However, Tibet is the more serious problem. Ties between India and Tibet have always been viewed by Beijing with wariness, not to say suspicion. The troubles in Tibet have ccentuated Chinas concerns about the Dalai Clique and its links with India. Repeated calls in Indian public discourse on the need to play the Tibet card only serve to stoke Chinas suspicions. Beijings protests against the Dalai Lamas visit to Tawang were vehement precisely ecause it put the spotlight on the links between the Tibetan problem and Chinas territorial claims on the area.
Indeed, Tibet is the one issue that could undermine Indias steadily improving ties with China. Contrary to wishful thinking in some quarters, the Tibetan issue does not afford any leverage to India. The issue has no purchase on the Indian political class or public opinion. This being case, the realistic course is to find ways of offering more convincing reassurances to China about its attitude to Tibet. This will be essential to removing needless mistrust and to reaching an accord on the boundary. Towards the latter end, it is equally imperative that the Indian government informs and shapes domestic opinion on China. The bogey of an aggressive China may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy, for strident views on both sides feed on and accentuate the other. An accord on the boundary may not be reached in the near-term. But the boundary dispute need not hold to ransom the multifaceted relationship between the two countries. As Deng Xiaoping once observed, perhaps our grandchildren will be wiser than us.
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