Japan Defence Forum

[Aepsilons]

Make In India And Expanding Scope For India-Japan Defense Cooperation – Analysis


India’s Act East policy and Prime Minister Modi’s Make in India drive coincide with the shifts in the Japanese post-war security policy and the April 2014 easing of the self-imposed arms export ban. The Agreement concerning transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation signed during the latest visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on December 12, 2015 unveils a new chapter in India-Japan defence cooperation by making available defence equipment and technology needed to carry out joint research, development and/or production projects.1 India’s defence modernisation presents enormous opportunities for the Japanese defence industry, which until recently concentrated exclusively on the domestic market in order to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to peace. Now, there is tremendous scope for redefining the contours of the bilateral defence cooperation by way of transfer of, and collaboration on, projects related to defence equipment and technology.

The most recent India-Japan Defence Ministerial Meeting in March 2015 underscored that defence technology cooperation “can emerge as a key pillar of bilateral defence relations”.2 Besides, Japan has been identified as a privileged partner in the Make in India campaign by Defence Minister Parrikar.3 India is interested in joint development and production of defence equipment. The progress on sourcing Japanese defence technology – for instance, negotiation on the Utility Seaplane Mark 2 (US-2) amphibian aircraft – is now in its final stages. Moreover, the manufacturers of the US-2 amphibian aircraft, ShinMaywa Industries, initiated discussions with several Indian counterparts as India and Japan debated the prospects of assembling the aircraft in India. The Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Company will reportedly partner with ShinMaywa Industries in assembling the aircraft in India.4

India plans to obtain 12 US-2 aircraft for use in patrolling the Andaman and Nicobar islands and conducting search and rescue operations in the Indian Ocean. While Bombardier (Canada) and Beriev (Russia) expressed interest in responding to the Request for Information (RFI), the US-2’s competence vis-à-vis rapid surveillance and response enabled by state of the art technology, rough sea operation capability, lake/riverine landing capacity, and short take-off and landing characteristics are best suited for securing critical SLOCs, conducting air sea rescue, casualty evacuation, humanitarian relief and disaster management, as well as constabulary operations and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) assignments of the Indian Navy. While ShinMaywa Industries is not a fresh entrant in India – it has provided aerobridges for airports and set up waste water treatment pumps5 — the US-2 is the first Japanese aircraft offered to India which is otherwise used mainly by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

Earlier, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) pressure on the Abe administration had enabled a policy shift in April 2014 concerning the export of military equipment aimed at supporting Japanese firms, which were restricted to the domestic needs of the Self-Defense Forces. Following this, Japan has entered into several military technology deals, including the export of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries manufactured gyroscopes to enhance the accuracy of the US developed Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile interceptors, supplying sensor technology to Britain aimed at improving air-to-air missile guiding capabilities, exploring the prospects of a submarine deal with Australia, and building underwater drones and robots capable of operating in radioactive surroundings with France.

Building upon the deepening bonhomie, Modi had earlier encouraged Japan to participate in Project 75 India. The objective is to strengthen naval power by building six stealth submarines in India. He welcomed the manufacturers of the ultra-quiet Soryu class non-nuclear attack submarine, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, to compete with other contractors including DCNS of France, HDW of Germany, Rosoboron export of Russia and Navantia of Spain.6 It is, however, important to note that in such projects, technology prerequisites, project timeframes, and economic practicability often complicate military technology cooperation. Besides, cooperation and access to Japanese technologies including communications, electronic warfare technologies, and surveillance radars should be explored.

So far, the compass of bilateral defence cooperation has included high level defence exchanges involving the Defence Ministers, Vice-Minister/Defence Secretary level Defence Policy Dialogue, Vice-Minister/Secretary level 2+2 dialogue, and visit by the Service Chiefs. JMSDF and the Indian Navy engage in joint exercises in bilateral or trilateral frameworks focusing on anti-piracy drills and search and rescue operations. The Indian Army and Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) engage in professional exchanges in humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief and counter-terrorism. Japan Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) and the Indian Air Force hold staff talks and official exchanges of test-pilots and air transport squadrons. In addition, there are exchanges on UN peace keeping operations between the Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) of the Indian Army and the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College and the Central Readiness Force (CRF) of JGSDF.7 In a welcome development, Japan has also become a regular partner in the India-US Malabar Exercise. Besides, an agreement concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information has been signed during the latest summit which guarantees the mutual protection of confidential military information shared with each other, provided they are consistent with the national laws of the receiving party.8

India-Japan relations have been elevated to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in the 2014 Tokyo Declaration. For long, maritime cooperation constituted the core of India-Japan defence and security cooperation. To add further value to the relationship that has ‘the largest potential in the world’,9 defence cooperation needs to advance from joint exercises and multi-faceted exchange frameworks to co-development and co-production of sophisticated defence equipment and technologies. The December 12, 2015 agreement on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation is a big step that will further consolidate India-Japan strategic ties. Since both Modi and Abe have pledged to realise the full potential of the partnership, this is an opportune time for addressing the challenges and producing tangible gains while deepening the scope of India-Japan defence cooperation.


Make In India And Expanding Scope For India-Japan Defense Cooperation – Analysis – Eurasia Review

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The debate over how far the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) would be able to intervene in an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula is heating up after the Shinzo Abe administration passed security legislation on Sep. 19, giving Japan the right to exercise collective self-defense. Information given by Abe at an Aug. 24 meeting of the House of Councillors Budget Committee suggests that Japan's new powers would not result in the sending of fighting units overseas because it does not represent a complete form of collective self-defense of the kind that allowed South Korea to send large numbers of troops to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. The only scenario Abe gave of collective self-defense was a situation involving the Korean Peninsula, in which North Korea attacked a US AEGIS destroyer.

But is a JSDF landing on the peninsula really out of the question? The answer is no. With last week's amendment of the 1997 Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to the Law on Situations with Important Influence on Japan, Tokyo increased potential rear-area support recipients from the US alone to the US and other countries' armed forces. It also permitted forms of support such as ammunition supplies and fueling of fighter planes readying for takeoff, which had previously been banned as presenting the potential for identification with the use of force by the US.

The concept of non-combat regions was significantly expanded to allow rear-area support from JSDF logistical units in regions in which no combat actions are currently taking place. In other words, the new system in one in which JSDF logistical units could land in Busan or another region where no combat actions are currently taking place to provide rear-area support in a war on the peninsula where the South Korea and US armies are leading the fight.

Japan's argument is that the JSDF would have to sign an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to be able to provide support directly to South Korean forces along with US ones. The situation hints that the US and Japan may begin applying greater pressure on South Korea to strengthen the countries' trilateral alliance. Japan has included wording in Article 2-4 of its Law on Situations with Important Influence of Japan stating that rear-area support would be limited to situations with consent from foreign countries. South Korean Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo attempted to allay fears during a parliamentary audit by the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21. Since operational control is such that the Combined Forces Commander acts in accordance with guidelines from the South Korean and US Presidents, [a JSDF landing] would be impossible without the South Korean President's consent, Han said.

But Han's remarks were merely a statement of principle. In reality, Seoul is likely to find itself unable to refuse a USFK request for an operationally necessary JSDF landing. A bigger problem surfaces when South Korea and Japan differ in their positions.

The biggest issue between Seoul and Tokyo right now involves the sort of situation described by Abe - and the question of whether Japan would require South Korea's consent to protect a US warship in the event of a North Korean attack. Seoul maintains that its consent would be required in situations involving the Korean Peninsula's security and South Korea's national interests. Japan has rejected that argument, with one former Defense Minister noting that North Korea is an independent state and United Nations member.

If Japan does intervene in a situation on the peninsula on collective self-defense grounds, the possibility cannot be ruled out that a potentially minor clash could escalate into a threat to East Asia as a whole. Abe himself is currently asserting that Japan will not be sending JSDF fighting units overseas.

It's unclear for how long that promise will be kept. The Prime Minister claims that we are not sending troops overseas, but nowhere in the law is it clearly stated that 'we will not do that,' noted Councillor Toshio Ogawa in a Sept. 19 Q&A session. Meanwhile, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party continues to push for a Constitutional amendment that would upend the existing Peace Constitution.

This means Abe's interpretation of the law could change going ahead. It's a major potential headache for South Korea, which is in the position of having to improve relations with the North and achieve balanced diplomacy between China on one side and the US and Japan on the other. By Gil Yun-hyung, Tokyo correspondent and Park Byong-su, senior staff writer.


Could Japan intervene militarily on the Korean peninsula? : International : News : The Hankyoreh

The poem is by Gesshū Sōko, yes?

Inhale, exhale
Forward, back
Living, dying:
Arrows, let flown each to each
Meet midway and slice.
The void in aimless flight --
Thus I return to the source

 

[Aepsilons]

Forest Monitoring Systems Resultant Of JAXA + JICA Initiative


On December 1, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) announced their Initiative for Improvement of Forest Governance at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris.

Artistic rendition of the ALOS-2 satellite.
Image is courtesy of JAXA.

The initiative will create a new tropical forest monitoring system that tracks deforestation and forest loss with JAXA’s Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2). The initiative will be conducted by a partnership between JICA and JAXA, and supporting private corporations are expected to join the initiative to contribute to the conservation of the world’s tropical forests. Activities will include building a forest monitoring system, training human resources in developing countries on how to use the system, and spreading knowledge about successful forest conservation projects around the world.

The forest monitoring system will maintain a constant watch on deforestation and forest loss in tropical regions of the globe and provide open access to its findings. With a resolution to 50 meters, the findings of the monitoring system will be updated about every six weeks on average to the JAXA website and other resources by March 2017. It is expected that these efforts will help countries with serious deforestation issues restrain illegal logging, and in the long term, help control the reduction of forests as an effective measure against climate change.

An example of how the data will be provided on the JAXA website.

Tropical forests serve as an immense storage tank to hold carbon dioxide in the form of carbon, and conserving the forests is critical in the fight against climate change. However, the loss of tropical forests continues unabated due to illegal logging and other factors, and implementing measures to stop the loss is a global priority. Aboard the ALOS-2 satellite is PALSAR-2 (L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar-2), a system that uses L band radio waves suitable for forest observation and capable of monitoring the ground surface 24 hours a day regardless of weather. PALSAR-2 can thus monitor for illegal logging and other changes in tropical forests despite the cloud cover that is typical found in such areas.

With technical cooperation provided by JICA in Brazil from 2009 to 2012 and data gathered by ALOS, the predecessor to ALOS-2, illegal foresting was monitored and assistance provided in near-real time. More than 2,000 incidents were discovered and the action taken contributed to a 40 percent reduction in the amount of forest area destroyed. The ALOS-2 improves on the earlier satellite model by using two types of reflecting radio waves that make it possible to analyze the data and detect deforestation with greater precision.

JICA and JAXA signed a partnership agreement in April 2014 with the objective of using aerospace technology to solve the many development challenges that developing countries face along with global issues. The Initiative for Improvement of Forest Governance with its incorporation of ALOS-2 was launched under the framework created by that agreement. Both agencies will continue to use satellite technology to conserve the world’s tropical forests.


Satnews Publishers: Daily Satellite News

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宇宙航空研究開発機構（JAXA）は、第48回航空科学技術委員会で「D-SEND#2試験結果報告」を報告した。

試験は、「静かな超音速旅客機」の実現に必要なキーとなる技術である低ソニックブーム設計概念を用いて設計された機体による飛行試験を通して、その効果を実証するもの。

試 験手法は、ブーム計測システム（BMS）上空を超音速で飛行し、ソニックブームを発生させ、高度方向に複数設置されたマイクロホンで計測する。計測したソ ニックブームが設計通り低減されていることを確認するもので、2015年7月24日、スウェーデン宇宙公社（SSC）エスレンジ宇宙センター内で実施し た。

試験の結果、BMS上空を計測要求の範囲内で飛行することに成功し、飛行異常対策の改修効果を確認した。3カ所のBMS設置場所と各サイトの高度方向4カ所を含めた全てのマイクロホンが正常に作動し、合計196個のソニックブーム波形の計測に成功した。

また、計測ブーム波形の振幅は推算ブーム波形（低ブーム型）とほぼ一致しており、明らかにN型のブーム波形と異なり、その振幅の低減効果を確認した。

ソ ニックブーム伝播過程への大乱気流の影響を解析したところ、ソニックブーム波形は、波線の通過場所と時間に応じてランダム性を持つ大気乱流の影響を受ける ため、一般に圧力上昇がなまる、圧力上昇がスパイク（先鋭）化、変化無しの3種類に変形することが確率的に推測される。

解析波形に、計測 ブーム波形の立ち上がり時間が長く、コブがなまっている特徴と、同傾向の波形が得られたことから、計測ブーム波形は大気乱流の影響を受けて変形したもの で、大気乱流の影響を受けていない場合、設計通りの波形が計測されていたと推測でき、D-SEND#2試験において「低ソニックブーム設計概念」を実証し たとしている。

今回の飛行試験で「低ソニックブーム設計概念」の実証に世界で初めて成功した。この過程で得た「低ソニックブーム波形に対する大気乱流の影響に関する詳細な解析結果」も世界初の知見となる。

今後については、超音速タスクグループ（SSTG）で提示した飛行試験結果と議論を踏まえ、2016年2月に開催されるICAOのCAEP10総会で報告される内容に関して調整するとともに、今後のソニックブーム基準策定に向けた技術的な議論を進め、検討を加速させる。

JAXAとしては、D-SENDプロジェクト終了に向けた審査を年度内に実施する予定。

今後、更なる技術課題への挑戦に向けた新たな研究開発計画を立案し、そこにこれまでの超音速機技術に関する研究成果を継承させるとともに、コンコルド以来止まっている超音速旅客機の運航再開に向けた機体開発に結びつける活動を産業界と積極的に推進していく方針。


JAXA、ソニックブーム波形の計測に成功…「静かな超音速旅客機」に向けて | レスポンス

 

[Jäger]

1st JSDF Bushmaster MRAP

 

[Jäger]

JSDF AH-1 with a OH-1

 

[Aepsilons]

Postwar Semantics in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

The Japan-U.S. alliance is one of the strongest in the world. Not only does it include a vast array of economic and diplomatic agreements, but the average observer can easily point out the degree to which their militaries cooperate. Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel can be found side-by-side with American forces during most of Asia’s major military exercises, and ongoing capability building and technology exchange has made the U.S.-Japan military partnership the most robust and advanced in Asia. Both nations share operating bases. both patrol the same waters, and both practice in the same airspace. In short, Japan-U.S. military cooperation is extensive and well established.

A foreign officer in Japan, however, soon encounters a phenomenon peculiar to the JSDF: Military terms were revised in the post-World War II lexicons. If seeking his infantry or artillery unit counterparts, he will have trouble finding anyone who knows the words “infantry” or “artillery.” While searching for captains, majors, and colonels to speak with, the same officer would only find curiously numbered personnel (1-rank, 2-rank, 3-rank, and so on). A naval officer looking for information on “destroyers” or “cruisers” will find himself at a loss as to which terms to use in his search.

So what’s the cause of these verbal contortions? In short, the post-World War II Japanese military has sought to separate itself from the wartime-legacy of the Japanese imperial forces, and all the negative press that comes with it: military coups, overthrow of the constitutional order, and rapacious conquest. To this end, the rearmament of Japan beginning in 1951 explored an unprecedented idea: If units, specialties, vessel classes, and even military ranks were given more innocuous names, it would decrease the possibility of a return to militarism and downplay the extent to which the JSDF is an actual military force.

New Force, New Names

Chief among the institutions to be torn down by the American occupiers immediately after the war was the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy; troops repatriating home were demobilized quickly and former Imperial officers found themselves on the street with little use for their wartime experience, and an occupying force with even less will to re-employ them. Despite the thoroughness of the imperial demobilization, however, Cold War imperatives spurred special negotiator John Foster Dulles to demand in 1951 that Japan raise an armed force for national defense (and deterring the Soviets). Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru agreed to establish land, sea, and air forces with 50,000 personnel, eventually rising to 75,000. With the old army and navy thoroughly dismantled, Japan would have to start almost from scratch – and the U.S. found itself responsible for training and equipping this new armed force, just as quickly as it found itself responsible for tearing the old one down.

To this end, an American Army officer named Colonel Frank Kowalski took charge of the rearmament, which included two major objectives relevant to this article: to ensure that no nefarious imperial influences find its way into the officer corps in order to prevent a resurgence in militarism, and to form a defense force as mentally separate as possible from the wartime military establishment. This led the U.S. trainers to develop brand new names for old military concepts; even the everyday terms used by Japan during World War II were frightening enough to conjure up images of the imperial banner marching across Asia. The U.S. architects of Japan’s National Defense Force were determined to avoid such images from causing potential Asian allies to flee their sphere of influence, or accidentally rekindle war fervor in Japan proper. The primary objective of the name changes, therefore, was to create as much distance (and difference) as possible between the prewar and postwar Japanese military image. This has critical implications when considering military morale, pride, and how the civilian population views the JSDF, even today.

The change in words from prewar to postwar form is difficult to understand unless one has daily encounters with the JSDF; the subtle differences are unavailable in English since both prewar and postwar Japanese military terms are translated as the same word. For example, a novice translator may translate the word “infantry” as 「歩兵」(hohei), which literally means “walking soldier,” and was certainly used to describe infantry during World War II and before. In practice, however, this is a dead word in postwar Japanese; the correct word today is 「普通科」(hutsuuka), which literally means “normal soldier” but is now also used to denote “infantry.” Term after term, postwar Japanese words for older military concepts create a sense of separation with the past in attempts to soften the formerly rigid specter of the military martinet.

Here is a list of some more prominent terms that have been changed. The list is not all-inclusive, but the objective is clear: Modern Japanese terms attempt to soften or redirect a “military” image as much as possible.

Pride, Not Militarism

From the JSDF’s perspective, most personnel are ambivalent about these word differences, finding them silly or ingratiating. After all, a large part of being an effective fighting force is pride, and pride is difficult to come by serving in a framework whose daily operating terms remind one of past humiliations and sever contact with one’s history. Indeed, daily conversation between JSDF and foreign military personnel often slips into the prewar terms, especially when discussing rank and titles. A conversation that begins discussing the “航空自衛隊” or “Air Self-Defense Force” might end with each party referring to themselves as “空軍” or “Air Force,” an image the JSDF has tried to avoid in public statements and in conduct. Additionally, the traditional terms for the military services imply a full offensive capability. In fact, the JSDF are restricted to defensive operations only and the Japanese government has taken great pains to establish this image. Any term that takes away from this effort, therefore, is frowned upon, especially from a policy level.

Despite irrational fears sometimes found in East Asia, this return to the old terminology doesn’t betray a wicked desire to return to prewar militarism; rather, it occurs because the prewar terms are the terms still used by other nations and cross all international boundaries, including some like Sweden or Switzerland that haven’t fought a war in more than two centuries. This makes them easy to use in regular conversation. Indeed, among themselves JSDF personnel often use the simpler terms “Army,” “Navy,” and “Air Force” not only because they’re easier to use but also because they reflect a broader tradition of military history and culture. The JSDF has only been a “defense force” for 65 years; it was an “armed force” during its formative years in the 19th century, and its tradition reflects such a history. A similar analogue can be found when the United States changed its “Department of War” to the “Department of Defense;” historically difficult to part from, the name change carries subtle differences in goals and reflects a changing policy world, yet the traditions of the War Department live on in the Department of Defense and in each individual service, unchanged by the name.

Today’s Implications

The name changes have had several notable implications. Some U.S. officers, now wishing for a more active defense partner in the Pacific, look upon the name changes with a combination of curiosity and regret. In most estimations, it was an experiment designed both to satisfy GHQ’s idealistic goals of demilitarization, best represented by Article IX of the constitution, and to minimize any chances of Japan returning to militarism in the way Germany did during the interwar period. Nevertheless, the new names became custom, and custom has become tradition; a change back to more direct and “warlike” terms will most likely only accompany a return to full-fledged Armed Forces status.

Adding new terms and eliminating old ones has also served to increase the gulf between the JSDF and the civil population. Already unpopular in Japan, by changing the ranks and names of basic service functions, everyday citizens who shunned military matters lost even more of their basic military awareness. In contrast with the average U.S. citizen who at least has heard the word “sergeant” and may grasp the basic differences between the services, for a long time Japanese, from the lowliest pauper to the highest policymakers, actively scorned the JSDF. Facing neglect from their own countrymen and forced to use names that intentionally emasculate them, it is no wonder the JSDF revert to the old names on occasion; to do otherwise would not only be to ignore their own history but would also be self-deprecating and potentially harmful to unit morale.

No matter the opinion, the postwar military terminology changes reflect a substantial though rarely discussed facet of everyday JSDF life that affects JSDF operations and reputation in ways seldom understood. Essentially possessing two lexicons, each politically charged in a different way, the JSDF continue their precarious balancing act between historical pride, postwar loathing, and reputation concerns in their daily operations, an unenviable position that other militaries have the luxury to be without.


Postwar Semantics in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces | The Diplomat

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Developments in the arctic! LET'S BUILD! I mean, let us Research !!

@Hamartia Antidote @Technogaianist @yoshi.oda

 

[Aepsilons]

 

[Aepsilons]

 

[Aepsilons]

INTER-BRANCH Wrestling Competition Event, 2016.

 

[Aepsilons]

New officers, declaring the Supreme Oath to the Nation, Graduating class of 防衛大学校 (National Defense Academy of Japan), 2016.

 

[Dzul]

Japan Ready For Next Fighter Engine Core

Jan 21, 2016 Bradley Perrett | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Laying the groundwork for a fighter their country may field around 2030, Japanese engineers are preparing to build a demonstrator engine core, following success in materials research for the low-bypass turbofan engine they are planning for the aircraft. On the airframe side of the technology-acquisition program, another team has made much progress researching supersonic use of weapon bays for the proposed F-3 fighter.

A complete demonstrator engine, including a fan and low-pressure turbine, will follow the building of the core, says the defense ministry’s Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI). IHI Corp. is the main contractor for the engine work, one of a range of projects Japan is undertaking in support of the F-3.

Airframe developers, probably including key personnel from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, appear to have settled on something close to a 2013 configuration for the F-3 that emphasized endurance and weapons load over flight performance. TRDI has not confirmed the general arrangement of the aircraft has been decided, but its latest graphical presentation of the program uses previously seen drawings that approximate the 2013 configuration.

That design, 25DMU, described a heavy fighter with a belly weapons bay for six ramjet missiles about the size of the MBDA Meteor. The wing was large and slender by fighter standards, offering high fuel volume and low drag due to lift but penalizing acceleration.

TRDI continues to publish drawings of F-3 concepts similar to the long-endurance 25DMU of 2013. Credit: TRDI

TRDI presented an analysis in 2014 to show why that configuration was best. The key factor was that the high-endurance design provided more aircraft on station than would be available from an alternative fleet of high-performance fighters. By defending the configuration, which was compared with earlier studies, the agency gave outsiders reason to think an undisclosed design then in preparation, 26DMU, would not be much different.

The drawings republished in the latest report differ from 25DMU in two respects, probably because they slightly predate that design: They appear to show space for only four missiles in the bay, and an infrared sensor below and forward of the cockpit is absent.

While TRDI says in its presentation that building and testing the core will be the next step in engine development, with the complete turbofan to follow, it gives no timing for those activities. According to earlier planning, prototypes of the low-pressure compressor and low-pressure turbine will be tested from fiscal 2017 (testing started in fiscal 2015). A full prototype engine should be demonstrated in fiscal 2018, when the government is due to decide on whether to go ahead with the F-3. No doubt the government will want to see strong progress in engine development before committing to the fighter.

Testing of a compressor and combustor, the other two main modules of an engine core, has produced good results, says TRDI, without offering details on that work.

According to plans set at least three years ago, the demonstrator engine should generate 15 metric tons (33,000 lb.) of thrust and will be unusually slim, for reduced drag. Each F-3 would have two such engines. Like the Pratt & Whitney F119 of the Lockheed Martin F-22, the two-shaft Japanese engine is intended to have three fan stages, six high-pressure compressor stages and single-stage high- and low-pressure turbines that counterrotate. Barring upsets in testing, the main features of its configuration are likely to be settled. TRDI continues to present the engine with a drawing first shown in 2011.

In its progress update, TRDI confirms the average temperature of gas entering the high-pressure turbine will be as high as 1,800C (3,300F), a figure mentioned earlier in the program. Studies conducted so far indicate that ceramic matrix composite (CMC), a material that can cope with higher temperatures than metals, can be used to make the shroud of the turbine. The reinforcement of the ceramic will be carbon-silicon fiber. Stator and rotor blades will be made of a nickel-based single-crystal superalloy. The turbine disk, on which the rotor blades are mounted, will be built with a locally developed nickel-cobalt superalloy, TMW-24.

Five years ago, program managers expected to make the stator of CMC, while the rotor, a more challenging assembly, seems always to have been planned as metal. Japanese research suggests the rotor’s TMW-24 disk can be made through the traditional process of casting and forging, rather than by powder metallurgy, the usual technology for such rotor parts over the past few decades.

Researchers assessed TMW-24 on the basis of a disk life of 1,000 hr. under centrifugal stress of 630 megapascals (91,000 lbf. per sq. in.). Subject to those conditions a TMW-24 disk should cope with 710C, approaching the 730C performance of powder-metallurgy technology early in the previous decade, and above the 690C of the best cast-and-forged technology from the mid-1970s, TRDI reports. This aspect of the turbine has not yet been verified, however.

Weapons bay studies began in 2010 and were followed by tests beginning in 2013. That work has revealed combinations of supersonic airflow velocities and angles at which a weapon can be released from a bay. The next step will be the design of a release mechanism.

Japanese engineers are already familiar with dropping weapons from the bays of subsonic aircraft, such as the Kawasaki Heavy Industries P-1 maritime aircraft. The research into supersonic release from bays used computational dynamics and a wind-tunnel test rig that simulated the underside of an aircraft with an open weapon bay. The wind tunnel was capable of speeds of Mach 0.3-2.5. According to a 2012 report, release tests in the wind tunnel were conducted at Mach 1.4. That is a likely speed for the launch of an air-to-air missile. At the time of that report, 11 cavity shapes were being investigated.


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@Nihonjin1051

I know japan metal material science and technology are so adavance long decades ago... I dont intend to say that this is late, But why japan just serious develop their advance fighter engine? Isthis related to restrictions imposed by US that make the law since japan defeat?

 

[Aepsilons]

１９５０年（昭和２５年）に陸上自衛隊の前身である「警察予備隊」が創隊しました。そ

の後、「保安庁保安隊」、「防衛庁陸上自衛隊」、「防衛省陸上自衛隊」と名前を変え、現在に至ります。

　積極的平和主義のもと、日本の平和と安全、そして世界の平和と安定のために、何時如何なる任務が与えられようとも事態に即応して任務を完遂し得る「強靭な陸上自衛隊の創造」を目標に、これからも、進化し続けます。
　　今後も、陸上自衛隊に対して、より一層のご理解とご協力をよろしくお願いいたします。

 

[Aepsilons]

SDF shows off armored transport vehicle in drill to rescue Japanese expats

By YUSUKE FUKUI/ Staff Writer


The Self-Defense Forces on Dec. 17 revealed its new armored vehicle equipped with a roof-mounted machine gun that will be used to evacuate Japanese civilians in a foreign nation in conflict.


Japan’s “transport protection vehicle” was put through the paces in an SDF drill at the Somagahara Maneuver Area that straddles Takasaki and Shinto in central Gunma Prefecture.


A V-shaped hull makes the 10-seat vehicle highly resistant to bombs and other munitions used by insurgents.


It is the SDF’s version of the Australian Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle. Australian forces used the vehicle in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Four were deployed this year to the Ground SDF’s Central Readiness Regiment stationed in Utsunomiya. The regiment acts as an advance team for the SDF.


The drill simulated the rescue of Japanese civilians gathered at the Japanese embassy in a nation undergoing turmoil after a change in political leadership.


Fifteen SDF members acting as civilians were led into the armored vehicles under simulated conditions of being surrounded by an angry mob or attacked with a bomb as they headed to an airport.


Although recently enacted national security legislation eases restrictions on the use of arms in overseas rescue missions of Japanese civilians, the SDF decided not to use the machine gun during the drill.

Wearing bulletproof vests, Self-Defense Forces members acting as Japanese civilians in a foreign nation board transport protection vehicles


Reference: Asahi Shimbun

 

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[Aepsilons]

I know japan metal material science and technology are so adavance long decades ago... I dont intend to say that this is late, But why japan just serious develop their advance fighter engine? Isthis related to restrictions imposed by US that make the law since japan defeat?

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JICA and JAXA Announce Forest Monitoring System Using ALOS-2 Satellite

Constant monitoring of deforestation throughout the tropics and open data access on the Internet
On December 1, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) announced the Initiative for Improvement of Forest Governance at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris. The initiative will create a new tropical forest monitoring system that tracks deforestation and forest loss with JAXA’s Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2).

The initiative will be conducted by a partnership between JICA and JAXA, and supporting private corporations are expected to join the initiative to contribute to the conservation of the world’s tropical forests. Activities will include building a forest monitoring system, training human resources in developing countries on how to use the system, and spreading knowledge about successful forest conservation projects around the world.

The forest monitoring system will maintain a constant watch on deforestation and forest loss in tropical regions of the globe and provide open access to its findings. With a resolution to 50 meters, the findings of the monitoring system will be updated about every six weeks on average to the JAXA website and other resources by March 2017. It is expected that these efforts will help countries with serious deforestation issues restrain illegal logging, and in the long term, help control the reduction of forests as an effective measure against climate change.

Tropical forests serve as an immense storage tank to hold carbon dioxide in the form of carbon, and conserving the forests is critical in the fight against climate change. However, the loss of tropical forests continues unabated due to illegal logging and other factors, and implementing measures to stop the loss is a global priority. Aboard the ALOS-2 satellite is PALSAR-2 (L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar-2), a system that uses L band radio waves suitable for forest observation and capable of monitoring the ground surface 24 hours a day regardless of weather. PALSAR-2 can thus monitor for illegal logging and other changes in tropical forests despite the cloud cover that is typical found in such areas.

With technical cooperation provided by JICA in Brazil from 2009 to 2012 and data gathered by ALOS, the predecessor to ALOS-2, illegal foresting was monitored and assistance provided in near-real time. More than 2,000 incidents were discovered and the action taken contributed to a 40 percent reduction in the amount of forest area destroyed. The ALOS-2 improves on the earlier satellite model by using two types of reflecting radio waves that make it possible to analyze the data and detect deforestation with greater precision.

JICA and JAXA signed a partnership agreement in April 2014 with the objective of using aerospace technology to solve the many development challenges that developing countries face along with global issues. The Initiative for Improvement of Forest Governance with its incorporation of ALOS-2 was launched under the framework created by that agreement. Both agencies will continue to use satellite technology to conserve the world’s tropical forests.

An example of how the data will be provided on the JAXA website

* Polygon shapes outline areas where forest loss has been detected. The data will be provided about every six weeks in images with a resolution of 50 meters showing reduced forest cover.


http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/activity/int/topics.html#topics6664

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Revision of the Mutual Cooperation Agreement between
the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and
the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)

National Research and Development Agency
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)

Dr. Naoki Okumura, President of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (hereinafter referred to as JAXA), and Dr. Jean-Yves Le Gall, President of the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (hereinafter referred to as CNES), signed the revised agreement for the "Inter-Agency Arrangement between NASDA and CNES Concerning the Preparation of a Long Term Cooperation in the Field of Space Programs " on 5 October 2015.

The purpose of the revision is to achieve effective cooperation between space agencies of Japan and France, in light of the changes in the business environment., This includes the increasing presence of emerging countries and the private sector in space development and utilization, as well as changes in Japan such as the enactment of the new Basic Plan for Space Policy and the transition of JAXA to a National Research and Development Agency.

On the occasion of the visit by Mr. Manuel Valls, Prime Minister of France to Japan, the exchange ceremony of signing agreement took place at the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan in the presence of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Manuel Valls.

Background of cooperation with CNES
Cooperation between JAXA and CNES in the field of space was initiated in 1980s. In the 1990s, the two agencies built their cooperative relationship through specific programs, such as carrying the CNES instrument on Japan’s “Midori” (ADEOS: the Advanced Earth Observing Satellite).

In November 1996, in the presence of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Chirac, the "Inter-Agency Arrangement between NASDA and CNES Concerning the Preparation of a Long Term Cooperation in the Field of Space Programs " was signed by Mr. Isao Uchida, President of NASDA (former JAXA) and Dr. Alain Bensoussan, President of CNES.

In 2010, the Presidents of both agencies signed the new “Inter-Agency Agreement between JAXA and CNES Concerning the Cooperation in the Field of Space Programs”, due to the maturing situation of the relationship between the two agencies which had moved into implementation phase from preparation phase.

Main points of the revision:

1. (1) In order to strengthen the cooperative study, a strategic meeting is established with the attendance of executives in charge of planning of both agencies. This meeting will drive the overall discussion between JAXA and CNES to decide the direction of cooperation.
2. (2) Towards cooperation, three areas are prioritized: “Future joint mission study”; “Space applications for the society (Down Stream Applications)”; and “Parts under the space environment”.
   
   
   http://global.jaxa.jp/press/2015/10/20151005_cnes.html