Iranian Chill Thread

[QWECXZ]

So if Pashinyan conducts some move against Iran, it's the Islamic Republic's fault? What exactly did you expect Iran to do, prevent the CIA's "color revolution" in Yerevan? Invade Armenia and Azarbaijan Republic at once, duplicating the utter stupidity of a Saddam Tikriti?

It doesn't work that way. Iran has set a red line which is politically legitimate and practically viable, whereas the sort of over-the-top actions some seem to have in mind wouldn't have been. And legitimacy as well as cost-effectiveness are paramount in international politics. Should the announced red line be crossed, adequate action (which doesn't boil down to offensive military operation but encompasses a broad spectrum of options) will follow suit. Until then, nobody will be in a position to accuse Iran of passivity on this dossier.

As for pan-Turkists being influential in Iran, could you explain how exactly? Are you truly imagining that in the absence of these insignificant clowns, Iran would've bombed Baku by now? The comparison with Iran's policy vis à vis the USA is way off. Or could you name an instance in which Iran initiated military action against the Americans, the kind of which you appear to be defining as some sort of a yardstick for gauging whether or not Iran's doing the right thing about the antics coming out of Baku? Moreover, western-absolving liberals weigh "slightly" more than pan-Turkists ever will. Yet the system is robust and well designed enough to systematically prevent them from having their way. Last but not least, Iran prioritizing the USA and zionist regimes in her hierarchy of enemies is precisely the correct thing to do, including with regards to possible threats emanating out of Baku, because these do not arise in a vacuum, they are a consequence of and entirely stemming from zio-American schemes against Iran.

When it comes to the Qajars, this sort of rhetoric is so comical, normally it wouldn't deserve to be addressed. But let's still throw in a couple of reminders, no-brainers to be honest: under the Qajars, Iran lost a large chunk of her territory to imperial powers, under the Islamic Republic she's never conceded a single inch. This is while Islamic Iran's immediate reach today is stretching from the Levant and the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, from Afghanistan to every Shia community further East, for the first time in around 500 years. Not to mention entrenched Iranian presence in far away lands such as Venezuela. Qajars? The same dynasty whose weakness reached such depths that 9 out of 20 million Iranians could be subjected to genocide at the hands of the British empire. And you're serious about drawing analogies with the Iran of today? Non-existent arms industries under not only the Qajars but the Pahlavis as well, versus the Islamic Republic's vast and self-sufficient defence sector, doesn't ring a bell? The level of independence and sovereignty of present day Iran versus an era (again, both applying to the Qajars and Pahlavis) where Iran's general policy orientation not to mention key decisions were directly dictated from London, Moscow, and then Washington D.C. and Tel Aviv. And so on, and so forth.

Let's not lose touch with reality.

What's your solution? To sit idle and see how things develop against our interests?
I don't think you're offering a solution at all, let alone an optimal solution.

 

[Blue In Green]

So if Pashinyan conducts some move against Iran, it's the Islamic Republic's fault? What exactly did you expect Iran to do, prevent the CIA's "color revolution" in Yerevan? Invade Armenia and Azarbaijan Republic at once, duplicating the utter stupidity of a Saddam Tikriti?

It doesn't work that way. Iran has set a red line which is politically legitimate and practically viable, whereas the sort of over-the-top actions some seem to have in mind wouldn't have been. And legitimacy as well as cost-effectiveness are paramount in international politics. Should the announced red line be crossed, adequate action (which doesn't boil down to offensive military operation but encompasses a broad spectrum of options) will follow suit. Until then, nobody will be in a position to accuse Iran of passivity on this dossier.

As for pan-Turkists being influential in Iran, could you explain how exactly? Are you truly imagining that in the absence of these insignificant clowns, Iran would've bombed Baku by now? The comparison with Iran's policy vis à vis the USA is way off. Or could you name an instance in which Iran initiated military action against the Americans, the kind of which you appear to be defining as some sort of a yardstick for gauging whether or not Iran's doing the right thing about the antics coming out of Baku? Moreover, western-absolving liberals weigh "slightly" more than pan-Turkists ever will. Yet the system is robust and well designed enough to systematically prevent them from having their way. Last but not least, Iran prioritizing the USA and zionist regimes in her hierarchy of enemies is precisely the correct thing to do, including with regards to possible threats emanating out of Baku, because these do not arise in a vacuum, they are a consequence of and entirely stemming from zio-American schemes against Iran.

When it comes to the Qajars, this sort of rhetoric is so comical, normally it wouldn't deserve to be addressed. But let's still throw in a couple of reminders, no-brainers to be honest: under the Qajars, Iran lost a large chunk of her territory to imperial powers, under the Islamic Republic she's never conceded a single inch. This is while Islamic Iran's immediate reach today is stretching from the Levant and the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, from Afghanistan to every Shia community further East, for the first time in around 500 years. Not to mention entrenched Iranian presence in far away lands such as Venezuela. Qajars? The same dynasty whose weakness reached such depths that 9 out of 20 million Iranians could be subjected to genocide at the hands of the British empire. And you're serious about drawing analogies with the Iran of today? Non-existent arms industries under not only the Qajars but the Pahlavis as well, versus the Islamic Republic's vast and self-sufficient defence sector, doesn't ring a bell? The level of independence and sovereignty of present day Iran versus an era (again, both applying to the Qajars and Pahlavis) where Iran's general policy orientation not to mention key decisions were directly dictated from London, Moscow, and then Washington D.C. and Tel Aviv. And so on, and so forth.

Let's not lose touch with reality.

Azerbaijan, distinctly poses a unique threat to the territorial integrity of Iran in my opinion. Barring your bog-standard Pan-Turkish "all your lands are belong to us" rhetoric. Their actions as a state as well as their associations with the Zionist enclave, puts the Islamic Republic in a precarious position regardless of how significant/insignificant local pro-Azerbaijan/Turkish sentiments may or might not be. Over and over and over again, Azerbaijani leaders and prominent political figures (normal people really) think that Iranian lands belong to them. This coupled with the recent war and want to commit to more land grab operations should send a profound message to Iranian leadership that "hey, these people up North are going to probably do something sooner or later".

I'll propose this notion forward as well... I don't have a dog in this fight outside of wanting Iran to be safe from those who wish our people, lands and blood harm but... I think Iran shouldn't just allow Armenia to be ceaselessly bullied by Turkey and a clearly racist Azerbaijan. After all, many Iranians have family in Armenia, we share a deep historical and cultural roots as we do with Azerbaijan but these actions Azerbaijan is committing is simply unacceptable.

idk.. maybe I'm just talking from a place of ignorance. I'll freely admit I'm not all that well versed in the matter so I will differ to you and others.

What's your solution? To sit idle and see how things develop against our interests?
I don't think you're offering a solution at all, let alone an optimal solution.

Agreed, to be quite frank... this Azerbaijan problem (and it is most definitely a problem). Requires proactive decision making from Iran.

Protect our lands; shield our people, maintain the peace to the best of our abilities but prepare for the worst really...

 

[SalarHaqq]

What's your solution? To sit idle and see how things develop against our interests?
I don't think you're offering a solution at all, let alone an optimal solution.

I'm not a policy maker, but what I know is that Iran in 2022 is vastly more powerful, influential and secure than she used to be in 1979, in 1953, 1941, 1925 and 1789. I'm rather confident that a system which has managed to weather the multiple storms of the past four decades and not only survived but didn't cease cementing its stability in the face of continuous plots hatched against it by the world's dominant superpower, will also know how to handle the situation in the southern Caucasus for that matter.

As far as I'm concerned, the stakes in this regard are quite clear at this point in time: the enemy's goal in the short to mid term (and by that I mean both the regime in Baku and its protectors in Tel Aviv and Washington) is to cut off Iran from Armenia and have Baku occupy the Zangezur corridor, while Iran is bent on preventing it. There's no doubt in my mind that if and when troops from the Republic of Azarbaijan actually proceed with a serious attempt to wrestle the area away, we will witness Iran's reaction. In the meantime, as far as I'm concerned I see no reason for panic.

I could list a whole series of long-term measures Iran could eye vis à vis Baku, maybe I will if I get the time, but at the end of the day it won't represent much more than a tentative subjective take, as would every other user's. I've nothing against this sort of an intellectual exercise by the way, all I'm suggesting is to try and be as realistic as possible when assessing the odds. Things such as likening Iran's present conditions with the Qajar period isn't exactly helpful I believe, because we're objectively so far away from that.

 

[TheImmortal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1570035396867768326

 

[QWECXZ]

I'm not a policy maker, but what I know is that Iran in 2022 is vastly more powerful, influential and secure than she used to be in 1979, in 1953, 1941, 1925 and 1789. I'm rather confident that a system which has managed to weather the multiple storms of the past four decades and not only survived but didn't cease cementing its stability in the face of continuous plots hatched against it by the world's dominant superpower, will also know how to handle the situation in the southern Caucasus for that matter.

As far as I'm concerned, the stakes in this regard are quite clear at this point in time: the enemy's goal in the short to mid term (and by that I mean both the regime in Baku and its protectors in Tel Aviv and Washington) is to cut off Iran from Armenia and have Baku occupy the Zangezur corridor, while Iran is bent on preventing it. There's no doubt in my mind that if and when troops from the Republic of Azarbaijan actually proceed with a serious attempt to wrestle the area away, we will witness Iran's reaction. In the meantime, as far as I'm concerned I see no reason for panic.

I could list a whole series of long-term measures Iran could eye vis à vis Baku, maybe I will if I get the time, but at the end of the day it won't represent much more than a tentative subjective take, as would every other user's. I've nothing against this sort of an intellectual exercise by the way, all I'm suggesting is to try and be as realistic as possible when assessing the odds. Things such as likening Iran's present conditions with the Qajar period isn't exactly helpful I'd say, because we're so far away from that.

You don't have to be a policy maker to offer a solution to one of Iran's current problems.
This is a forum. You could discuss your solution here, it doesn't mean that it has to be implemented. Nobody expects that of you, of course. But again, as I read your post, I see that you don't have a solution.

 

[SalarHaqq]

You don't have to be a policy maker to offer a solution to one of Iran's current problems.
This is a forum. You could discuss your solution here, it doesn't mean that it has to be implemented. Nobody expects that of you, of course. But again, as I read your post, I see that you don't have a solution.

My solution is the following:

1) In the short to mid term, should there be an attempt at revising international borders to Iran's north through force, some form of counter-force will probably have to be resorted to. At that point it'd be legitimate too. I don't think preemptive military action would be productive. As to what shape Iran's counter strike should take, you understand that this would depend on a range of factors, namely the exact process through which Baku would attempt to occupy and annex Zangezur: direct invasion, or indirectly by reigniting military conflict in Karabakh and offering ceasefire in exchange for Zangezur. In case of treason by Pashinyan, again Iran's counter strike would have to adapt accordingly.

2) Long term plans are more complex and I lack the time to go into details now. But there are various things Iran could and should perhaps start doing. One avenue is to gain greater foothold among public opinion across the Aras. Here the issue is that the audience Iran is traditionally most comfortable reaching out to, namely religious communities, is not strongly represented in the Baku republic. More than 70 years of Soviet rule not only secularized Azarbaijani state institutions, they drove back religious practice in society. Sure, there's the Nardaran suburb of Baku and several other such localities where the Islamic Revolution is popular, there's the Hoseyniun Brigade, there are olama who adhere to the ideology of Imam Khomeini (r.a.). They represent a limited segment of society though. Several possibilities may exist to extend Iran's appeal beyond these localized communities, which I will try to expand upon later. Another option would be to grant support to and to help organize dissident representatives of the Talesh minority in the Baku republic. Etc.

 

[TheImmortal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1569911994433560582

https://twitter.com/x/status/1570091551522684929

Look at this vatan fooroosh

https://twitter.com/x/status/1570073636572127237

 

[QWECXZ]

My solution is the following:

1) In the short to mid term, should there be an attempt at revising international borders to Iran's north through force, some form of counter-force will probably have to be resorted to. At that point it'd be legitimate too. I don't think preemptive military action would be productive. As to what shape Iran's counter strike should take, you understand that this would depend on a range of factors, namely the exact process through which Baku would attempt to occupy and annex Zangezur: direct invasion, or indirectly by reigniting military conflict in Karabakh and offering ceasefire in exchange for Zangezur. In case of treason by Pashinyan, again Iran's counter strike would have to adapt accordingly.

2) Long term plans are more complex and I lack the time to go into details now. But there are various things Iran could and should perhaps start doing. One avenue is to gain greater foothold among public opinion across the Aras. Here the issue is that the audience Iran is traditionally most comfortable reaching out to, namely religious communities, is not strongly represented in the Baku republic. More than 70 years of Soviet rule not only secularized Azarbaijani state institutions, they drove back religious practice in society. Sure, there's the Nardaran suburb of Baku and several other such localities where the Islamic Revolution is popular, there's the Hoseyniun Brigade, there are olama who adhere to the ideology of Imam Khomeini (r.a.). They represent a limited segment of society though. Several possibilities may exist to extend Iran's appeal beyond these localized communities, which I will try to expand upon later. Another option would be to grant support to and to help organize dissident representatives of the Talesh minority in the Baku republic. Etc.

Both options are sound and good. The problem is that we need to arm Armenia to the teeth and the presidency of Pashinyan is a big problem for that.

 

[TheImmortal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1570035396867768326

https://twitter.com/x/status/1570042901681573889

 

[Stryker1982]

Is this to say that if Pashinyan conducts some move against Iran, it'll be the Islamic Republic's fault? In that case, what exactly did you expect Iran to do, prevent the CIA's "color revolution" in Yerevan? Or invade both Armenia and Azarbaijan Republic at once, duplicating the sort of mistakes Saddam Tikriti was known for?

It doesn't work that way. Iran has set a red line which is politically legitimate and practically viable, whereas the sort of over-the-top actions some seem to have in mind wouldn't have been. Legitimacy as well as cost-effectiveness are paramount in international politics. Should the announced red line be crossed, adequate action (which doesn't necessarily boil down to offensive military operation but encompasses a broad spectrum of options) will follow suit, this we can be certain of. Until then, Iran can cannot be accused of passivity on this dossier.

As for pan-Turkists influence in Iran, do you think that in the absence of these rather marginal clowns, any rational government in Iran would've launched strikes on Baku by now? I doubt it. The comparison with Iran's policy vis à vis the USA isn't accurate, or could you name an instance in which Iran initiated military action against the Americans, the kind of which you appear to be considering as a yardstick as to whether or not Iran's doing the right thing about Baku? Moreover, don't forget western-absolving liberals weigh "slightly" more than pan-Turkists ever will in domestic Iranian politics. Yet the system is robust and well designed enough to systematically prevent even the liberals from having their way. Last but not least, Iran prioritizing the USA and zionist regimes in her hierarchy of enemies is precisely the way to go, including with regards to possible threats emanating out of Baku, because these do not arise in a vacuum, they are a consequence of and fully stemming from zio-American schemes against Iran.

When it comes to the Qajars, this is rather a no-brainer, to be honest: under the Qajars, Iran lost a large chunk of her territory to imperial powers, under the Islamic Republic she's never conceded a single inch. This is while Islamic Iran's immediate reach today is stretching from the Levant and the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, from Afghanistan to every Shia community further East, for the first time in around 500 years. Not to mention entrenched Iranian presence in far away lands such as Venezuela. Qajars are the same dynasty whose weakness attained such depths that 9 out of 20 million Iranians could be subjected to genocide at the hands of the British empire. Drawing analogies between that era and the Iran of today, seriously? Non-existent arms industries under not only the Qajars but the Pahlavis as well, versus the Islamic Republic's vast and self-sufficient defence sector. The level of independence and sovereignty of present day Iran versus a time (again, both applying to the Qajars and Pahlavis) where Iran's general policy orientation not to mention key decisions were directly dictated from London, Moscow, and then Washington D.C. and Tel Aviv. And so on, and so forth.

Let us not lose touch with reality, please. Also, we need to remain consistent. If the Islamic Republic is the reincarnation of the Qajars, what's the point arguing against all the iranophobes on here then, who claim Iranian-made weapons are plastic toys, that Iran is an insignificant powerless nation and so on? Wouldn't you then have to concur with their rhetoric? I don't know, but it can't be both at the same time.

I am not saying they are Qajars, I said if this border is closed, then yes it is fair to call them Qajars because they have locked us out of Qafqaz region. If Pashanyan wants to sell Artaskh, frankly that is not crossing a redline of Iran, I will agree with you there but if you are looking at the battlefield events, Azerbaijan as I type this has already attack villages deep into Syunik and its ambitions have been very clearly to control this corridor and lock Iran out. If you want to wait until they are at the finish line before making an impact, then we will have to pay a higher price for it. Our passivity is starting to look like Putins passivity for years in Ukraine.

Since when you do care about neoliberal rules based international order?
We send ballistic missiles to Houthis, and targeted inside Abu Dhabi without giving a shit, we attack Abqaiq of Saudi Arabia. We give sophisticated technology to non-state actors. All the things we've done is actually more than enough justification for states in the region and the United states to wage a war against Iran. When it comes to the Israeli republic of Baku, it is all about diplomacy? That is not the Islamic Republic of Iran that I know of. Pashayan may be a traitor and a loser for the west, but when has that ever stopped us from protecting our interests? Azerbijian must know if it seizes villages inside Syunik (which they have done, technically violating our red line), then they are risking limited attacks from Iran (within Armenia) to drive them out. They are also risking an Islamic awakening inside Azerbaijan. If these threats have been given and they still ignore, then perhaps the SL has to reconsider its approach to this Kheybar state in the making.

I'm not a policy maker, but what I know is that Iran in 2022 is vastly more powerful, influential and secure than she used to be in 1979, in 1953, 1941, 1925 and 1789. I'm rather confident that a system which has managed to weather the multiple storms of the past four decades and not only survived but didn't cease cementing its stability in the face of continuous plots hatched against it by the world's dominant superpower, will also know how to handle the situation in the southern Caucasus for that matter.

As far as I'm concerned, the stakes in this regard are quite clear at this point in time: the enemy's goal in the short to mid term (and by that I mean both the regime in Baku and its protectors in Tel Aviv and Washington) is to cut off Iran from Armenia and have Baku occupy the Zangezur corridor, while Iran is bent on preventing it. There's no doubt in my mind that if and when troops from the Republic of Azarbaijan actually proceed with a serious attempt to wrestle the area away, we will witness Iran's reaction. In the meantime, as far as I'm concerned I see no reason for panic.

I could list a whole series of long-term measures Iran could eye vis à vis Baku, maybe I will if I get the time, but at the end of the day it won't represent much more than a tentative subjective take, as would every other user's. I've nothing against this sort of an intellectual exercise by the way, all I'm suggesting is to try and be as realistic as possible when assessing the odds. Things such as likening Iran's present conditions with the Qajar period isn't exactly helpful I believe, because we're objectively so far away from that.

If you have time, I would greatly appreciate your insight on the matter.

I mentioned before but I will mention again, just incase, I wasn't likening the Islamic Republic to Qajar era. I was comparing them to Qajar if this land connection is cut off, because that is exactly what happened to us during that era, we lost all contact with Qafqaz region.

 

[Stryker1982]

1) In the short to mid term, should there be an attempt at revising international borders to Iran's north through force, some form of counter-force will probably have to be resorted to. At that point it'd be legitimate too. I don't think preemptive military action would be productive. As to what shape Iran's counter strike should take, you understand that this would depend on a range of factors, namely the exact process through which Baku would attempt to occupy and annex Zangezur: direct invasion, or indirectly by reigniting military conflict in Karabakh and offering ceasefire in exchange for Zangezur. In case of treason by Pashinyan, again Iran's counter strike would have to adapt accordingly.

I see, you've already touched upon it.

I was more so advocating for limited attacks WITHIN Armenia territory to drive them out as they have technically blocked our transit route fully justified, even by rules based international order). This should not be a challenging job for IR

 

[Muhammed45]

Syria is static front. War is relatively over. Iran isn’t involved in Ukraine outside of some possible arms sales.

Azerbaijan would get steam rolled by Iran. They have zero ABM or Air Force. Iran, it’s airforce, it’s drones, it’s missiles, it’s artillery rockets would wreck havoc on Azerbaijan.

Only thing holding Iran back is it’s own Azeri population and it’s economic relationship with Turkey. Bull in China shop isn’t the right strategy here for Iran. Whatever decision it makes, it needs to think about the 2nd and 3rd order actions and reactions.

I am from your so called Azeri population. Why would you think that we have problem with returning Azerbaijan to where it actually belongs?

I was merely pointing to a possible coordinated action between Russia and Iran. Caucaus is too sensitive to be ignored. Israel is looking for making trouble in that area, this threat could turn into a potential chance.

 

[Blue In Green]

I am not saying they are Qajars, I said if this border is closed, then yes it is fair to call them Qajars because they have locked us out of Qafqaz region. If Pashanyan wants to sell Artaskh, frankly that is not crossing a redline of Iran, I will agree with you there but if you are looking at the battlefield events, Azerbaijan as I type this has already attack villages deep into Syunik and its ambitions have been very clearly to control this corridor and lock Iran out. If you want to wait until they are at the finish line before making an impact, then we will have to pay a higher price for it. Our passivity is starting to look like Putins passivity for years in Ukraine.

Since when you do care about neoliberal rules based international order?
We send ballistic missiles to Houthis, and targeted inside Abu Dhabi without giving a shit, we attack Abqaiq of Saudi Arabia. We give sophisticated technology to non-state actors. All the things we've done is actually more than enough justification for states in the region and the United states to wage a war against Iran. When it comes to the Israeli republic of Baku, it is all about diplomacy? That is not the Islamic Republic of Iran that I know of. Pashayan may be a traitor and a loser for the west, but when has that ever stopped us from protecting our interests? Azerbijian must know if it seizes villages inside Syunik (which they have done, technically violating our red line), then they are risking limited attacks from Iran (within Armenia) to drive them out. They are also risking an Islamic awakening inside Azerbaijan. If these threats have been given and they still ignore, then perhaps the SL has to reconsider its approach to this Kheybar state in the making.


If you have time, I would greatly appreciate your insight on the matter.

I mentioned before but I will mention again, just incase, I wasn't likening the Islamic Republic to Qajar era. I was comparing them to Qajar if this land connection is cut off, because that is exactly what happened to us during that era, we lost all contact with Qafqaz region.

Could one argue that Azerbaijan is a lost cause for Iran in terms of finding a healthy normal and that conducting limited kinetic operations is the only realistic option left?

 

[Stryker1982]

I am from your so called Azeri population. Why would you think that we have problem with returning Azerbaijan to where it actually belongs?

I was merely pointing to a possible coordinated action between Russia and Iran. Caucaus is too sensitive to be ignored. Israel is looking for making trouble in that area, this threat could turn into a potential chance.

I have to agree
@TheImmortal

Is Iran's Azeri population a barrier? I think not, many Azerbaijanis are patriots of Iran, and would have no problem of the reclamation of this territory back to Iran.

Of course their are people who have a different idea, but this is not in such a amount that would affect any sort of decision making in Iran. Overwhelmingly the force of Pro-Iran is larger than pro-seperatist.

 

[Stryker1982]

Could one argue that Azerbaijan is a lost cause for Iran in terms of finding a healthy normal

It sure looks that way. As long as the Aliyev government is in charge. God knows we've tried to be friendly, but they keep insulting us. It's almost like they have little idea with who they are dealing with. Woe to Aliyev should Iran turn its attention northward fully. He won't even get 1 nights good sleep.