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Indian Military was ready for a swift war after 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack
Defence of India
The spectre of two-and-three-half front war
By Pravin Sawhney
A few days after the Pakistan Army-supported Lashkar terrorists struck Mumbai on 26 November 2008, the Indian military concluded that a swift war with Pakistan was worth the while.
It would be a blitzkrieg; with the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the lead, the Indian Army (IA) was ready to cross the international border. In an operational surprise, for example, a nondescript, lightly-held Pakistani town, Fort Abbas in southern Punjab facing Indias Rajasthan desert, very close to the border could fall within days before the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, a Punjabi, would wake up to the reality that Punjab land, however small, has been occupied by the IA. Considering the unsaid rule on both sides of the divide that not even an inch of Punjab can be lost, Kayanis nemesis would stare him in the face.
In the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting attended by the three defence service chiefs, the chiefs unanimously told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Pakistan Armys corps commanders would disallow Kayani from contemplating use of nuclear weapon; the loss of Fort Abbas would not be good enough reason to imperil the existence of Pakistan.
The worst case scenario would be the use of ballistic missile with conventional warhead by Pakistan. If it fell in a built-up area, India could lose as many as 10,000 lives, but this will not affect the war for India. If anything, Pakistan would be shamed for massive collateral damage. Before the chiefs gave their assessment to the CCS, plenty of work was done by them to decide how to run the war campaign against Pakistan.
Five terms of references were clear to the defence chiefs: the IAF and IA would need to work in close synergy for the Air-Land campaign; the war campaign must remain clear of nuclear red lines, and hence only shallow penetrations were doable; the war gains had to be achieved swiftly before Kayani could redirect his nearly 30 per cent army (his reserves) committed on the Afghanistan front to the Indian theatre; enormous US and global pressure would come within a week to halt the war; and most importantly, given the earlier experience of the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Chinese front had to be defended firmly.
China would indulge in mischief to assist Pakistan war effort. Except for the Chinese issue, about which the political and military leadership were unsure, all other aspects were dovetailed in the war plan.
A rough military appreciation could be as follows:
The IAF would be able to muster 33 combat squadrons at an average of 75 per cent of aircraft availability against the Pakistan Air Forces 22 squadrons including maritime assets. In addition to offensive counter-air missions, the IAF would do a mix of air defence suppression, battlefield air interdiction and close air support, the details of which were worked out with the IA during the 10-month-long Operation Parakram in 2002 and have since been refined and practiced. The (limited) air superiority provided by the IAF would help the IA unfold its May 2002 campaign, which has been fine-tuned by the creation of new IA organisational assets.
Pakistans Army Reserve North (ARN) structured around 1 corps (with 6 armoured division) and with 30 corps at Gujranwala and a few other elements would be hard pressed to meet the Indian challenge posed by the refurbished pivot corps (with enormous combat potential) and additional assets equivalent of an offensive corps in Pathankot general area. Meanwhile, Pakistan Army Reserve south (ARS) structured around 1 armoured division in Multan, and with 31 corps (armour heavy) in Bahawalpur (5 corps is way south in Karachi) would be pitted against the might of Indian strike (offensive) 2 and 21 corps in the Rajasthan desert.
The important issues are that with Pakistans 11 and 12 corps committed in Afghanistan few army reserves would be available to GHQ, Rawalpindi for either ARN or ARS. This is not all. The Pakistan Army reserves fighting a counter-insurgency (CI) campaign in Afghanistan would need time to re-orient themselves for conventional war on the Indian front.
Moreover, their heavy armour equipment would have been mothballed as these are not being used in CI operations. Getting equipment in a fighting fit state will also need time.
The remaining text is by subscription only, one need to pay to read further.
Defence of India
The spectre of two-and-three-half front war
By Pravin Sawhney
A few days after the Pakistan Army-supported Lashkar terrorists struck Mumbai on 26 November 2008, the Indian military concluded that a swift war with Pakistan was worth the while.
It would be a blitzkrieg; with the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the lead, the Indian Army (IA) was ready to cross the international border. In an operational surprise, for example, a nondescript, lightly-held Pakistani town, Fort Abbas in southern Punjab facing Indias Rajasthan desert, very close to the border could fall within days before the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, a Punjabi, would wake up to the reality that Punjab land, however small, has been occupied by the IA. Considering the unsaid rule on both sides of the divide that not even an inch of Punjab can be lost, Kayanis nemesis would stare him in the face.
In the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting attended by the three defence service chiefs, the chiefs unanimously told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Pakistan Armys corps commanders would disallow Kayani from contemplating use of nuclear weapon; the loss of Fort Abbas would not be good enough reason to imperil the existence of Pakistan.
The worst case scenario would be the use of ballistic missile with conventional warhead by Pakistan. If it fell in a built-up area, India could lose as many as 10,000 lives, but this will not affect the war for India. If anything, Pakistan would be shamed for massive collateral damage. Before the chiefs gave their assessment to the CCS, plenty of work was done by them to decide how to run the war campaign against Pakistan.
Five terms of references were clear to the defence chiefs: the IAF and IA would need to work in close synergy for the Air-Land campaign; the war campaign must remain clear of nuclear red lines, and hence only shallow penetrations were doable; the war gains had to be achieved swiftly before Kayani could redirect his nearly 30 per cent army (his reserves) committed on the Afghanistan front to the Indian theatre; enormous US and global pressure would come within a week to halt the war; and most importantly, given the earlier experience of the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Chinese front had to be defended firmly.
China would indulge in mischief to assist Pakistan war effort. Except for the Chinese issue, about which the political and military leadership were unsure, all other aspects were dovetailed in the war plan.
A rough military appreciation could be as follows:
The IAF would be able to muster 33 combat squadrons at an average of 75 per cent of aircraft availability against the Pakistan Air Forces 22 squadrons including maritime assets. In addition to offensive counter-air missions, the IAF would do a mix of air defence suppression, battlefield air interdiction and close air support, the details of which were worked out with the IA during the 10-month-long Operation Parakram in 2002 and have since been refined and practiced. The (limited) air superiority provided by the IAF would help the IA unfold its May 2002 campaign, which has been fine-tuned by the creation of new IA organisational assets.
Pakistans Army Reserve North (ARN) structured around 1 corps (with 6 armoured division) and with 30 corps at Gujranwala and a few other elements would be hard pressed to meet the Indian challenge posed by the refurbished pivot corps (with enormous combat potential) and additional assets equivalent of an offensive corps in Pathankot general area. Meanwhile, Pakistan Army Reserve south (ARS) structured around 1 armoured division in Multan, and with 31 corps (armour heavy) in Bahawalpur (5 corps is way south in Karachi) would be pitted against the might of Indian strike (offensive) 2 and 21 corps in the Rajasthan desert.
The important issues are that with Pakistans 11 and 12 corps committed in Afghanistan few army reserves would be available to GHQ, Rawalpindi for either ARN or ARS. This is not all. The Pakistan Army reserves fighting a counter-insurgency (CI) campaign in Afghanistan would need time to re-orient themselves for conventional war on the Indian front.
Moreover, their heavy armour equipment would have been mothballed as these are not being used in CI operations. Getting equipment in a fighting fit state will also need time.
The remaining text is by subscription only, one need to pay to read further.
