Kashmir's Young Rebels

[That Guy]

In any insurgency, the ideological component is not equally shared by all members of the group. There are very few dedicated individuals who are committed to their ideology whereas most others, particularly foot soldiers are the soldiers of convenience. They are not there because they are ardent supporters of the ideology but because they are opportunists who see a valid opportunity to stage a power grab. A case in point can be Iraq where in a matter of half a decade, elements belonging to the secular Ba'ath Party had pulled a volte-face and allied themselves with the IS whose ideology is no where near that of the Ba'athists. So what would one considered to have changed during this period? Nothing but the nature of the opportunity, with the defeated Ba'ath Party being put out of commission and its most dedicated cadres being taken out, the opportunity of grabbing power now rested with the IS and those left behind were all too keen to hitch a ride.
So that explains how I view ideology as merely a vehicle that members of the group might not necessarily be attached to as ardently as they might claim. Now for the question of violence, it is the refuge of the weak, the more threatened a group becomes, the more likely they are to engage in attacks that are meant to horrify and stun the world even if it comes at the expense of the ideology and identity of the group because at such a critical stage, survival becomes the first priority. A case in point would be the TTP that has fallen on very hard times in particular, from attacking the GHQ, Kamra and Mehran Base in well planned and flawlessly executed precision raids, they have been relegated to shooting up a school full of unarmed children, attacking volleyball matches and the like. Their ideology has also undergone a massive change during this point in their history in line with the change in their tactics, from identifying themselves as the harbingers of Islam and the seeds of the global caliphate, they have revised their role to the defenders of tribals against a "Punjabi" army. When they saw their wider appeal faltering, the TTP moved to consolidate their support within their core group, the tribal pukhtuns and all of a sudden from Islamic warriors who were beyond ethnicity and creed, they became the defenders of tribal pukhtuns which once again leads me to my first point that ideology and identity for such groups is fluid.

This is my humble assessment, I hope I have done a fair amount of justice to the topic though I feel that @Irfan Baloch and @Horus will be more suited to address this issue because they possess significant understanding of the paradigms of counter insurgency. @That Guy, @Oscar and @Arsalan are also few of my favourite posters so I would like them to offer their comments as well.

Thanks.

Not much to add to what you said. Well written.

You van pretty much find your idea in almost all insurgencies, from FARC in Columbia, to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

 

[Arsalan]

In any insurgency, the ideological component is not equally shared by all members of the group. There are very few dedicated individuals who are committed to their ideology whereas most others, particularly foot soldiers are the soldiers of convenience. They are not there because they are ardent supporters of the ideology but because they are opportunists who see a valid opportunity to stage a power grab. A case in point can be Iraq where in a matter of half a decade, elements belonging to the secular Ba'ath Party had pulled a volte-face and allied themselves with the IS whose ideology is no where near that of the Ba'athists. So what would one considered to have changed during this period? Nothing but the nature of the opportunity, with the defeated Ba'ath Party being put out of commission and its most dedicated cadres being taken out, the opportunity of grabbing power now rested with the IS and those left behind were all too keen to hitch a ride.

So that explains how I view ideology as merely a vehicle that members of the group might not necessarily be attached to as ardently as they might claim. Now for the question of violence, it is the refuge of the weak, the more threatened a group becomes, the more likely they are to engage in attacks that are meant to horrify and stun the world even if it comes at the expense of the ideology and identity of the group because at such a critical stage, survival becomes the first priority. A case in point would be the TTP that has fallen on very hard times in particular, from attacking the GHQ, Kamra and Mehran Base in well planned and flawlessly executed precision raids, they have been relegated to shooting up a school full of unarmed children, attacking volleyball matches and the like. Their ideology has also undergone a massive change during this point in their history in line with the change in their tactics, from identifying themselves as the harbingers of Islam and the seeds of the global caliphate, they have revised their role to the defenders of tribals against a "Punjabi" army. When they saw their wider appeal faltering, the TTP moved to consolidate their support within their core group, the tribal pukhtuns and all of a sudden from Islamic warriors who were beyond ethnicity and creed, they became the defenders of tribal pukhtuns which once again leads me to my first point that ideology and identity for such groups is fluid.


This is my humble assessment, I hope I have done a fair amount of justice to the topic though I feel that @Irfan Baloch and @Horus will be more suited to address this issue because they possess significant understanding of the paradigms of counter insurgency. @That Guy, @Oscar and @Arsalan are also few of my favourite posters so I would like them to offer their comments as well.


Thanks.

I don't think sir there is much of anything that needs to be added, yourself and all other posters you have mentioned have pretty much summed it up. AND, it was all very interesting to read. There however is one point that i guess you missed, i will like to mention that.

Addressing the type of people in an insurgency, you correctly identified those who strictly adhere to the ideology behind that insurgency and the second type who are opportunists who are there only for power grab. However, i do think there is a third very important group, the group of fools who have been brainwashed in the name of religion, ethnicity or any number of reasons. It is these people who form the bulk of the movement's force and number. Driven by false sense of righteous these are among the most fieriest warriors and devoted soldiers. Now the problem is that these are the most difficult men to deal with by force. They are so driven, by the false sense of righteous that the make for very devoted soldiers. However, while they are among the most difficult to deal with, they are amongst the easiest to stop for being made to begin with. Proper education, better communication equal rights and opportunities will prevent these people from joining any terrorist organizations or be part of insurgencies. A correct sense of right and wrong from the point of view of the country they are national of will prevent them for false sense of righteous that the insurgent organizations will try to feed into these men through brain washing.

While dealing with the hard cores in job of security forces, it is the job of local administration and government to prevent these soft radical brain washed type from happening in the first place. Again, educations, equal rights and opportunities will be the key.

With the ongoing operation against terrorists and the reported success stories we get to hear time to time, it is far from over. The army, as expected Is doing an excellent job is wiping out the miscreants, destroying there hide out and disrupting the supply chains (for arms, money and recruits). However these efforts are mostly against the culprits that we can see, the brain washed ones are more mixed into general population and difficult to locate. Also army cannot annihilate the whole place, it is our own country, our land and our own people. This is where the local administration and government will need to step up. The areas that have been cleared by army need immediate reforms. The supposedly cleared areas may still have a large number of these brain washed men, they are required to be handled carefully. The government should speed up its efforts of development in these areas. We keep on blaming the porous border but have we ever though what we have done our self? NOTHING! The tribal areas have no access to many of the basic necessities of life. This need to be changed. The areas should have better access to the rest of the country, efforts to develop local small industry are required. Education need to be made common and people need to be given equal rights and opportunities, even better ones as this is an area a mistake that we need to put in extra effort to correct now. Army cannot do this, they should not be expected to do this. It is job of the government and a very important one at that. Unless government do not comes in and actively address the issues of these areas, all the good work of army will be/can be undone in months. All it will take for the enemy will be to slip in a few dozen of new commanders and the brain washed recruits who no better than to believe in those false truths will be available to join that insurgency and it will start all over again.