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Is India-Pakistan entente possible?
By Izzuddin Pal
Sunday, 21 Feb, 2010
During the twenties the western powers had an opportunity to decide about the future of conquered territories, and during the forties they had to cope with decolonisation of their subject nations. In both cases they followed what some historians of imperialism call the policy of strengthening post-colonial links. The goal of this policy was to link the conquered territories or the post-colonial regimes with the emerging international political economy in order to protect their interests.
This objective had many facets, such as: to patronise the reliable compradors; and to restrain the newly-acquired autonomy by defining the borders in order to leave scope for potential disputes between the neighbouring countries, e.g. Middle East Jordan-Transjordan-Palestine-Balfour Declaration for a Jewish homeland; Africa from north to south, ignoring geography, tribal affiliations, and animal migrations; and South and South-East Asia The Philippines, Indonesia, Sukarno later deposed by Suharto, India-Pakistan, the Radcliffe-Mountbatten Award ignoring agreed principles for population and river-canal linkages.
All this was to promote dependency and protect the imperial political interests and trade. In the post-Second World War period, this policy produced a significant bonanza for what US President Eisenhower had referred to in another context as military-industrial complex, and of course for globalisation.
The India-Pakistan dispute has both internal (Hindu-Muslim tensions) and external dynamics. In the case of the latter factor, the dispute seems to correspond with the rules of the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links for both countries.
Kashmir is the core issue that explains the India-Pakistan dispute. The future of the princely state, the majority of population, and its geographical linkage with the Indus Valley would by all counts have made it a part of Pakistan. It did not happen and several factors are usually mentioned which created this situation, such as hostile attitude of Lord Mountbatten towards Mohammad Ali Jinnah, role of Jawaharlal Nehru and what is called the Edwina-Nehru relations, the role of the ruler of the state, the failures of the Pathans to occupy the strategic route, the Poonch revolt, etc.
The real causes which seem to describe the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links are: 1) to temper with the partition plan in order to allot the district of Gurdaspur to India and create a corridor for providing all-season link for Kashmir with India and, 2) to make a massive airlift of the Indian army to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, in October 1947. Such an airlift would require contingency plans to implement it in time. As Alastair Lamb (Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy) mentions, both the Indian apologists and the British officials had argued that this was the result of a triumph of improvisation. But the airlift on such a scale would take more than a few days, even a few weeks. Some military strategists are of the view that perhaps this kind of airlift must have been in the works, involving considerable staff work, perhaps parallel to the announcement of Radcliffe-Mountbatten Award as mentioned above.
In this possible time-frame, the objective of the airlift would be in line with the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links planned for the two countries. Lord Mountbatten was accompanied in his mission for transfer of power by some senior members of the British bureaucracy and some advisors who had high credentials as members of the Establishment, thoroughly familiar with the policy for strengthening post-colonial links. Of course, the Hindu-Muslim relations after the introduction of provincial autonomy had deteriorated, especially in the old United Provinces; and during the Pakistan movement, Hindu fundamentalists were also bent upon creating instability and to protest against the possible vivisection of Mother India. The tinkering with the border of Kashmir, however, had long-term implications.
Given this context, let us go fast forward and briefly ponder on the current perspective, and to examine the arguments which would strongly favour an honourable settlement of the dispute, with reference to the following three factors: the economic perspective, the financial considerations and the role of diplomacy.
That India and Pakistan should be able to live side by side peacefully is an important principle honouring contiguity which was the basis of establishing a separate homeland for Muslims. That was the desire of the founder of the nation, as indicated by the fact that he left his property interests intact in Bombay and his will included beneficiaries from both countries.
Trade is usually considered as a first propeller of good relations. In a narrow sense, this factor alone is not a reliable index, because as the global data on trading with the enemy would indicate, the profit motive and the urge to pursue transactions for mutual gain usually defy obstacles, both in official trickles as well as informal dealings. This is made possible by the fact that in the cross-border dealings, there are advantages in shipping and other transaction costs which can be higher for longer distances. Trade, however, is also associated with other factors which play an important part in promoting mutual economic relations between the countries, such as trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIP) in goods and services, and rules for foreign investment. All this becomes part of good economic relations.
There may be some resistance from the business and industrial sectors in Pakistan to removing official barriers to economic relations. Both sectors have become used to the shelter for high-cost goods provided by the no-war situation prevailing between the two countries for decades, as against, Indian industry significantly improving its comparative advantage. But this is the stuff for negotiation and arrangement for transitional and temporary exceptions and exemptions in bilateral agreements.
Above all, peace has its distinct economic dividends, for citizens in both countries, for promoting cultural and educational exchange. The two countries do have a long history of a shared heritage.
The other factor, the financial considerations, which favours peace with its own dividends, is related to the cost of war or near-war conflicts. Professor Paul Kennedy, a well-known British historian in his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers examines how wars are usually decided by the relative financial advantage among the adversaries, and it equally applies to other near-war conflicts. He suggests that in specific conflicts or over the long run, the chances of gaining ascendancy are correlated strongly to available resources and economic durability; military over-stretch is the consistent threat when ambitions for security requirements are greater than the resource base can provide.
Both India and Pakistan, as nuclear powers, tend to divert large resources to feed deficit financing and military build-up. The arguments offered by Professor Kennedy, therefore, would equally apply to both countries. The recent statement of General Ashfaq Kayani underlining the India-centric position of the army is of course a strategy prepared in response to Indias Cold Start doctrine to attack before mobilising, increasing the possibility of a sudden spiral of escalation. It may lower the threshold for nuclear overhang and increase hostility between them. But the question of drain on resources the choice between guns against butter -will continue to haunt both countries.
Is it possible then to argue that diplomacy would present better prospects than the previous two options? The literature on the strategy of survival of a small state gives us some guidance in this regard. For example, a stable and a growing economy can provide a strong negotiating position to the country, which is not the case with Pakistan. Associated with this phenomenon is the role that the diaspora can play in advocating the case of their native land. But there is a small professional class living abroad which is not able to relate to the performance of the political elite for their poor governance and reputation for lack of integrity.
There is no military solution, in any case, which Pakistan can pursue effectively. Negotiation and persuasion are the only options available to the country. Both countries can liberate themselves from the burden of the big powers policy for strengthening post-colonial links by recognising that there are three parties involved in the dispute over Kashmir. In any viable solution of the issue, the people of Kashmir will have to exercise their opinions, who still live in a virtual limbo of special status. And Pakistan as a lower riparian of the rivers, the life blood of the Indus region, has considerable stake in the future of the territory. For India, the solution to the conflict will allow it to play a meaningful role in the region. Peace will have dividends for both countries
By Izzuddin Pal
Sunday, 21 Feb, 2010
During the twenties the western powers had an opportunity to decide about the future of conquered territories, and during the forties they had to cope with decolonisation of their subject nations. In both cases they followed what some historians of imperialism call the policy of strengthening post-colonial links. The goal of this policy was to link the conquered territories or the post-colonial regimes with the emerging international political economy in order to protect their interests.
This objective had many facets, such as: to patronise the reliable compradors; and to restrain the newly-acquired autonomy by defining the borders in order to leave scope for potential disputes between the neighbouring countries, e.g. Middle East Jordan-Transjordan-Palestine-Balfour Declaration for a Jewish homeland; Africa from north to south, ignoring geography, tribal affiliations, and animal migrations; and South and South-East Asia The Philippines, Indonesia, Sukarno later deposed by Suharto, India-Pakistan, the Radcliffe-Mountbatten Award ignoring agreed principles for population and river-canal linkages.
All this was to promote dependency and protect the imperial political interests and trade. In the post-Second World War period, this policy produced a significant bonanza for what US President Eisenhower had referred to in another context as military-industrial complex, and of course for globalisation.
The India-Pakistan dispute has both internal (Hindu-Muslim tensions) and external dynamics. In the case of the latter factor, the dispute seems to correspond with the rules of the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links for both countries.
Kashmir is the core issue that explains the India-Pakistan dispute. The future of the princely state, the majority of population, and its geographical linkage with the Indus Valley would by all counts have made it a part of Pakistan. It did not happen and several factors are usually mentioned which created this situation, such as hostile attitude of Lord Mountbatten towards Mohammad Ali Jinnah, role of Jawaharlal Nehru and what is called the Edwina-Nehru relations, the role of the ruler of the state, the failures of the Pathans to occupy the strategic route, the Poonch revolt, etc.
The real causes which seem to describe the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links are: 1) to temper with the partition plan in order to allot the district of Gurdaspur to India and create a corridor for providing all-season link for Kashmir with India and, 2) to make a massive airlift of the Indian army to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, in October 1947. Such an airlift would require contingency plans to implement it in time. As Alastair Lamb (Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy) mentions, both the Indian apologists and the British officials had argued that this was the result of a triumph of improvisation. But the airlift on such a scale would take more than a few days, even a few weeks. Some military strategists are of the view that perhaps this kind of airlift must have been in the works, involving considerable staff work, perhaps parallel to the announcement of Radcliffe-Mountbatten Award as mentioned above.
In this possible time-frame, the objective of the airlift would be in line with the British policy for strengthening post-colonial links planned for the two countries. Lord Mountbatten was accompanied in his mission for transfer of power by some senior members of the British bureaucracy and some advisors who had high credentials as members of the Establishment, thoroughly familiar with the policy for strengthening post-colonial links. Of course, the Hindu-Muslim relations after the introduction of provincial autonomy had deteriorated, especially in the old United Provinces; and during the Pakistan movement, Hindu fundamentalists were also bent upon creating instability and to protest against the possible vivisection of Mother India. The tinkering with the border of Kashmir, however, had long-term implications.
Given this context, let us go fast forward and briefly ponder on the current perspective, and to examine the arguments which would strongly favour an honourable settlement of the dispute, with reference to the following three factors: the economic perspective, the financial considerations and the role of diplomacy.
That India and Pakistan should be able to live side by side peacefully is an important principle honouring contiguity which was the basis of establishing a separate homeland for Muslims. That was the desire of the founder of the nation, as indicated by the fact that he left his property interests intact in Bombay and his will included beneficiaries from both countries.
Trade is usually considered as a first propeller of good relations. In a narrow sense, this factor alone is not a reliable index, because as the global data on trading with the enemy would indicate, the profit motive and the urge to pursue transactions for mutual gain usually defy obstacles, both in official trickles as well as informal dealings. This is made possible by the fact that in the cross-border dealings, there are advantages in shipping and other transaction costs which can be higher for longer distances. Trade, however, is also associated with other factors which play an important part in promoting mutual economic relations between the countries, such as trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIP) in goods and services, and rules for foreign investment. All this becomes part of good economic relations.
There may be some resistance from the business and industrial sectors in Pakistan to removing official barriers to economic relations. Both sectors have become used to the shelter for high-cost goods provided by the no-war situation prevailing between the two countries for decades, as against, Indian industry significantly improving its comparative advantage. But this is the stuff for negotiation and arrangement for transitional and temporary exceptions and exemptions in bilateral agreements.
Above all, peace has its distinct economic dividends, for citizens in both countries, for promoting cultural and educational exchange. The two countries do have a long history of a shared heritage.
The other factor, the financial considerations, which favours peace with its own dividends, is related to the cost of war or near-war conflicts. Professor Paul Kennedy, a well-known British historian in his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers examines how wars are usually decided by the relative financial advantage among the adversaries, and it equally applies to other near-war conflicts. He suggests that in specific conflicts or over the long run, the chances of gaining ascendancy are correlated strongly to available resources and economic durability; military over-stretch is the consistent threat when ambitions for security requirements are greater than the resource base can provide.
Both India and Pakistan, as nuclear powers, tend to divert large resources to feed deficit financing and military build-up. The arguments offered by Professor Kennedy, therefore, would equally apply to both countries. The recent statement of General Ashfaq Kayani underlining the India-centric position of the army is of course a strategy prepared in response to Indias Cold Start doctrine to attack before mobilising, increasing the possibility of a sudden spiral of escalation. It may lower the threshold for nuclear overhang and increase hostility between them. But the question of drain on resources the choice between guns against butter -will continue to haunt both countries.
Is it possible then to argue that diplomacy would present better prospects than the previous two options? The literature on the strategy of survival of a small state gives us some guidance in this regard. For example, a stable and a growing economy can provide a strong negotiating position to the country, which is not the case with Pakistan. Associated with this phenomenon is the role that the diaspora can play in advocating the case of their native land. But there is a small professional class living abroad which is not able to relate to the performance of the political elite for their poor governance and reputation for lack of integrity.
There is no military solution, in any case, which Pakistan can pursue effectively. Negotiation and persuasion are the only options available to the country. Both countries can liberate themselves from the burden of the big powers policy for strengthening post-colonial links by recognising that there are three parties involved in the dispute over Kashmir. In any viable solution of the issue, the people of Kashmir will have to exercise their opinions, who still live in a virtual limbo of special status. And Pakistan as a lower riparian of the rivers, the life blood of the Indus region, has considerable stake in the future of the territory. For India, the solution to the conflict will allow it to play a meaningful role in the region. Peace will have dividends for both countries
