Some random thoughts....
The contribution of the navies and air forces of both sides can be decisive in specific situations. Overall, however, since both countries are land powers, the final outcome of wars between them must be decided on land.
In 1971, for example, the Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan. Pakistan had no reinforcements to spare, nonetheless, the psychological impact of complete and final isolation was considerable. Similarly, the IAF, by overwhelming the small PAF contingent in the East achieved rapid air supremacy. For an army such as Pakistan’s, accustomed to fighting under the secure protection of its active and efficient air force, loss of its air cover proved devastating to morale and operations.
Both these services thus contributed very substantially—perhaps even decisively—to the quick decision in the East. Considering that each day’s delay increased the possibility of United Nations intervention in some form, by helping to ensure a quick war, the two services proved strategically decisive.
The Indian Navy cannot contribute materially to a short war against Pakistan. In a long war it will become a vital actor, because the bulk of war supplies and civilian trade must come by sea.
Today Pakistan has excellent road and good rail connections with Iran. Since the Middle East nations have now become its primary support base in the event of conflict with India (the U.S. connection notwithstanding), Pakistan cannot be totally isolated as was its eastern wing in 1971.
Vital high-volume low-weight supplies will come by air. The roads from the Middle East to Pakistan can take 40 -ton semitrailers enabling a continual supply flow from Europe and the Arab nations. The Karakoram Highway link with China is of less importance, as it will be quickly closed by the IAF at the outbreak of war. For a long war, however, the sea route is irreplaceable.
If, for example, military equipment carried in four Chinese freighters has first to unload at Iran’s Chahbahar port, then be containerized or shipped on heavy trailers by road to Zahedan in Iran, and then transshipped by rail or by road to Karachi and Lahore, then the process is obviously more time consuming than unloading at Karachi in the first place. In a longer war, the enormous consumption of replacement arms and war material, and the loss of trade from closure of the nation’s ports would hurt Pakistan badly.
Pakistan’s maritime strategy is the essence of simplicity:
- Protect its coast with a combination of Arabian Sea and attacking the Indian Navy as close to its home bases as possible.
- destroyers in the second-line, ranging upto 250 kilometers or so from the cost.
- torpedo and missile boats in the third-line, operating close to the cost.
- maritime reconnaissance aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, and strike aircraft operating in conjunction with the surface forces.
- Keep its larger Indian opponent off balance by using its small submarine force to threaten Bombay High and Indian shipping.
This is clearly a strategy of sea denial.
India, on the other hand, will seek to impose its naval will on Pakistan, a strategy of sea control by:
- Aggressively seeking to attack all Pakistani coastal bases and targets, including the landing of amphibious forces to help the Army achieve strategic results.
- Seeking to clear the Arabian Sea of all Pakistani shipping, military or civilian.
The dominant reality of the naval balance between the two countries is that sea-denial (Pakistan’ s strategy) is far easier and cheaper to achieve than sea-control (India’s strategy). The situation may be linked to that between Germany and the Allies in World War II. With a much smaller investment in men and equipment, the German Navy neutralized the much larger Allied fleets for almost five year;
India’s strike, power against Pakistan may have increased by a factor of five since 1971, but Pakistan’s ability to defend itself has increased by a factor of—say—twenty. While avoiding more exact comparisons to these figures than justified by the available data, a repeat of the Karachi raid may well be at least three times harder than was the case in 1971.
In 1971, Karachi was a sitting duck because Pakistan had no maritime reconnaissance capability. An ad hoc capability after the attack on Karachi was provided by Pakistan International Airways, akin to using Vayudoot or Indian Airlines to cover Bombay port and naval base. Pakistan had no land-based strike aircraft, nor any anti-ship missiles. The results are a matter of history, even if we dispute as to who inflicted the greater damage on Karachi, the IN or the IAF.
Today the major naval bases of Karachi and Gwader are well protected by anti-ship missiles. A small but adequate, reconnaissance element exists as well. Sea King holicopters, capable of anti- submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship missile strikes are available. Long-range strike elements of PAF equipped with AShMs are there. All this makes simply sailing in and blasting Gwader or Karachi impossible.
Today a repeat of 1971 may prove, more expensive to IN than to PN. If IN sends twenty warships to sink three Pakistani warships, and damage the port, but lose four or five of its expensive ships in return, the exchange ratio cannot be considered favorable.
A point to be kept in mind regarding PN's old destroyers equipped with anti ship missiles is that the sophistication lies in the missile, which is basically an inert round till fired, not in the ship.
If IN wants to fight the Pakistan Navy in its home waters, then even the otherwise insignificant Chinese missile boats become deadly. The Pakistan Navy may not be able to attack, except with submarines, but it certainly can defend.
The problem with defending against submarines is that the cost- benefit ratio favors the submarine. This has led the submarine to be a preferred weapon of the weaker naval power. As with any other weapon, no matter how good, numbers themselves are the best force multiplier, and Pakistanis submarines today present a threat more than twice its four, submarines presented in 1971.
The point is not that of quality: IN subs are much superior to Pakistan’s subs. It is instead:
— In 1971 Pakistan had just received its three Daphnes from France and many of the crew, Bengali in origin, had jumped ship before they reached Pakistan, so that the small force was effectively crippled. Today’s force is much more effective.
— Trying to stop a handful of submarines in an area as large as the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is a losing proposition.
In 1971 Pakistan’ s obsolete American submarine Ghazi, actually a training boat, sneaked right up to Vishakapatnam and but for bad luck, would have sunk the Vikrant instead of being sunk in its turn. Today if PNS Hurmat /Saad / Hamza manages to put three torpedoes into Vikrant, IN's blasting of Karachi will prove of little comfort.
