ISI and MI fear spike in terrorism

[TalibanSwatter]

DAWN

RATHER than increasing confidence, the report on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata presented to the Supreme Court on Tuesday on behalf of Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence gives cause for greater concern. In January, the attorney general had conceded that some 700 suspected terrorists were confined in internment centres established under the Action in Aid of Civil Power Regulations 2011, a time-bound and area-specific law that legalises the detention of suspected terrorists. In trying to defend such detentions, the report for the SC exposed worrying details that many had suspected but the agencies had not officially revealed before now: that there is a fear of increased terrorist activities in several border agencies because of a nexus between the Tehreek-i-Taliban Swat and the Afghan government, and that the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is merging with violent sectarian outfits that operate in the country at large, with the implication being that if detained members of the latter were removed from internment centres they would slip away into other parts of the country, including urban centres, and carry out further violence.

This leaves a lot of questions to be answered. Why did it take a legal petition against the AACPR to bring these issues to light? This information ought to have been shared much earlier with parliament and the people, because the mergers being talked of have very serious repercussions. In particular, the information about the TTP-sectarian nexus and the ability of any freed militants to carry out attacks in major cities and other settled areas constitutes an official admission that the militancy issue is not confined to the tribal belt, which is more of a hub from where violence is being exported to the rest of the country.


If reality is as presented in Tuesday’s report, this necessitates a rethink in Pakistan’s approach to the militancy problem. The authorities argue that the AACPR helps keep the peace in the restive tribal agencies, given the well-known issues, such as the lack of witnesses, with prosecuting terrorism suspects captured in the area. But if the problem is not restricted to Fata, are we to see the scope of the law expanded to other parts of the country too? Now that this information is public, it needs to be recognised that detention of the kind permitted by the AACPR is a short-term response rather than a real solution to the problem. Pakistan delays the creation of a comprehensive strategy at its peril.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Pakistan became vulerable to it when the Ruskies attacked Afghanistan.

@nuclearpak: I do not agree with this.
1.Pakistan did not become vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew" in Afghanistan when the Soviets came in.

2.Pakistan did not also really become vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew" in Afghanistan even though it helped to concoct that brew with the help of USA and KSA.

3.Pakistan really became vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew" when it allowed it to survive and even prosper (as Strategic Asset or whatever); when it should have obliterated it when its "utility" was done. The upshot of this is now that Pakistan is alone and majorly vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew". Nobody is likely to get hit harder by it other than Pakistan (apart from Afghanistan of course) itself. Pakistan had numerous chances to tackle it but failed. Now.......

To you and me and other folks on this board, yes, to most people on the street, sadly no.

Sadly I agree with this part.

 

[Jango]

3.Pakistan really became vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew" when it allowed it to survive and even prosper (as Strategic Asset or whatever); when it should have obliterated it when its "utility" was done. The upshot of this is now that Pakistan is alone and majorly vulnerable to the "Toxic Brew". Nobody is likely to get hit harder by it other than Pakistan (apart from Afghanistan of course) itself. Pakistan had numerous chances to tackle it but failed. Now.......

What option did we have? How would we have 'destroyed' this monster?

 

[Capt.Popeye]

What option did we have? How would we have 'destroyed' this monster?

Destruction was not easy, agreed. What coud have been done first was withdraw financial and material help which was all they were looking for externally. The rest (motivation etc) was internal. Also (atleast) keep them at arms-length wrt moral support to start with.

Then build up the forces in western flank of the country to physically contain them outside the borders and reduce their ability to infiltrate and cause trouble internally. Fencing and mining parts of the border could have been an adjunct to that.

Later; progressively mop up the Madarsas which had become the breeding grounds for the lot. Some of the more toxic ones needed to be dealt with more ruthlessly, but some others could have been turned around to some extent. This was the most difficult and time-consuming part of the operation. Here there was need for a Socio-Economic methodology. Here the very same KSA could have been used to fund and morally support the 'carrot and stick' type of operation. Did we see any of that?

Instead that policy of persisting with "Strategic Assets" was continued. After a point they have ceased to be assets to anybody but themselves. They have tasted blood; and like a Man-Eating Tiger that has tasted blood; there is no chance of weaning them away.

 

[Jango]

Destruction was not easy, agreed. What coud have been done first was withdraw financial and material help which was all they were looking for externally. The rest (motivation etc) was internal. Also (atleast) keep them at arms-length wrt moral support to start with.

Then build up the forces in western flank of the country to physically contain them outside the borders and reduce their ability to infiltrate and cause trouble internally. Fencing and mining parts of the border could have been an adjunct to that.

Later; progressively mop up the Madarsas which had become the breeding grounds for the lot. Some of the more toxic ones needed to be dealt with more ruthlessly, but some others could have been turned around to some extent. This was the most difficult and time-consuming part of the operation. Here there was need for a Socio-Economic methodology. Here the very same KSA could have been used to fund and morally support the 'carrot and stick' type of operation. Did we see any of that?

Instead that policy of persisting with "Strategic Assets" was continued. After a point they have ceased to be assets to anybody but themselves. They have tasted blood; and like a Man-Eating Tiger that has tasted blood; there is no chance of weaning them away.

Mining and fencing the border is easier said than done. Had we mined the border then, the refugees that had come would have created a huge uproar IMO.

As for the rest, I think we massively underestimated the fallout of this whole project. I am not familiar with what the top honchos thought on the issue, but I reckon that they made big mistakes and thought that this would go away as quickly as the Ruskies did from Afghanistan. Sadly, that didn't happen...naivety on our part perhaps.

Because we thought this would go away on it's own, we didn't feel the need to do anything proactively...all our policies have been reactionary ones, which are made after something happens.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Mining and fencing the border is easier said than done. Had we mined the border then, the refugees that had come would have created a huge uproar IMO.

As for the rest, I think we massively underestimated the fallout of this whole project. I am not familiar with what the top honchos thought on the issue, but I reckon that they made big mistakes and thought that this would go away as quickly as the Ruskies did from Afghanistan. Sadly, that didn't happen...naivety on our part perhaps.

Because we thought this would go away on it's own, we didn't feel the need to do anything proactively...all our policies have been reactionary ones, which are made after something happens.

I agree with the description of policies being reactionary by nature. That has somehow been the underlying factor time and again. Coupled with a singular desire to piggy-back on events.

About the naievety part, I disagree. More likely it was "cocksureness" a belief that people and events could be manipulated for a long time (if not for ever) using that magic mantra of religiosity as motivation. Another problem was that some of the Head Honchos of that time who had formulated this stratagem of using that mantra to induce effects came under its spell themselves. So their beliefs (born again?) and interests took primacy over the larger (national) interests. So they could see no reason to stop or derail the progress of the behemoth that had been set rolling.
IMO, that was the greatest cause of this mess.

 

[Jango]

About the naievety part, I disagree. More likely it was "cocksureness" a belief that people and events could be manipulated for a long time (if not for ever) using that magic mantra of religiosity as motivation. Another problem was that some of the Head Honchos of that time who had formulated this stratagem of using that mantra to induce effects came under its spell themselves. So their beliefs (born again?) and interests took primacy over the larger (national) interests. So they could see no reason to stop or derail the progress of the behemoth that had been set rolling.
IMO, that was the greatest cause of this mess.

Hmm...that is another angle to look at it from.