Iran’s Plan B in Syria

[BLACKEAGLE]

IRAN’S strategic and sectarian interests in the Syrian crisis cannot be clearer. While its number one interest is to help Bashar Assad survive, Tehran has a Plan B in case Assad falls down: Transforming Syria into another Afghanistan. In other words, a civil war is Iran’s second best option. Not surprisingly, Iran provides the Syrian regime with weapons just to realize one of these goals.

Senior American officials are distressed that Iran has resumed shipping weapons to Syria via Iraqi airspace. The embattled regime in Damascus has so far managed to hold on thanks to the Iranian support. Undoubtedly, the new shipment will bolster the regime’s troops in its bid to crush the revolution. This new development came at a time when the Syrian Free Army and other revolutionary forces are gaining ground in the daily battles with the Syrian troops.

The Syrian rebels are aware of Iran’s crucial support to the regime. To stave off any destructive impact of Iran, rebels controlled some border crossing to prevent Iran from trucking weapons into Syria. And yet, Iran seems to find a way to overcome this obstacle by using air shipment via Iraq under the nose of the Americans. If anything, this means that the United States has been losing Iraq slowly but surely. The Al-Maliki government in Baghdad seems to be under the cloak of Iran and therefore the limit of American influence in Iraq cannot be more obvious.

Al-Maliki has increasingly allied himself with Iran and has been viewing the conflict from his sectarian perspective. For him, the fall of Assad regime in Syria could be a strategic blow. Al-Maliki — who is obsessed with his sectarian agenda inside Iraq — fears that the power of his Kurdish and Sunni opponents may be accentuated in case Assad steps down or is forced to leave. On top of that, Al-Maliki feels that he should be in the opposite camp of key Gulf States. In fact, Al-Maliki failed to cultivate a positive and constructive relationship with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Additionally, the United States has been losing influence. Far from being effective, President Barack Obama seems to be unintentionally hurting the Syrian people in their fight for independence and freedom. His inability or unwillingness to stop the Iranians from using the Iraqi space has given Assad the oxygen needed to hold on as much as possible while the rebels are not being aided with weapons that can match what Iran has been giving to the Syrian regime.

Explicit in Iran’s behavior is that it is having a hard time giving up on its staunchest Arab ally that has facilitated Iran’s influence in Lebanon. Now with Al-Maliki throwing his lot with Iran, it seems as if the dice has been rolled and the Syrian regime will be emboldened to continue its bloody crackdown on Syrians to the end. In a twist of events, many American reports talk about Iraqi Shiite militia fighters fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Syrian Army to defend Assad from a looming downfall.

Iran is planning for the day after Assad. For the Iranian leadership, a chaotic Syria without Assad is better than a political transition that produces a government friendly with the West. For Iranians, a stable Syria minus Bashar regime is a non-starter. They will do what it takes to create the seeds of anarchy or another Iraq. Seen in this light, Iran cannot be a positive force in Syria and this lesson should not be forgotten by the Gulf countries, Turkey and Jordan. It is highly unlikely that Iran will acquiesce to international calls not to interfere in the Syrian crisis. The stakes are high for Iranians and chances of Assad’s demise are high. Iran feels that Assad is fighting a proxy war at the behest of Tehran. So far Iran has bankrolled a huge percentage of the Syrian war efforts.

On the whole, pundits and analysts agree that the conflict has taken a brutal turn with the negative external intervention especially the one by Iran. And yet, Iran justifies its support by accusing some Gulf countries of arming rebels to help them bring down the regime in Damascus. Iran is not expected to see eye to eye with its opponents in the region. Seen in this way, if Iran can get away with this policy and go on unchecked, Assad will deepen his cruel and brutal polices and will guarantee that his departure will be followed by a civil war, the second best scenario for Tehran.
http://www.arabnews.com/iran’s-plan-b-syria

 

[kollang]

the Syrian government and Iran want peace in Syria.its a known fact.
its not our plan but PGCC and west's plan B.they failed to keep Syria out of our alliance by revolution then they started plan B by destroying our ally and make her sth like AFG.anyway insha Allah their Plan B will be failed too

 

[Syrian Lion]

blackeagle, you seriously gonna bring articles about Syria and Iran from Arabnews?? it's like bringing sources from Aljazeera and Alarabieyh

you want to talk about civil war
?

Iran was the one who supported peace and dialogue, but the west and terrorists GCC supported bloodshed, no one from you people said sit on the table and talk it out, instead American and its slaves said do not drop your weapons and keep fighting. Iran, Russia, and China all support peace, while you support fighting and bloodshed, so who is interest is civil war? isn't Israel interest to weaken Syria with civil war...

 

[Jamaal Yelmaaz]

GÖKHAN BACIK
g.bacik@todayszaman.com
Iran's Plan B in Syria

Iran's support is a major dynamic in the explanation of the survival in Syria of the Assad regime.
Iran supports Syria financially and is on the ground in different ways, from training militia to sending special troops. Iran's interest in Syria is a strategic one that is also the result of a complex historical background. In brief, Syria has a strategic impact on the cost of survival of the Iranian regime. Any unwanted change in Syria, from Iran's perspective, has the potential to increase that cost. There is nothing surprising here, as in the region, states always help their strategic friends in various formal and informal ways.

Iran's calculations on Syria cannot be reduced to Assad's presidency. Iran is even likely to be open to bargaining on Assad's future; its major goal is to keep Syria, or some parts of it, an Iran-friendly political regime. So far, the Iranian policy has been to prevent the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. To support Damascus, Iran has given all diplomatic, financial and political support to Assad. However, given that the Assad regime is weakening, Iran is doing well to develop a Plan B; otherwise, its long-term strategic interests could be shaken. From now on, Iran is more interested in more complex planning that would guarantee Tehran's interests even in a post-Assad Syria.

To this end, Iran will create certain zones through which its interests are protected. Even if a hostile regime emerges in Damascus, Iran will increase its impact on informal networks within Syria. Iran is the leading Middle Eastern country in terms of having many proxy groups. It has consistently had many proxies and informal networks across Syria. The “Lebanonization” of Syria is seriously linked with Iran, as that state is ready to perpetuate its impact there through various ethnic and sectarian groups. As a part of this strategy, Iran will keep backing the Alawite community in Syria. Iran has many natural allies, not only in Latakia, but even in central places such as the Zaynabiyya neighborhood of Damascus. Indeed, Iran's tenacity in deploying such a strategy would amount to a major reason for a long-term instability in Syria. Meanwhile, the issue of a larger Alawite community is a matter of serious concern there. We do not know how the opposition would approach them. Constituting a large bureaucratic, military and economic group, it is naïve to expect their sudden purge.

Put simply, Iran will be against any kind of pro-Turkish regime in Damascus. Turkey-friendly groups such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood will be politically targeted by Iran. Instead, Iran will try for the incorporation of the “remnants of the Assad regime.”

In other words, like Baghdad, Damascus will be another contested area for Iran and Turkey, as each backs different groups on the ground. On the other hand, any kind of new regime in Damascus that is formed by the opposition is likely to be anti-Iran, due to Tehran's support for Assad's regime. To prevent this, Tehran will back the Alawite community in the post-Assad period. Iran's major strategy from now on is to keep its proxies as important players in a post-Assad Damascus.

The Egyptian example should contain the essential lesson: The various groups once united against Mubarak are now in tense political conflict. We have no idea about the post-Assad political balances in Syria. Also, as happened in other countries like Iraq, political preferences are likely to be very different after transition. Therefore, the Syrian opposition that utilizes the common hatred of Assad may face some risks after the fall of Assad. Something a liberal Syrian refugee told me is a typical intimation of post-Assad political ruptures in Syria: “I am indebted to Turkey for its support, but also, I am sad to see Ankara's support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.”

Iran's Plan B in Syria