Indonesia Defence Forum

[Ayan81]

we need dedicated training aircraft and LIFT aircraft and we lack of them, even though we had 8 Hawk Mk53 and 16 T-50.

ok, it's just a suggestion

good luck with the KFX program

 

[Nike]

ok, it's just a suggestion

good luck with the KFX program

some of us has reconsider some options to increase the number of Combatant units in our fleet and inventory including your very own idea to upgrading the T-50, but not all of top brass in the Air Forces very convinced and impressed. But still your idea has been thought for a while by our top brass.

 

[Nike]

program for the next period, how about to replace our old tracked SPH?

 

[Jakartans@PkDef]

program for the next period, how about to replace our old tracked SPH?View attachment 94151

Agree with you its time to find replacement of our old AMX 105mm SPH.

 

[Jakartans@PkDef]

Women in uniform
Army reporters, video and photographers of the Army Information Center (Dispenad)
The front-line soldiers for media exposure, building good images and sharing documentation of the army to the public and media.

 

[Dante]

Thanks for the reply
Ok then you're clear that the procurement plan is for replacing the F5 Tiger II fighter, in which is mission is mainly air superiority

The Golden Eagle might be good for light fighter role, but we know the fighter trainer plane are short legged, I honestly hope that KAI can come up with a conformal fuel tank system rather than a conventional drop tank, so that it can free up some pylon for weapon system

I do also hope Golden Eagle have in flight refueling capability

I never stated that fa50 can do your air superiority role and it never will be, upgrading your current t50's can offer you light attack and point air defense, It also can substitute some missions of the high end fighters in a much less cost, together with your f16's i can be part of high low mix, because there are some jobs it can't do.

It's just a great force multiplier.

program for the next period, how about to replace our old tracked SPH?View attachment 94151

K9 Thunder?
Are you serious?is it gonna be involving tech transfer deal or just purchasing?

Before, I hope the army seek out some PzH 2000 that on reserve in Bundeswehr and/or in Royal Netherlands Army, but K9 Thunder is more than alright especially if the deal involving tech transfer

 

[Nike]

The Next South China Sea Crisis: China vs. Indonesia?

Scott Bentley
September 24, 2014

As Indonesian president-elect Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, prepares officially to begin his term later next month, there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding the future policy settings of his administration both at home and abroad. One thing, though, seems increasingly clear: momentum is building toward the realization of Indonesia’s long-dormant potential to emerge as a maritime power.

The vision of Indonesia as a “global maritime nexus” (poros maritim dunia) gained prominence during the presidential campaign and seems set to become a central focus of the upcoming Jokowi administration. While Indonesia’s emergence as a maritime power is by no means assured—it will face many challenges ahead—we may be witnessing the dawn of a new era in Indonesian history.
The precise details of that maritime vision remain a work in progress, but some preliminary observations can be made. The foundation of the “global maritime nexus” concept is primarily economic: it seeks to increase maritime connectivity and thus economic equality between the various Indonesian provinces. That argument has been convincingly advanced by Faisal Basri, a leading economist and member of Jokowi’s expert team on the economy. Yet according to Basri, the vision of Indonesia as a maritime power isn’t limited to the economic dimension alone, and can also contain a security or defense function, including the protection of state sovereignty.

While Jokowi hasn’t spoken at any length on his own vision of the concept, the vision and mission statement he submitted during the campaign prioritized the protection of Indonesia’s maritime interests. The public statements that Jokowi has made on the issue have repeatedly touched on that priority, specifically the problem of illegal fishing.

In comments made earlier this month and published in the local Indonesian press, Jokowi stated that it was necessary to act decisively against foreign fishing vessels in order to prevent the continued theft of Indonesian resources. “If we do not act decisively, our fish will be stolen by foreign ships,” Jokowi was quoted as saying. Such comments indicate that he may not be as disengaged on foreign policy matters as some have expected; in fact he may be more assertive on certain priorities.

The issue of illegal fishing by foreign vessels is likely to prove a pivotal challenge for Jokowi’s administration, and will almost certainly create tension with another emerging maritime power—China. China is hardly the only country whose fishermen are operating illegally in Indonesian waters. But it’s the only one whose fishermen are directly supported if not encouraged by the coercive power of its state security services at sea.

China’s expanded presence in disputed areas of the South China Sea is increasingly bringing its fishermen, and its maritime security organizations, into direct contact and often confrontation with those of Indonesia. While the Indonesian foreign ministry continues to maintain there’s no dispute between China and Indonesia, China’s actions suggest otherwise.

A number of incidents have occurred in the area since 2010, resulting from what ultimately proved to be unsuccessful attempts by Indonesian security forces to prosecute Chinese fishermen operating illegally within Indonesia’s claimed EEZ. Those efforts to assert Indonesian jurisdiction in its claimed EEZ are beginning to form a pattern of persistent failure, a pattern which, if left unaltered, may eventually compromise Indonesia’s military deterrent posture in those areas, as well as the legal basis for its claims.

The most recent of those incidents occurred in March of 2013. Since I first wrote about that incident late last year new details have come to light, including the apparent use of electronic-warfare capabilities by the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) vessel Yuzheng 310. Based on the Indonesian captain’s own reporting, as well as subsequent investigation and analysis, it now appears highly likely that during that incident Yuzheng 310 jammed the communications of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) vessel Hiu Macan 001.

Consistent with the KKP captain’s description of events, Yuzheng 310 may have been disabling his ability to receive communications from his headquarters ashore, in an apparent effort to sever the vessel from its command and control (C2) loop. It appears likely Yuzheng 310 would have been calculating that—in combination with other coercive measures—the action would force the Indonesian captain to release his Chinese prisoners. The suite of measures had the desired effect, but might just as easily have proved dangerously escalatory had the KKP captain instead decided not to acquiesce.

Continued patrols in those areas by what is now the China Coast Guard may confront Jokowi with an early test of his leadership, possibly in a crisis scenario not dissimilar to that from March 2013. It remains to be seen whether or not the new administration is even aware of that potential contingency, let alone prepared to respond effectively.

Despite the obvious overlap between Jokowi’s focus on combating illegal fishing and the recent incidents with China in the South China Sea, it’s also unclear to what extent Jokowi is himself aware of that overlap, or the severity of the challenge it presents to his vision of Indonesia as a global maritime nexus. Addressing that challenge will require decisive leadership from the new president and his team, both domestically and abroad.

Scott Bentley is currently a PhD candidate at the Australian Defense Force Academy, UNSW. His research focuses on security strategies in maritime Southeast Asia. This piece first appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist here.

The Next South China Sea Crisis: China vs. Indonesia? | The National Interest Blog

 

[Nike]

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment - Gunfighters, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 conduct the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal.(U.S. Army photo by Sgt.1st Class Matthew Veasley, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment - Gunfighters, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 conduct the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal.(U.S. Army photo by Sgt.1st Class Matthew Veasley, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment - Gunfighters, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 conduct the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal.(U.S. Army photo by Sgt.1st Class Matthew Veasley, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment - Gunfighters, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 conduct the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal.(U.S. Army photo by Sgt.1st Class Matthew Veasley, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

 

[Nike]

A Bo-105 from the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 fires rockets as part of the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal during Garuda Shield 2014. The exercise is a bilateral, tactical military exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific and hosted by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Approximately 1,200 personnel from U.S. Army and Indonesian Armed Forces will conduct a series of training events focused on peace support operations. (Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Brooks Fletcher, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 remove 30mm explosive and tracer rounds from a MI-35 Attack Helicopter following the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal during Garuda Shield 2014. The exercise is a bilateral, tactical military exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific and hosted by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Approximately 1,200 personnel from U.S. Army and Indonesian Armed Forces will conduct a series of training events focused on peace support operations. (Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Brooks Fletcher, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment - Gunfighters, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian Army Aviation's Squadron 31 conduct the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise Aviation Rehearsal.(U.S. Army photo by Sgt.1st Class Matthew Veasley, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

 

[Nike]

Indonesian Army on duty in Lebanon

 

[Genesis]

The Next South China Sea Crisis: China vs. Indonesia?

View attachment 95293

Scott Bentley
September 24, 2014

As Indonesian president-elect Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, prepares officially to begin his term later next month, there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding the future policy settings of his administration both at home and abroad. One thing, though, seems increasingly clear: momentum is building toward the realization of Indonesia’s long-dormant potential to emerge as a maritime power.

The vision of Indonesia as a “global maritime nexus” (poros maritim dunia) gained prominence during the presidential campaign and seems set to become a central focus of the upcoming Jokowi administration. While Indonesia’s emergence as a maritime power is by no means assured—it will face many challenges ahead—we may be witnessing the dawn of a new era in Indonesian history.
The precise details of that maritime vision remain a work in progress, but some preliminary observations can be made. The foundation of the “global maritime nexus” concept is primarily economic: it seeks to increase maritime connectivity and thus economic equality between the various Indonesian provinces. That argument has been convincingly advanced by Faisal Basri, a leading economist and member of Jokowi’s expert team on the economy. Yet according to Basri, the vision of Indonesia as a maritime power isn’t limited to the economic dimension alone, and can also contain a security or defense function, including the protection of state sovereignty.

While Jokowi hasn’t spoken at any length on his own vision of the concept, the vision and mission statement he submitted during the campaign prioritized the protection of Indonesia’s maritime interests. The public statements that Jokowi has made on the issue have repeatedly touched on that priority, specifically the problem of illegal fishing.

In comments made earlier this month and published in the local Indonesian press, Jokowi stated that it was necessary to act decisively against foreign fishing vessels in order to prevent the continued theft of Indonesian resources. “If we do not act decisively, our fish will be stolen by foreign ships,” Jokowi was quoted as saying. Such comments indicate that he may not be as disengaged on foreign policy matters as some have expected; in fact he may be more assertive on certain priorities.

The issue of illegal fishing by foreign vessels is likely to prove a pivotal challenge for Jokowi’s administration, and will almost certainly create tension with another emerging maritime power—China. China is hardly the only country whose fishermen are operating illegally in Indonesian waters. But it’s the only one whose fishermen are directly supported if not encouraged by the coercive power of its state security services at sea.

China’s expanded presence in disputed areas of the South China Sea is increasingly bringing its fishermen, and its maritime security organizations, into direct contact and often confrontation with those of Indonesia. While the Indonesian foreign ministry continues to maintain there’s no dispute between China and Indonesia, China’s actions suggest otherwise.

A number of incidents have occurred in the area since 2010, resulting from what ultimately proved to be unsuccessful attempts by Indonesian security forces to prosecute Chinese fishermen operating illegally within Indonesia’s claimed EEZ. Those efforts to assert Indonesian jurisdiction in its claimed EEZ are beginning to form a pattern of persistent failure, a pattern which, if left unaltered, may eventually compromise Indonesia’s military deterrent posture in those areas, as well as the legal basis for its claims.

The most recent of those incidents occurred in March of 2013. Since I first wrote about that incident late last year new details have come to light, including the apparent use of electronic-warfare capabilities by the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) vessel Yuzheng 310. Based on the Indonesian captain’s own reporting, as well as subsequent investigation and analysis, it now appears highly likely that during that incident Yuzheng 310 jammed the communications of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) vessel Hiu Macan 001.

Consistent with the KKP captain’s description of events, Yuzheng 310 may have been disabling his ability to receive communications from his headquarters ashore, in an apparent effort to sever the vessel from its command and control (C2) loop. It appears likely Yuzheng 310 would have been calculating that—in combination with other coercive measures—the action would force the Indonesian captain to release his Chinese prisoners. The suite of measures had the desired effect, but might just as easily have proved dangerously escalatory had the KKP captain instead decided not to acquiesce.

Continued patrols in those areas by what is now the China Coast Guard may confront Jokowi with an early test of his leadership, possibly in a crisis scenario not dissimilar to that from March 2013. It remains to be seen whether or not the new administration is even aware of that potential contingency, let alone prepared to respond effectively.

Despite the obvious overlap between Jokowi’s focus on combating illegal fishing and the recent incidents with China in the South China Sea, it’s also unclear to what extent Jokowi is himself aware of that overlap, or the severity of the challenge it presents to his vision of Indonesia as a global maritime nexus. Addressing that challenge will require decisive leadership from the new president and his team, both domestically and abroad.

Scott Bentley is currently a PhD candidate at the Australian Defense Force Academy, UNSW. His research focuses on security strategies in maritime Southeast Asia. This piece first appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist here.

The Next South China Sea Crisis: China vs. Indonesia? | The National Interest Blog

what do you recommend? Since I think you can be reasonable.

Let's say we don't stop, and let's also say we don't bring the confrontation on the table, but under it, while we are at it let's say we will continue to assert our claims with just coast guards and fishermen.

Do you recommend shooting it out and see who comes up with what?

BTW, nice pics, blackhawks are awesome.

 

[Nike]

what do you recommend? Since I think you can be reasonable.

Let's say we don't stop, and let's also say we don't bring the confrontation on the table, but under it, while we are at it let's say we will continue to assert our claims with just coast guards and fishermen.

Do you recommend shooting it out and see who comes up with what?

BTW, nice pics, blackhawks are awesome.

Cautious approach, since we know China can only respect power more than words. But we know China can be reasoned more than Russia in any way.

i think Indonesia can using her diplomatic cards in line with to preparing and beefed up our defense system in and around Natuna. And with that, Indonesia must using all of diplomatic cards to made the status quo to be maintained as long as she can. Promoting joint patrol, join naval exercises and code of conduct between ASEAN countries, PR of China, Japan and US in South China Sea area is one thing came up to my mind to de-escalate the tension and bringing the freedom of Navigation here in South China Sea.

 

[guitar01]

Hi guitar01
Could you elaborate more about the news...thx

I can't find the article anymore, but it's somewhere in old kaskus circa 2011/2012. Not long after the news of original grant.

 

[Nike]

Landing in Bung Tomo Class

Helikopter jenis Bolkow dari Skuadron Udara 400 TNI AL melakukan pendaratan di geladak KRI Bung Tomo (357), di Selat Madura, Jatim, Sabtu (27/9). Keberhasilan helikopter jenis Bolkow, Bell maupun Dauphin melakukan misi terbang dan mendarat di atas kapal jenis Multi Role Light Fregate (MRLF) yang berlayar dengan kecepatan 10 knot itu menepis keraguan sejumlah pengamat Alutsista terkait stabilitas tiga unit kapal MRLF yang baru dibeli TNI AL untuk menambah kekuatan di Satuan Kapal Eskorta (Satkor-Armatim). ANTARA FOTO/Joko Sulistyo

Helikopter jenis Bolkow dari Skuadron Udara 400 TNI AL melakukan pendaratan di geladak KRI Bung Tomo (357), di Selat Madura, Jatim, Sabtu (27/9). Keberhasilan helikopter jenis Bolkow, Bell maupun Dauphin melakukan misi terbang dan mendarat di atas kapal jenis Multi Role Light Fregate (MRLF) yang berlayar dengan kecepatan 10 knot itu menepis keraguan sejumlah pengamat Alutsista terkait stabilitas tiga unit kapal MRLF yang baru dibeli TNI AL untuk menambah kekuatan di Satuan Kapal Eskorta (Satkor-Armatim). ANTARA FOTO/Joko Sulistyo

 

[Nike]

Kedatangan KRI Usman HarunSejumlah awak KRI Usman Harun (USH-359) melakukan penghormatan lambung kiri di Perairan Karimunjawa, Jateng, Minggu (28/9). KRI kelas Multirole Light Fregate (MRLF) buatan BAE System Maritime Naval Ship Inggris itu tiba dari Inggris setelah menempuh pelayaran bersama KRI John Lie (JOL-358) selama 40 hari lebih, selanjutnya kapal tersebut akan bertugas di jajaran Satuan Kapal Eskorta Armada RI Wilayah Timur TNI AL. (ANTARA FOTO/Joko Sulistyo)

Sejumlah kapal Republik Indonesia (KRI) kelas Van Speijk dan Multi Role Light Fregate (MRLF) melakukan manuvera taktis di perairan Karimunjawa, Jawa Tengah, Minggu (28/9). Latihan tersebut bagian dari penyambutan KRI John Lie (JOL)-358 dan KRI Usman Harun (USH)-359 buatan BAE System Maritime Naval Ship Inggris yang selanjutnya akan bergabung dengan KRI Bung Tomo (TOM)-357 di jajaran Satuan Kapal Eskorta (Satkor) Komando Armada RI wilayah Timur (Koarmatim) TNI AL. (ANTARA FOTO/M Risyal Hidayat)

Sejumlah awak KRI Usman Harun (USH-359) melakukan penghormatan lambung kiri di Perairan Karimunjawa, Jateng, Minggu (28/9). KRI kelas Multirole Light Fregate (MRLF) buatan BAE System Maritime Naval Ship Inggris itu tiba dari Inggris setelah menempuh pelayaran bersama KRI John Lie (JOL-358) selama 40 hari lebih, selanjutnya kapal tersebut akan bertugas di jajaran Satuan Kapal Eskorta Armada RI Wilayah Timur TNI AL. (ANTARA FOTO/Joko Sulistyo)