India shows off the MKI that Pakistan claimed to have shot down. True?
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Avicenna
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The Indian government and the Indian media has no credibility at this point regarding Feb 27.
Mighty Lion
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Mgw3814
But it was not brought down and escaped unscathed.
Areesh
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And how do you know that the MKI flying today had the same Mgw3814 transponder code?
See??
That is how your airforce is making a fool out of you
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This is one of the best account of Feb 27th event and the preceding 26th feb. Balakot attacks, got this from Quora.
Fahd Hassan
Updated Aug 17
This is true account of the events of Feb 26-27 2019, following an abortive Indian attempt at bombing a seminary full of kids in Pakistan. What came on news regards the Pakistani response the next morning wasnt even part of what really happened as PAF planes had gone deep inside India having totally degraded the adversary radar and comms ability. Details of involvement of a third country and how they were responded into backing up arent given.
The following is based on radar records, identifications, VHF monitoring and what truly happened on that day.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED.
At 0130 hours (all times PST), on the morning of 26 February, a flight of six IAF Mirage 2000 configured for strike, along with two apparent tied escorts, and another four of the same type as reserves, took-off from their home station at Gwalior. Escorted en route by several more Su-30MKI, the sizeable formation sneaked in from a south-easterly direction for a stand-off attack on a seminary at Jabba village near Balakot town, close to the international border. The Mirage 2000s, which had lifted-off at quite a distance, were supported by an Il-78 in-flight refuelling tanker of the IAF. Two ERJ 145 ‘Netra’ Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEWCS) provided surveillance support to the strike package.
At about 0245 hours, six Mirages carrying one 900 kg Israeli-origin Spice 2000 bomb each, lobbed them in the autonomous GPS-assisted delivery mode, and broke off immediately. With the bombs’ stand-off range at over 60 km, there was no need to cross into Pakistani territory, as safety of their aircraft was of greater concern than any qualms about international censure for violating Pakistan’s airspace. In the event, the aircraft did ingress about 10 km into Azad Kashmir, ostensibly to drive home a point that they did cross into Pakistan Air Space. Traversing about 40 km, five bombs fell in a forested area, a few hundred meters from the intended target, and decimated nothing more than a few pine trees.
It was propitious that the bombs did not hit the seminary, as it housed a boarding facility for over 200 students aged 8-15 years. The seminary is one of thousands of similar facilities in the country where young children memorise the Holy Quran, not an uncommon practice amongst the faithful.
Patrolling Pakistani F-16 and JF-17 fighters aircraft were promptly directed to intercept the intruders, restrained by the prevalent rules of engagement from crossing over into enemy territory and more so, Pakistani radar controllers alerted them of large number of Indian planes on the other side.
Mercifully, there was no loss of lives or property at Balakot as the IAF mission had failed completely. There have been speculations about the cause of the failure, but the most plausible conclusion was proffered by three members of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) viz, Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser and Aakriti Bachhawat. The trio posited that a mismatch between the target elevation sensed by the GPS and the orthometric elevation (above mean sea level) as given on aeronautical charts s responsible for the miss. High resolution satellite images of the bomb impact craters provided by European Space Imaging clearly show that all the bombs missed their targets by similar distances, and in the same direction, indicating a mission planning miscalculation. Apparently the orthometric elevation was in error (less than actual), leading all bombs to overshoot. Captain Parvez Mahmood, PAF’s former Group, who has extensive experience of interpreting satellite imagery, is of the opinion that, “determining a precise 3D point on Earth requires satisfying a lot of variables, so errors similar to the one in the Balakot strike are not unusual.” The option of delivering the bombs in the electro-optically guided mode was made out on the not so possible side due to complete cloud cover and heavy rain in the area for several days. In any case, it was a riskier option as the bombs had to be data linked for guidance all the way to impact, and would have brought IAF aircraft in lethal range of PAF's Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles.
Immediately after the failed Indian strike, Pakistanis clamoured for revenge. The Pakistani Air Force had already planned many attack combinations, and was well-prepared for a whole range of targeting options, and it settled for a stand-off attack similar to the IAF’s, with the important difference that it would be against military targets in the Poonch-Rajauri-Naushera Sector in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK), unlike Indian attack though, both datalink and fire forget ordnance was selected, meaning deep penetration into indian air space.
The IAF stood guard on the night of 26 February when the PAF’s riposte was expected. Extensive Combat Air Patrols (CAP), surveillance support from ground radars, as well AEWCS were flown by the IAF that night. When the PAF did not show up until the sunrise of February 27, the IAF eased off from its highest alert state, and waited for the following night. A pair each of Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 were patrolling the IHK area however.
That's what the PAF was waiting for.
On the morning of Feb 27 2019 a strike package of four PAF Mirage 5PA/IIIDP of No 15 Squadron and two JF-17 of No 16 Squadron, duly supported by a big swarm of escorts and patrolling fighters (a mix of F-16A/Bs and JF-17s), cluttered the scopes of IAF’s ground radars at 0920 hours. Working at the rear of the fighter package were PAF’s SAAB Erieye AEWCS aircraft, and the DA-20 Falcon in which electronic warfare wizards sat ready with their arcane tricks.
Two vintage – but still quite capable – Mirage 5PA, each armed with one H-4 stand-off bomb, along with two JF-17s, each armed with two Mk-83 Range Extension Kit (REK) bombs, headed towards their respective targets in southern-western IHK. The Mirages were followed by their aircraft, Mirage IIID for each weapon, which was to datalink and steer the H-4 after launch whereas the JF-17s’ Mk-83 REK were to launch in the autonomous ‘fire and forget’ mode. With the a range of over 120 km for H4, and the Mk-83 REK at half that, the bombs offered safety to PAF planes after release. The Mirage IIID control aircraft, however, had to continue flying towards the target, refining the H-4 bomb’s flight path till impact. The bomb can be steered with great accuracy, as the high resolution image of the target seen by the bomb’s seeker is constantly relayed to the control aircraft. Since the purpose of the mission was essentially to demonstrate that Pakistan had the resolve and capability of responding in kind , it was decided that there was no compelling need to take out the front door of a brigade commander’s office, or let the bombs fly into the air shafts of soldiers’ bunkers. General area bombing of open spaces in military garrisons near the Line of Control (LOC) in IHK was, therefore, agreed upon. It was expected that this ‘abundance of restraint’ would prevent mass carnage in the Indian military garrisons, which could otherwise lead to a chain of escalatory actions, and spiral into a very dangerous all-out war under a nuclear overhang.
When the PAF struck the garrisons, within 36 hours of IAF’s abortive air strike at Balakot, it came like a ‘shot across the bow’ and had the desired sobering effect on the Indian military commanders. General Bipin Rawat, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, was forced to take a pause from his regular harangue about sorting Pakistan out. Unsurprisingly, he has not uttered any more threats to Pakistan, ever since.
Meanwhile the PAF’s approaching strike force had rung frantic on the Indian air defense radars where controllers directed patrolling Indian planes to intercept them. Struggling to sift through the degraded communications environment (courtesy electronic wizards of the PAF), IAF fighters were unable to understand the instructions of their air defense controllers.
Meanwhile an F-16 pair led by Squadron Leader Hasan Siddiqui of the elite Combat Commanders’ School, was vectored towards two approaching IAF fighters. The very long range at which the adversary aircraft appeared on the F-16 radar scopes suggested that these were big targets, most likely Su-30MKI, the ones patrolling earlier. After sampling the target data and confirming valid firing parameters, Hasan let go an AIM-120C-5 (AMRAAM). Missile flight data fed back to the F-16 fire control computer in real-time indicated that the missile had made its mark. This data was later verified and confirmed for being accurate by US Air Attache Islamabad. (Indian Military display of the missile fragments provided the visual clue).
Hasan promptly announced ‘Fox Three,’ the brevity code for an active radar-guided missile contact at the target. Though hard evidence by way of aircraft wreckage or aircrew casualties has not been available so far, ground and airborne radar traces indicated that the blip vanished from the screens after a couple of tight orbits by the aircraft. Whether the Su-30mki had met a violent end, or the damaged aircraft spiralled down to make an emergency landing at nearby Srinagar, remains moot. Debris of the AIM-120C missile, as mentioned, however was later picked up and displayed on Indian television in a ludicrous tri-services press conference as the IAF brass unsportingly complained that the PAF had used its F-16s against them, in what was actually a telling response to their own aggression. Indian Media however did blunder into initially admitting this loss (A Pakistan Air Force F16 has shot down an Sukhoi 30mki of the IAF) and quickly hushed up as evidently the world witnessed how stifled and unprofessional Indian media had been thru the whole time, actively allowing itself as Modi's falsehood machine after a humiliating defeat.
Soon after the shoot-out, all hell broke loose in the Indian camp, as revealed by monitoring of their radar and VHF comms. In the ensuing confusion, the Terminal Air Defence Unit at Srinagar Air Force Station reported a slow speed radar contact heading towards it. The contact was taken for a hostile Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and the Chief Operations Officer ordered its shooting. An Israeli-origin Spyder surface-to-air missile was launched, but its target turned out to be an IAF Mi-17 V-5 helicopter belonging to the Srinagar-based No 154 Helicopter Unit. The helicopter crashed near Budgam, six aircrew, along with a civilian on the ground, lost their lives in a case of morale-shattering fratricide.
Meanwhile higher in the skies, the remaining Su-30mki flew around in panic and confusion, something quite baffling, considering that these are multi-crew fighters endowed with very powerful radars, and were armed to the teeth with a dozen air-to-air missiles each. The Su-30 abruptly called ‘Bingo’(low on fuel) and exited the area at high speed after only 25 minutes of flight, despite fuel endurance for at least two hours while on routine air patrols. Possibly overwhelmed by the pugnacious PAF fighters milling around and been gone totally blind, the leader of the IAF Mirage 2000 formation on patrol also called out that his airborne intercept radar, along with that of his wingman, had gone bust. It is noteworthy that the PAF F-16s had picked up tell-tale lock-on ‘chirps’ of the apparently serviceable Mirage 2000 radar on their threat warning systems, a short while earlier. In the desperate situation that was developing, an IAF radar controller was heard calling out to the Mirage leader, “Confirm you can employ your missiles without the radars?” On hearing a negative reply, the controller pulled Mirage patrol well out of the active zone, and ordered ground scrambles to tackle a full squadron strength of menacing PAF fighters.
Five MiG-21 Bison of No 51 Squadron were, meanwhile, scrambled successively from Srinagar to boost up IAF’s diminishing presence in the air. Fourth in the scramble sequence, Wg Cdr Abhinandan ‘Nandu’ Varthaman, was vectored towards a patrolling pair of PAF fighters. However, before he could get his bearings right, Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was hit by an AIM-120C missile launched from an F-16 flown by Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan, the Officer Commanding of No 29 ‘Aggressor’ Squadron. Radio revealed that Abhinandan was being frantically warned by his ground control about the disaster waiting for him. “Nandu, flow cold; Nandu, if you hear me, flow cold,” is how a desperate female controller called the unresponsive pilot in high-pitched screams. Fully conscious, but half-deaf by then, Abhinandan had met his fate. He was lucky to have come down by parachute near Sandar village in Bhimber District, about five km from the LOC inside Azad Kashmir. Not unexpectedly, he got an unsavoury welcome at the hands of locals who had mobbed him. Later, during his brief confinement, Abhinandan stated that while he was looking for the target on the radar display, his aircraft was hit, and he managed to eject just as it went out of control.
It has to be noted that at no stage did Abhinandan claim shooting down an F-16, something deceitfully attributed to him after his repatriation by none other than the Indian Defence Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman. The false claim has been repeated ad nauseam by the IAF, and parroted by the Indian media in a furtive effort to redeem some respectability, after a disastrous showing by the world’s fourth largest air force.
To add more to their stories about the F16, all four unfired missiles were recovered from the downed MiG-21 wreckage, and werr displayed to the media by the Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations, exposing Sitharaman’s brazen claim. None of the missiles had been fired, whereas thanks to the Indian Air Force, they had lavishly flashed the PAF's AMRAAM to the world, that missile had clearly met its target. It is worthwhile to mention that in the closing days of Pakistan India 1971 war, an otherwise disastrous event for Pakistan, a PAF F86 Saber, a subsonic Korean war airplane engaged and shot down an indian Mig 21, a supersonic state of the art airplane then. To now say to that an Indian Mig 21 brought down a Pakistani F16 is simply to bring it out of a comic book. It was then that Gen Chuck Yeager, attached with the PAF, gave account of the aerial war in his memoirs as, “The Pakistanis kicked their asses in the air”. He had counted the Indian wrecks himself.
Abhinandan’s effusive compliments to the Pakistan Army about being ‘a very professional service’ – as well as praise for the delicious tea served to him at a custodial facility, which he slurped with relish – earned him enough ‘brownie’ points in Pakistan. His countrymen, however, were evidently not amused by his capers. Abhinandan was discourteously seen off by the Islamabad-based Indian Air Advisor at the border crossing point of Wagah, and in a frosty reception, was not even saluted by the Indian guards as he set foot in his country. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that on return from captivity, Abhinandan was presented with afait accompli: claim downing an F-16, or face disciplinary action for ‘unpatriotically fraternising with the enemy.’ If such was indeed the case, it is possible that a straight-talking Abhinandan may be averse to towing the official line, and explains why the ‘hero’ continues to be hidden from the media and the public on grounds of ‘security.’
According to a report by senior staff writer Lara Seligman of the prominent US Foreign Policy magazine (4 April 2019), “a US count of Pakistani F-16s found that all their fighter planes were present and accounted, and none of them were missing.” The report clearly contradicts India’s claim that the IAF had shot down a PAF F-16. Seligman writes that, “the count, conducted by U.S. authorities on the ground in Pakistan, sheds doubt on New Delhi’s version of events, suggesting that Indian authorities may have misled the international community about what happened that day.” In the same report, Vipin Narang, an Indian-origin US associate professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program states, “As details come out, it looks worse and worse for the Indians. It looks increasingly like India failed to impose significant costs on Pakistan, but lost a plane and a helicopter of its own in the process.”
That the US has completely disregarded the frivolous Indian complaints also reinforces the Pakistani contention that the F-16s were used legitimately for self-defense. Soon after the Indian protest, the US State Department’s deputy spokesman Robert Palladino shrugged it off by curtly stating that, “as a matter of policy, we don’t publicly comment on the contents of bilateral agreements involving US defense technologies.” Later on April 28, The Indian Express quoted a US official as saying, “Soon after we were informed by the Indian side about Pakistan using F-16 aircraft on February 27, we informed the Indians that we will not be sharing any information on the subject as it is a bilateral matter between US and Pakistan.” The apparent US indifference to the Indian complaint can also be seen as a clever marketing ploy for US military hardware, which had yet again demonstrated its cutting edge.
Rather than complain about PAF using F-16s in combat, the IAF needs some stern introspection about its questionable performance. Having the initiative, as well as some of the world’s best fighters like the Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000I in its inventory, it failed to deliver in a situation where it could have done what the plucky PAF actually did. The fig leaf of ‘technical asymmetry’ is now being shoddily used to cover up IAF’s embarrassing dysfunction at the operational and tactical levels. What the IAF needs to reflect on is the hard fact the PAF is well-trained, very vigilant, and endowed with a strong fighting spirit. The IAF would do well to undertake a second reading of PAF’s combat history, just to remind itself.
With nothing to show for, the proper course of action for Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa, the IAF air chief, would have been to step down. Instead, he has deplorably leagued up with the discomfited BJP government and the Bollywood-inured media, which continue to churn out nothing but lies and fanciful claims. It would indeed be a travesty if the IAF air chief gets dignified with the prestigious Sarvottam Yudh Sevamedal, for ‘distinguished service of most exceptional order during war, conflict or hostilities.’
It is of great concern that Modi’s military advisors, particularly the Air Staff, were unmindful of the fact that grave risk of escalation is inherent in the cavalier use of air power, whose most significant attribute is its vast offensive capability.
In the aerial encounter of February 27, there was a high probability of several more IAF aircraft being shot down, given PAF’s definite edge in BVR air combat. The conflict was, thus, clearly fraught with the likelihood of tit-for-tat intensification to a point of no return. That the two nuclear powers were on the brink of a terrible catastrophe is something which needs serious reflection, especially for the initiator of the conflict – in this case Mr Modi, who seemed to have coolly run an election campaign on the wings of the IAF which was clearly mauled by a smaller Pakistan Air Force, again.
Tailpiece: The Indian Prime Minister’s whimper (quoted in India Today, 3 March 2019), “if we had the Rafale, things would have been different,” Clearly, the Indian Prime Minister miscalculated Pakistan’s resolve, ability and willingness to pay back promptly, in kind.
Arrogance and self awareness never mix.
"Pakistan has one of the best, most combat ready air forces of the world".
General Chuck Horner
Commander USAF during Desert Storm
1991
Mighty Lion
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Lol nice joke.This is one of the best account of Feb 27th event and the preceding 26th feb. Balakot attacks, got this from Quora.
Fahd Hassan
Updated Aug 17
This is true account of the events of Feb 26-27 2019, following an abortive Indian attempt at bombing a seminary full of kids in Pakistan. What came on news regards the Pakistani response the next morning wasnt even part of what really happened as PAF planes had gone deep inside India having totally degraded the adversary radar and comms ability. Details of involvement of a third country and how they were responded into backing up arent given.
The following is based on radar records, identifications, VHF monitoring and what truly happened on that day.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED.
At 0130 hours (all times PST), on the morning of 26 February, a flight of six IAF Mirage 2000 configured for strike, along with two apparent tied escorts, and another four of the same type as reserves, took-off from their home station at Gwalior. Escorted en route by several more Su-30MKI, the sizeable formation sneaked in from a south-easterly direction for a stand-off attack on a seminary at Jabba village near Balakot town, close to the international border. The Mirage 2000s, which had lifted-off at quite a distance, were supported by an Il-78 in-flight refuelling tanker of the IAF. Two ERJ 145 ‘Netra’ Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEWCS) provided surveillance support to the strike package.
At about 0245 hours, six Mirages carrying one 900 kg Israeli-origin Spice 2000 bomb each, lobbed them in the autonomous GPS-assisted delivery mode, and broke off immediately. With the bombs’ stand-off range at over 60 km, there was no need to cross into Pakistani territory, as safety of their aircraft was of greater concern than any qualms about international censure for violating Pakistan’s airspace. In the event, the aircraft did ingress about 10 km into Azad Kashmir, ostensibly to drive home a point that they did cross into Pakistan Air Space. Traversing about 40 km, five bombs fell in a forested area, a few hundred meters from the intended target, and decimated nothing more than a few pine trees.
It was propitious that the bombs did not hit the seminary, as it housed a boarding facility for over 200 students aged 8-15 years. The seminary is one of thousands of similar facilities in the country where young children memorise the Holy Quran, not an uncommon practice amongst the faithful.
Patrolling Pakistani F-16 and JF-17 fighters aircraft were promptly directed to intercept the intruders, restrained by the prevalent rules of engagement from crossing over into enemy territory and more so, Pakistani radar controllers alerted them of large number of Indian planes on the other side.
Mercifully, there was no loss of lives or property at Balakot as the IAF mission had failed completely. There have been speculations about the cause of the failure, but the most plausible conclusion was proffered by three members of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) viz, Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser and Aakriti Bachhawat. The trio posited that a mismatch between the target elevation sensed by the GPS and the orthometric elevation (above mean sea level) as given on aeronautical charts s responsible for the miss. High resolution satellite images of the bomb impact craters provided by European Space Imaging clearly show that all the bombs missed their targets by similar distances, and in the same direction, indicating a mission planning miscalculation. Apparently the orthometric elevation was in error (less than actual), leading all bombs to overshoot. Captain Parvez Mahmood, PAF’s former Group, who has extensive experience of interpreting satellite imagery, is of the opinion that, “determining a precise 3D point on Earth requires satisfying a lot of variables, so errors similar to the one in the Balakot strike are not unusual.” The option of delivering the bombs in the electro-optically guided mode was made out on the not so possible side due to complete cloud cover and heavy rain in the area for several days. In any case, it was a riskier option as the bombs had to be data linked for guidance all the way to impact, and would have brought IAF aircraft in lethal range of PAF's Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles.
Immediately after the failed Indian strike, Pakistanis clamoured for revenge. The Pakistani Air Force had already planned many attack combinations, and was well-prepared for a whole range of targeting options, and it settled for a stand-off attack similar to the IAF’s, with the important difference that it would be against military targets in the Poonch-Rajauri-Naushera Sector in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK), unlike Indian attack though, both datalink and fire forget ordnance was selected, meaning deep penetration into indian air space.
The IAF stood guard on the night of 26 February when the PAF’s riposte was expected. Extensive Combat Air Patrols (CAP), surveillance support from ground radars, as well AEWCS were flown by the IAF that night. When the PAF did not show up until the sunrise of February 27, the IAF eased off from its highest alert state, and waited for the following night. A pair each of Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 were patrolling the IHK area however.
That's what the PAF was waiting for.
On the morning of Feb 27 2019 a strike package of four PAF Mirage 5PA/IIIDP of No 15 Squadron and two JF-17 of No 16 Squadron, duly supported by a big swarm of escorts and patrolling fighters (a mix of F-16A/Bs and JF-17s), cluttered the scopes of IAF’s ground radars at 0920 hours. Working at the rear of the fighter package were PAF’s SAAB Erieye AEWCS aircraft, and the DA-20 Falcon in which electronic warfare wizards sat ready with their arcane tricks.
Two vintage – but still quite capable – Mirage 5PA, each armed with one H-4 stand-off bomb, along with two JF-17s, each armed with two Mk-83 Range Extension Kit (REK) bombs, headed towards their respective targets in southern-western IHK. The Mirages were followed by their aircraft, Mirage IIID for each weapon, which was to datalink and steer the H-4 after launch whereas the JF-17s’ Mk-83 REK were to launch in the autonomous ‘fire and forget’ mode. With the a range of over 120 km for H4, and the Mk-83 REK at half that, the bombs offered safety to PAF planes after release. The Mirage IIID control aircraft, however, had to continue flying towards the target, refining the H-4 bomb’s flight path till impact. The bomb can be steered with great accuracy, as the high resolution image of the target seen by the bomb’s seeker is constantly relayed to the control aircraft. Since the purpose of the mission was essentially to demonstrate that Pakistan had the resolve and capability of responding in kind , it was decided that there was no compelling need to take out the front door of a brigade commander’s office, or let the bombs fly into the air shafts of soldiers’ bunkers. General area bombing of open spaces in military garrisons near the Line of Control (LOC) in IHK was, therefore, agreed upon. It was expected that this ‘abundance of restraint’ would prevent mass carnage in the Indian military garrisons, which could otherwise lead to a chain of escalatory actions, and spiral into a very dangerous all-out war under a nuclear overhang.
When the PAF struck the garrisons, within 36 hours of IAF’s abortive air strike at Balakot, it came like a ‘shot across the bow’ and had the desired sobering effect on the Indian military commanders. General Bipin Rawat, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, was forced to take a pause from his regular harangue about sorting Pakistan out. Unsurprisingly, he has not uttered any more threats to Pakistan, ever since.
Meanwhile the PAF’s approaching strike force had rung frantic on the Indian air defense radars where controllers directed patrolling Indian planes to intercept them. Struggling to sift through the degraded communications environment (courtesy electronic wizards of the PAF), IAF fighters were unable to understand the instructions of their air defense controllers.
Meanwhile an F-16 pair led by Squadron Leader Hasan Siddiqui of the elite Combat Commanders’ School, was vectored towards two approaching IAF fighters. The very long range at which the adversary aircraft appeared on the F-16 radar scopes suggested that these were big targets, most likely Su-30MKI, the ones patrolling earlier. After sampling the target data and confirming valid firing parameters, Hasan let go an AIM-120C-5 (AMRAAM). Missile flight data fed back to the F-16 fire control computer in real-time indicated that the missile had made its mark. This data was later verified and confirmed for being accurate by US Air Attache Islamabad. (Indian Military display of the missile fragments provided the visual clue).
Hasan promptly announced ‘Fox Three,’ the brevity code for an active radar-guided missile contact at the target. Though hard evidence by way of aircraft wreckage or aircrew casualties has not been available so far, ground and airborne radar traces indicated that the blip vanished from the screens after a couple of tight orbits by the aircraft. Whether the Su-30mki had met a violent end, or the damaged aircraft spiralled down to make an emergency landing at nearby Srinagar, remains moot. Debris of the AIM-120C missile, as mentioned, however was later picked up and displayed on Indian television in a ludicrous tri-services press conference as the IAF brass unsportingly complained that the PAF had used its F-16s against them, in what was actually a telling response to their own aggression. Indian Media however did blunder into initially admitting this loss (A Pakistan Air Force F16 has shot down an Sukhoi 30mki of the IAF) and quickly hushed up as evidently the world witnessed how stifled and unprofessional Indian media had been thru the whole time, actively allowing itself as Modi's falsehood machine after a humiliating defeat.
Soon after the shoot-out, all hell broke loose in the Indian camp, as revealed by monitoring of their radar and VHF comms. In the ensuing confusion, the Terminal Air Defence Unit at Srinagar Air Force Station reported a slow speed radar contact heading towards it. The contact was taken for a hostile Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and the Chief Operations Officer ordered its shooting. An Israeli-origin Spyder surface-to-air missile was launched, but its target turned out to be an IAF Mi-17 V-5 helicopter belonging to the Srinagar-based No 154 Helicopter Unit. The helicopter crashed near Budgam, six aircrew, along with a civilian on the ground, lost their lives in a case of morale-shattering fratricide.
Meanwhile higher in the skies, the remaining Su-30mki flew around in panic and confusion, something quite baffling, considering that these are multi-crew fighters endowed with very powerful radars, and were armed to the teeth with a dozen air-to-air missiles each. The Su-30 abruptly called ‘Bingo’(low on fuel) and exited the area at high speed after only 25 minutes of flight, despite fuel endurance for at least two hours while on routine air patrols. Possibly overwhelmed by the pugnacious PAF fighters milling around and been gone totally blind, the leader of the IAF Mirage 2000 formation on patrol also called out that his airborne intercept radar, along with that of his wingman, had gone bust. It is noteworthy that the PAF F-16s had picked up tell-tale lock-on ‘chirps’ of the apparently serviceable Mirage 2000 radar on their threat warning systems, a short while earlier. In the desperate situation that was developing, an IAF radar controller was heard calling out to the Mirage leader, “Confirm you can employ your missiles without the radars?” On hearing a negative reply, the controller pulled Mirage patrol well out of the active zone, and ordered ground scrambles to tackle a full squadron strength of menacing PAF fighters.
Five MiG-21 Bison of No 51 Squadron were, meanwhile, scrambled successively from Srinagar to boost up IAF’s diminishing presence in the air. Fourth in the scramble sequence, Wg Cdr Abhinandan ‘Nandu’ Varthaman, was vectored towards a patrolling pair of PAF fighters. However, before he could get his bearings right, Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was hit by an AIM-120C missile launched from an F-16 flown by Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan, the Officer Commanding of No 29 ‘Aggressor’ Squadron. Radio revealed that Abhinandan was being frantically warned by his ground control about the disaster waiting for him. “Nandu, flow cold; Nandu, if you hear me, flow cold,” is how a desperate female controller called the unresponsive pilot in high-pitched screams. Fully conscious, but half-deaf by then, Abhinandan had met his fate. He was lucky to have come down by parachute near Sandar village in Bhimber District, about five km from the LOC inside Azad Kashmir. Not unexpectedly, he got an unsavoury welcome at the hands of locals who had mobbed him. Later, during his brief confinement, Abhinandan stated that while he was looking for the target on the radar display, his aircraft was hit, and he managed to eject just as it went out of control.
It has to be noted that at no stage did Abhinandan claim shooting down an F-16, something deceitfully attributed to him after his repatriation by none other than the Indian Defence Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman. The false claim has been repeated ad nauseam by the IAF, and parroted by the Indian media in a furtive effort to redeem some respectability, after a disastrous showing by the world’s fourth largest air force.
To add more to their stories about the F16, all four unfired missiles were recovered from the downed MiG-21 wreckage, and werr displayed to the media by the Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations, exposing Sitharaman’s brazen claim. None of the missiles had been fired, whereas thanks to the Indian Air Force, they had lavishly flashed the PAF's AMRAAM to the world, that missile had clearly met its target. It is worthwhile to mention that in the closing days of Pakistan India 1971 war, an otherwise disastrous event for Pakistan, a PAF F86 Saber, a subsonic Korean war airplane engaged and shot down an indian Mig 21, a supersonic state of the art airplane then. To now say to that an Indian Mig 21 brought down a Pakistani F16 is simply to bring it out of a comic book. It was then that Gen Chuck Yeager, attached with the PAF, gave account of the aerial war in his memoirs as, “The Pakistanis kicked their asses in the air”. He had counted the Indian wrecks himself.
Abhinandan’s effusive compliments to the Pakistan Army about being ‘a very professional service’ – as well as praise for the delicious tea served to him at a custodial facility, which he slurped with relish – earned him enough ‘brownie’ points in Pakistan. His countrymen, however, were evidently not amused by his capers. Abhinandan was discourteously seen off by the Islamabad-based Indian Air Advisor at the border crossing point of Wagah, and in a frosty reception, was not even saluted by the Indian guards as he set foot in his country. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that on return from captivity, Abhinandan was presented with afait accompli: claim downing an F-16, or face disciplinary action for ‘unpatriotically fraternising with the enemy.’ If such was indeed the case, it is possible that a straight-talking Abhinandan may be averse to towing the official line, and explains why the ‘hero’ continues to be hidden from the media and the public on grounds of ‘security.’
According to a report by senior staff writer Lara Seligman of the prominent US Foreign Policy magazine (4 April 2019), “a US count of Pakistani F-16s found that all their fighter planes were present and accounted, and none of them were missing.” The report clearly contradicts India’s claim that the IAF had shot down a PAF F-16. Seligman writes that, “the count, conducted by U.S. authorities on the ground in Pakistan, sheds doubt on New Delhi’s version of events, suggesting that Indian authorities may have misled the international community about what happened that day.” In the same report, Vipin Narang, an Indian-origin US associate professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program states, “As details come out, it looks worse and worse for the Indians. It looks increasingly like India failed to impose significant costs on Pakistan, but lost a plane and a helicopter of its own in the process.”
That the US has completely disregarded the frivolous Indian complaints also reinforces the Pakistani contention that the F-16s were used legitimately for self-defense. Soon after the Indian protest, the US State Department’s deputy spokesman Robert Palladino shrugged it off by curtly stating that, “as a matter of policy, we don’t publicly comment on the contents of bilateral agreements involving US defense technologies.” Later on April 28, The Indian Express quoted a US official as saying, “Soon after we were informed by the Indian side about Pakistan using F-16 aircraft on February 27, we informed the Indians that we will not be sharing any information on the subject as it is a bilateral matter between US and Pakistan.” The apparent US indifference to the Indian complaint can also be seen as a clever marketing ploy for US military hardware, which had yet again demonstrated its cutting edge.
Rather than complain about PAF using F-16s in combat, the IAF needs some stern introspection about its questionable performance. Having the initiative, as well as some of the world’s best fighters like the Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000I in its inventory, it failed to deliver in a situation where it could have done what the plucky PAF actually did. The fig leaf of ‘technical asymmetry’ is now being shoddily used to cover up IAF’s embarrassing dysfunction at the operational and tactical levels. What the IAF needs to reflect on is the hard fact the PAF is well-trained, very vigilant, and endowed with a strong fighting spirit. The IAF would do well to undertake a second reading of PAF’s combat history, just to remind itself.
With nothing to show for, the proper course of action for Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa, the IAF air chief, would have been to step down. Instead, he has deplorably leagued up with the discomfited BJP government and the Bollywood-inured media, which continue to churn out nothing but lies and fanciful claims. It would indeed be a travesty if the IAF air chief gets dignified with the prestigious Sarvottam Yudh Sevamedal, for ‘distinguished service of most exceptional order during war, conflict or hostilities.’
It is of great concern that Modi’s military advisors, particularly the Air Staff, were unmindful of the fact that grave risk of escalation is inherent in the cavalier use of air power, whose most significant attribute is its vast offensive capability.
In the aerial encounter of February 27, there was a high probability of several more IAF aircraft being shot down, given PAF’s definite edge in BVR air combat. The conflict was, thus, clearly fraught with the likelihood of tit-for-tat intensification to a point of no return. That the two nuclear powers were on the brink of a terrible catastrophe is something which needs serious reflection, especially for the initiator of the conflict – in this case Mr Modi, who seemed to have coolly run an election campaign on the wings of the IAF which was clearly mauled by a smaller Pakistan Air Force, again.
Tailpiece: The Indian Prime Minister’s whimper (quoted in India Today, 3 March 2019), “if we had the Rafale, things would have been different,” Clearly, the Indian Prime Minister miscalculated Pakistan’s resolve, ability and willingness to pay back promptly, in kind.
Arrogance and self awareness never mix.
"Pakistan has one of the best, most combat ready air forces of the world".
General Chuck Horner
Commander USAF during Desert Storm
1991
He copied pasted the entire blog and added a couple of his own made up paragraphs like these:
As you can see there is no such mention of anything such in the original blog:
https://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.co...21PrxMPvpxTkDmKavLVsh_ynL_fvPptkhDBtEO_qY&m=1
2/10 to Fahd Hassan for his effort.
'
Your radar controllers saw the same transponder codes on their radar scopes today.And how do you know that the MKI flying today had the same Mgw3814 transponder code?
See??
That is how your airforce is making a fool out of you
N.Siddiqui
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LOl!! read the attached blog again....it clearly cited the two IAF fighters shot down.
Gandhi G in da house
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Even before Pakistan could have provided any proof of downing the Su-30, which they never would have since they have no proof, the claim has already been disproved by IAF. Good going.
Was wondering the same; they might as well say that Mig wasn't shot down either if this is the standard.
Haris Ali2140
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Areesh
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"disproved by IAF"
And how exactly IAF disapproved PAF claim? Explain to us please
Gandhi G in da house
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The onus of proof to prove that a Sukhoi 30 was downed is on the Pakistanis anyway and they have not provided any proof till date. IAF is not obligated to disprove anything. So if they show us the formation which faced the PAF on Feb 27, we can only take their word for it.
Also, @Areesh
Areesh
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And obviously you have no proof for this
Just like IAF even today doesn't have blackbox of the MI17 that it itself shot down on 27 February 2019
