Sir, I know what I am talking about. Let me explain:
The Indians claim that the Instrument of Accession was signed by Mahrajah Hari Singh on 26th October 1947, in which the Mahrajah agreed to accede to India in return for military assistance to put down the popular rebellion against him, seen at that time as an invasion by tribesmen from neighbouring Pakistan. The details of the accession were worked out between the Kashmiri Prime Minister, MC Mahajan and the Indian official, VP Menon, in Dehli. However, there are serious doubts about the signing of the document. Alastair Lamb (in his book, Kashmir - A disputed legacy 1846-1990) points out that the Instrument of Accession could not have been signed by the Mahrajah on 26th October as he was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350 Km).
Lamb is wrong.
There is an eyewitness account by Field Marshal Manekshaw who was then the DMO of the protracted meeting through the day on the 26th October. The Maharaja and his entourage were getting ready for departure to Jammu. On obtaining the signature, Manekshaw and Menon left for the airport and the Maharaja left for Jammu.
I suggest that you rely on an eye-witness rather than Lamb's bilious attempt to justify Pakistani chicanery.
There is no evidence to suggest that a meeting or communication of any kind took place on 26th October 1947.
Are you looking for a minutes of the meeting? It is there in the form of the Instrument of Accession and of the detailed covering letter, both dated the 26th.
In fact it was on 27th October 1947 that the Mahrajah was informed by his MC Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar), the the Instrument of Accession had already been negotiated in Dehli. The Mahrajah did not in fact sign the Instrument of Accession, if at all, until 27th October 1947.
Since V. P. Menon was in attendance at the meeting in Delhi, presided over by Mountbatten, on the 27th morning, this is not a very water-tight story.
This sheds doubts on the actions of the Indian regime.
Only because Pakistan desperately seeks a shred of legitimacy in the whole sandbagging operation that it attempted.
Some Indian troops had already arrived and secured Srinagar airfield during the middle of October 1947.
There was not a single Indian soldier in Jammu and Kashmir before the 26th of October, and the soldier present on that date was Manekshaw. There were ORs guarding the aircraft and the pilot and flight crew.
This canard is based on another canard, that Patiala state forces were involved in the disturbances in west Jammu.
On 26th October 1947, a further massive airlift brought thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir - BEFORE the signing of the Accession.
This massive airlift, the first effort to bring in Indian troops, since India had already set signing of the Instrument of Accession as a necessary preliminary, was organised by Manekshaw, at the direct order of Patel. At the meeting, when Nehru went off into a philosophical speech, he was abruptly interrupted by Patel, who asked,"Jawaharlal, do you want to help Kashmir or not?" Nehru replied,"Yes", upon which Patel turned to Manekshaw and told him,"You have your orders."
It is sad to see you moving heaven and earth to bring some figment of propriety to Pakistan's actions by pretending that nothing happened, and by relying on a single, jaundiced British source, against an eye-witness account.
Therefore, this situation begs the question: would the Mahrajah have signed the Instrument of Accession had the Indian troops not been on Kashmiri soil?
This begs the counter-question: considering that by then Azad Kashmir, and Poonch, and Rajouri had broken away, what difference would your proposed presence of Indian troops on Kashmiri soil have made? If he was intimidated by military presence, which has been disproved, would he not be intimidated by the military presence only two days march away, at Muzzafarabad? Further, the presence of Pakistani infiltrators, and of officers of the PA, at Muzzafarabad has been attested by Pakistani sources themselves. Their names and approximate numbers are known. Can you cite any evidence that any unit of the Indian Army was present on the 26th (other than those on Manekshaw's team)?
I admire your repeated kite-flying. The weather is adverse.
Further shedding doubt on the treaty`s validity, in 1995 Indian authorities claimed that the original copy of the treaty (letter of accession) was either stolen or lost.
You mean that until then, the copy, that was kept on display, was valid, and in 1995, it was no longer valid? You mean that the numerous copies of the original are also fake?
Can we move away from the childish?
The Instrument of Accession" was neither presented to the United Nations nor to Pakistan. And it is not registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Hence India cannot invoke the treaty before any organ of the United Nations.
The sovereign, even after the Instrument of Accession, with regard to all matters but Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, was Maharaja Hari Singh. If the document of accession was faulty, or non-existent, as you have tried to show, then the sovereignty defaulted in any case to the Maharaja in all respects. So what then is your problem?
Regarding the UN, there was no obligation, then or later, to lodge internal documents with the UN. There were 561 princely states, including the states of Junagadh and Hyderabad, over which Pakistan and Hyderabad raised disputes. Except for the two states of Junagadh and Hyderabad, all the other instruments have never been filed. What is the implication? That these are invalid? Or is it that since there was a reference to the UN, these should have been filed? If so, then there is a serious question: please read this following bit carefully.
The UN passed a recommendatory resolution asking for a ceasefire. It is this that is the basis for all further discussion. The UN did not dispute the accession. The UN merely took up India's own decision to hold a plebiscite and affirmed it. At every point thereafter, the UN scrupulously instructed India to manage affairs, and asked that Pakistan should withdraw her troops. It was that signal failure that wrecked all further movement.
As for why no one questioned the authenticity of the accession, the simple reason was that there was no need to question the authenticity of the Instrument of Accession as it had lost all its importance and relevance once the Security Council passed Resolutions that established self-determination as the governing principal for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute and when India and Pakistan accepted those resolutions thus endorsing a binding agreement between India and Pakistan that a plebiscite would be held to decide the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan.
I am sorry but you are wrong. The UN did not pass resolutions that established self-determination as the governing principle for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It recommended the holding of the plebiscite in pursuance of the Indian decision to do so, and it recommended the vacation of the aggression by the Pakistani irregulars; at that time, Pakistan had categorically denied, as was done many years later at Kargil, that any regular soldiers were involved, and there was no specific mention in the earlier resolutions of the Pakistan Army.
It is difficult to understand how Pakistan's stand can be based on such scrupulous attention to detail when the country consistently denied, until the time that the Plebiscite Commission actually met, that there were any Pakistani, as distinct from Kashmiri, elements involved.
Jinnah met Mountbatten on Nov 1, 1947 and told him that Kashmir's accession to India "was not a bona fide one since it rested on fraud and violence." And since then, it has been Pakistan's official position. When Pakistan responded to Indian complain of aggression in the SC in Jan 1948, it maintained that it did not accept the accession as it was based on fraud and violence. A lot has been written on this subject by Pakistani authors (letters to UN, speeches and other official documents are also available) and I don't think that we need to go into more details. However, it is pertinent to mention here that charge (of aggression against Pakistan) and counter-charge ceased to be relevant the minute both sides agreed to the resolution of UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
Since Mountbatten was personally asked to work with the princes by the King, his response to this can only be imagined. He had personally written extensively to Hari Singh, asking him to make up his mind, and he was personally in conversation with that monarch. So we need not make too much of this initial resounding accusation.
Further, the act of aggression was addressed by the UN seeking vacation of Kashmir by all intruding elements; what, in your opinion, does that mean? Does it mean that these were holiday-makers whose idle fancies had turned to loot, rape and murder in Baramula?
There are, in fact, no material reasons to vitiate the tale of aggression and violence other than
- Alastair Lamb's account of the daily record of the 26th and the 27th of October, which was based on a late departure of the Maharaja from Srinagar, and on his ignorance of the meeting that had taken place already, at the palace in Srinagar, between Menon and Manekshaw on the one hand, and the Maharaja on the other;
- The wishful Pakistani speculation that there may have been Indian troops even earlier than the 26th, which turns out to be a figment of a cornered imagination;
- The wonderful story of the missing copy, which was never an issue while Mountbatten was alive (until 1979), or Hari Singh had not signed away his residual powers through the J&K Constitution to the State Assembly, notwithstanding the great to-do made about its contents and its precise form in all accounts, including Lamb and including every Pakistani commentator;
- The recent marvel of detective science whereby one Pakistani wizard pointed out that the Pakistan Army was not specifically mentioned as a body corporate in the resolution, and that therefore the withdrawal did not refer to it;
The Maharaja had no authority to sign the treaty, hence the Instrument of Accession can be considered without legal standing. The situation on the ground demonstrates that the Maharaja was hardly in control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Why should he have had no authority? He was still the sovereign. Even if, hypothetically, he had signed it in Buckingham Palace, he was still the sovereign and still the empowered party.
The situation on the ground on the 26th, as unfortunately you forgot in your haste, was that only western Jammu, now known as Azad Kashmir, was in armed rebellion; further armed elements had entered, and were in Baramula, having passed through Muzaffarabad; Gilgit was, on that date, indisputably in control; Baltistan was never in dispute and Ladakh was undisturbed. In the Vale, the representative party favoured union with India, and an Indian aim was to release him from his detention and put him in charge.
Hari Singh was in flight from the state capital, Srinigar.
After signing the accession,and on the way to his seat of power, Jammu.
What difference does that make?
And it is highly doubtful that the Maharaja could claim that his government had a reasonable chance of staying in power. Two days before the Maharaja signed his Instrument of Accession to India, the Poonch rebels and their tribesman-allies set up the Azad Kashmir government headquartered at Muzaffarabad. So at the time of the alleged accession, Kashmir was, in effect, divided into three distinct sectors: Azad Kashmir, "Legal" Kashmir and the Gilgit region. (Now GB)
It was precisely because he was under attack that he sought military intervention, and it was precisely in order to clear the legal position that the Government of India sought a legal foundation. And you really must do your homework about dates, before declaring so blithely that Gilgit was gone by then.
The Maharaja did NOT exercise sovereignty over Gilgit Region, which constituted one-third of Kashmir. By the 1890s, it was the British Agent at Gilgit who wielded the real authority there. In 1935, the British leased Gilgit from Kashmir for sixty years, but surrendered their lease on the eve of partition." In theory, sovereignty reverted to Kashmir, but the Maharaja was never able to make this sovereignty effective in any way.
Tch, tch, tch. You forget that prior to the 1890s, the Gilgit region had been physically conquered by the Dogra troops, and the British had at best an ancillary role to play, at times, not always. You forget that the British Agent wielded real authority over EVERY princely state in India. You forget that the very act of taking the territory of lease underlines the British understanding of the legal position of the Maharaja; they would not have leased it when they had easier options, which a study of the question of Berar might make clear to you.
[/quote]When the Maharaja sent a governor to Gilgit, the Gilgit Scouts imprisoned him and turned the territory over to Pakistan. In light of this fact, it is clear that the Maharaja did not perform the activities of a territorial sovereign in the Gilgit region. As such, the Maharaja had never exercised sovereignty over the region, and as per international law, could not transfer more rights than he possessed. Therefore, India did not receive the Gilgit region, now possessed by Pakistan, under the Instrument of Accession[/quote]
LOL.
The dates, dear Sir, the dates.
You also forget - every loyal and patriotic Pakistani forgets - that there was nothing to Pakistan but the territory carved out of British India by the Radcliffe Award, and the accession to that Dominion of a few states, Bahawalpur and Chitral and Swat and Kalat (conditionally) among them. There was no question, then or later, of any part of India choosing to become Pakistan. The plebiscite in the NWFP was due to the reluctance of the Congress Government in power to join Pakistan, although the only other alternative was to join Afghanistan, which would have blown a hole through British policy of a century. The plebiscite in Bengal was constituted of a vote by the elected assembly, to determine if a partition was desired.
No part of British India, the colony, or any princely state, had the right to join either Dominion. Their paths were set for them by law, the India Independence Act. You have to understand that questioning that law undermines the very basis of the creation of Pakistan as an independent Dominion. So there was no question of any part of any type of state taking decisions. These were conquered lands, and the determined law of the conqueror was the prevalent basis for the future independence.
Under International Law, A state can intentionally acquire sovereignty over any such territory that is not under the sovereignty of another state. The occupied territory must have, been terra nullius, without owner, and the occupation must have been real or "effective." ... Effective occupation occurs when there is an announced intention to acquire the territory, and actual settlement or occupation with the assertion of governmental authority has taken place.
J&K, by India, in other words? We choose to take our stand on the law, not on conquest.
As previously shown, after the British surrendered their lease on the eve of partition, the Gilgit region was a terra nullius.
On the contrary, as a land-owner you should be particularly sensitive to the condition of a reversionary lease.
At the time of accession, under the August 1947 Standstill Agreement, Pakistan alone was responsible for administering services in Kashmir such as the post, telegraph and railways. These services were the beginning of Pakistan's establishment of government authority over the region. This process was completed after the territory was transferred to Pakistan by the Gilgit Scouts. Since this time, Pakistan has claimed the Gilgit region, formerly a terra nullius, as part of its territory, keeping it beyond the control of the Azad Kashmir authorities and making it an integral part of Pakistan. In doing so, Pakistan has established governmental control sufficient to provide security to life and property. Thus, Pakistan effectively occupies the Gilgit region to the exclusion of India.
I put it to you that your desires have overtaken your legal understanding.
The Standstill Agreement did not constitute a unique Pakistani responsibility, contrary to your statement that it was Pakistan alone. It was Pakistan alone because India asked for a clearcut decision, not this postponement without a date. So your interpretation that it was a unique assertion of Pakistani right falls down.
You say that the territory of Gilgit was transferred by the Gilgit Scouts to Pakistan. Does that sound normal to you? Do you imagine that any land transferred on lease to the Chinese government by the administration of Pakistan can then be returned to Pakistan, and in the interval, before Pakistani administrators return to their positions, the frontier constabulary can transfer the territory to, say, Afghanistan, on the ground that for a few hours, it was terra nullius?
Incidentally, terra nullius is land over which no government has earlier exercised sovereignty, or over which a government has either explicitly or implicitly relinquished authority. This has to be understood properly. Annexing a neighbouring country's land is not an annexation of terra nullius; it is rank aggression. The neighbour needs to have explicitly given up sovereignty or implicitly given up sovereignty. Neither explicitly nor implicitly did the Maharaja give up sovereignty. Occupying his offices and displacing his administrators by force do not constitute an implicit giving up of sovereignty. Even the J&K State Assembly is constituted with provision for delegates from Gilgit to join at a later date, so there was no implicit object in the mind of the sovereign; it was territory grabbed from him.
Pakistan's claim on GB is legally valid and justified. However, if needed, Pakistan will be ready to hold a referendum in GB as well.
I note your obfuscation by including Baltistan, never under British lease, but conquered by the columns of the Gilgit Scouts and the state forces of Chitral, first, through besieging and conquering Skardu (not an implicit surrender of sovereignty), Kargil and an attempted conquest of Leh.
Sir, a lot can be said here, but all I would say is : Best of Luck with that !!
While I must congratulate you on a valiant effort, I regret that you have so little to fight with. The basic case is weak. It is based on an emotional desire to command all Muslim resident areas, and to go above and beyond the terms of partition. In other words, to second-guess partition, itself agreed to by the Congress only due to what they saw as the intransigence of the Muslim League during the period of joint government of the Dominion. There is little, actually no legal foundation for what is sought. Just desire.
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-19-The Hyderabad question.pdf
Khanate of Kalat was just a princely state in Baluchistan. You can not use Kalat and Baluchistan interchangeably. Pakistan's breach of treaty obligations ? .. Baluchistan States Union (Kalat, Kharan, Las Bela and Makran) and the Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan) were merged with all the remaining provinces and princely states in other parts of Pakistan to form the province of West Pakistan in 1955. Ahmad Yar Khan (the Khan of Kalat) who signed the
instrument of accession died in 1979. He could have taken the issue to the UN if he wanted. But he didn't.
That does not extinguish his rights. Any more than India's reference to the UN extinguished India's underlying rights and substituted them by the thinking of various delegates deputed to look into the matter by the UN.
