Read the actual truth:
Exercise Red Flag 2008-4 / Su-30MKI vs F-15, F-16, F-22
About the speaker
Colonel Terrence Fornof (Colonel is equivalent to a Group Captain in the IAF) is an F-15 pilot and the Director of the Requirements and Testing office at the United States Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada. The lecture above is a private briefing in August 2008 to a group called the “Daedalians”. The Daedalians are a local group of retired military pilots.
Per the press statement handed out by Nellis AFB: “Col. Fornof did not mean to offend any U.S. allied forces, as he knows firsthand the importance of training with allied forces and the awesome firepower they bring to the fight. His comments during this briefing were his personal opinions and not those of U.S. Air Force Warfare Center or of the Air Force."
Comments and Analysis
Despite Col. Fornof having observed Red Flag up close, his comments should not be treated as the gospel truth - there is a possibility that he is ‘playing to the gallery’. His comments are noteworthy since he is an operational pilot with the USAF but he certainly cannot cover the entire exercise and has no inside knowledge of the way IAF ‘fought’. The comments initially appear to be negative about the IAF to the uninformed listener; overall he has actually praised the IAF and its performance.
The Su-30MKI did not use the data link in the exercise unlike the other air forces. The reason being the HAL supplied system is not compatible with NATO data links – neither is the system required to be compatible with NATO. The speaker clearly mentions that the high fratricide ratio in the kills was because of this reason. While NATO air forces are designed to inter operate with each other and carry out joint missions, the IAF is not.
Su-30MKI is equipped with its own data link which can share target information across multiple fighters. IAF is presently inducting A-50EI Phalcon AEW&C aircraft. Red Flag and other exercises before it have seen IAF working very closely with the AWACS crew of the other air force. Operational Data Link (ODL) will be provided to all fighters in the IAF over the coming years.
The IFF system used by IAF is not compatible with NATO standard, hence the need for verbal communication with the controller.
The aircraft were operating their radars on training mode since the actual signals with which the Bars radar operates are kept secret.
The high mix of highly experienced pilots in Ex Cope India, if true, cannot be consistent across all sqns that were involved in the exercise. During Cope India, the 24 Sqn operating Su-30K/MK was first Flanker unit in the IAF and only one of two Su-30 units in the entire IAF at that time. To find a concentration of senior pilots in these squadrons will not be unexpected given that these units will be forging doctrines and tactics and building up a pool of pilots. Per article on Cope India here; “Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.”. Moreover, the mix of experience needs to be examined for the USAF squadrons as well. The aggressor squadron at Nellis and the F-22 attracts the best in the USA.
MiG-21 Bison does not have an Israeli radar as noted in the lecture. The type is equipped with a Phazotron Kopyo (spear) unit. The Kopyo radar has a 57km detection range against a 5 m^2 (54ft^2) radar cross section, or fighter-sized target. It can track eight targets and shoot at two simultaneously.
Su-30MKI is equipped with Saturn AL-31FP engines, not Turmansky as mentioned in the lecture
Soviet era aircraft were designed to operate from poorly prepared airfields. For example; MiG-29 closes its intakes during taxi and take-off to avoid ingestion of FOD thrown up by the front wheels. In this state the engines are supplied air thru louvres located on upper surface of the leading edge. This design feature is at the cost of significant internal fuel capacity and hence has been eliminated in newer MiG-29 versions starting with the K/KUB variants. Flanker come with lighter anti-FOD grills in the intakes as well as wheel fenders that catch FOD. IAF has precautions built into their SOPs – which may be overlooked in case of war or any such exigency. Since the deployment was far away from home base in the USA, with no spares support and related infrastructure it was well worth to observe strict adherence to SOPs instead to being stuck with a grounded aircraft!
This is not the first time the MiG-21 Bison has been praised for successes during dissimilar air combat training (DACT) – even during previous USAF exercise and internal IAF exercises pilots are known to have scored ‘kills’ against more advanced adversaries. The small size (lower visual signature) and inherently small radar cross section coupled with modern avionics, radar, effective jammers, precision guided munitions and missiles (R-73, R-77) make Bison one of the best fighters in IAF after Su-30 and Mirage-2000. IAF’s has had good experience with small jets such as Gnat which earned the reputation of “Sabre Slayer” in the 1965 war with Pakistan. The under-development LCA Tejas promises to carry on this legacy when it replaces the Bison.
Observations by Vishnu Som
Mr. Vishnu Som is an Indian journalist who was reporting on the exercise.
As the only Indian journalist who spent a lengthy period of time at Nellis after being granted permission by both the Indian Air Force and the US Air Force, I was granted access to impeccable sources in both forces.
Whats more, I was able to independently corroborate this information with reliable, alternative sources.
For starters ... and this cannot be stressed enough ... the Red Flag exercises were a brilliant learning experience for all the participants, not least of all the Indian Air Force which, over a period of time, has earned the reputation of being one of the world's finest operational air forces.
This was a reputation which was reinforced at Red Flag 2008, the world's most advanced air combat exercises where the Indian Air Force fielded a number of state of the art Sukhoi 30 MKI jets in addition to IL-76 transports and IL-78 mid air refuellers.
For other participants at the Red Flag exercises ... namely the South Korean Air Force, French and US Air Force ... the opportunity to train with a platform such as the Sukhoi 30 MKI was an opportunity which just couldn't be missed. This has a lot to do not just with the jet but also with the air force operating the fighter, a force which has made a mark as an innovative operator of fast jets. The US Air Force … the host of these exercises … was singularly gracious in its appreciation for the Indian Air Force contingent which came into Red Flag having trained extensively for the exercises not only back home but also at the Mountain Home Air Force base in the US.
Contrary to unsolicited remarks by certain serving US personnel not directly linked to day to day operations at the exercises … the Indian Air Force and its Su-30s more than made a mark during their stint in the United States. For starters … not a single Sukhoi 30 MKI fighter was `shot down’ in close air combat missions at the Mountain Home air base. In fact, none of the Sukhois were even close to being shot down in the 10 odd one on one sorties which were planned for the first two days of the exercises at Mountain Home. These one on one engagements featured USAF jets such as the F-15 and F-16 in close air engagements against the Su-30 MKI. The majority of the kills claimed in these engagements were granted to the Indian Air Force with the remainder of these being no-results. Indian Air Force Sukhois did use their famed thrust vectoring in these one on one engagements. Contrary to what may have been reported elsewhere … the Su-30 has a rate of turn of more than 35 degrees when operating in the thrust vector mode. In certain circumstances, this goes up substantially.
By the time the exercises at Mountain Home had matured … the Indian Air Force had graduated to large formation exercises which featured dozens of jets in the sky. In one of these exercises … the blue forces, of which the Indian Air Force was a part … shot down more than 21 of the enemy jets. Most of these `kills’ have been credited to the Indian Air Force.
By the time the Indian Air Force was ready for Red Flag, the contingent had successfully worked up using the crawl, walk, run principle. At Red Flag though, they found themselves at a substantial disadvantage vis a vis the other participants since they were not networked with AWACS and other platforms in the same manner in which USAF or other participating jets were. In fact, Indian Air Force Sukhois were not even linked to one another using their Russian built data links since American authorities had asked for specifics of the system before it was cleared to operate in US airspace. The IAF, quite naturally, felt that this would compromise a classified system onboard and decided to go on with the missions without the use of data links between the Sukhois.Neither was the Indian Air Force allowed to use chaff or flares, essential decoys to escape incoming missiles which had been fired by enemy jets. This was because the US FAA had visibility and pollution related concerns in the event that these were used in what is dense, busy air space in the Las Vegas region.
The Red Flag exercises themselves were based on large force engagements and did not see the Indian Air Force deploy thrust vectoring at all on any of the Sukhoi 30 jets not that this was required since the engagements were at long ranges. Though it is true that there were 4-5 incidents of fratricides involving the Indian Air Force at Red Flag … it is important to point out the following: In the debriefs that followed the exercises … responsibility for the fratricides were always put on the fighter controllers not the pilots. Its also important to point that unlike in Mountain Home, none of the Indian Air Force’s own fighter controllers were allowed to participate since there was classified equipment at Nellis used for monitoring the exercises. The lack of adequate controlling and the fact that Nellis fighter controllers often had problems understanding Indian accents (they had problems understanding French accents as well) resulted in a lack of adequate controlling in situations. Whats more … given the fact that the availability of AWACS was often low … the bulk of fratricides took place on days when the AWACS jet was not deployed. Whats important to remember though is that US participants in these exercises had a similar number of fratricides despite being fully linked in with data links and the latest IFF systems.
So was the Indian Air Force invincible at Red Flag. In a word … no. So yes, there were certainly days in which several Sukhoi jets were shot down. And there were others when they shot down many opposing jets. Ultimately though … the success of the Indian Air Force at Red Flag lay in the fact that they could meet their mission objectives as well, if not better, than any other participant. Despite the hot weather conditions, the IAF had a 95 per cent mission launch ratio, far better than some of the participants. And no one went into the exercises thinking the score line would be a perfect one in favour of the IAF. In fact … the IAF went into these exercises with an open mind and with full admiration of the world beating range at Nellis with an unmatched system of calibrating engagement results.Perhaps the most encouraging part of these exercises comes from the fact that the Indian Air Force’s young pilots … learnt from their mistakes, analysed, appreciated and came back strong. Mistakes were not repeated. In fact … the missions where the IAF did not fare well turned out to be immense learning experiences. At the end of the exercises … its more than clear that the IAF’s Su-30s were more than a match for the variants of the jets participating at the Red Flag exercises. Considering the fact that the central sensor of the Sukhoi, its radar … held up just fine in training mode …despite the barrage of electronic jamming augurs well for the Indian Air Force.
The complete article is available here.
Observations by Pushpindar Singh Chopra.
Mr. PS Chopra is the Editor of Vayu Aerospace Review.
The IAF did not undertake any IvIs at Nellis during Red Flag, nor did they engage thrust vectoring during the Exercise. IvIs were flown only at Mountain Home AFB. In none of the IvIs were the Su-30MKIs ever vulnerable, let alone shot down. As all exercises were flown with ACMI, the situations are recorded and available to substantiate this aspect. Additionally, the MKI's behaviour with thrust vectoring is dramatically different from that described by the Colonel. F-15 and F-16 aircrew were well appreciative of IAF manoeuvres with thrust vectoring.
Colonel Fornof's statement on Su-30MKI rates of turn with thrust vectoring (20o/ sec) is grossly 'out' but apparently gives away actual F-22 performance (28o/sec). Pitch of the talk seemed as to whether thrust vectoring was important or not. As all sorties were with ACMI, entire profiles are recorded, can be analysed and surely would have been replayed to drive the point home and make the 'chest thumping' sound more real. Apparently this was not done. Perhaps, as the Colonel is aware of F-22 data, he has tried to down play the Su-30MKI in comparison. Surprisingly, while there was no systems / avionics / comparison between the two types or with any other type of 'legacy' aircraft, the speaker does admit that radar of the MKI is 'superior' to that of the F-15 and F-16, however 'inferior' to AESA of the F-22 (a correct assessment). However, the IAF used the Su-30's radar in the training mode, with downgraded performance vis-à-vis operational mode, as they could hardly participate without this primary sensor
Fratricide by IAF fighters : this is correct, the IAF did 'shoot down' some 'friendlies' and that was assessed and attributed to the IAF not being networked. However, what the Colonel did not bring out were the two essential reasons for this. Firstly, this occurred mainly when the AWACS was not available (unserviceable) and controlling was done by GCI. More significantly it happened during extremely poor controlling by their operators, this fact being acknowledged during debriefs and the controllers being admonished accordingly. 'Accents' were perhaps the main culprit here, which very often led to American controllers not being able to understand Indian calls.
Now hear this : the F-15C and other USAF fighters had the same number of fratricides as the IAF ! Considering they are well networked, yet their pilots shot down the same number of 'friendlies'. This was not only a major concern but also turned out to be a major source of embarrassment as the USAF had everything -- Link 16, IFF Mode 4 etc and the IAF had nothing. Under the Rules of Engagement, they did not even permit the IAF to use data link within themselves. All cases of USAF fratricide were covered in the next day's mass briefing as lessons learnt by concerned aircrew. In the IAF, the incidents were covered by concerned controllers, and attributed to lack of adequate integration, excessive R/T congestion and poor controlling. Gloating on cases of IAF fratricide is frivolous and unprofessional.
However, Colonel Fornof did appreciate IAF 'professionalism' and that the IAF were able to dovetail with USAF procedures within short time. There was not a single training rule / airspace violation. This is a most important aspect.
Since the Colonel could hardly tell his audience that the IAF had given the USAF good run for their money, they downplayed the Su-30's capability. It is correct that the IAF aircrew included some very young pilots -- nearly 70 percent - but they adapted rapidly to the environment (totally alien), training rules (significantly different), airspace regulations etc but to say that they were unable to handle the Su-30 in its envelope (something that they have been practicing to do for four to five years) is just not credible ! If young pilots can adapt to new rules and environment within a short span of two weeks, it is because they are extremely comfortable and confident of their aircraft.
The IAF's all round performance was publicly acknowledged during, and at end of the Exercise, specifically by those involved. Not a single TR / airspace violation was acknowledged. Mission achievement rate was in excess of 90%. The drop out / mission success rates of all others, inclusive of USAF, were significantly lower. This is of major significance considering the fact that IAF was sustaining operations 20,000 km away from home base while the USAF were at home base. (The 8 Su-30s flew some 850 hrs during the deployment, which is equivalent to four months of flying task in India over 75 days). IAF's performance at Mountain Home AFB was even better that that at Nellis AFB.
FOD : At Mountain Home, IAF had reduced departure intervals from the very beginning (30" seconds) considering that operating surfaces were very clean. However, a few minor nicks were encountered and it was decided to revert to 60 seconds rather than undertake engine changes. This was communicated by the IAF at the very start (IPC itself).
There is no need to go in for 'kill ratios' as that would be demeaning. However, the IAF had significant edge throughout and retained it. In fact the true lesson for the USAF should be : 'do not field low value legacy equipment against the Su-30MKI' !. (demeaning or otherwise, it is understood that the kill ratio (at Mountain Home AFB) was 21 : 1, in favour of the Su-30MKIs).
). Have a reason to feel good about themselves, cuz we SATISFY nigga!! Go read the latest programming language while I enjoy my life!
