India-Russia T-90 Deal: An Analysis
by Rajesh Kumar Mishra
It is not our intention to muddy the waters further when Tehelka exposures are rocking the government. This T-90 deal may kill the indigenous MBT-project Arjun, but what is surprising is that no one knows except a fortunate few in the Defence ministry, about the expected military advantages and the actual price being paid for the final product. Is it more than for what we bargained for and if so why? Director
Today in India, the philosophy behind the culture of maintaining secrecy in defence matters has come under considerable public scrutiny. It may take heavier tolls than what the country had experienced. Its spin off might further affect the morale of the army.
In the light of the present defence demands, the rationale to get the best of the utilised resources needs three important points of reference prioritisation of demands, selection of the best available competitive price compliant goods and services under a specified category, and the management of resources. Taking these aspects into account, does the agreement to acquire T-90 main battle tanks (MBT) justify the deal?
The recent expose has raised a fairly good number of questions ranging from the individual values to the preparedness of the national defence. Today, a nation wide debate is needed on all the relevant issues pertaining to the weakening endemic systems whatsoever in past and present. Analytically, it is good and bad both. It is good that its urgency has been realized at a time when the countrys military strength is undergoing tremendous resurrection. Bad because the legitimacy of the governance itself is under severe criticism, when the country is busy in looking for some headway in Kashmir like volatile situation, and pressing hard to find a responsible position in the global political and strategic systems. Also, one needs to take into account that, at the international front, India is yet to convince and thoroughly justify the world community of Indias ongoing missile and nuclear development programmes.
Every year, the size of budgetary allocations for the defence reflects governments concern towards defence needs and demands. In the Budget for 2001-2002, there is an increment of 13.8 percent over the last years defence spending. However, is the financial allocation based on judicious conclusions for acquisition and procurement needs? Do all the defence spending justify the rationale behind them?
No doubt, military hardware has collectively been reaching obsolescence after decades of service. Consequently, timely upgradation and modernisation of defence assets are long overdue. Even the Standing Committee on Defence in its Third Report (2001), referring the Kargil conflict of 1999 as a wake-up call, justified the 20.79 per cent increase over the revised estimate of last years budget for essential requirements for modernising the armed forces.
At the same time, it also acknowledges that poor planning results in wasteful purchases which are a drain on the scarce resources of the country. Even the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Padmanabhan, in an interview with the Janes Defence Weekly (Vol.35, Issue No.3, 17January,2001, p.32) has suggested an encouragement to efficient and transparent procurement policy.
Differing reports on the T-90 Deal
It is reported through government documents that Russia in December1997 first offered the T-90 tanks. In December 1998, the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the proposal for the acquisition by the technical delegation that had evaluated the tanks in Russian conditions. Then, after three trials as recommended by the Price Negotiation Committee (PNC) in peak summers in Rajasthan during May-July1999 and a subsequent protection trial during October-November1999 in Russia, the Army headquarters prepared a General Staff Evaluation Report and recommended the induction of T-90s into the services. Since then, negotiations continued to finalise the price tag and the procurement of the tanks.
* Josy Joseph an analyst explained the minor problems with regard to the summer trials in 1999 as - The T-90S tanks brought to India for summer trials had shown a heating problem at temperatures above 44 degrees Celsius. The summer trials were conducted in the Pokhran desert in June. But the senior officer said these were "minor problems that can in no way undermine the combat worthiness of the tank". (http//www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/20tank-htm )
* An another source on the Indian purchase of T-90, Associated Press of Pakistan, News Summary (05-11-1999), quoting Asian Age reported that India will soon purchase around 300 T-90 tanks from Russia for around Rs 10.50 crores each, for deployment in offensive formations in Rajasthan and Punjab by next year. T-90 tank will swiftly " kill" Arjun, the main battle tank developed locally after 25 years.
* The report quoting military sources mentioned that T-90 purchase would also render India vulnerable to an unreliable supplier of spares and backup support; the paper quoted military sources. Military sources said the decision for the outright purchase of T-90s to equip four to five armoured regiments, despite its lukewarm performance" during the summer trials at Pokhran, have been "pushed forcefully" by "influential sections "within the army. They also said the T-90s- broadly compatible with T-72s, the army's current MBT-that are being finalised for purchase by India, are reportedly being offered minus at least six critical assemblies, including night vision and navigation systems that give it the decisive edge.---But the paper again quoting military sources said the T-90 missile system performed "poorly" during summer trials in the desert where it will eventually be deployed. Initially, the tank engines worked well, as the trials were being conducted at night. Problems, however, emerged once daytime trials began, with the power packs de-rating and at least one of three tank engines suffering extensive damage in high desert temperatures. Official sources said officials at army headquarters, inexplicably desperate to acquire the T-90s, reportedly dismissed the overheating as teething problems.
* Same year, the Indian Parliament witnesses an uproar in the twelfth Lok Sabha proceedings when the former Prime minister H.D. Deve Gowda and others raised the issue of T-90 tanks in the House. Referring to a letter addressed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee to then Defence Minister on 3rd November 1998, the former prime minister mentioned that all the add-ons of T-90 can be fitted into T-72S which have a tank fire control system, latest technology, 125 mm tank gun, 1000 horse power engine, anti-tank and anti-helicopter missile, SBIR and anti-tank guided missile protective system. With all these add-ons, T-72S have virtually become as good as T-90 and the cost is about Rs. 5-6 crore, whereas T-90 is about Rs. 12-13 crore. (For detail, please see Appendix-I)
* In, DEFENCE NEWS, 22 January,20001, it quoted Konstatin Makienko, the deputy head of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow, that- Ukraines T-84 main battle tank is roughly equivalent in quality and capability to Russias T-90 and at $2.2 million, is considerably cheaper than the T-90s export price of $2.7 million. (page no.8)
The Deal
Passing through several other such hiccups the deal finally got through. India and Russia signed an agreement on 15th February 2001 on T-90 MBTs covering the tank purchase and licensing to manufacture, including the weapons systems.
* The first part of the agreement enables India to purchase 124 MBTs in ready-to-use configuration and 186 MBTs in semi-knocked down (SKD) and completely knocked down (CKD) conditions. Assembling of the 186 SKD and CKD tanks is to take place at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi in Tamil Nadu.
* The second part of the agreement includes license to manufacture MBTs in India and transfer of the associated technologies to India.
* The third part of this agreement implies production of the weapon systems of these MBTs. Bharat Dynamics is to undertake the assembling of the acquired missiles in knocked down conditions.
Media reports maintain that the acquisition of T-90 tanks with better night vision and battle survivability would provide India an edge over Pakistan which has recently acquired 300 T-80 tanks from Ukraine. Also, with the mid-life upgrade these T-90 tanks will remain in service for at least 30 years.
Technical specifications
According to the FAS military Analysis Networks description The T-90 main battle tank, the most modern tank in the army arsenal, went into low-level production in 1993, based on a prototype designated as the T-88. The T-90 was developed by the Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau at the Vagonka Works in Nizhniy Tagil. Initially seen as an entirely new design, the production model is in fact based on the T-72BM, with some added features from the T-80 series. The T-90 features a new generation of armor on its hull and turret. Two variants, the T-90S and T-90E, have been identified as possible export models. Plans called for all earlier models to be replaced with T-90s by the end of 1997, subject to funding availability.------- Derived from the T-72, the GPO Uralvagonzavod T-90 is the most modern tank currently in service with the Russian Army.---- Several hundred of these tanks have been produced, with various estimates suggesting that between 100 and 300 are in service, primarily in the Far East. As of mid-2000 India planned to acquire T-90 tanks, based on field trials which had already been completed. Although orders had been placed for the supply of 124 Arjun tanks through the Defence Research Development Organisation, it would be difficult to predict when these orders would be fulfilled. Until such time, T-90 tanks would serve to counter Pakistan's T-85 tanks. (For more detail, please see Appendix-II)
The Website For Defence Industries-Army, Current Projects explains about the T-90S that The T-90S is the latest development in the T-series of Russian tanks and represents an increase in firepower, mobility and protection. ..The T-90S is in service with the Russian Army and has been selected by the Indian Army, with a requirement for 250 vehicles. (
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-90)
Pertinent inquiries
The agreement concluded does not reveal the negotiated final price tag. Taking into account the various reports, it must not be less than Rs. 2500 crore. This amount is more than approximately 10 per cent of the budget estimate of the Army for the year 2000-2001. However, in comparison to other financial demands of defence requisitions, the value of the transaction being high has to be closely scrutinised. Given the resources at hand, today, India needs the best bang for the buck.
To reach at a final price tag the PNC is reported to have had held more than seventy rounds of committee meetings. Also, before the final declaration of the agreement, defence officials were reported showing concern that the Indian dealing with M/S Rosvoorouzhenie might raise the final price tag between 15 to 20 percent as commission over and above the actual selling price of the tank, if not dealt directly from the producer- Uralvagonzavod State United Enterprises, Omsk (Belarus Republic). The official explanation for routing purchase through Rosvoorouzenie, however, is that it is the nodal agency for all defence deals with Moscow and that New Delhi has been dealing with it since its inception. (The Asian Age, T-90 tank deal hits roadblock, December11,2000). There has been no official explanation from the government on this issue.
The official version of the Defence Secretary, on the basis of a draft contract given by the Russian side, stated before the Standing Committee that the $2.41 million was the price. Though they started with $2.65 million, it was brought down. This statement further indicated that the price could be brought even below $2.2 million. If so, one should know what was the final price. Was any commission included in the price for the nodal agency?
However, official secrecy of the negotiated final price tag is bound to raise speculations. In a democratic country, people may not be allowed to question the idea of maintaining official secrecy pertaining to national security matters beyond a limit, but how does non-disclosure of the negotiated amount of money would add to the national security anyway? After all, the people of this country have every right to know if not why and how at least how much and where?. At times, even on small matters, non-probity could cause considerable public dissent.
Judging through different variables of the defence procurements and the allegations of political corruption involved through the rank and file of functionaries, could it be possible that in discreet manner the defence demands are oversized or over stressed? Does this assumption also apply to the T-90 deal?
Defence experts question as to whose vested interests this costly deal serves to?. They dwell upon the cost-benefit analysis of such deals and subsequently raise the question that does India need them (T-90 MBTs) at all? (
http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper201)
Going against the views of the government and defence circles that T-90 deal would provide supremacy to Indian armoured divisions over Pakistans acquisition of T-80 UD main battle tanks, Dr. Subhash Kapila, a senior retired army official maintains that the armoured divisions themselves are irrelevant to the Indian tactical conditions. This argument is based on the concept that armoured formations have inherent limitations in terms of geographical locations of the India-Pakistan and Sino-Indian borders. He had suggested that the resources should be utilised more toward the acquisition of advanced anti-tank weapons and missile systems to strengthen the anti-tank defence of infantry divisions. In addition, taking into account the emerging high technological environment, efficient Air Cavalry Brigades are preferred alternatives to Armoured Divisions.
Therefore, amidst the air thickened with numerous queries, India needs to tread carefully in future. Especially, as far as the main battle tanks are concerned, when three ambitious plans are in the offing, the policy makers should promote timely appraisal of the defence deals and agreements. These ambitious plans include - upgradation of existing T-72 tanks, delivery of indigenous Arjun and the procurement of T-90 tanks. After all, the country can overcome the enemies on or off territorial front, but will hardly survive the disease within.
APPENDIX-I
Following is the excerpt of DeveGowdas statement in the Parliament:
Now, I now want to deal with T-90 tanks. The hon. Raksha Mantri has mentioned about T-90 tanks and also about Vishnu Bhagwat issue. Sir, he has circulated a book, `Government of India, Ministry of Defence'. Part-I deals with Vishnu Bhagwat issue. Part-II has been reserved for T-90 tanks. Now, he tried to print in this book, which has been circulated to all the Members of the House, only one letter which I have written to the Prime Minister on the 8th November. It was very convenient for him and that is why, he has printed that letter, where certain typographical errors were there. On the 10th November, within two days, I wrote another letter making the correction.
Sir, I would like to just bring to the notice of this august House that these are the letters which I have written to the hon. Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. ... (Interruptions)----------------
SHRI H.D. DEVEGOWDA : Sir, this is a serious matter. Please allow me to speak. Otherwise, it is going to be one-sided argument, which has been advanced in this booklet circulated to all the Members.
Sir, kindly see as to what plea the hon. Defence Minister had taken. In his reply, the Defence Minister had taken the plea that this was decided by the previous Government. Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, as the Raksha Mantri, had gone to Moscow in October 1997. In November 1997, a meeting was held in the room of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister; so and so persons were present there. The Army Delegation evaluation performance of T-90 tanks was made in February 1998. The Technical Evaluation Report was given on the 25th of May 1998. The visit of the Defence Secretary was made in June 1998. The Cabinet Committee on Security gave the approval in principle for the procurement of T-90 tanks on the 3rd December 1998. The date of arrival of the Russian Delegation for the Price Negotiation Committee meeting for T-90 tanks was on the 20th January 1999.
I raised this issue not because I have any interest of a particular tank. This was the issue raised by the Member of the very same House, who is also the Chairman of the Standing Committee. He wrote a letter to the Raksha Mantri on the 3rd November 1998.
In that letter, he has categorically mentioned that T-90 tank is the state-of-the-art tank but it never came into production for reasons best known to the Russians. Therefore, the induction of these tanks cannot be done within the acceptable time frame in view of the absence of production line in Russia. To produce the same at Avadi will not be cost effective both in money and time taken for production to commence. Moreover, T-90 has never been trial evaluated in India in summer or winter. Russia has now gone to their state-of-the-art tank, `Black Eagle', which is the tank of the future. This was written by the Chairman of the Standing Committee who is also one of the officers who served in the Defence. Shri George Fernandes is not an expert. I am not an expert. Or Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav is not an expert. A person who has served in the Defence has written the letter to the Defence Minister on 3rd November 1998. I would like to again, particularly, stress one point. He says, T-72S, on the other hand, has many common features with 272M and the production of this tank can commence without much delay. It is pertinent to clarify here that all the add-ons of T-90 can be fitted into T-72S which has a tank fire control system, latest technology, 125 mm tank gun, 1000 horse power engine, anti-tank and anti-helicopter missile, SBIR and anti-tank guided missile protective system. With all these add-ons, T-72S has virtually become as good as T-90 and the cost is about Rs. 5-6 crore, whereas T-90 is about Rs.12-13 crore. This was the letter addressed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee.
In addition to that, there is one more letter written by Lieutenant-General Foley. What has he written? This is letter dated 6th June.
The hon. Defence Minister should go through the letter which was written by a retired Army General whether we should go for T-90 or not. Yes, Shri Mulayam Singh went there somewhere in November 1997. Yes, I have quoted the date. Subsequently, the Principal Secretary has taken the meeting. He has tried to shift the responsibility on all these things, including the initiation made by us. Who has initiated this purchase of T-90 tanks? It is the UF Government. Have they said anywhere you should not consider T-72? (Interruptions) No, Sir, this is the issue which I cannot avoid. (http:/www.alfa.nic.in/Isdeb/Is12/ses4/0116049924.htm)
APPENDIX-II
FAS military Analysis Networks description of the T-90 main battle tanks mentions the following:
(
T-90)
The T-90 main battle tank, the most modern tank in the army arsenal, went into low-level production in 1993, based on a prototype designated as the T-88. The T-90 was developed by the Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau at the Vagonka Works in Nizhniy Tagil. Initially seen as an entirely new design, the production model is in fact based on the T-72BM, with some added features from the T-80 series. The T-90 features a new generation of armor on its hull and turret. Two variants, the T-90S and T-90E, have been identified as possible export models. Plans called for all earlier models to be replaced with T-90s by the end of 1997, subject to funding availability. By mid-1996 some 107 T-90s had gone into service in the Far Eastern Military District.
Derived from the T-72, the GPO Uralvagonzavod T-90 is the most modern tank currently in service with the Russian Army. Of conventional layout, the T-90 represents a major upgrade to every system in the T-72, including the main gun. The T-90 is an interim solution, pending the introduction of the new Nizhny Tagil MBT which has been delayed due to lack of funding. Produced primarily mainly due to its lower cost, the T-90 it will probably remain in low-rate production to keep production lines open until newer designs become available. Several hundred of these tanks have been produced, with various estimates suggesting that between 100 and 300 are in service, primarily in the Far East.
As of mid-2000 India planned to acquire T-90 tanks, based on field trials which had already been completed. Although orders had been placed for the supply of 124 Arjun tanks through the Defence Research Development Organisation, it would be difficult to predict when these orders would be fulfilled. Until such time, T-90 tanks would serve to counter Pakistan's T-85 tanks.
Specifications
Dimensions
Length
9.53 - 6.86 meters
Width
3.78 meters
Height
2.225 meters
clearance
0.47 meters
Weight
46.5 - 50 metric tons
Armored volume
11.04 m3
Turret volume
1.85 m3
Crew
3
Engine
840 hp V-84MS diesel
1,000 hp V-84KD turbo-supercharged diesel
1,000 hp V-85 diesel
1 kW AB-1-P28 auxiliary power unit
Max Road Speed
65 km/h
Max cross-country Speed
45 km/h
Power/Weight
18 - 20.0 hp/tn
Ground Pressure
0.938 kg/sq.cm
Range
550 - 650 km
Obstacle negotiation
Fording depth
1.2 m on the move/5 m with OPVT (snorkel)
Trench width
2.8 m
Vertical obstacle
0.8 m
Maximum gradient
30
Weapons
Main Weapon
125mm 2A46M-2 smoothbore
Stabilization
2E42-4 Zhasmin
Rate of fire
6-8 rounds/min
Ammunition
43 rounds (22 in carousel)
Ammunition Types
APFSDS, HEAT, HEF
ATGM through 125mm
9M119M Refleks-M (AT-11 Sniper-B)
Machine Guns
Coaxial PKT 7.62mm (2000 rounds)
Remotely-controlled AAMG mount Utjos NSVT 12.7mm (300 rounds)
Smoke Screens
12 902B 82mm mortars with 3D17 smoke grenades
smoke discharger
Equipment
Night Vision
TO1-PO2T Agava-2 TI (target id range 2.5 km)
TPN-4-49-23 Buran-PA (target id range 1.2/1.5 km)
Fire Control
1A45T Irtysh computerized system with 9S515 missile guidance system
Onboard sights
Commander
PNK-4S sight includes TKN-4S Agat-S day/night sight (target id range 800 m (day)/700 m (night))
Gunner
1V528-1 ballistic computer
1A43 rangefinder/sight
1G46 laying device
DVE-BS wind gauge
Driver
TVN-5 IR night viewer
Radio
R-163-50U
R-163-50U + R-163-50K (T-90K)
Navigation
TNA-4-3 (T-90K)
Jammers
Shtora-1 EOCMDAS
Dazzle painting
Other
NBC, 3ETs13 Inej auto-fire-fighting equipment,
self-dig-in blade,
air conditioning,
KMT-6 mine clearing equipment (optional)
Front & side armor
laminated front, side and top armor behind Kontakt-5 ERA
Front armor rating, mm RHA
Vs APFSDS: 550 mm + 250-280mm with Kontakt-5 = 800-830mm
Vs HEAT: 650 mm + 500-700mm with Kontakt-5 = 1,150-1,350mm
