news about china trimming down the PLA size existed since 2009. this white paper is not news at all..
Indian Army matches China man-for-man on the border
- Thread starter IND151
- Start date
news about china trimming down the PLA size existed since 2009. this white paper is not news at all..
S-DUCT
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2013
- Messages
- 619
- Reaction score
- 0
@Dillinger:
Sichuan military province is also a home of chengdu military regions and manufacturer of PLAAF aircrafts.The city of Chengdu is within 1000km from Indian eastern border and making a deep strike won’t be problem as most of the Indian Su-30MKI based at Tezpur can penetrate it without mid-air refueling.So making Making sure that the city is well safe guarded from the Indian Air strike would be primarily objective of PLA.
As for the Chinese to attack Indian aircraft manufacturing would be risky as most of our manufacturing plant is in Deep South except for HAL Kanpur.
Now comes status of Air defence in both sides:
The Chinese ground force has a huge network of radar and point defense air defense system and it would be difficult for the any invader to invade their airspace. As in our context most the Pechora system has been phased out and being replace by the Akash.Most probably Chinese will field their HQ-9 and HQ-7 based SAM which are superrior than Pechora and Akash sam.So in this field chinese are ahead of us.
AWAC electronic warfare:
With A-50IE and KJ-200,both sides are equally matched so surprise attack in both be very unlikely.
Both sides are conducting regular excersies to boost their skills in multiple fronts scenario. My only conclusion is either one can win the air war however maintaining total air supremacy would be total story by itself.
Sichuan military province is also a home of chengdu military regions and manufacturer of PLAAF aircrafts.The city of Chengdu is within 1000km from Indian eastern border and making a deep strike won’t be problem as most of the Indian Su-30MKI based at Tezpur can penetrate it without mid-air refueling.So making Making sure that the city is well safe guarded from the Indian Air strike would be primarily objective of PLA.
As for the Chinese to attack Indian aircraft manufacturing would be risky as most of our manufacturing plant is in Deep South except for HAL Kanpur.
Now comes status of Air defence in both sides:
The Chinese ground force has a huge network of radar and point defense air defense system and it would be difficult for the any invader to invade their airspace. As in our context most the Pechora system has been phased out and being replace by the Akash.Most probably Chinese will field their HQ-9 and HQ-7 based SAM which are superrior than Pechora and Akash sam.So in this field chinese are ahead of us.
AWAC electronic warfare:
With A-50IE and KJ-200,both sides are equally matched so surprise attack in both be very unlikely.
Both sides are conducting regular excersies to boost their skills in multiple fronts scenario. My only conclusion is either one can win the air war however maintaining total air supremacy would be total story by itself.
Last edited by a moderator:
Dillinger
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 12, 2012
- Messages
- 6,103
- Reaction score
- 13
- Country
- Location
Its that massive air-defense system which will allow them to protect their MSR in any possible conflict and ergo the need for LRCMs and the IRNSS.
IF we do not get the LR-SAM operational within 4 or so years we'll be at a disadvantage..other than that you've got a bit outdated there- check out the IAF IACCCS- TRISHUL: IAF’s Multi-Phase IACCCS Being Enhanced The AFNET system is already in operation- the MR-RADAR systems are a year away from coming up but we've done well with net-centricity, gap filler radars and refurbishments.
Last edited by a moderator:
Shardul.....the lion
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 15, 2011
- Messages
- 3,074
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
You guys have to be realistic. 1 PLA > 2 indian soldiers in strength and combat ability
similarly our neighbour thinks 1 PA>10 IA
But I had somewhere, China is going like US, decreasing the quantity and increasing the quality of training and equipments of soldieres..........
asad71
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- May 24, 2011
- Messages
- 6,863
- Reaction score
- 4
- Country
- Location
All this man to man thing sounds very nice. But on ground the reality is that the Indian soldier is so terrified of the Chinese that at the first report of them approaching, a general cry rings out in the Indian FDLs: "Bhago Bhago". (As narrated to me by a PLA officer.)
bloo
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 20, 2012
- Messages
- 2,516
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
you are a wise person, you know that?????????
dekho
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 24, 2010
- Messages
- 202
- Reaction score
- 0
That same soldier liberated your sorry *** nation you ingrateful p.rick. Never disrespect the bravery and dedication of a man in uniform. But what would you know of bravery and valour, you are the last remenant of a regime that left your nation half a decade ago with 90000 stranded soldiers.
yea then they come back to india frustrated and go and kill some bangals for timepass.
Bhai Zakir
BANNED
- Joined
- Jun 26, 2012
- Messages
- 2,371
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
A PLA offer told me that a Bangladeshi run away to Canada after some %$#@* incident now he calls himself a analyst who have a nose to poke at every matter.
1962 War: What if there was no unilateral ceasefire by China?
Fifty years ago, India suffered its worst military defeat when China invaded and India buckled. The memory of that defeat __ alongwith embarrassing revelations of Indias misbegotten forward policy, strategic and tactical blunders __ still sends a humiliating chill down Indians spine. The unspoken thought always is __the war stopped when China carried out a unilateral ceasefire. What if it didnt?
The collective Indian trauma that surrounds the 1962 war has informed Indias strategic outlook since. India has never made public the Brooks-Henderson report which analysed the conflict. Neville Maxwell, whose book, Indias China War squarely blames India for the conflict was banned in India. We never looked at ourselves critically on that war. And perhaps left gaps in future strategic thought.
K. Subrahmanyam, late guru of strategic thought once said, Indias 1962 burden stems from the fact the defeat of Sela-Bomdilla was papered over and the nation never had the chance of a catharsis. That festering wound continues.
But half a century later, its a new generation in both countries. Our strategic destinies have changed. Most 20-somethings know China as a budding superpower, with enviable national attributes, the worlds second largest economy.
It's an opportunity and a challenge. in these fifty years, India too has evolved as a nation, and in military strength. It may be difficult.
We remain mired in the 1962 thought. As a society, India doesn't invest in Chinese thought, language or culture and continue to train our attentions to Pakistan or the US. You would be hard-pressed to find Chinese scholars in India.
As both nations grow and develop, our greatest challenge is how India learns to live with China. China is certainly an opportunity. It's also a significant challenge but in many different ways. The border dispute persists and India remains notorious laggard in implementing national security imperatives. We fear China, we envy China, we don't want to be China but we want to be as efficient as China.
Any reading of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 does not look good for India. Whether it was Jawaharlal Nehru's misreading of Chinese intentions in the wake of his support to Tibet's rebellion, India's "forward policy" which meant different things to different people, Mao Zedong's desire to teach India a "lesson" or the subsequent national security paranoia that it bred in the Indian political and security systems .... 1962 evokes mixed feelings in India even after half a century.
But for India to grow out of the morass of humiliation, it's necessary to revisit that war, and perhaps admit to major blunders committed at every level, not least at the very top.
In 1951, China began its occupation of Tibet, which, by 1959, became a full-throated conquest. Until 1959, India tried to diplomatically persuade Beijing to give some kind of autonomy to Tibet along with providing covert arms shipments to the Tibetan rebellion.
India's discomfort stemmed from the fact that India believed the loss of Tibetan independence robbed India of an important buffer in the Himalayas and bout China to its borders. But China viewed India's actions as interference in its internal affairs, and Mao ordered a "harder approach" to India's interference.
In India, Nehru maintained the romance of Hindi-Chini friendship. A more realistic Sardar Vallabbhai Patel proposed better border development, strengthening of the military presence etc and to better integrate the northeastern states. John Garver, in "Protracted Contest" writes "Patel saw clearly the linkage between Tibet and what would become the crux of the border/territorial issue".
Nehru looked at the inhospitable Tibetan terrain and decided first, not to push the Chinese too far, second, that they would not be able to maintain troops in distant Tibetan plateau, and third, that China would not engage in any major attack against India -- completely missing the technology argument, that China could and did.
By 1959, a huge change came over Indian public opinion at China's open repression in Tibet, which led Dalai Lama to flee to India in 1959. In April 1960, Nehru reject Zhou enLai's boundary settlement proposal. Mao was convinced India was working with the US and USSR against China. Contemporary Chinese thinking believed that India's desire to keep Tibet was the cause of the 1962 war. India has refused to declassify documents of that era.
Nehru's forward policy, his demand that China vacate "all Indian territory" and his support of the Tibetan rebellion were all part of this. China had been active in Aksai Chin for over a decade before 1962. India was aware of Chinese activity there from 1951. But in 1953, nehru decided to redraw the boundary which included Aksai Chin within India, as opposed to British policy of 1899 which kept Aksai Chin out of India. In 1957, Beijing's road building activiticompound not be ignored any longer and India sent patrols to the area. it would be the beginning of the India-China conflict which would culminate in 1962.
By 1961, Nehru's forward policy had taken shape, creating 60 forward posts, 43 of them north of the McMahon Line. Meanwhile, China too had been preparing for war with India, because Mao wanted to teach India "a lesson" . Indian units reported increased Chinese aggression, but the Nehru government did not read the tea leaves. China prepared for war while India missed the clues. After intermittent clashes in the preceding days, when on October 20, 1962 China launched massive strikes in the north-east and Ladakh India was caught off guard. The Himalyan war ended in a rout of Indian forces. Chinese then withdrew although their victory was not without cost. The defeat, however, changed Indias view of China forever.
1962 War: What if there was no unilateral ceasefire by China? by Globespotting : Indrani Bagchi's blog-The Times Of India
You are absolutely right thats what happen in 1962 except two or three pass other just run away leaving their weapons and ammunition,Chinese where very good they just return every thing and also took good care of indian POW .
Fifty years ago, India suffered its worst military defeat when China invaded and India buckled. The memory of that defeat __ alongwith embarrassing revelations of Indias misbegotten forward policy, strategic and tactical blunders __ still sends a humiliating chill down Indians spine. The unspoken thought always is __the war stopped when China carried out a unilateral ceasefire. What if it didnt?
The collective Indian trauma that surrounds the 1962 war has informed Indias strategic outlook since. India has never made public the Brooks-Henderson report which analysed the conflict. Neville Maxwell, whose book, Indias China War squarely blames India for the conflict was banned in India. We never looked at ourselves critically on that war. And perhaps left gaps in future strategic thought.
K. Subrahmanyam, late guru of strategic thought once said, Indias 1962 burden stems from the fact the defeat of Sela-Bomdilla was papered over and the nation never had the chance of a catharsis. That festering wound continues.
But half a century later, its a new generation in both countries. Our strategic destinies have changed. Most 20-somethings know China as a budding superpower, with enviable national attributes, the worlds second largest economy.
It's an opportunity and a challenge. in these fifty years, India too has evolved as a nation, and in military strength. It may be difficult.
We remain mired in the 1962 thought. As a society, India doesn't invest in Chinese thought, language or culture and continue to train our attentions to Pakistan or the US. You would be hard-pressed to find Chinese scholars in India.
As both nations grow and develop, our greatest challenge is how India learns to live with China. China is certainly an opportunity. It's also a significant challenge but in many different ways. The border dispute persists and India remains notorious laggard in implementing national security imperatives. We fear China, we envy China, we don't want to be China but we want to be as efficient as China.
Any reading of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 does not look good for India. Whether it was Jawaharlal Nehru's misreading of Chinese intentions in the wake of his support to Tibet's rebellion, India's "forward policy" which meant different things to different people, Mao Zedong's desire to teach India a "lesson" or the subsequent national security paranoia that it bred in the Indian political and security systems .... 1962 evokes mixed feelings in India even after half a century.
But for India to grow out of the morass of humiliation, it's necessary to revisit that war, and perhaps admit to major blunders committed at every level, not least at the very top.
In 1951, China began its occupation of Tibet, which, by 1959, became a full-throated conquest. Until 1959, India tried to diplomatically persuade Beijing to give some kind of autonomy to Tibet along with providing covert arms shipments to the Tibetan rebellion.
India's discomfort stemmed from the fact that India believed the loss of Tibetan independence robbed India of an important buffer in the Himalayas and bout China to its borders. But China viewed India's actions as interference in its internal affairs, and Mao ordered a "harder approach" to India's interference.
In India, Nehru maintained the romance of Hindi-Chini friendship. A more realistic Sardar Vallabbhai Patel proposed better border development, strengthening of the military presence etc and to better integrate the northeastern states. John Garver, in "Protracted Contest" writes "Patel saw clearly the linkage between Tibet and what would become the crux of the border/territorial issue".
Nehru looked at the inhospitable Tibetan terrain and decided first, not to push the Chinese too far, second, that they would not be able to maintain troops in distant Tibetan plateau, and third, that China would not engage in any major attack against India -- completely missing the technology argument, that China could and did.
By 1959, a huge change came over Indian public opinion at China's open repression in Tibet, which led Dalai Lama to flee to India in 1959. In April 1960, Nehru reject Zhou enLai's boundary settlement proposal. Mao was convinced India was working with the US and USSR against China. Contemporary Chinese thinking believed that India's desire to keep Tibet was the cause of the 1962 war. India has refused to declassify documents of that era.
Nehru's forward policy, his demand that China vacate "all Indian territory" and his support of the Tibetan rebellion were all part of this. China had been active in Aksai Chin for over a decade before 1962. India was aware of Chinese activity there from 1951. But in 1953, nehru decided to redraw the boundary which included Aksai Chin within India, as opposed to British policy of 1899 which kept Aksai Chin out of India. In 1957, Beijing's road building activiticompound not be ignored any longer and India sent patrols to the area. it would be the beginning of the India-China conflict which would culminate in 1962.
By 1961, Nehru's forward policy had taken shape, creating 60 forward posts, 43 of them north of the McMahon Line. Meanwhile, China too had been preparing for war with India, because Mao wanted to teach India "a lesson" . Indian units reported increased Chinese aggression, but the Nehru government did not read the tea leaves. China prepared for war while India missed the clues. After intermittent clashes in the preceding days, when on October 20, 1962 China launched massive strikes in the north-east and Ladakh India was caught off guard. The Himalyan war ended in a rout of Indian forces. Chinese then withdrew although their victory was not without cost. The defeat, however, changed Indias view of China forever.
1962 War: What if there was no unilateral ceasefire by China? by Globespotting : Indrani Bagchi's blog-The Times Of India
You are absolutely right thats what happen in 1962 except two or three pass other just run away leaving their weapons and ammunition,Chinese where very good they just return every thing and also took good care of indian POW .
Check out these thread from A1kaid
very informative thread good work by A1kaid
Causalities -India
Killed: 4,885
POW: 3,968
Wounded: 1,697
Causalities -China
Killed: 722
Wounded: 1,696 (many of them were wounded by extreme mountain terrain)
Source: Part 2 of the Doc. found at 7:59-8:10
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/milita...ino-indian-war-documentary.html#ixzz2RIzDMnpd
http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history-strategy/28803-1962-sino-indian-war-documentary.html
very informative thread good work by A1kaid
Causalities -India
Killed: 4,885
POW: 3,968
Wounded: 1,697
Causalities -China
Killed: 722
Wounded: 1,696 (many of them were wounded by extreme mountain terrain)
Source: Part 2 of the Doc. found at 7:59-8:10
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/milita...ino-indian-war-documentary.html#ixzz2RIzDMnpd
http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history-strategy/28803-1962-sino-indian-war-documentary.html
Srinivas
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2009
- Messages
- 12,455
- Reaction score
- -26
- Country
- Location
Can you answer the question why the **** Chinese went back after initial thrust into Indian lands??
Do you know Stalingrad battle of WW2, it will repeat if Chinese do any adventures here.
talking about the Chill inside the spine Chinese felt that in 1987 and 1966 and ask any papa of PLA soldier he will narrate it.
Chinese are adding one more enemy around them , Phillipines, Vietnam and Japan's case is different. India is a match when it comes to Man power and logistics.
S-DUCT
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2013
- Messages
- 619
- Reaction score
- 0
Thanks for this info.Yeah, LR-SAM will surely be a game changer.
Invincible INDIAN
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- May 18, 2011
- Messages
- 1,166
- Reaction score
- -1
You guys have to be realistic. 1 PLA > 2 indian soldiers in strength and combat ability
Like this
Similar threads
- Locked
