Kargil War 1999 - A Dedication

[Areesh]

what more of a simple answer are you looking for areesh, i stated the objectives and whether they were achieved or not. What more would you like me to state ?

Humm. Huh OK coming to your primary objective.

Primary Objective - Win back all territory and send the terrorist and the Pakistani army back into Pakistan - Achieved

Winning back all the territory was your primary objective. Then what is this?

 

[Ammyy]

So you won the kargil war because you take back all the posts that Pakistan won in the war and secure the national highway. Right?

Is this the reason you claim about "victory" in Kargil War.

NO Pakistam win

You send your soidiers who got kick on their back side and ran towards their country only they win

 

[Dash]

I thought of posting a big post here....But after reading all the posts I thought lets ask Pakis a small question..

if you guys are so brave.. why did you send Mujahiddins to fight? if you are that brave Mr Musharraf could have sent the regular army!!..

Why so defensive about your actions that you give them a mask while fighting and refuse to take the bodies after they die???...

Some one said on some other thread that we dont have guts apart from sending dossiers....why not fight a war, even a border war?

Where were the refular army when Mirages were bombing kargil with PGBs.
Cant open up yourself to the world is it?.

So apprehensive about your own actions..

 

[Rafi]

In point of fact, I have seen pictures of dozens of indian corpses stacked up on top of another, PA soldiers tried to use kerosene to give the soldiers a hindu funeral, as these corpses were ******* and becoming full of maggots.

In fact General Pal the Army Commander on the indian side, has clearly and forthrightly admitted that <quote "india lost the war, in strategic terms" unquote> The PA still control posts and peaks that were formally under the control of the indian state, peak 5353 gives a commanding view of the whole area, as well as being in a prime position to cut their main supply route for IOK in case of another conflict.....

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

I hope the turds know it was PARAMILITARY N MUJAHEDEEN?
NOT REGULAR ARMY... AND U LOST ON MILITARY FRONT..

 

[Agnostic_Indian]

I hope the turds know it was PARAMILITARY N MUJAHEDEEN?
NOT REGULAR ARMY... AND U LOST ON MILITARY FRONT..

 

[Rafi]

General Pal seems to think it was defeat for India, he is a honourable soldier - who can admit the unpalatable truth. And as he was in the thick of it, his assessment is the most critical, PA were the only ones to benefit territorially from that conflict, ie we hold posts and peaks that were previously occupied by india prior to 1999.

 

[nForce]

General Pal seems to think it was defeat for India, he is a honourable soldier - who can admit the unpalatable truth. And as he was in the thick of it, his assessment is the most critical, PA were the only ones to benefit territorially from that conflict, ie we hold posts and peaks that were previously occupied by india prior to 1999.

Gen Kishan Pal was referring to the loss of 587 Indian soldiers duing the conflict,which should not have happened if Indian Army did not evacuate the posts during winter,he did not say that the objectives were not met.

We did gain some tactical victories, we regained the territories we lost, we lost 587 precious lives. I consider this loss of war because whatever we gained from the war has not been consolidated, either politically or diplomatically. It has not been consolidated militarily.

Please do a bit more digging and know about it before speaking.

While the loss of life around 2700 Pakistani soldiers in this misadventure,though regrettable,is none of our concern.As Indians,we will be concerned with our losses.Point 5353 is still in Pakistani control and that is a fact.But if someone says that the whole point of Pakistani Army to start the Kargil war was to control point 5353 then he cannot be anymore mistaken.There are many such peaks along the LOC,and neither IA nor PA try to man each and every peak,as it is strategically fruitless.Only those peaks are important which serve strategic purpose.Point 5353 is one of those peaks which serve no strategic purpose to either side,and was vacant at the time of invasion.The following article may give a complete idea.

Fact and fiction on Point 5353
​

The defence establishment's response to the controversy over Point 5353 plumbs new depths.

PRAVEEN SWAMI

IN August, news broke that Pakistan holds one of the most important mountain features in the Drass Sector, Point 5353-metres. Since then, there has been a welter of fresh revelations, the most important of them being lawyer and Rajya Sabha MP R.K. Anand' s disclosure that five other positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) are held by Pakistan. Anand also made public Army's internal correspondence on the causes of the debacle over Point 5353. The revelations did not lead to a considered rebuttal, but generated a wave of hostile official polemic, often through pro-establishment journalists. One so-called security affairs expert charged that the revelations were part of a Pakistani intelligence plot to generate a "divisive debate" in Indi a.

Addressing an audience of businessmen in Mumbai in early August, Union Defence Minister George Fernandes put forward the sole cogent official response to the revelations about Point 5353. "5353," he said, "is the point over which the LoC goes. The fact i s, our troops had never occupied that. The normal practice among them has been that where the line goes over a peak, then nobody occupies it." The Minister then proceeded to assault what he perceived to be irresponsible media organisations, much to the d elight of the assembled Mumbai businesspersons, many of whom have had their own skirmishes with reporters. But an analysis of Fernandes' statement shows not only little concern for fact, but an alarming willingness to use falsehood to ensure that his cho sen team in the defence establishment can continue to be incompetent with impunity.

"5353 is the point over which the LoC goes"

Assertions that the LoC is imprecisely defined on the ground, and that the territorial status of Point 5353 is therefore unclear, have formed the central component of official discourse on the controversy. A few hours spent poring over old newspapers are all that it takes to set the record straight. Sadly, few of the many commentators who have engaged with the revelations made in Frontline and other publications on the status of Point 5353 have seen it fit to make the effort.

During the Kargil war, Pakistan had put forward claims that the LoC was undefined on the ground, and that its territorial contours were imprecise. An irate spokesman of the Union Ministry of External Affairs responded on June 19, 1999. "The LoC is well d efined and delineated," he said, "and is the very cornerstone of Indo-Pakistan relations." Pointing out that detailed co-ordinates of the LoC were given in 19 annexures to the agreement of December 11, 1972, arrived at between Lieutenant-General Abdul Ha mid Khan and Lieutenant-General P.S. Bhagat, the spokesman added that "so far as the de jure position is concerned, there are no doubts."

Speaking in New Delhi on June 23, 1999, his first press conference after military operations began in Kargil, Chief of the Army Staff V.P. Malik was even more explicit. "In today's display," he said after a formal presentation, "we have also given you de tails of the LoC; its delineation; how it was delineated." "With marked maps, a military man without a GPS (Global Positioning System) can make an error of a few hundred metres on the ground, but an error of 8 to 9 kilometres is unimaginable."

No one appeared to be in any doubt about just where Point 5353 was during the Kargil war itself. The Press Trust of India (PTI) put out official responses to Pakistan claims that Point 5353 was on its side of the LoC on July 28, 1999. "The maps signed by the Indian and Pakistani DGMOs (Directors General of Military Operations) in 1972 clearly indicate that it belongs to India," the PTI despatch noted. On July 30, a PTI depatch repeated the assertion in a report on fighting around Point 5353: "In this se ctor, Pakistan claims some mountains to be a part of this territory whereas the maps signed between the Directors General of Military Operations in December 1972, are contrary to this claim."

Maps published in Frontline, and also separate documents made available to the press by Anand, both make clear that Point 5353 is at an aerial distance of almost a kilometre from the LoC on the Indian side. On the ground, that would mean a trek of several kilometres, given the terrain's savage contours. How what was "well defined" and "well delineated" only a year ago has now become so confused is a question only the defence establishment's apologists can answer.

"Where the line goes over a peak, nobody occupies it"

Leaving aside the so far undenied fact that Pakistan is indeed in occupation of Point 5353, this second element of Fernandes' argument raises more than a few interesting issues. Right through the Kargil war, Indian officials made clear that the fight for Point 5353 had been joined. But that fight would have served little purpose had the strategically located peak not fallen inside Indian territory.

Northern Command chief H.M. Khanna announced in Srinagar on July 21, 1999 that while the bulk of the Pakistan intrusion had been vacated, "some 50 to 70 intruders still held three positions along the LoC in Kargil". Two days later, The Tribune, ci ting official reports, noted that "fierce fighting was on in Batalik and Kaksar sub-sectors as the Indian troops launched operations to evict the intruders from the three pockets they were holding." "Fighting," the report noted, "was under way at Point 5 353 in Drass, Muntho Dhalo and Shangruti Ridge in Batalik, and also at a position in Kaksar." These are much the same areas as Anand referred to in his press conference.

Nothing much changed over the next few days. On July 24, The Tribune again reported that "Pakistani intruders continued to hold their position in the small pockets of intrusion". The same day, the Asian Age's special correspondents in New D elhi and Srinagar quoted Union Defence Minister George Fernandes as saying that "a very few Pakistani soldiers are occupying one point each in Drass. Batalik and Mushkoh." "These points," he insisted, "will be cleared at any time." Officials did their be st to prove their Minister right, announcing both on July 25 and July 26, 1999 that the last of the intrusions had been cleared.

Fernandes and Lieutenant-General Nirmal Vij, the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), were, in fact, being economical with the truth. On July 28, PTI reported that fighting continued in several areas. One soldier was killed in shelling in the Batalik area while another died in the Muntho Dalo area. The Pakistan Army, PTI recorded, "also launched a counter-attack on Sando Top and Zulu Spur." The Zulu Spur forms the junction of ridges from the Mushkoh Valley and the Marpo La area. Most importan t of all, PTI noted that "in Mushkoh sub-sector of Drass both sides exchanged small arms fire around Point 5353". What Indian troops were doing there if the peak is not on the Indian side of the LoC remains a mystery - particularly if, as the Army's publ ic relations staff insist, the peak is of little strategic significance and poses no real threat to National Highway 1A.

Pakistan, which now denies that it holds any territory on the Indian side of the LoC, clearly understood the gains it had made. On July 26, even as officials in New Delhi announced that the last Pakistani intruder had been evicted from the Indian side of the LoC, the Pakistan Army's Brigadier Rashid Qureshi made a significant, but little noticed, statement. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that "contrary to Indian claims, the Pakistan Army is still holding some strategic heights along the Li ne of Control and can effectively tackle any Indian attack." "We are in a position to target Indian vehicles on the Kargil-Drass road," it quoted Qureshi as saying.

But in the triumphal glow provoked by the end of Operation Vijay, news regarding Point 5353 disappeared from the press. No reportage on the fighting in the area appeared after the PTI report of July 28. A similar fate befell operations in the Batalik are a. On July 9, Army spokesperson Bikram Singh announced that "valiant Gorkha Rifles soldiers, who had recaptured Khalobar and Point 5287, regained point 4821 and Kukerthang". "The gallant Bihar regiment," he continued, "took control of the Tharu hills in an overnight operation." "Now," he concluded, "only one or two pockets where the intruders are giving resistance are left to be recaptured." Nothing about those pockets, which included the Shangruti feature on the LoC, was heard of again.

"Fact is, our troops had never occupied that"

The argument that Point 5353 was never held by India has been regularly used by the Army public relations apparatus to rebut the charge that operational incompetence and strategic errors led to its occupation by Pakistan during the Kargil war. The claim is, in fact, true. India did not hold Point 5353 before the war broke out. What has not been reported widely is that this statement of fact rebuts nothing, for no one ever claimed that the peak was physically held by India before the war. Indeed, reports that appeared in Frontline and Business Line made quite clear that the peak was not held by either side in the build-up to the conflict.

Point 5353, along with the features around it, was occupied by the Pakistani troops at the start of the Kargil war. When the hostilities ended, the Indian troops had succeeded only in taking back Charlie 6 and Charlier 7, two secondary positions on the M arpo La ridgeline. The Indian troops had also been unable to evict Pakistani soldiers from Point 5240, some 1,200 metres from Point 5353 as the crow flies. Amar Aul, the 56 Brigade Commander in charge of the operations to secure Point 5353, responded by occupying two heights on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251, just before the ceasefire came into force.

Aul later tried to use these two heights to bring about a territorial exchange. In mid-August 1999, his efforts bore fruit, and both sides committed themselves to leave Points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied. Indian and Pakistani troops pulled back to their pre-Kargil position as part of a larger agreement between their respective DGMOs. In October that year, however, the deal broke down. Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take Point 5240 and the 1/3 Gorkha Rifles to occupy Point 5353, choosing to vio late the August agreement rather than risk a Pakistani reoccupation of these positions. The operation was mishandled, and when the Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 5240, they promptly launched a counter-assault on Point 5353.

Pakistan rapidly consolidated its position on 5353 after the abortive Indian offensive. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to the base of the peak of Benazir Post. And with Point 5353 and its adjoining area now linked by roa d to Pakistan's rear headquarters at Gultari, any attack will lead to a full-blown resumption of hostilities. No official from the Army or the Defence Ministry has, until the third week of September, denied this sequence of events.

Nor has a denial been made of significant new revelations made by Anand. Anand made available the correspondence between Captain Navneet Mehta, who led an unsuccessful attack on Peak 5353 in May 1999. The correspondence outlines the errors that led to th is debacle. Aul has not been called to account for his actions. Nor has the Army denied or accepted this highly decorated solider's part in the debacle. Neither have his superiors seen it fit to explain why Pakistan was left in possession of the peak, an d why the subsequent exchange-deal was terminated to India's evident disadvantage. Most significant, Anand's claim that Point 5353 was indeed held by India in 1992-1993, successfully cutting off Pakistani supply routes, has not been rebutted.

In the wake of Anand's intervention on the 5353 debate, General Malik has chosen to distance himself from the entire controversy. At an August 31 press conference, held to inaugurate the Army Wives Welfare Association's website, Malik said the issue had now entered the "political domain." "We are going through his statement," Malik said. "We have the answer, but let the government react." Coming from an Army chief who allowed his officers to brief the Bharatiya Janata Party on the conduct of the Kargil war, and permitted his soldiers to host a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-organised religious function in Leh, the new disdain for politics is interesting.

The worrying lack of answers about Point 5353 is not the only problematical aspect of the affair. Many of the Army's responses to Point 5353 stories were put out not through attributable statements, for which officials could later be held accountable, bu t through off-the-record briefings held behind closed doors. In effect, a section of the media allowed itself to be used as the public relations wing of an incompetent defence apparatus. One Calcutta-based daily even apologised for the unpardonable sin o f having failed to censor Anand's press conference on behalf of the defence establishment.

India's defence establishment and much of the press have chosen to hide from uncomfortable truth. But the silence does no one any favours, least of all the soldiers who could one day have to pay again with their lives for the failures of the Kargil war.

Source

 

[Rafi]

Lets not indulge in semantics, and call a spade a spade <quote> " Gen Pal say the war, was a strategic defeat for india <unquote> he is a senior former general and has a firm grasp of language, so lets not put words into his mouth.

As to the claim of 2700 KIA, this figure was cooked up by NS, when Musharraf and he were locked in a battle for power, PA has never accepted this figure. As to NS, now that he is back in Lahore and has excellent relations with the Army again, all such statements have stopped.

In point of fact NS's party has a significant presence in the NA, and could easily bring a motion for an inquiry in to the Kargil war, but as their main target Musharraf is no longer their, they are not interested.

Also the NLI units that played a major role in the conflict are recruited from Gilgit-Baltistan, which used to be known formerly as the Northern Areas, this area has a population of less than 2m people, there is no way that such a small population could sustain that number of casualty without the outside world hearing about it. We lost less than 250 men KIA, and about 500 injured.

Regarding Peak 5353 :-

There are numerous indian media outlets reporting that this was one of the peaks captured by the PA that still remain in our hands. And our people regard it a vital position to have, it dominates the whole area, and can be used to cut a vital indian supply line to her troops in IOK.

 

[Rafi]

Army sources confirmed to Tehelka that at least two of these features are under Pakistani control, thanks to botched








up military operations
and a government that wanted to hide the truth. The fate of the other two features, Dalu Nag and Bunker Ridge, is still shrouded in mystery.

"Dalu Nag is certainly in the Kargil sector, but it has a history of its own since the 1980s. It has nothing to do with Kargil operations. Some parts of Dalu Nag may have been occupied by them at that time," former army chief Ved Prakash Malik told Tehelka. "I do not know what exact locations are being referred to by these names," he added referring to Saddle Ridge and Bunker Ridge.

For the officers and jawans ordered to engage the intruders in a near-impossible battle, this is more humiliating

than the government's negation of the gains made by the army in the 1965 war. But then, Kargil would probably have never happened if the Tashkent Agreement was not signed in 1965. Even in 1999, India gave Pakistan a walkover and enabled it to retain territory that was always under Indian control. And then, the government misled the nation that Kargil had been cleared of all Pakistani intruders.

Former defence minister George Fernandes
, argued that the LoC runs over Pt 5353 and, therefore, was unoccupied by either countries till Kargil happened. A point which is not true.

Ironically, though it was the bjp-led government that hid the truth, the Congress-led upa government is also reluctant to clarify. Tehelka sent a questionnaire to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee asking him to spell out the truth about the four posts. But at the time of going to print, he had not replied.

Meanwhile, within the army at the level of middle and junior level officers and the brave jawans, there is discontent. Any army unit that has done its tour of duty in Kargil after the war in the summer of 1999 has heard about the secrets locked up in the forbidding heights.

Perhaps it is painful for the army top brass to admit that Operation Vijay

was not really an unalloyed



victory.

Pt 5353 is the highest mountaintop

in the Dras sector. It offers a vantage point to observe movement on the Srinagar-Leh highway (National Highway 1). Pakistani forces occupied Pt 5353 after senior commanders of 56 Mountain Brigade failed in a mission to recapture the peak. Just as the mission to capture Pt 5353 was botched, another Indian post, called Saddle Ridge, came under Pakistani occupation after senior commanders of 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras bungled








a military operation to recapture another strategic mountain post on Pt 5000 close to the LoC.

The Dras sector was the western-most of the intruder's positions and many posts on the mountaintops overlook nh 1. With Pt 5353 under Pakistani control, traffic moving on the highway is vulnerable to interdiction
by Pakistani artillery fire.

In addition to the Pakistani ability to interdict highway traffic in the Dras sector, Tehelka's investigation reveals that Pakistani occupation of three other Indian posts can put tremendous pressure on other Indian positions in the Tiger Hill
and Tololing complexes (see map). Pt 5000 is north-west of Pt 5100 and the latter is an important Indian post 12-13 km north-west of 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras.

The significance of Pakistani occupation of Saddle Ridge in the general area of Pt 5000 is as follows (see map):

Pt 5100, located close to the LoC, was a major supply route for enemy forces. The capture of this on July 1, 1999 was instrumental in the recapture of Tiger Hill.

The Pakistani occupation of Saddle Ridge near Pt 5000 gives its forces the ability to act as a pressure point on Pt 5100. If the current India-Pakistan ceasefire breaks down, Indian troops will have to keep their heads down, literally, in fear of enemy fire. It also gives Pakistan the ability to threaten Pt 5140, close to the LoC The attack on Pt 5000 was launched on July 24, 1999 at 10.30 pm with two officers, two junior commissioned officers (jcos) and 60 jawans of the 16 Grenadiers. It was way below the technically specified strength of a company. This ad hoc company was split into three platoons to attack the feature from both the flanks with the punch coming right through the middle. And a reserve platoon was also organised at the rear. Within four and half hours, the post was under Indian control.

A little after mid-day on July 25, 1999 the Pakistani forces launched a massive counter attack. Two prominent features on this strategic height, the right and left pimples, came under a volley of Pakistani artillery and small arms


fire. The company commander radioed the jco on the left flank to send 10 soldiers to the right flank.

But the jco and the troops under him were under heavy attack. The jco expressed his inability to send extra men. His platoon itself was short of troops and ammunition. The reserve platoon of four jawans under another jco was also facing a barrage of Pakistani artillery fire. It was incommunicado

because it did not have a wireless set.

By 6.30 pm, the Indian troops repulsed the attack. Five jawans were killed and 14 injured. The situation report (sitrep) initiated by 16 Grenadiers to the headquarters 56 Mountain Brigade mentioned that "Coy.Ex 16 Grenadiers captured Point 5000 in square 5363 by 25th July '99 by 0300 Hrs...enemy counter attack on Saddle Ridge from North and North-east on 25th July '99 at 1400 Hrs...(and) repulsed both the enemy attacks on Saddle Ridge.

Once the Pakistani counter attack was beaten back, the evacuation of the dead and injured commenced. But there was no sign of the reinforcement company. Brigadier Amarnath Aul, the then commander of the 56 Mountain Brigade, had ordered the 1/3 Gurkha Regiment
(gr) company to reach Pt 5000 as reinforcement. Strangely, 1/3 GR reached the objective next day at 9.00 am.

Official operational record of the combat mission on Pt 5000 clearly shows that 1/3 Gurkhas began their march to Pt 5000 at 9.00 pm on July 25, 1999. At that time, they were 5-6 km away from the objective. The reinforcement company finally reached the area of Pt 5000 ten hours after the counter attack was repulsed.

Despite the existence of such detailed official record of the battle for Pt 5000, Brigadier Aul authorized a sitrep dated August 10, 1999 that it was company of 1/3 gr that had withstood and beaten back the Pakistani counter attack on July 25, 1999. This was done despite the dispatch of a sitrep on July 26, 1999 that 16 Grenadiers had secured Pt 5000. Brigadier Aul recommended a gallantry award, the Mahavir Chakra


, for the company commander of 1/3 GR. Brigadier Aul is from 3 Gurkha Regiment.

According to





the official statement of the company commander of 1/3 Gurkhas, his troops reached the location at around "0430 Hrs on 26th July 1999...I moved up to the top...I then moved further south to fetch the balance of the (16 Grenadiers) company. However, when it was completely daylight intense and accurate enemy shelling made further movement of personnel difficult."

This combat operation also brought to fore the failure of senior commanders of the 56 Mountain Brigade in planning the attack on Pt 5000. The 16 Grenadiers company were not supplied with adequate ammunition and wireless sets. The company was not provided with an artillery officer and, therefore, Pakistani shelling could not be retaliated. Five jawans lost their lives and 14 were injured because of this oversight. Besides, there were no medical cover or stretcher-bearers to lift and help the maimed



and injured soldiers. Also, as a rule, the strength of the attacking company should be 3:1. Since the Pakistani forces numbered around 80 at Pt 5000 so the attacking 16 Grenadiers technically should have comprised of 240 men.

Though the Pakistani counter attack on Pt 5000 was beaten back the Indian forces failed to regain control of a strategic feature in the area of Pt 5000 called Saddle Ridge. That was because they were weighed down by lack of communication systems, adequate ammunition and battlefield causalities. Had the reinforcement of 1/3 Gurkhas reached in time, Saddle Ridge would have been under Indian control.

Brig Aul's ignorance about what really happened at Pt 5000 is reflected in his observation on official documentation. According to him the "enemy" counter attacked "on the night of 25/26 July 1999". But official records show that the counter attack started building from 2.30 pm on July 25, 1999.

The failure to grasp the small details of a combat operation is striking because 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras was keeping tabs on the progress of the battle through a system of wireless relay. In mountain terrain wireless communication breaks down frequently or is interrupted by a noisy static known as 'screening'. The Brigade hq, therefore, had to relay information and receive information by first radioing the Indian post on Pt 5100, which in turn transmitted messages to the combat company on Pt 5000.

So far there is no official explanation for the loss of Saddle Bridge. Five years after the war, even the new government is completely silent on these four Indian posts.

Published by HT Syndication with permission from Tehelka.

Copyright Tehelka

Provided by Syndigate.info an Albawaba.com company

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Pakistan+still+occupies+four+kargil+peaks.-a0199260724

 

[Rafi]

India Lost Kargil War: General Kishen
Submitted by BZ on June 1, 2010 &#8211; 7:36 pm85 Comments
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NEW DELHI&#8212;Eleven years after having led troops on the ground during the Kargil war, a retired army general has claimed India had actually lost the war in strategic terms as it failed to consolidate tactical gains. Lt Gen (retd) Kishen Pal, who headed the Srinagar-based 15 Corps during the 1999 conflict, told television channel NDTV in an interview broadcast on Sunday that he had never been convinced that India had won.

&#8220;We did gain some tactical victories, we regained back the territories we lost, but we lost 587 precious lives,&#8221; he said. &#8220;I consider this loss of war because whatever we gained from the war has not been consolidated, either politically or diplomatically, it has not been consolidated militarily,&#8221; he added.

The Armed Forces Tribunal recently indicted Pal for showing bias against his junior Brigadier Devinder Singh and falsifying accounts during the Kargil war.

Asked if the army was under pressure then to give quick results, Pal admitted it was so. &#8220;It was a big embarrassment to everybody. The then vice Chief Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar told me that there is lot of pressure we have to clear this very fast,&#8221; he said.&#8212;Agencies

India Lost Kargil War: General Kishen | Pakistan Ka Khuda Hafiz

 

[nForce]

Lets not indulge in semantics, and call a spade a spade <quote> " Gen Pal say the war, was a strategic defeat for india <unquote> he is a senior former general and has a firm grasp of language, so lets not put words into his mouth.

Exactly,lets not try to put words into his mouth.I have already quoted what he said,directly from ndtv website.I will put it here again.

We did gain some tactical victories, we regained the territories we lost, we lost 587 precious lives. I consider this loss of war because whatever we gained from the war has not been consolidated, either politically or diplomatically. It has not been consolidated militarily.

Feel free to check it in the ndtv website.

As to the claim of 2700 KIA, this figure was cooked up by NS, when Musharraf and he were locked in a battle for power, PA has never accepted this figure. As to NS, now that he is back in Lahore and has excellent relations with the Army again, all such statements have stopped.

In point of fact NS's party has a significant presence in the NA, and could easily bring a motion for an inquiry in to the Kargil war, but as their main target Musharraf is no longer their, they are not interested.

Also the NLI units that played a major role in the conflict are recruited from Gilgit-Baltistan, which used to be known formerly as the Northern Areas, this area has a population of less than 2m people, there is no way that such a small population could sustain that number of casualty without the outside world hearing about it. We lost less than 250 men KIA, and about 500 injured.

This time,lets try not to put wods into Nawaz Sharif's mouth.He was the ruling PM of Pakistan at the time of conflict.He knows about the issue more than you.You can refer to hi memoirs,named "Ghadaar Kaun? Nawaz Sharif Ki Kahani, Unki Zubani",if you wish to.

A report:

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Army lost 2,700 military personnel in the Kargil conflict, far higher than its casualties during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif has said in his memoirs.

Giving his account of the 1999 conflict in the book "Ghadaar Kaun? Nawaz Sharif Ki Kahani, Unki Zubani", Sharif said the casualties suffered by the Army were so extensive that an entire brigade of the Northern Light Infantry based in the Pakistan-controlled Northern Areas was wiped out.

Sharif reiterated his contention that Gen Pervez Musharraf, the then Army chief, had not taken him into confidence on the situation in Kargil and that he learnt the details from his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

"As a prime minister, I was not taken into confidence on Kargil. I came to know what the Army was doing from Prime Minister A B Vajpayee. Even the Air and Naval Chiefs as well as many Corps Commanders of the Army did not know about the Kargil operation," Sharif he said in a series of interviews to journalist Sohail Waraich that were compiled and published in the book in Urdu.

Sharif said he was told by Musharraf, who toppled him later in 1999, that the Kargil operations were being conducted by mujahideen and not the Pakistan Army.

"I was told the Army itself will not participate in the fighting. Only mujahideen invasion will be enough but when the conflict began the entire Northern Light Infantry was wiped out and 2,700 personnel were martyred and hundreds others injured. The number of those martyred was more than those killed in the wars of 1965 and 1971 together," he said.

"They (Army) briefed the prime minister four or five months after they invaded Kargil and then said it was mujahideen fighting there and the reality was different. It was Vajpayee who called me and told me the military is fighting there," Sharif said.

Sharif said the extent of the casualties was so "huge" that he asked Musharraf how Pakistan suffered so many losses when his initial claim was that the military would not suffer any damage as the operations were being conducted by mujahideen. Musharraf attributed the casualties to carpet bombing of the Kargil peaks by India.

"I inquired (from Musharraf) were you not aware that this kind of bombing could take place. Musharraf said, 'Sir, we were not aware of it,'" Sharif said adding he was told the Indian artillery bombardment was so extensive that it blew off the heads of Pakistan soldiers hiding in trenches.

Musharraf told Sharif that because the trenches did not have covers, the soldiers were directly exposed to artillery fire.

"Let me tell you by the time when the Washington deal took place, the Indians had already recaptured half of the peaks and were advancing further. I protected the Pakistan Army's honour or they would have been left with nothing," Sharif said.

In response to a question why he visited the front lines with Musharraf in the midst of Kargil episode, Sharif said he went after Musharraf insisted that he goes there and meet the soldiers.

Source

There are numerous indian media outlets reporting that this was one of the peaks captured by the PA that still remain in our hands. And our people regard it a vital position to have, it dominates the whole area, and can be used to cut a vital indian supply line to her troops in IOK.

It seems that you did not bother to read the report that I posted earlier and decided to jump the gun instead.
The neighbouring posts like 5287,Khalobar,4821 and Kukerthang proved to be a security risk and they were all re captured.Point 5353 was never even manned by IA.There are scores of peaks in the region,many of which are neither manned by IA nor PA.Point 5353 was one of those.

I am wondering how can this point,given to its location can cut off supply lines.Care to tell me which roadways it is which is under threat because of this??Let alone whole area.Infact whole area is a vague term,which just shows that you have none whatsoever idea of the scenario.

Having said that,one will be greatly mistaken to the level of insanity if he says that PA actually won the Kargil conflict.

The offensive was thwarted back,the Indian army took control of all the posts that it was previously manning.PA lost nearly 2700 soldiers,most of whom died off bombing by IAF and shelling of the Bofors guns,while the PA or PAF could not do anything to save their own brothers.Thats so much for the sense of Ummah.

The IAF played a significant role doing the high altitude bombing,while the PAF did not even dare to engage.

The aftereffects were also devastating for Pakistan,as it led to yet another military coup in Pakistan.

In the fields of International diplomacy,Pakistan failed,as GoP at first did not accept that regular troops were engaged but later had to admit when IA showed IDs of fallen NLI officers in the operations.The PA even refused to accept the bodies of the officers initially.

After all these failures if someone points out that PA was successful in securing a post which was never ever manned,then it sounds like consolation prize kind of thing to any sane ears.

Btw,what happened to PAF???It was not there in Longewala when the PA tanks needed them.It was no where in the picture during the Kargil conflict,while IAF launched full fledged operations from their side.WHY??

 

[Patriot]

Btw,what happened to PAF???It was not there in Longewala when the PA tanks needed them.It was no where in the picture during the Kargil conflict,while IAF launched full fledged operations from their side.WHY??

The PAF Chief had clearly told Army Chief that Longewala was out of range of PAF Sabres and that they could not provide cover in that sector but Army did not listen and went ahead with the battle.IAF did not enter Pakistani Border.It was still fighting outside Pakistan Territory hence it did not cross border otherwise that would have started full scale war across international borders.PAF Flew regular CAPs just alongside border to avoid any incursion but managed to take down some IAF Jets without PAF even being present.

 

[Rafi]

Army sources confirmed to Tehelka that at least two of these features are under Pakistani control, thanks to botched up military operations and a government that wanted to hide the truth. The fate of the other two features, Dalu Nag and Bunker Ridge, is still shrouded in mystery.

"Dalu Nag is certainly in the Kargil sector, but it has a history of its own since the 1980s. It has nothing to do with Kargil operations. Some parts of Dalu Nag may have been occupied by them at that time," former army chief Ved Prakash Malik told Tehelka. "I do not know what exact locations are being referred to by these names," he added referring to Saddle Ridge and Bunker Ridge.

For the officers and jawans ordered to engage the intruders in a near-impossible battle, this is more humiliating than the government's negation of the gains made by the army in the 1965 war. But then, Kargil would probably have never happened if the Tashkent Agreement was not signed in 1965. Even in 1999, India gave Pakistan a walkover and enabled it to retain territory that was always under Indian control. And then, the government misled the nation that Kargil had been cleared of all Pakistani intruders.

Former defence minister George Fernandes
, argued that the LoC runs over Pt 5353 and, therefore, was unoccupied by either countries till Kargil happened. A point which is not true.

Ironically, though it was the bjp-led government that hid the truth, the Congress-led upa government is also reluctant to clarify. Tehelka sent a questionnaire to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee asking him to spell out the truth about the four posts. But at the time of going to print, he had not replied.

Meanwhile, within the army at the level of middle and junior level officers and the brave jawans, there is discontent. Any army unit that has done its tour of duty in Kargil after the war in the summer of 1999 has heard about the secrets locked up in the forbidding heights.

Perhaps it is painful for the army top brass to admit that Operation Vijay

was not really an unalloyed



victory.

Pt 5353 is the highest mountaintop

in the Dras sector. It offers a vantage point to observe movement on the Srinagar-Leh highway (National Highway 1). Pakistani forces occupied Pt 5353 after senior commanders of 56 Mountain Brigade failed in a mission to recapture the peak. Just as the mission to capture Pt 5353 was botched, another Indian post, called Saddle Ridge, came under Pakistani occupation after senior commanders of 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras bungled








a military operation to recapture another strategic mountain post on Pt 5000 close to the LoC.

The Dras sector was the western-most of the intruder's positions and many posts on the mountaintops overlook nh 1. With Pt 5353 under Pakistani control, traffic moving on the highway is vulnerable to interdiction
by Pakistani artillery fire.

In addition to the Pakistani ability to interdict highway traffic in the Dras sector, Tehelka's investigation reveals that Pakistani occupation of three other Indian posts can put tremendous pressure on other Indian positions in the Tiger Hill
and Tololing complexes (see map). Pt 5000 is north-west of Pt 5100 and the latter is an important Indian post 12-13 km north-west of 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras.

The significance of Pakistani occupation of Saddle Ridge in the general area of Pt 5000 is as follows (see map):

Pt 5100, located close to the LoC, was a major supply route for enemy forces. The capture of this on July 1, 1999 was instrumental in the recapture of Tiger Hill.

The Pakistani occupation of Saddle Ridge near Pt 5000 gives its forces the ability to act as a pressure point on Pt 5100. If the current India-Pakistan ceasefire breaks down, Indian troops will have to keep their heads down, literally, in fear of enemy fire. It also gives Pakistan the ability to threaten Pt 5140, close to the LoC The attack on Pt 5000 was launched on July 24, 1999 at 10.30 pm with two officers, two junior commissioned officers (jcos) and 60 jawans of the 16 Grenadiers. It was way below the technically specified strength of a company. This ad hoc company was split into three platoons to attack the feature from both the flanks with the punch coming right through the middle. And a reserve platoon was also organised at the rear. Within four and half hours, the post was under Indian control.

A little after mid-day on July 25, 1999 the Pakistani forces launched a massive counter attack. Two prominent features on this strategic height, the right and left pimples, came under a volley of Pakistani artillery and small arms


fire. The company commander radioed the jco on the left flank to send 10 soldiers to the right flank.

But the jco and the troops under him were under heavy attack. The jco expressed his inability to send extra men. His platoon itself was short of troops and ammunition. The reserve platoon of four jawans under another jco was also facing a barrage of Pakistani artillery fire. It was incommunicado

because it did not have a wireless set.

By 6.30 pm, the Indian troops repulsed the attack. Five jawans were killed and 14 injured. The situation report (sitrep) initiated by 16 Grenadiers to the headquarters 56 Mountain Brigade mentioned that "Coy.Ex 16 Grenadiers captured Point 5000 in square 5363 by 25th July '99 by 0300 Hrs...enemy counter attack on Saddle Ridge from North and North-east on 25th July '99 at 1400 Hrs...(and) repulsed both the enemy attacks on Saddle Ridge.

Once the Pakistani counter attack was beaten back, the evacuation of the dead and injured commenced. But there was no sign of the reinforcement company. Brigadier Amarnath Aul, the then commander of the 56 Mountain Brigade, had ordered the 1/3 Gurkha Regiment
(gr) company to reach Pt 5000 as reinforcement. Strangely, 1/3 GR reached the objective next day at 9.00 am.

Official operational record of the combat mission on Pt 5000 clearly shows that 1/3 Gurkhas began their march to Pt 5000 at 9.00 pm on July 25, 1999. At that time, they were 5-6 km away from the objective. The reinforcement company finally reached the area of Pt 5000 ten hours after the counter attack was repulsed.

Despite the existence of such detailed official record of the battle for Pt 5000, Brigadier Aul authorized a sitrep dated August 10, 1999 that it was company of 1/3 gr that had withstood and beaten back the Pakistani counter attack on July 25, 1999. This was done despite the dispatch of a sitrep on July 26, 1999 that 16 Grenadiers had secured Pt 5000. Brigadier Aul recommended a gallantry award, the Mahavir Chakra


, for the company commander of 1/3 GR. Brigadier Aul is from 3 Gurkha Regiment.

According to





the official statement of the company commander of 1/3 Gurkhas, his troops reached the location at around "0430 Hrs on 26th July 1999...I moved up to the top...I then moved further south to fetch the balance of the (16 Grenadiers) company. However, when it was completely daylight intense and accurate enemy shelling made further movement of personnel difficult."

This combat operation also brought to fore the failure of senior commanders of the 56 Mountain Brigade in planning the attack on Pt 5000. The 16 Grenadiers company were not supplied with adequate ammunition and wireless sets. The company was not provided with an artillery officer and, therefore, Pakistani shelling could not be retaliated. Five jawans lost their lives and 14 were injured because of this oversight. Besides, there were no medical cover or stretcher-bearers to lift and help the maimed



and injured soldiers. Also, as a rule, the strength of the attacking company should be 3:1. Since the Pakistani forces numbered around 80 at Pt 5000 so the attacking 16 Grenadiers technically should have comprised of 240 men.

Though the Pakistani counter attack on Pt 5000 was beaten back the Indian forces failed to regain control of a strategic feature in the area of Pt 5000 called Saddle Ridge. That was because they were weighed down by lack of communication systems, adequate ammunition and battlefield causalities. Had the reinforcement of 1/3 Gurkhas reached in time, Saddle Ridge would have been under Indian control.

Brig Aul's ignorance about what really happened at Pt 5000 is reflected in his observation on official documentation. According to him the "enemy" counter attacked "on the night of 25/26 July 1999". But official records show that the counter attack started building from 2.30 pm on July 25, 1999.

The failure to grasp the small details of a combat operation is striking because 56 Mountain Brigade in Dras was keeping tabs on the progress of the battle through a system of wireless relay. In mountain terrain wireless communication breaks down frequently or is interrupted by a noisy static known as 'screening'. The Brigade hq, therefore, had to relay information and receive information by first radioing the Indian post on Pt 5100, which in turn transmitted messages to the combat company on Pt 5000.

So far there is no official explanation for the loss of Saddle Bridge. Five years after the war, even the new government is completely silent on these four Indian posts.

Published by HT Syndication with permission from Tehelka.

Copyright Tehelka

Provided by Syndigate.info an Albawaba.com company

Pakistan still occupies four kargil peaks. - Free Online Library

This is an article from the famous Tehelka group, who is rightly regarded by indian civil society to be one of the best investigative media outlets, they confirm. Indians were desperate to recapture these posts, but failed

 

[Rafi]

Lets not indulge in semantics, and call a spade a spade <quote> " Gen Pal say the war, was a strategic defeat for india <unquote> he is a senior former general and has a firm grasp of language, so lets not put words into his mouth.

And the man on the ground says this was a strategic defeat, he is a military man and not a politician having a tussle for power so his admission holds more water..

As to the claim of 2700 KIA, this figure was cooked up by NS, when Musharraf and he were locked in a battle for power, PA has never accepted this figure. As to NS, now that he is back in Lahore and has excellent relations with the Army again, all such statements have stopped. This book was written by Mr NS when he was in exile, in Saudi Arabia. It is the same thing as during the war, your politicians were making all sorts of allegations against the incumbent bjp govt.

In point of fact NS's party has a significant presence in the NA, and could easily bring a motion for an inquiry in to the Kargil war, but as their main target Musharraf is no longer their, they are not interested.

The Army has rejected this figure, and NS being the shrewd politician he is, now that there is no need for this disputed figure, has quietly let it drop

Also the NLI units that played a major role in the conflict are recruited from Gilgit-Baltistan, which used to be known formerly as the Northern Areas, this area has a population of less than 2m people, there is no way that such a small population could sustain that number of casualty without the outside world hearing about it. We lost less than 250 men KIA, and about 500 injured.