The Bars is powerful but very suseptible to ECM, especially as it has not had any upgrades in 30 years.
The ELL-8222 was a good system back in the day but again, very long in the tooth. Unsure anyone other then India uses it.
Ultimately the BARS was unable to fire off a single missile during Feb 27th and the ELL-8222 failed to prevent multiple locks by F-16s and the destruction of a MIG-21. Theory is great, and I appreciate you feel the need to defend anything that India happens to use, but in this case it is not even a fair compariosn. There is a very very good reason both the IAF ACM and the PM of India said things would have been different with Rafales and why there was a rush for new missiles and indeed ECM straight after Feb 27th.
Check out the AN/ALQ-211(V9) and compare it to the EL-8222. Anyone with any knowledge of aviation (in this case we obviously have to excuse some of your countrymen on this forum) will tell you they are generations apart. In fact I would go so far to say that the AN/ALQ-211(V9) was probably the unsung hero of Feb 27th. Not a single one of our jets was ever threatened bu Indian missiles that day. On your side you had one loss, one fraticide and multiple jets out of the fight trying to stay alive (by your own admission), so one begs the question, what did the SU-30/BARS/EL-8222 combo achieve in real combat?
Israel moved on to the very potent EL-8251. Most modern pods can collate and store new threats to update their library, the 8222 is unable to do this, it has to be done externally. Furthermore India is in the difficult position of not being able to effectively asses most Chinese sources radars and assets in training (it obviously can train against F-16s) whilst PAF can face pretty much every aircraft the IAF uses in exercises. Again, maybe something that also had an effect on Feb 27th.
Here is a rough timeline of what happened that day. All times are approximate, and to repeat - this is my interpretation.
9:45 AM: The IAF is maintaining Combat Air Patrols over J&K. Two Mirage 2000 aircraft are on CAP in the north. Two Su-30 MKI are on CAP in the south. Apart from these, other aircraft are on quick reaction alert, primarily Mig-21 Bisons.
9:50 AM: The PAF begins execution of its plan. Its aircraft take off from a number of bases. They are probably picked up by Indian long range radars soon after, and alerts are sounded.
9:55 AM: The IAF scrambles its quick reaction aircraft. Two Mig 21 Bisons start take-off rolls.
10:00 AM: In the north, a force of PAF JF-17s and Mirage IIIs or Vs (let’s call them Flight 1) fly towards the Line of Control. The Mirage 2000 CAP aircraft turn towards the threat. Both sets of aircraft attempt to gain locks on each other.
10:00 AM: In the south, PAF F-16 aircraft (let’s call them Flight 2) hurtle towards the LOC, flying at high altitudes and high speeds. The Su-30 MKIs prepare to engage.
10:00 AM: A third set of PAF aircraft (Flight 3), again F-16s, fly low and slower, backing up the first set of F-16s.
10:02 AM: Neither the JF-17s (Flight 1) nor the Mirage 2000 gain firing solutions on each other. Each set of aircraft begins BVR maneuvers, without crossing the border.
10:02 AM: The PAF F-16s (Flight 2) gain locks on the Su-30 MKIs, and fire their BVR missiles at extreme range. At this range, it is relatively easier for the Su-30s to evade these missiles, and accordingly, they begin to take evasive action, including using their jammers.
10:03 AM: Having fired their missiles and guided them part-way, the F-16s of Flight 2 go cold, i.e. they turn back and accelerate hard away from the fight, to return to their bases.
10:03 AM: Unable to gain firing solutions, the JF-17s and Mirages of Flight 1 now disengage, turning away from the Mirage 2000s. They do not cross the LoC, and the Indians do not pursue them across the LoC.
10:04 AM: The Su-30s finish evasive maneuvers, and turn back towards the F-16s of Flight 2. By this time, the F-16s are moving away from them at high speed, so the Su-30s have no hope of gaining a good firing solution. They do not fire their missiles, and they do not chase them across the LoC, though they are close.
10:04 AM: The second set of F-16s, Flight 3, now prepares to join the fight. Some of them release air-to-ground guided weapons, which hit Indian territory, but do not do any damage. The other F-16s prepare to engage the Su-30 MKIs, who are trying to engage the F-16s of Flight 2. If they can lock the Su-30s and fire their BVR missiles, they have a decent chance of shooting down one - which would be a major psychological victory for the PAF.
10:05 AM: The IAF Mig-21s arrive on the scene, and are picked up by the F-16s of Flight 3. This is a surprise for the F-16s, since the MiGs were flying low, in the radar shadow of a mountain range, and were trying to gain altitude. The F-16s now leave the Su-30s alone, and instead hurriedly turn to engage this new threat.
10:06 AM: One of the Mig-21s turns away, to evade a radar lock from a F-16. The other Mig (Cdr. Varthaman) continues straight ahead to engage the F-16s.
10:07 AM: An F-16 fires a missile which shoots down the Mig-21 flown by Cdr. Varthaman. He is taken prisoner. The IAF claims that before being shot down, he fired at and shot down an F-16. The PAF denies this.
10:09 AM: The engagement is over.
So, you see, the entire thing probably lasted about 15 minutes, despite all this action. There wasn’t enough time for additional IAF aircraft to join the fight. The Su-30 MKIs were involved, and did engage.
Again, do note that “engagement” doesn’t mean a dogfight. For the Pakistanis, their objective was to prevent the Mirage 2000s and the Su-30 MKIs from interfering with Flight 3, which they did, through a reasonably complex plan. I don’t think they wanted to get into a fight with the Su-30s!
For the IAF, their objective was to guard their airspace, which they did against superior number of attacking aircraft, without crossing the LOC.
