It is a useful notion for Beijing, inducing paralysis in the West. But it has no relevance to the current great power clash. China is not rising any longer. It is ageing more quickly than the West. The reserve army of migrant workers from the villages has dried up. The workforce is already contracting and will shrink by 200 million over the next 30 years in a spectacular demographic collapse.

The proper British response as it decides what to do about Huawei, Hong Kong and China's escalating threats is surely polite but inflexible resistance, in the knowledge that Xi's hand is weaker than he lets on.

If the democracies bide their time and hold together, China will eventually settle down and accept that it too is a greying status quo nation and perhaps even that its bid for global supremacy is going nowhere.

The Telegraph, London

@KAL-EL @Joe Shearer @T-123456 @F-22Raptor @Gomig-21 @VCheng @Hamartia Antidote @Vergennes @gambit
I don't really understand this article. China's relationship with other states, besides namely the United States (which has gotten much worse in recent years), has more of less remained the same. Using this article's criteria of being "friendless", China was also "friendless" back in the mid 2000s and yet still achieved near 15% GDP YOY growth. The same countries that accuse China of human rights violations today are the same ones that did in 20 years ago. I would argue China's overall geopolitical situation is more favorable to them than it was 5 years ago. Of course, the lashing out at Canada or Australia def doesn't buy Chinese diplomacy points but these are most likely temporary setbacks imo. These countries still fundamentally need Chinese trade and especially in Australia's case, they cannot antagonize China too much due to the security in the region.
 
If i can get a peeny for every articles like this about doom of china is near in last 20 years i will be millionaire by now.
Add the ones about Pakistan's disappearance from the map since the 80s and I would wager you'd be a billionaire!
 
Using this article's criteria of being "friendless", China was also "friendless" back in the mid 2000s

Nah...2000s was still much inertia operation from the 90s when China was let in to the global "operating system" at large without having to pay in much (politically wise) to those that created it....because of wall street greed, certain operating assumptions and expectations and reward for China for doing its side of 20+ years to be a major thorn in USSR side during the mid and final phases of cold war.

Now that model is basically crunching up to the ceiling as the LRAD (GDP potential) comes ever more into view for the global economy at large (i.e its velocity not being enough to overcome certain mounting inelasticities present in the system)....so there is going to be inevitable major dispensation at pressure points.

The model's initial conditions don't apply anymore, they aren't even really remarked and analysed much anymore (and in fact a lot of them are soundly disproven as there was no real political change inside China that was promised by the early western proponents as the long term expectation for higher wealth)....rather the whole conversation and debate has shifted drastically by the inelasticities that are building up and exerting counter pressure.
 
This op-ed reminds me of the many dire predictions about the U.S. economy I have seen over the years. They have been good for laughs. Now, it's fashionable to predict Chinese demise as well. But, decade after decade both countries keep on marching ahead of everyone else. China's meteoric rise given the length and height of its expansion only points to likelihood of something deep structurally which benefits all. Therefore, no, we are not likely to see either the US or China suddenly crash no matter who says what.

Here is why:
1. The assumption the writer makes: His unspoken assumptions is that China wants to be the police man of the world and take over this role from the US. No, they do not. Even POTUS wants to get rid of this burden as it's not cheap. China just wants to be free from encroachments of the MNCs (The New East India co.) originating from places not friendly to them and hybrid war funded by NGOs; so, they can have a seat on the table as an equal. Even India has been wary of the NGOs and MNCs for decades including its restrictions of Amazon as being the latest example. Chinese have worked hard for this one thing and they don't have to "win it all" to meet their objectives of being treated fairly as part of the existing world order; neither do they want to be the USSR. They have done more than enough to earn the respect and may be open to an offer which treats them equally and does not ask them to constrain their own growth.

2. The points provided to boost the OP's case are strong, pointing to some of China's weaknesses even if they are one-sided and ignore China ability to "manipulate" many levers within China to meet its sole objective of being free. Let's look at the OPs points one by one for their accuracy:
i. BRI is Neo-colonialism. China is saying it wants to create a win-win situation. This is probably true. USA also did something similar as a rising power against Great Britain in the early 1800: promising to create a win-win relationships in exchange for friendships. Many aspects of BRI are win-win. However, the Chinese companies are very cut throat and focused on profitability; they are also backed by their government. This gives BRI a tinge of Neo-colonialism. At the same time they have offered to address such concerns unlike their competition. This means countries receiving BRI investments will have to learn to do their own homework: prioritize projects and negotiate the price down. China may need them as much as they need China to reduce its dependence upon the currently Rich countries as the writer points out.
ii. The Rich countries are coalescing into a united front against China: The writer does not quantify nor provide trends which shows slowdown in activity with China on the whole. We are only left to ponder examples of constraining Huawei, China Mobile and others. In this case both parties will lose; MNCs also risk losing access to a large and fast growing middle class in China. So far investment in China is only increasing as it is containing the virus. Remember, China does not need to "win it all" to meet her objective of being free and be treated equally. Some of their tech is as much as two generations behind but they will close the gap or at least be "good enough".
iii. Article 34 is undemocratic: I am not up to speed on HK's internal politics but UK had a similar ban on protests against Queen's rule by HK residents. External interference does not leave China much choice and it's opting for stability. It's noteworthy of lack of similar coverage of Kashmir's lock-down which is far worse of a humanitarian disaster going on one-year. For afar, China seems very cohesive. Even the HK and Taiwanese immigrants I know well, point out the false hype in the media.
iv. China is not sufficiently developed: This could be a real Achilles-heel for China. The writer points out China's own assessment of exhaustion of "low hanging fruits" but does not provide any metrics on the next level activities in China or why such a gap is insurmountable other than China being undemocratic. Being a one-party rule hasn't stopped China so far and has been noted to be a reason of their success where India is pointed to having failed. USSR succeeded in high-tech such as engines while being fully communist and autocratic. Remember unlike the former USSR, China does not have a competing world order to build so it has less of a burden of lifting up allies; instead, it's in a co-dependent relationship with the Rich. Anecdotal reading of the current news shows China continuing to advance in aerospace, passenger planes and electrical cars industires. Perhaps China's Vision 2025 will adequately address the gaps. But, such a possibility is not adequately addressed by the OP.
v. China needs unfettered global access: While this is another weakness; this needs to be looked at in terms of the three divisions of the current global economy. Industrial: China is not likely to experience a wholesale blockage due to risk of supply chain disruptions and other MNCs also losing out to China's growing market anytime soon. In-fact luxury brands and Teslas of the world are counting on China for future growth. Unlike Indians, many Chinese like to spend and show-off. Internet: The OP talks about the internet decoupling of apps as one such implementation. This will be the one area where we see the cleanest break and creation of two Internets. China would lose more here in the long term because the innovations it provided for the marketplace could be most easily copied (such as TikTok's) without as much apparent risk as comes with decoupling of the supply chain. Apparent risk is loss of jobs by TikTok in India. Real loss is hidden: loss of investments in the startup scene provided by Chinese internet companies over the next couple of decades of millions of dollars. Financial decoupling: Financial market access is another area for decoupling but the OP didn't go into. Complete financial decoupling will cause Rich investors to miss out on Chinese innovation and hard work so the likelihood of such decoupling is low.
vi. China is aging and workforce is expected to shrink by 200M over 30 years. This seems to be another Achilles heel because of such a huge burden when you have to provide for them. But, the aging of the population is not even across the country and was probably planned that way. Also, 30 years is a long time if they wanted they could add just 100 millions additional population of working age in a country of 1.3B+ by 2050. Barring that, friendly BRI countries can be leveraged as fall back to continue the benefits which come with China centered supply-chain. BRI creates a buffer and spreads risk for China in addition to other benefits because they are business deals and not military alliances. Aging population may also cap the rise of China's mix of some economic metrics but this may make them less threatening and lead to an accommodation.

3. What the author misses: First is China has shown the ability of relentless pursuit of their key objective because their deep state cares about the nation and not the MNCs. If they make a mistake, they can get back on their feet pretty quickly just like the US does but with less drama due to one party control. Second, with Covid-19 thrashing world economies, China's growth is going to be the key driver of friendships. China's continuous growth offers a buffer for friends although not as much in the near term until Covid-19's impact to China itself is addressed. Third, BRI investments in foreign countries is China's way to create the circumstances to help it consolidate its gains. And, a win-win investment is always welcome especially in a coming slow down if some predictions are right.

My prediction: since China is not interested in upsetting the existing world order, just to be considered an equal, the Rich countries will come to an accommodation with China before the decade is out and increase their relationship even more than they do today.

What should other countries do: Learn from China on their focus and hard work. Keep the two poles happy enough but meet their own objectives. Stay away from the hype in what will likely be a temporary battle before world's focus shifts elsewhere when the Rich realize it's a fait accompli and dive into PARTY!!
A very very comprehensive write up and made a lot of very valid points. Well done. A lot of the argument from OP are totally expected from someone with a superficial understanding of political economy. I largely agree with your prediction but I am less optimistic about timeline that rich countries will start to accommodate China by the end of this decade.

By 2030, China is projected to be of similar size to US in terms of nominal GDP. It will be the point where the struggle between the two powers reaches its peak. Key non Anglo Saxon European countries like Germany, France, Italy, Spain etc will play pragmatically and forge their tie with China on the economical front. US and it’s AS partners will try to slow the process for sure. To be able to make US truly become accommodating to China’s rise, China needs to be at about twice the size of US in terms of GDP, which will likely to be reached by 2050.

The prediction above bases on a fundamental assumption- China will continue its growth trajectory and will dethrone Western countries US in particular in economical and technological domains that they have dominated for the last 300 years. There are 3 fundamental elements underpinning this growth projection in Chinese economy: economy of scale and an unified political system.

Economy of Scale: capitalism is a form of production and everything is about the capability of producing goods at industry scale. Economy of Scale is the very same elements that lead US surpass UK in the second half of 19th century. For manufacturing, US is 10x of UK in size with similar technology and cost of input, which provided it great efficiency gain and reduce the cost of production massively. UK was in no position to compete and progressively it lost its market. China is in a certain way a bigger version of US. Again with similar technology and similar cost of input (assuming the labor cost will be similar in the future), China in a whole will be able to produce things at much lower cost with the size of the manufacturing. It will gradually push US products out the market, just like how US push UK out of the market. China has already occupied the low to middle tier industrial sectors and push upward strongly. US and Western countries are still holding their strongholds in the high end manufacturing but China is also busy upgrading its industry to close the technological gap. The economy of scale guarantees that China will outproduce them and crash the premium that supported high living standard in the developed countries have enjoyed once the technological gap is closed. This is why they reacted so strongly and emotionally against MIC 2025 strategy.

Unified political system: An unified political system is a key founding stone that supported China’s growth over the last 4 decades and will continue to play central role in the decades to come. It ensures a stable governance and consistent policies. A gargantuan project like BRI requires a unified and stable system to implement. Many believe that democracy is the cause of western countries being prosperous and developed. To the contrary, these two things are parallel concepts. It is a great system to maintain status quo but may not be conductive to the process of development.
 
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It would mean much more if it operationalises and gains crediblity with its own currency.

But it doesn't (and it is quite telling why).....and continues to piggyback on USD (but never paid into it institutionally)....this is a huge problem now for them.

A 4 billion dollar level gold ponzi scam has already been unearthed recently....to give some idea of the cascade now as more chips get called when you are not the final issuing authority (in cold hard terms, with established accepted norms by significant others) of your national interest.



Autistic much?

Going into further discussion about the points you raise above may cross some red lines about China on this forum, so it is best to let this go, save for the observation that China is entitled to pursue its national interests as it sees fit, just like all other countries.
 
Going into further discussion about the points you raise above may cross some red lines about China on this forum, so it is best to let this go, save for the observation that China is entitled to pursue its national interests as it sees fit, just like all other countries.

Always enjoy your posts because they make me think even if I wish you weren't correct but I know you mean them sincerely.

Now, I am curious. I hope you don't get a mark against you for your opinion as long as it is constructive. Go ahead and let me know what you're thinking. If I were to guess what you may be alluding to I would say yes you're correct and that puzzle needs to be solved next but they wouldn't have been helped to get to where they are without it. And, helped they were--like India is being. Also, that is why the current "Supreme" is in the driver's seat for the foreseeable future: the max benefits flows to them. Happy to learn what you are really referring to and what should they have done differently in your opinion?
 
I hope you don't get a mark against you for your opinion as long as it is constructive.

I'd rather not risk it in the present environment.

On topic, China's increasing economic muscle with increase its international influence as well, of course. How far its internal political structure will be able to capitalize on it remains to be seen.
 
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