Kashmir : The History of Exploitation During the Dogra Rule

[Joe Shearer]

You know, I blame the Kashmiris. This supposed "peacefulness" hasn't gotten our people anywhere. Look at the Gilgitis and Baltis. Look at what they did the first chance they got. While we sat in our houses weighing promises at the mercy of foreign invaders. Read William Brown's accounts on the rebellion, we Kashmiris should envy them.

In a sense, a sense I deplore but admit, you should have acted clearly then. The Mirpuris were clear. They took to arms. The Gilgitis were clear; they, too, took to arms. The people of Baltistan and the people of the Vale were not clear. They actually leaned towards the Congress. Now what do you expect India to do when these occur:

1. The Maharaja finally makes up his mind for India;
2. The leading politician, one close to Nehru and even to Gandhi, and to Bacha Khan, is strongly pro-Congress, and changes his party name from the Muslim Conference to the National Conference;
3. There was a hideous attack on the state, distinct from the rebellion in Mirpur and the mutiny in Gilgit;
4. Jammu was fanatically pro-India;
5. Ladakh was neutral and helpless, like Baltistan.

Look at it from the Indian point of view for a moment.

 

[Zibago]

In a sense, a sense I deplore but admit, you should have acted clearly then. The Mirpuris were clear. They took to arms. The Gilgitis were clear; they, too, took to arms. The people of Baltistan and the people of the Vale were not clear. They actually leaned towards the Congress. Now what do you expect India to do when these occur:

1. The Maharaja finally makes up his mind for India;
2. The leading politician, one close to Nehru and even to Gandhi, and to Bacha Khan, is strongly pro-Congress, and changes his party name from the Muslim Conference to the National Conference;
3. There was a hideous attack on the state, distinct from the rebellion in Mirpur and the mutiny in Gilgit;
4. Jammu was fanatically pro-India;
5. Ladakh was neutral and helpless, like Baltistan.

Look at it from the Indian point of view for a moment.

Rebellion started from Poonch not Mirpur and he is from Neelum(whifh borders Baramulla ) the political dynamics there were a bit different from Southern regions(which had huge number of fighters who were previously in the Colonial forces in large numbers)
Interestingly Mirpur,Kotli,Bhimber belt had a bigger hindu minority than Muzzafarabad,Neelum belt

 

[Joe Shearer]

Rebellion started from Poonch not Mirpur and he is from Neelum(whifh borders Baramulla ) the political dynamics there were a bit different from Southern regions(which had huge number of fighters who were previously in the Colonial forces in large numbers)
Interestingly Mirpur,Kotli,Bhimber belt had a bigger hindu minority than Muzzafarabad,Neelum belt

Tell me more. I am fascinated. At the end of the day, I may approach you for permission to reproduce some of it. Actually, I wanted to do an oral history, but I'll never be allowed in.

Rebellion started from Poonch not Mirpur and he is from Neelum(whifh borders Baramulla ) the political dynamics there were a bit different from Southern regions(which had huge number of fighters who were previously in the Colonial forces in large numbers)
Interestingly Mirpur,Kotli,Bhimber belt had a bigger hindu minority than Muzzafarabad,Neelum belt

I read your post with more attention, and quite agree. My record for those times was/is Christopher Snedden. If you haven't already read him, beg, borrow or steal a copy, or if you have a contact in the Gulf, send me the address and I'll photocopy and mail you a photocopied version. It's amazing.

He talks about the martial Sudans of Sudnoti, and how Poonch fell, and how it spread to Mirpur, and to Kotli and Bhimber, and the carnage that followed, and was repeated at Rajauri, worse, he says, proportionately than at Baramula later. He also talks, not in so much detail, about the Muzaffarabad region and up the Neelum Valley.

Some more stuff I got from poring through fragmentary accounts here and there. I would so like to write a trustworthy military history, but that means around 15 or 20,000 worth of books, and that is out of reach just at the moment.Besides much of the useful material is in Pakistan only, and some part of it in Urdu. Looks like I have to be multi-lingual to do any good. WAJsal is a very good source for events up north in Gilgit, and, of course, Brown wrote about his own 'derring-do' (I hate Brown! sorry, can't help that) with Ibex Force and - what was the other? - Tiger Force?

Leaving aside the bitter record of civil affray, ambush and revolt, of mutiny, rape and loot, and the tactical cut, thrust and parry in the ravines and valleys, the military history of the times, partly recorded, is stirring. Col. Rai dying at the head of his troops, the defence of the Srinagar airport periphery, the dislodging of the artillery pieces which commanded Zoji La with the help of dismantled Stuart tanks flown in by plane and re-assembled outside Srinagar, Bevoor's call for volunteers for a forlorn hope and the two Garhwali kids who volunteered, and led a small detachment of (also volunteer) Gorkhas to defend an undefended Leh, the defence of Kargil, the fall of Kargil and the re-capture of Kargil, the story of Brigadier Usman on whose head the PA had put a bounty, after failing to win him over (just for comparison, he was commanding fighting troops as a Brigadier, and Manekshaw, badly shot up as a Company Commander, was DMO; a tussle for the top job would have been touch and go) - I could go on and on.

I wish I was rich and could do this.

 

[Kambojaric]

You know, I blame the Kashmiris. This supposed "peacefulness" hasn't gotten our people anywhere. Look at the Gilgitis and Baltis. Look at what they did the first chance they got. While we sat in our houses weighing promises at the mercy of foreign invaders. Read William Brown's accounts on the rebellion, we Kashmiris should envy them.

I would say the Kashmiris were duped by Abdullah and his personal friendship with Nehru. Abdullah was vehemently anti Pakistan although later on in life his views became more mild (probably years languishing in Indians jail taught him that when it came to Realpolitik, Nehru was just as much his friend as Jinnah). He then tried to make up for his mistakes but by then it was too late. However Kashmiris for some reason adored him and were ready to follow him in which ever direction he led them. In contrast the Gilgit Baltistanis and Azad Kashmiris took matters into their own hands. One could however also argue that these latter two had significant groups of soldiers (both ex and serving) living amongst them. The British recruited in large numbers from the Hindko belt and as far up as Mirpur/Poonch. The Gilgit scouts similarly was made up of local recruits. As far as I know, the same cannot be said for the valley. The Dogra army was dominated by Hindu and Sikh Rajputs from Jammu, and the Muslims of the valley had a negligible presence in it.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I would say the Kashmiris were duped by Abdullah and his personal friendship with Nehru. Abdullah was vehemently anti Pakistan although later on in life his views became more mild (probably years languishing in Indians jail taught him that when it came to Realpolitik, Nehru was just as much his friend as Jinnah). He then tried to make up for his mistakes but by then it was too late. However Kashmiris for some reason adored him and were ready to follow him in which ever direction he led them. In contrast the Gilgit Baltistanis and Azad Kashmiris took matters into their own hands. One could however also argue that these latter two had significant groups of soldiers (both ex and serving) living amongst them. The British recruited in large numbers from the Hindko belt and as far up as Mirpur/Poonch. The Gilgit scouts similarly was made up of local recruits. As far as I know, the same cannot be said for the valley and its valley. The Dogra army was dominated by Hindu and Sikh Rajputs from Jammu, and the Muslims of the valley had a negligible presence in it.

I agree more or less with your points, except that by 1952/53, Sheikh Sahib was getting a little restless and wanted a solution, not the frozen in place stasis that seemed to suit both Pakistan and India at that time. When he went off to Pakistan without the support of Nehru, and tried to broker a deal, unsuccessful though it was, that had a fatal effect on Nehru's ego. By then, both Jinnah and Patel had passed away; Nehru was almost unstoppable.

About the Kashmiris: they were very largely enthralled by him, but it was not unanimous. On one occasion, Sheikh Sahib's opponents lined the banks of the canal, and as the Sheikh, Nehru and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan passed, they turned, and men facing forward, women facing away, flipped up their pherans. Bacha Khan roared with laughter, but Nehru was not amused and Sheikh Sahib was flustered.

 

[Kambojaric]

I agree more or less with your points, except that by 1952/53, Sheikh Sahib was getting a little restless and wanted a solution, not the frozen in place stasis that seemed to suit both Pakistan and India at that time. When he went off to Pakistan without the support of Nehru, and tried to broker a deal, unsuccessful though it was, that had a fatal effect on Nehru's ego. By then, both Jinnah and Patel had passed away; Nehru was almost unstoppable.

About the Kashmiris: they were very largely enthralled by him, but it was not unanimous. On one occasion, Sheikh Sahib's opponents lined the banks of the canal, and as the Sheikh, Nehru and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan passed, they turned, and men facing forward, women facing away, flipped up their pherans. Bacha Khan roared with laughter, but Nehru was not amused and Sheikh Sahib was flustered.

Do you think Abdullah was unsure as to what he meant by Azadi? That is certainly the impression I got from the little I have read about him. At one point Azadi seems to mean autonomy within an independent India but then increasingly post independence it seems to mean complete independence from India. A lack of clarity with regards to what his goal was, may also have resulted in his successive failures. From the Pakistani pov he was a man beset by personal ambition it seems, and he dragged down the rest of the valley with himself.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Do you think Abdullah was unsure as to what he meant by Azadi? That is certainly the impression I got from the little I have read about him. At one point Azadi seems to mean autonomy within an independent India but then increasingly post independence it seems to mean complete independence from India. A lack of clarity with regards to what his goal was, may also have resulted in his successive failures. From the Pakistani pov he was a man beset by personal ambition it seems, and he dragged down the valley with himself.

Abdullah was clear that he wanted complete autonomy except for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, as the Maharaja had already structured matters. Within this, he wanted to have a role insofar as coaxing Pakistan to get out of Mirpur and Gilgit were concerned. Remember that the politicians in "Azad Kashmir" were all very well known to him and that the Muslim Conference was part of the National Conference that had broken away and gone back to the old name.

It was this muddling up a straightforward Article 370 autonomy, without Article 370, with his dabbling in pan-Kashmir issues that aroused Nehru's paranoia. In any case, there was a significant school of thought within the Indian administration, then as much as now, which thought that since Article 370 had remained frozen in space and time, due to the incredible bungle by the J&K Constituent Assembly, it was justifiable to slide changes past it; they used the instrument of a one-time change in the relationship, which was agreed by both sides, to keep tampering with the J&K Constitution. Dr. Rajendra Prasad pointed out the totally undesirable nature and suspect legality of this subterfuge, but finally gave up when he found he was quite alone.

I feel that the assessment of his being beset by personal ambition is highly unfair. He was in a maelstrom of conflicting policies and conflicting personalities, and simply did not have the authority or power to cope with these, resist these and ultimately dominate these. Consider that he was caught between Nehru, Jinnah, Patel, Liaqat Ali, Ananthaswamy Ayyangar on the constitutional front, and his own minions, some of whom were ready to shop him anyway.

This Pakistani pov is quite horrendously lopsided. Abdullah had wrested what few other states-level politicians had done (states-level as in Indian states, not as in Indian provinces - the difference was huge), and that was power from the ruler. None of us today, and especially not Pakistani observers, might understand what an epic battle that had been, right from 1931, and none of us can even understand what a nest of vipers surrounded him as he tried to make a go of a Kashmir state governed by the people. My sardonic aside was intended to remind all of us that Abdullah had far, far more power than anyone outside the central Dominion governments of India and Pakistan, until he was hurled from the throne and jailed. It was his failure to complete his dream and be ruler of all Kashmir that killed him and his career.