.I request a little time, around four hours, to respond to posts 24, 25, 26 and 27.
This is one of the most meaningful discussions to emerge in recent months, and I will have to kill myself if the discussants drop the topic.
So do I Sir.
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.I request a little time, around four hours, to respond to posts 24, 25, 26 and 27.
This is one of the most meaningful discussions to emerge in recent months, and I will have to kill myself if the discussants drop the topic.
A strike corps will have a primary and a secondary role. If the primary role of the strike corps being raised for NE India is to capture targets inside China, it will have to identify particular sets of targets within a geographical limit and can only go as far inside china as it is capable of, while the holding corps' conduct defensive operations.
How much difference would it make to the Chinese with regard to the sensitivity of the lost territory is the core point. If they can afford to lose some territory and in the bargain cut-off NE India from the rest of India, they can deal with the intrusion later. In any case they would've surrounded all the Indian forces within NE India.
It therefore is rather interesting to war-game such environment.
If the plan is to react to a PLA attack, that doesn't sound like a strike corps. But perhaps the point is that nomenclature is getting in the way. Assuming for a moment that the troop build-up takes place successfully, and it really should do so, what next? Guard and hold key points? Keep divisional and corps reserves? Keep sufficient resource for rapid air deployment of the reserves, and evacuation of outnumbered strong points? What then? Assume for a moment that the attacking forces find yet another geographical feature or combination of features supporting their attack, what do we do to stop the PLA?
Can the Army do the job alone? If the Air Force is to be a critical component of the plans, is something being done to integrate the respective structures at least at strategic, theatre level? Assuming that integration lower down might be a mammoth task and might even be unnecessary?
I believe our focus should be on this type of inter-services integration. Today, a ground unit cannot talk to an airborne element. The frequencies differ. Should we worry about this more than about nomenclature?
Sir, you elucidate your thinking pretty well. I am not as well conversant with the geo-political environment as you are, however I will attempt to put across a bit of my response:
America's dealings with different countries is based on their interests. They seek a different kind of response from India and different from Pakistan. India is placed by them in Pacific Command (PACOM), whereas Pakistan is placed in CENTCOM. These two commands have different areas of operation. Though on insistence of India, they allowed India to place a liaison officer in CENTCOM yet, India remains in PACOM. That is why they repeatedly seek India's indulgence in South East Asia.
They also want to take advantage of India's cheap labour and seek an alternative of China in an effort to improve their economy.
They also want India to be a countervailing factor with regard to containing China.
Because India is boxed in between two strong nuclear countries, they want to take advantage of India's naval forces in keeping the "world commons". World commons are international air, sea and space thoroughfares.
At the same time, they also don't want India as a challenger to US hegemony in future.
They want different set of things from Pakistan according to their interests therefore need Pakistan's support as well.
For this, they want both these countries to improve their relations, so that any conflict between them, and I don't mean armed conflict only, which can adversely impact their interests, is avoided.
Dont you think the situation which you are potraying would become bloody for both sides in the end.I mean we are talking of Mountaineous warfare here.The aggresor has to take casualties in order to hold enemy territory.The foot soldiers have to pay a price in such battles where the Armour cant play much of a role.
Moreover i believe that if China has to attack India it will be through air or Navy more than the land.I hope you will agree that the war from China's point of veiw should be short and lethal..achieving their objectives before the International community can come in.
You are talking about a war here, not a play fight. Wars are ugly and bloody, thats the purpose of it. A knife fight between both PLA and IA will indeed by brutal and bloody. Both sides are very well equipped and most importantly very well trained. They know how to use their equipment well and inflict maximum casualties on the opponent. I know its sad for humanity but its a fact.
The only problem for the Chinese is that both IN and IAF are very well equipped and are capable of handling any attack either from PLA or PLAN. The induction of new platforms in the last two decades has taken IN and IAF a generation ahead. They are perfectly well equipped to fight a war against China. If its a long ridden war than IAF will face problems due to her inferior logistics, don't know much about IN's logistical capability.
One more point that i will add is that PLA does not train to fight a battle taking the international community into account. They fight deep battles of annihilation, something they learned well from the Soviets. If you look at the last couple of exercises that PLA has performed, they have moved away from fortification manoeuvres towards deep battles of engagement. They don't fight half hearted battles like India and Pakistan, they fight deep bloody battles. I believe history has a huge impact on their military institutions. They fought a war of annihilation against the Japs, and the Soviet officers whom trained younger generation of Chinese officers had fought a war of annihilation against the Germans. They have taken these lessons and deeply ingrained these lessons into their institutional structures.
In my opinion your severely underestimating the Chinese threat.
Rather, my suggestion would be to try and put in a Herculean effort to achieve air superiority, not impossible, though very, very tough, and use that for medium- and long-range interdiction. As someone has already pointed out, notorious eagle, perhaps, the edge the PLA has is logistics, and that should be the primary target of Indian forces.
you are right but again there are limits of indian efforts and its military.U.S will have to clear way for india and should let india to be great military power.so we yet have to see how U.S will react after 2014.
so south asia is not just india pak n china,its whole world...i used to say that U.S wont leave this region,i mean A-stan but fanboys used to bash me and i m again saying that U.S n nato wont leave A-stan fully...
and U.S is here for limited period may be decade more and south asia will witness a war.
so story ends with india n china in cold war with each other while U.S departs from region after decade....n i once said that if pakistan successfully manages next 10 yrs then it would be great achievement...plz dont take it wrong,this is not my point..
i read points of economist from india few years ago and watever he said is truth n same is happening here.if u want more proof then look at the desperate behavior of U.S in region n indian calm behavior like india is waiting for more from U.S.
Well put Sir
Lets go into a bit more depth. India upgrading her defences near her Chinese border is a welcome sign, it was long overdue. The PLA has got one thing right and that is to focus on logistics. The logistical infrastructure they have built across the Indian border is magnificent. They can rush reinforcements at a much faster pace compared to their Indian counterparts. India is setting up her infrastructure fast and from what i have read, they will increase the number of troops. One aspect where i believe the Indian war planners are lacking is the acquisition of artillery. Due to India's mammoth bureaucratic machinery, i believe IA still lacks the amount of artillery she needs on both fronts. PLA has dominance in this area, they have the necessary numbers required to punish Indian forces whether they are advancing or on the defence.
Due to the nature of terrain, sustained offensive operations are highly unlikely from both sides. Contrary to all the propaganda in the 1962 war, PLA would have been clobbered if they would have held the ground due to Indian reinforcements which were due to arrive. PLA was smart enough to know this and they retreated before those reinforcements arrived which would have meant sure encirclement for PLA. You do raise a good point that Air will be a decisive factor. Looking at the balance of forces and the terrain, it appears to me that both sides will launch punitive actions instead of battle of annihilation.
Well put Sir
Lets go into a bit more depth. India upgrading her defences near her Chinese border is a welcome sign, it was long overdue. The PLA has got one thing right and that is to focus on logistics. The logistical infrastructure they have built across the Indian border is magnificent. They can rush reinforcements at a much faster pace compared to their Indian counterparts. India is setting up her infrastructure fast and from what i have read, they will increase the number of troops. One aspect where i believe the Indian war planners are lacking is the acquisition of artillery. Due to India's mammoth bureaucratic machinery, i believe IA still lacks the amount of artillery she needs on both fronts. PLA has dominance in this area, they have the necessary numbers required to punish Indian forces whether they are advancing or on the defence.
Due to the nature of terrain, sustained offensive operations are highly unlikely from both sides. Contrary to all the propaganda in the 1962 war, PLA would have been clobbered if they would have held the ground due to Indian reinforcements which were due to arrive. PLA was smart enough to know this and they retreated before those reinforcements arrived which would have meant sure encirclement for PLA. You do raise a good point that Air will be a decisive factor. Looking at the balance of forces and the terrain, it appears to me that both sides will launch punitive actions instead of battle of annihilation.
It has been correctly stated that the logistics capability of the PLA is its greatest military asset against India, much more so than against any other adversary. The asymmetry is so great that one has to go back 140 years to find a similar situation, and then the similarities are hair-raising. What were the mistakes the French made in 1871? Are those mistakes replicable in today's situation on India's northern frontiers? Does the Indian Army find itself compelled by political pressure (and by pressure from Internet patriots) to defend every last rock, every last ravine? Does it have the equivalent of Belgium, a supposedly neutral country vulnerable to the slightest pressure that is capable of compromising the core of the Indian defensive structure? Is it inclined to give battle entirely within India, thus releasing the PLA to select its point of attack?
In one word, can India guard against China as things stand today?
The answer regretfully must be No, both for the reasons that might be collated from answers to the questions put above, and from the point of view of India's vulnerability to a simultaneous attack on the west. The answers to India's strategic vulnerability in the north lie entirely on its success in neutralizing the threat in existence to the west.
So far the discussion has thrown up many very interesting points.
India's policy at regional/geo-strategic level evolves in a manner that, while improving relations with China, deal with Pakistan upfront. This apparently is also undertaken to avoid a two front war.
With the US shifting political and military emphasis to Asia, India has gained in certain aspects and lost ground in attainment of some of her objectives. On the Chinese front, it has gained importance and is being asked by US and the West to assert itself, which Indian strategists are reluctant to indulge in. This in my opinion has become a dilemma for India. She wants US and Western support in enhancing her economy and stature at the world forums, while at the same time does not to want fight for them in their efforts to contain China.
Against Pakistan, India wants US and Western support to achieve her aims. However some of the American and Western interests do not allow them to push Pakistan in a manner which could help India attain her objectives. Here also, it places India in a dilemma.
In all this imbroglio, India's military strategy attempts to ready itself to simultaneously fight a two front war, in case such an environment arises. This is done to prepare for the worst case scenario.
However, if there is a war with Pakistan only, some forces deployed on Chinese front can be made available for Pakistan and conversely, if a war only with China has to be fought, some forces can be shifted from Pakistani to Chinese front.
In case a simultaneous two front war occurs, India first intends to deal with Pakistan and regain its lost territory from China after defeating or neutralizing Pakistan. Therefore, against Pakistan, India has to fight and win or neutralize in a certain time-frame, which makes the war short and violent.
Conversely in such a scenario, in case of China, India has to prepare and fight for a comparatively longer period of time. War with China in this case would not be short, no matter how violent it may be.
It is for this reason India is probably raising additional forces for Chinese front to either do not allow the Chinese to capture large chunk of territory or to keep the ingress limited. So that when the forces are available from the Pakistani front, they are shifted and regain the losses.
Here, the importance of current deployment and disposition of Indian Armed Forces is revealed and is understood. The problem in land battle would arise from the deployment of air assets. Against Pakistan, India has around 29-30 airbases. Against China, these are only around 9. These 9 or so bases can house a limited number of aircraft for the types of missions needed against China. And as @Joe Shearer also says, that though he wishes India to attain air superiority against China, it may not be really possible, irrespective of the number of air to air refuelers it possess.
Positing the nuclear factor and Indian Naval operations based on sea denial against China and Pakistan will also be an interesting discussion.