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Jerome M. Conley
INSS Occasional Paper 31
Proliferation Series
February 2000
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
USAF Academy, Colorado
INTRODUCTION
It is a strategic goal of the United States, rooted in the strategic self-interest of the United States, to see a secure India; a more economically vibrant India; and, of course, a better relationship between India and the United States. The nuclear issue is a complicating factor but not necessarily a contradictory one (and I insist on that distinction).
-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
Figure 1: Indian Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1988-96
THE COLD WAR YEARS: 1947-1991
The real reason why there is now an increasingly open conflict between Western and Indian policy and attitudes on so many issues is, quite simply, almost tautologically, that the West and India are running an increasing risk of pursuing policies which cut severely across each other�s interests. The Russians have done no more than act as a catalyst�.The real symbol of what has happened is not the welcoming millions who cheered Messrs. Bulganin and Khruschchev in Calcutta, but the grim sharpness of the reaction which met Mr. Dulles�s description of Goa as a "Province of Portugal."
�The Round Table, 1956
This section only briefly summarizes Indo-Soviet and Indo-American diplomatic, economic, and military relations during the Cold War years from 1947 to 1991. * This summary can only highlight an historical pattern in the Indo-Soviet relationship that supported India�s quest for regional security and independent global stature, and an oscillating Soviet vision of India based upon India�s changing geo-strategic and diplomatic significance. As a result, far from being an enduring and close "special relationship," the historical foundations of the Indo-Soviet relationship reveal an opportunistic relationship in which "India�s needs are a match for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet needs are a match for India�s strengths." Moreover, the strength of the Indo-Soviet relationship depended upon the short-term impact of Indo-American interactions. Additionally, major South Asian policy decisions made by the United States during the Cold War show that the cementing of the "special" Indo-Soviet relationship was a product of American inattention as much as Soviet perseverance.
The pattern of Indian military procurement during the period 1947 to 1990 highlights three central themes of this study. The first is the fragile nature of the Indo-Soviet "special" relationship. The second theme is the emergence and growth of the Indo-American divide. The final theme is the evolution of India�s strategic culture and its role in procurement decisions. A summary of these three topics is provided below.
Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation
The history of Indo-Soviet military cooperation can be summarized as a relationship determined by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism, and Western ambivalence. When India commenced the rapid modernization of its armed forces following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, its initial objective was to continue and expand upon its historical Western supply-line. After failing to secure arms transfer agreements with the West, India turned to the Soviet Union out of "dire necessity." For India, the agreement was a commercial one based on economics. Soviet military contracts usually had favorable financial terms and included provisions for production licensing. But in the long-run, these deals became a burden as India failed to secure a reliable supply of spare parts and also experienced a drop in operational readiness due to a void in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
When India made a concerted effort in the 1980s to diversify its procurement portfolio, it found itself returning to the Soviet Union to satisfy its short-term military needs. With a long-term goal of self-reliance in military procurement, India would continue to use Soviet arms as a stepping stone between the bygone era of the British Raj and future Indian procurement autonomy. While Soviet arms would be used to offset American influence in South Asia, they did not pose a direct military threat to American forces during this period.
The Indo-American Rift
Central to the discussion of Indo-American relations during the Cold War is the fact that India did not play a vital role in American geo-strategic thinking during this period. The ideological significance of India as the world�s largest democracy was negated by India�s unwillingness to align itself with the West in the pivotal East-West struggle. From the American perspective, a lack of Indian support versus the "communist threat" equated to Indian hostility. India�s quest for diplomatic independence and self-reliance did not fit into the American paradigm for a bipolar world.
From the Indian perspective, the confrontational American style threatened a return to colonial methods and subservience. In Indian eyes, America�s willingness to engage Pakistan and China, and thereby impair India�s regional security, illuminated American hegemonic aspirations and American indifference towards less developed countries. The unwillingness of the United States to provide arms to a fellow democracy when needed seemed hypocritical and incredible. The essence of the Indo-American "problem" was quite clear. Both states were acting in the same manner and securing their own national needs, with little regard for what other states might desire. The United States believed that as a superpower it had the right to take a superior position. India felt that as the world�s largest democracy, and a victim of centuries of repression, it had the right to demand equality. With both states proceeding forward and neither willing to give way to the other, a collision was imminent.
Indian Strategic Culture
History, geography, and political culture all played crucial roles in the development of India�s conventional forces and nuclear capabilities during the Cold War. India�s sudden emancipation in 1947 after centuries of subservience created "a fierce determination to preserve Indian independence no matter what the cost�an attitude often bordering on paranoia." Any attempt by outside powers, whether Soviet or Western, to exert influence upon India was often met with open defiance. While the Soviet Union, especially under Khrushchev, would be more understanding of India�s "paranoia" and would treat India with respect, the United States often presented India with demands, even when providing food aid. Furthermore, the United States would exacerbate India�s geographic isolation by providing arms and technical data to both Pakistan and China, thus adding fuel to Indian militarism.
Finally, India�s political and bureaucratic leaders were crucial in determining the course that India would take in weapons development and procurement. Nehru neglected the country�s military forces until it was too late to recover. Shastri provided the green signal to Bhabha, who manipulated the emerging Chinese threat skillfully. When Sarabhai replaced Bhabha in crucial posts within India�s atomic energy program, pursuit of the nuclear option was neglected. Indira Gandhi preferred cooperation with the Soviet Union during her first premiership (1966-1977), then became more pro-Western during her second term (1980-1984). Desai understood the limitations of a single-track procurement source and set the course for diversified procurement. While all these individuals had the will to shape and direct India�s weapons programs, their hands were often tied by financial, technical and diplomatic constraints. When these bonds began to loosen in the post-Cold War era, the influence and role of India�s political culture would become even more decisive.
NEW DYNAMICS AND CONTINUITIES: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
India is becoming a harder, more selfish and pragmatic entity. No longer encumbered by leaders besotted by larger-than-life images of themselves on the international stage, the new India is inclined to look at the world in terms of its own interests.
The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War brought about a drastic change in India�s geo-strategic and diplomatic importance. At the same time, India experienced internal economic turmoil and an increase in domestic instability due to numerous insurgency movements. These factors contributed to a sharp decrease in Indian military expenditures and arms importation. Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of Indo-American relations and prevent a broadening of these relations. Finally, the foundations of the Indo-Soviet/Russian military relationship would shift from Indian needs and Soviet opportunism to Russian economic needs and Indian military needs and opportunism. This section encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period represents a lost opportunity for American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was allowed to remain while Indian suspicions of American intentions were continually validated.
India�s Post-Cold War Identity
Having defined its identity and prestige in international politics as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India�s raison d�être and identity in international relations became uncertain with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. "The pursuit of autonomy without power was premised, first, on a balanced stalemate between the Atlantic and Soviet blocs...." The removal of the "Soviet bloc" from the "stalemate" effectively ended the stalemate and, consequently, the rationale for the non-aligned movement. Indians also came to realize that the absence of a bilateral competition between the two superpowers meant that India�s geo-strategic role as a "counter-weight" no longer existed. "When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, India found that few people outside the region cared much about the country. India neither had economic influence nor risked becoming a major source of instability�the two most important criteria for earning foreign attention." Furthermore, the rise of secessionist movements throughout India, South Asia and Central Asia shifted Indian defense concerns back to the issue of internal stability. Finally, after three decades of protectionist economic policies, India was forced to abandon its Soviet-supported "fortress mentality" and turn to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for economic rejuvenation.
Aiding the collapse of the Indian "fortress" was a realization among Indian elites that other Asian countries were experiencing rapid economic growth via the global market. It was during this transition period of the early 1990s that India emerged from centuries of subservience to (or, during the Cold War, dependence on) external powers to begin defining a global role for itself that was solely egocentric and not centered on India�s reliance on other states. On the strategic level, to rephrase Ashley Tellis� Cold War depiction of India, the post-Cold War era became a time of transition as India evolved from being a consumer of security to being a producer of its own security.
Indo-American Relations in the post-cold war era
In the early 1990s, economic reforms in India and the end of the East-West competition of the Cold War provided an opportunity for improved Indo-American relations. Many observers hoped that the continued growth in Indo-American trade relations would provide a "cornerstone" for improved relations. As a result of India�s Economic Reform Programme, foreign investment in India had risen sharply, with the United States taking the lead as India�s largest foreign investor. Additionally, the United States became a major source of technology for India.
Against this backdrop of opportunity, however, the legacy of the Cold War Indo-American rift persisted. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, India had silently allowed American cargo aircraft transiting from the Philippines to the Gulf States to refuel at several airports. When an Indian press photographer happened upon an American aircraft in Bombay that was delayed due to maintenance problems, the story exploded into the Indian press. Domestic politics elevated the refueling operations into a breech of India�s nonalignment policies, and the new Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, was forced to halt the operations.
Following the Gulf War, however, Indo-American military cooperation improved as the two nations conducted a joint naval exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military cooperation in 1995. Additionally, the United States continued to provide technical support to India�s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program and also authorized the transfer of 315 Texas Instruments Paveway bomb-guidance kits to the Indian Air Force. Despite these efforts, Indo-American relations continued to flounder.
During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the United States adopted foreign policy goals in South Asia based upon human rights issues, the desire to resolve tensions in Kashmir, and the need to "cap, roll-back and eliminate" nuclear weapons in the region. As the Clinton Administration continued into its second term, there appeared to be no attempt to readdress Indo-American relations. "One third of the Clinton Administration saw India in terms of arms control, one third saw it as an economic opportunity and one third saw it as a possible strategic partner. There was no policy review, no attempt to bring all this together." Additionally, in 1995, the U.S. Congress passed the Brown Amendment, which lifted most of the sanctions dictated by the Pressler Amendment and allowed the sale of $658 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan. Finally, the United States chose not to impose sanctions on China for the transfer to Pakistan of M-11 missiles and parts and 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistan�s unsafeguarded centrifuges. From the Indian perspective, in the early post-Cold War years, the United States continued to show a preference towards Pakistan and China while simultaneously infringing upon Indian sovereignty.
Russia�s Post-Cold War View of India
Unable to stabilize its own domestic environment, Russia�s leadership, specifically President Boris Yeltsin, emphasized a need for the "�de-ideologization� of its foreign policy." This "de-ideologization" policy resulted in Russia adopting a "wait and see" policy towards India. "The main thing was that Moscow wanted its policy towards India to be pragmatic and flexible." Perhaps the greatest source of Russian neutrality towards India during the transition period of the early 1990s was a Russian political leadership that was "dominated by �Westerners� and the �Atlanticists.�" Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin both appeared to rest their hopes for a rejuvenation of the Russian economy on some variant of the Marshall Plan. Both men failed to understand that a Marshall Plan scenario�at least in the variation pursued in West Germany�required not only defeat but also an occupation of the targeted state to ensure that the required infrastructure and "rule of law" were in place. As is well documented, the tremendous amount of corruption and disorganization within Russia�s bureaucracy curtailed the potential effectiveness of Western financial assistance.
The foreign policy struggle between the "Westerners" and "Asia first" groups in the new Russian state placed Indo-Russian relations in a precarious position. Two schools of thought concerning India existed within Russia in the early 1990s. The first school was composed of academics, members of the Duma and the defense industry who believed that Russia should maintain its "special" relationship with India. A strong India, they argued, could help fight the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that was sweeping across the Central Asian region between Russia and India. Additionally, this group believed that a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of the United States. If Russia promoted areas of regional strength throughout the globe, this school believed, the United States� ability to rest upon its post-Cold War laurels would be short-lived. Finally, India was the top importer of Soviet armaments during the final years of the Cold War, and many experts in Russia believed that this income source was crucial in Russia�s transition to a free-market economy.
The second Russian school of thought concerning future relations with India was headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. This group believed that Pakistani relations were more valuable in fulfilling Russia�s immediate foreign policy and security concerns. The southern periphery of Russia was a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan held the necessary credentials to be an effective middleman for Russia. This view obviously countered the pro-India school that believed the solution to the growing Islamic threat was a strong Indian counter-balance. Finally, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher priority than India due to their geographic proximity to Russia.
As the transition from Soviet to Russian rule took place, the anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making. This domination resulted in a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia. "In November 1991, when the Soviet Union was breathing its last, in a dramatic change of policy, Moscow suddenly supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia to the great consternation of New Delhi." A nuclear-free zone would mean that both India and Pakistan would discontinue their nuclear programs and become "equals" as non-nuclear states. The signal sent by the collapsing Soviet regime, with many of its leaders taking positions in the new Russian government, was that it sided with the West and Pakistan against India�s ambitions for regional leadership and security.
A second impetus for Soviet/Russian support of the Pakistani-sponsored resolution may have been the strong desire to put closure to the war in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the Soviet/Russian leadership wanted to "secure the release of their prisoners of war who were in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions." In January 1992, one month after a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen traveled to Russia, Moscow severed all "military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport" that were sustaining the Najib government�s war effort against the Mujihadeen. This decision effectively negated the airpower advantage that the Najib government had held over the Mujihadeen and tilted the conflict back in favor of the insurgents. New Delhi felt a certain sense of betrayal because of the reversal in Soviet policy since the Indian government had worked with the Soviet Union in supporting the nationalist and secular Najib government.
Strained Indo-Russian Relations
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India�s desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India�s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational. For Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.
Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of missile proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India�s Agni IRBM missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive Branch changed administrations from President Bush to President Clinton.
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of "peaceful space ventures." Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.
The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India�s leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was compromised, however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. space projects.
While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given in to Western pressure. "The conclusion they drew was that Russia�s overriding need for American economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure. In Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature." As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions between the two states also revealed tensions.
During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee versus ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged between the two states over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the military cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not a financial pool. Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet Union, almost half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected. When the new and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR." After much domestic squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005, after which the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over forty-five years.
Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over distribution of the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to establish a three-year import schedule with India which would allow Indian exporters to forecast the amount of products needed in advance. In September 1994, the Russian government reversed this decision out of fear that long-term financial commitments would be too constricting. The new plan offered by Moscow provided a 180-day export forecast to Indian producers.
To further stimulate investor interest in India�s currency, the Russian government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian importers at discounted rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the auctions led to rampant corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially among Russia�s banking oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Indian government continued to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously maintained its protectionist import-export policies. By 1993, the level of bilateral trade between India and Russia had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5 billion.
Figure 2: Indian Arms Imports in Constant 1996 U.S. dollars
India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia�s Foreign Minister. The result was an immediate swing in Russia�s foreign policy focus that included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. A clear signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. "The two countries signed an accord paving the way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it seems that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time." Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly westwards.
India�s Military Needs and Russia�s supplier-dependency
The primary short-term military concern for India in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-produced armaments. After three decades of reliance on Soviet-produced hardware, India was in a position in 1991 in which seventy percent of Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force armaments, and eight-five percent of Navy armaments were of Soviet origin. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies for these systems, India�s military faced an immediate crisis. The break-up of the Soviet Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-Indian military supply-line as the administrative control and actual locations of the Soviet defense industries were situated throughout the newly independent states. "As Air Vice-Marshall S. Krishnaswamy noted with some understatement, there was a �hiccup� in supply relations during 1991-92." Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had allowed India to postpone developing a self-reliant indigenous defense industry. More to the point, "the dependence on Russian weapons over 30 years was a serious strategic defect."
In response to its economic crisis in 1990-91 and the temporary loss of its primary foreign arms supplier, India imposed a reduction in defense expenditures and a sharp reduction in arms importation (see Figures 1 and 2 below). After having been the top importer of conventional weapons in the world during the period from 1988 to 1992, India was ranked as the twenty-third largest importer of conventional arms by 1996. Meanwhile, Russia�s share of the global arms market dropped from thirty-two percent in 1989 to eight percent in 1994. The inability of Russia to continue the Soviet flow of military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in Indian military expenditures, weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Percentage of Indian Arms Imported from the Soviet Union/Russia
http://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rc...-umjDA&usg=AFQjCNHYAdTi5zW3AKk9Du-gaUF8NzyLLQ
INSS Occasional Paper 31
Proliferation Series
February 2000
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
USAF Academy, Colorado
INTRODUCTION
It is a strategic goal of the United States, rooted in the strategic self-interest of the United States, to see a secure India; a more economically vibrant India; and, of course, a better relationship between India and the United States. The nuclear issue is a complicating factor but not necessarily a contradictory one (and I insist on that distinction).
-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
Figure 1: Indian Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1988-96
THE COLD WAR YEARS: 1947-1991
The real reason why there is now an increasingly open conflict between Western and Indian policy and attitudes on so many issues is, quite simply, almost tautologically, that the West and India are running an increasing risk of pursuing policies which cut severely across each other�s interests. The Russians have done no more than act as a catalyst�.The real symbol of what has happened is not the welcoming millions who cheered Messrs. Bulganin and Khruschchev in Calcutta, but the grim sharpness of the reaction which met Mr. Dulles�s description of Goa as a "Province of Portugal."
�The Round Table, 1956
This section only briefly summarizes Indo-Soviet and Indo-American diplomatic, economic, and military relations during the Cold War years from 1947 to 1991. * This summary can only highlight an historical pattern in the Indo-Soviet relationship that supported India�s quest for regional security and independent global stature, and an oscillating Soviet vision of India based upon India�s changing geo-strategic and diplomatic significance. As a result, far from being an enduring and close "special relationship," the historical foundations of the Indo-Soviet relationship reveal an opportunistic relationship in which "India�s needs are a match for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet needs are a match for India�s strengths." Moreover, the strength of the Indo-Soviet relationship depended upon the short-term impact of Indo-American interactions. Additionally, major South Asian policy decisions made by the United States during the Cold War show that the cementing of the "special" Indo-Soviet relationship was a product of American inattention as much as Soviet perseverance.
The pattern of Indian military procurement during the period 1947 to 1990 highlights three central themes of this study. The first is the fragile nature of the Indo-Soviet "special" relationship. The second theme is the emergence and growth of the Indo-American divide. The final theme is the evolution of India�s strategic culture and its role in procurement decisions. A summary of these three topics is provided below.
Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation
The history of Indo-Soviet military cooperation can be summarized as a relationship determined by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism, and Western ambivalence. When India commenced the rapid modernization of its armed forces following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, its initial objective was to continue and expand upon its historical Western supply-line. After failing to secure arms transfer agreements with the West, India turned to the Soviet Union out of "dire necessity." For India, the agreement was a commercial one based on economics. Soviet military contracts usually had favorable financial terms and included provisions for production licensing. But in the long-run, these deals became a burden as India failed to secure a reliable supply of spare parts and also experienced a drop in operational readiness due to a void in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
When India made a concerted effort in the 1980s to diversify its procurement portfolio, it found itself returning to the Soviet Union to satisfy its short-term military needs. With a long-term goal of self-reliance in military procurement, India would continue to use Soviet arms as a stepping stone between the bygone era of the British Raj and future Indian procurement autonomy. While Soviet arms would be used to offset American influence in South Asia, they did not pose a direct military threat to American forces during this period.
The Indo-American Rift
Central to the discussion of Indo-American relations during the Cold War is the fact that India did not play a vital role in American geo-strategic thinking during this period. The ideological significance of India as the world�s largest democracy was negated by India�s unwillingness to align itself with the West in the pivotal East-West struggle. From the American perspective, a lack of Indian support versus the "communist threat" equated to Indian hostility. India�s quest for diplomatic independence and self-reliance did not fit into the American paradigm for a bipolar world.
From the Indian perspective, the confrontational American style threatened a return to colonial methods and subservience. In Indian eyes, America�s willingness to engage Pakistan and China, and thereby impair India�s regional security, illuminated American hegemonic aspirations and American indifference towards less developed countries. The unwillingness of the United States to provide arms to a fellow democracy when needed seemed hypocritical and incredible. The essence of the Indo-American "problem" was quite clear. Both states were acting in the same manner and securing their own national needs, with little regard for what other states might desire. The United States believed that as a superpower it had the right to take a superior position. India felt that as the world�s largest democracy, and a victim of centuries of repression, it had the right to demand equality. With both states proceeding forward and neither willing to give way to the other, a collision was imminent.
Indian Strategic Culture
History, geography, and political culture all played crucial roles in the development of India�s conventional forces and nuclear capabilities during the Cold War. India�s sudden emancipation in 1947 after centuries of subservience created "a fierce determination to preserve Indian independence no matter what the cost�an attitude often bordering on paranoia." Any attempt by outside powers, whether Soviet or Western, to exert influence upon India was often met with open defiance. While the Soviet Union, especially under Khrushchev, would be more understanding of India�s "paranoia" and would treat India with respect, the United States often presented India with demands, even when providing food aid. Furthermore, the United States would exacerbate India�s geographic isolation by providing arms and technical data to both Pakistan and China, thus adding fuel to Indian militarism.
Finally, India�s political and bureaucratic leaders were crucial in determining the course that India would take in weapons development and procurement. Nehru neglected the country�s military forces until it was too late to recover. Shastri provided the green signal to Bhabha, who manipulated the emerging Chinese threat skillfully. When Sarabhai replaced Bhabha in crucial posts within India�s atomic energy program, pursuit of the nuclear option was neglected. Indira Gandhi preferred cooperation with the Soviet Union during her first premiership (1966-1977), then became more pro-Western during her second term (1980-1984). Desai understood the limitations of a single-track procurement source and set the course for diversified procurement. While all these individuals had the will to shape and direct India�s weapons programs, their hands were often tied by financial, technical and diplomatic constraints. When these bonds began to loosen in the post-Cold War era, the influence and role of India�s political culture would become even more decisive.
NEW DYNAMICS AND CONTINUITIES: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
India is becoming a harder, more selfish and pragmatic entity. No longer encumbered by leaders besotted by larger-than-life images of themselves on the international stage, the new India is inclined to look at the world in terms of its own interests.
The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War brought about a drastic change in India�s geo-strategic and diplomatic importance. At the same time, India experienced internal economic turmoil and an increase in domestic instability due to numerous insurgency movements. These factors contributed to a sharp decrease in Indian military expenditures and arms importation. Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of Indo-American relations and prevent a broadening of these relations. Finally, the foundations of the Indo-Soviet/Russian military relationship would shift from Indian needs and Soviet opportunism to Russian economic needs and Indian military needs and opportunism. This section encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period represents a lost opportunity for American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was allowed to remain while Indian suspicions of American intentions were continually validated.
India�s Post-Cold War Identity
Having defined its identity and prestige in international politics as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India�s raison d�être and identity in international relations became uncertain with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. "The pursuit of autonomy without power was premised, first, on a balanced stalemate between the Atlantic and Soviet blocs...." The removal of the "Soviet bloc" from the "stalemate" effectively ended the stalemate and, consequently, the rationale for the non-aligned movement. Indians also came to realize that the absence of a bilateral competition between the two superpowers meant that India�s geo-strategic role as a "counter-weight" no longer existed. "When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, India found that few people outside the region cared much about the country. India neither had economic influence nor risked becoming a major source of instability�the two most important criteria for earning foreign attention." Furthermore, the rise of secessionist movements throughout India, South Asia and Central Asia shifted Indian defense concerns back to the issue of internal stability. Finally, after three decades of protectionist economic policies, India was forced to abandon its Soviet-supported "fortress mentality" and turn to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for economic rejuvenation.
Aiding the collapse of the Indian "fortress" was a realization among Indian elites that other Asian countries were experiencing rapid economic growth via the global market. It was during this transition period of the early 1990s that India emerged from centuries of subservience to (or, during the Cold War, dependence on) external powers to begin defining a global role for itself that was solely egocentric and not centered on India�s reliance on other states. On the strategic level, to rephrase Ashley Tellis� Cold War depiction of India, the post-Cold War era became a time of transition as India evolved from being a consumer of security to being a producer of its own security.
Indo-American Relations in the post-cold war era
In the early 1990s, economic reforms in India and the end of the East-West competition of the Cold War provided an opportunity for improved Indo-American relations. Many observers hoped that the continued growth in Indo-American trade relations would provide a "cornerstone" for improved relations. As a result of India�s Economic Reform Programme, foreign investment in India had risen sharply, with the United States taking the lead as India�s largest foreign investor. Additionally, the United States became a major source of technology for India.
Against this backdrop of opportunity, however, the legacy of the Cold War Indo-American rift persisted. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, India had silently allowed American cargo aircraft transiting from the Philippines to the Gulf States to refuel at several airports. When an Indian press photographer happened upon an American aircraft in Bombay that was delayed due to maintenance problems, the story exploded into the Indian press. Domestic politics elevated the refueling operations into a breech of India�s nonalignment policies, and the new Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, was forced to halt the operations.
Following the Gulf War, however, Indo-American military cooperation improved as the two nations conducted a joint naval exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military cooperation in 1995. Additionally, the United States continued to provide technical support to India�s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program and also authorized the transfer of 315 Texas Instruments Paveway bomb-guidance kits to the Indian Air Force. Despite these efforts, Indo-American relations continued to flounder.
During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the United States adopted foreign policy goals in South Asia based upon human rights issues, the desire to resolve tensions in Kashmir, and the need to "cap, roll-back and eliminate" nuclear weapons in the region. As the Clinton Administration continued into its second term, there appeared to be no attempt to readdress Indo-American relations. "One third of the Clinton Administration saw India in terms of arms control, one third saw it as an economic opportunity and one third saw it as a possible strategic partner. There was no policy review, no attempt to bring all this together." Additionally, in 1995, the U.S. Congress passed the Brown Amendment, which lifted most of the sanctions dictated by the Pressler Amendment and allowed the sale of $658 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan. Finally, the United States chose not to impose sanctions on China for the transfer to Pakistan of M-11 missiles and parts and 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistan�s unsafeguarded centrifuges. From the Indian perspective, in the early post-Cold War years, the United States continued to show a preference towards Pakistan and China while simultaneously infringing upon Indian sovereignty.
Russia�s Post-Cold War View of India
Unable to stabilize its own domestic environment, Russia�s leadership, specifically President Boris Yeltsin, emphasized a need for the "�de-ideologization� of its foreign policy." This "de-ideologization" policy resulted in Russia adopting a "wait and see" policy towards India. "The main thing was that Moscow wanted its policy towards India to be pragmatic and flexible." Perhaps the greatest source of Russian neutrality towards India during the transition period of the early 1990s was a Russian political leadership that was "dominated by �Westerners� and the �Atlanticists.�" Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin both appeared to rest their hopes for a rejuvenation of the Russian economy on some variant of the Marshall Plan. Both men failed to understand that a Marshall Plan scenario�at least in the variation pursued in West Germany�required not only defeat but also an occupation of the targeted state to ensure that the required infrastructure and "rule of law" were in place. As is well documented, the tremendous amount of corruption and disorganization within Russia�s bureaucracy curtailed the potential effectiveness of Western financial assistance.
The foreign policy struggle between the "Westerners" and "Asia first" groups in the new Russian state placed Indo-Russian relations in a precarious position. Two schools of thought concerning India existed within Russia in the early 1990s. The first school was composed of academics, members of the Duma and the defense industry who believed that Russia should maintain its "special" relationship with India. A strong India, they argued, could help fight the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that was sweeping across the Central Asian region between Russia and India. Additionally, this group believed that a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of the United States. If Russia promoted areas of regional strength throughout the globe, this school believed, the United States� ability to rest upon its post-Cold War laurels would be short-lived. Finally, India was the top importer of Soviet armaments during the final years of the Cold War, and many experts in Russia believed that this income source was crucial in Russia�s transition to a free-market economy.
The second Russian school of thought concerning future relations with India was headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. This group believed that Pakistani relations were more valuable in fulfilling Russia�s immediate foreign policy and security concerns. The southern periphery of Russia was a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan held the necessary credentials to be an effective middleman for Russia. This view obviously countered the pro-India school that believed the solution to the growing Islamic threat was a strong Indian counter-balance. Finally, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher priority than India due to their geographic proximity to Russia.
As the transition from Soviet to Russian rule took place, the anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making. This domination resulted in a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia. "In November 1991, when the Soviet Union was breathing its last, in a dramatic change of policy, Moscow suddenly supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia to the great consternation of New Delhi." A nuclear-free zone would mean that both India and Pakistan would discontinue their nuclear programs and become "equals" as non-nuclear states. The signal sent by the collapsing Soviet regime, with many of its leaders taking positions in the new Russian government, was that it sided with the West and Pakistan against India�s ambitions for regional leadership and security.
A second impetus for Soviet/Russian support of the Pakistani-sponsored resolution may have been the strong desire to put closure to the war in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the Soviet/Russian leadership wanted to "secure the release of their prisoners of war who were in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions." In January 1992, one month after a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen traveled to Russia, Moscow severed all "military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport" that were sustaining the Najib government�s war effort against the Mujihadeen. This decision effectively negated the airpower advantage that the Najib government had held over the Mujihadeen and tilted the conflict back in favor of the insurgents. New Delhi felt a certain sense of betrayal because of the reversal in Soviet policy since the Indian government had worked with the Soviet Union in supporting the nationalist and secular Najib government.
Strained Indo-Russian Relations
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India�s desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India�s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational. For Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.
Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of missile proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India�s Agni IRBM missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive Branch changed administrations from President Bush to President Clinton.
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of "peaceful space ventures." Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.
The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India�s leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was compromised, however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. space projects.
While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given in to Western pressure. "The conclusion they drew was that Russia�s overriding need for American economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure. In Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature." As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions between the two states also revealed tensions.
During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee versus ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged between the two states over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the military cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not a financial pool. Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet Union, almost half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected. When the new and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR." After much domestic squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005, after which the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over forty-five years.
Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over distribution of the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to establish a three-year import schedule with India which would allow Indian exporters to forecast the amount of products needed in advance. In September 1994, the Russian government reversed this decision out of fear that long-term financial commitments would be too constricting. The new plan offered by Moscow provided a 180-day export forecast to Indian producers.
To further stimulate investor interest in India�s currency, the Russian government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian importers at discounted rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the auctions led to rampant corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially among Russia�s banking oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Indian government continued to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously maintained its protectionist import-export policies. By 1993, the level of bilateral trade between India and Russia had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5 billion.
Figure 2: Indian Arms Imports in Constant 1996 U.S. dollars
India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia�s Foreign Minister. The result was an immediate swing in Russia�s foreign policy focus that included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. A clear signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. "The two countries signed an accord paving the way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it seems that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time." Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly westwards.
India�s Military Needs and Russia�s supplier-dependency
The primary short-term military concern for India in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-produced armaments. After three decades of reliance on Soviet-produced hardware, India was in a position in 1991 in which seventy percent of Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force armaments, and eight-five percent of Navy armaments were of Soviet origin. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies for these systems, India�s military faced an immediate crisis. The break-up of the Soviet Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-Indian military supply-line as the administrative control and actual locations of the Soviet defense industries were situated throughout the newly independent states. "As Air Vice-Marshall S. Krishnaswamy noted with some understatement, there was a �hiccup� in supply relations during 1991-92." Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had allowed India to postpone developing a self-reliant indigenous defense industry. More to the point, "the dependence on Russian weapons over 30 years was a serious strategic defect."
In response to its economic crisis in 1990-91 and the temporary loss of its primary foreign arms supplier, India imposed a reduction in defense expenditures and a sharp reduction in arms importation (see Figures 1 and 2 below). After having been the top importer of conventional weapons in the world during the period from 1988 to 1992, India was ranked as the twenty-third largest importer of conventional arms by 1996. Meanwhile, Russia�s share of the global arms market dropped from thirty-two percent in 1989 to eight percent in 1994. The inability of Russia to continue the Soviet flow of military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in Indian military expenditures, weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Percentage of Indian Arms Imported from the Soviet Union/Russia
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