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India selects EF, Rafale for MMRCA shortlist

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Nice pics of Rafale with Scalp cruise missile:

SCALP-STORM-SHADOW-RAFALE-1_zoom.jpg

SCALP-STORM-SHADOW-RAFALE-15_zoom.jpg

SCALP-STORM-SHADOW-RAFALE-11_zoom.jpg

SCALP-STORM-SHADOW-RAFALE-3_zoom.jpg

SCALP-STORM-SHADOW-RAFALE-9_zoom.jpg




No real pics of EF with similar Storm Shadow, but at least with Taurus, displayed on the ground...:

TAURUS-TYPHOON-2_zoom.jpg

TAURUS-TYPHOON-3_zoom.jpg



...unlike the Gripen, that actually tested it:

TAURUS-GRIPEN_zoom.jpg

thnxx for sharing sir....U and DBC are my favorite members in Pdf. Cheers.
 
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Liam Fox promotes Typhoon in India
08 July 2011

Defence Secretary Liam Fox has met with senior Indian defence and security officials in a bid to strengthen ties between the two countries and promote the selection of Eurofighter for India's multi-role combat aircraft contract.

The Ministry of Defence said the visit underlines that defence was a "fundamental pillar" of the "enhanced partnership" between the UK and India set out by Prime Minister David Cameron and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last July.

Fox also promoted the Eurofighter Typhoon as the decision on which aircraft is to form the country's MRCA contract approaches.

The competition, which is due to be decided this year, is now said to be between the Typhoon and Dassault's Rafale.

Fox met India's Defence Minister Shri A K Antony and National Security Adviser Shri Shiv Shankar Menon in Delhi to discuss defence industrial co-operation, and the MRCA contract.

"In today's world of multi-layered security and economic interdependence the UK and India are looking for relationships that are built on partnership and respect, not one-off transactions," said Fox.

"The Eurofighter Typhoon not only provides India with cutting-edge operational capability, but also unmatched potential for an enduring strategic partnership in developing future defence technology."

In addition to defence industrial issues, the ministers discussed counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and long-term stability in Afghanistan.

Liam Fox promotes Typhoon in India - Defence Management
 
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Difficult negotiation of the Rafale in the UAE

Note: Translated news.. gramatical errors are present.



rafalebourget11.jpeg



After conducting exclusive negotiations with Dassault Aviation for the purchase of Rafale multirole fighter, the UAE Air Force had begun to explore other options for its future combat aircraft.

Initiated four years ago, negotiations with the French group have still not been completed, opening the competition to Lockheed Martin, said a source at Abu Dhabi. The source said that Abu Dhabi UAE complained repeatedly to the lack of flexibility of the French industry in the negotiations on the Rafale, while the multiple interventions of President Sarkozy failed to overcome the difficulties.

Apart from the issue price of the aircraft, the problems focus on four applications of Emiratis: providing a more powerful team than the one currently the Rafale, the recovery of their Mirage 2000-9 (numbering 62) and ability to use weapons of 2000-9 on the Rafale.



During his last visit to Abu Dhabi, the French Minister of Defence, Gerard Longuet, would have presented a new offer, at a total price of nine billion euros. This is the third offering, the first having been encrypted and the second thirteen billion to ten billion.



The Elysee Palace would have asked the member firms of the Rafale Team to work together so that each takes his share of the additional discount of one billion euros. For his part, Abu Dhabi still sticking to a budget of seven billion.


Thus taking advantage of the disagreement between the French and UAE, the U.S. administration has pushed the option Lockheed Martin, who managed to open negotiations with the UAE to assess their needs. The U.S. group proposes, for its part, the combat aircraft of the fifth generation F-35 JSF.


Knowing he can not deliver this unit in 2020 (earliest), given the delay in the program, Washington would have offered to supply Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, the F-16 Block 60 extra. The UAE air force currently has 80 aircraft of this type. The Americans have even offered to deliver F-16 used in the USAF, by bringing them to Block 60 standard, to overcome the hole capability, waiting to deliver all the F-35. Washington will then take over all the F-16 As the new aircraft will be delivered.

While the French negotiators felt that the opening of discussions with Lockheed Martin was only a means to pressure them, the progress of these discussions indicates that they may well succeed. Especially since just launched the modernization of weapons systems by the UAE Mirage 2000-9, which removes the prospects for recovery by France required in case of purchase of the Rafale.

If the mission of Team Rafale seems to be complicated, it is nevertheless doubtful that the offer of F-35 Lockheed final respects to the envelope of $ 7 billion available to the UAE.


Rafale EAU 80711
 
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Rafale is excellent fighter tested and implemented.

they buy Rafale or Euro fighter doesn't matter both are modern and most advanced. With those aircrafts they will also get the technology is very valuable.
 
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India needs defence partners not suppliers: Liam Fox


Investing in the Eurofighter would give India a relationship with "partners of choice" in global security, says British defence secretary Liam Fox. In an exclusive conversation with TOI, Fox also said that while China is seen as an emerging superpower, the UK was looking closely at how Beijing manages its internal challenges.

Excerpts:

Q: You have been promoting the Eurofighter in your meetings with the Indian leadership. Why is it a better deal?



A: We shouldn't see this as simply an aircraft. It's about buying into a strategic relationship. Britain's approach to these things has been too transactional in recent years. But what we now need to do is think strategically, think about interoperability, about our partners of choice in global security. Start to recognize that India wants partners not suppliers. In terms of the aircraft itself of course, we've just been using it in Libya. That's the first time we have used it in combat. We have been extraordinarily impressed by its capability and availability. India would be building a relationship with four European partners - it would be buying into that in terms of strategic outlook. Especially, when you've got countries like Britain who are very open in terms of their defence market. I mean it gives you a much better chance in terms of a constructive longer term relationship, to technology transfer. France, for instance, has a completely closed defence industrial sector.

Q: Will we have to pay a whole lot more for the Typhoon and what do we get for that much more?

A: In defence you tend to not get the best for the lowest price. So, if you want a quality product you have to pay a reasonable price. We've chosen Typhoon in the UK because we believe the best serves our interest in the years ahead. We plan to eventually phase out the Tornados and use Typhoons in the multi-role capability. We've also packed in the world's first second generation e-scan radar, the most advanced of its type.

Q: India is looking at this deal to also help build its indigenous defence industry. How can you help?

A: We shouldn't be looking at this as a simple transaction of a single item. Over time - as India's defence industry develops we will share technologies, we have a genuine partnership. That will take time. We expect to have Typhoons for a long time in the UK. Ultimately, we're looking at two types of fast jets - Joint Strike Fighter and the Typhoon. That would be what the RAF would want in terms of capability.

We've just completed a major defence review – of all types of equipment and all the forms available to it. And we decided to phase out Harrier, although it had previously done great service, because it didn't have the future capabilities that we wanted. We will eventually phase out Tornado as Typhoon takes on an even greater multi-role capability.

Given what it has shown so far in Libya, looks like we've bet on the right horse.

Q: China too has an ambitious defence agenda and capability. Do you look at it as an opportunity or a challenge?

A: Both, I think. China is developing a lot of military capability. There is no reason to suspect it's a threat to our security. Indeed, in things like blue water naval capability they have an absolute right internationally to do so. Obviously economically China is still an opportunity. But we always are watching to see how China develops internally. Its response to some of the big challenges it has demographically, and in terms of natural supplies, not least water. Although we often see China as an emerging superpower, it is in many ways, struggling as a developing economy with issues of mass poverty. So I think that with China we have to watch and encourage it to go in the right direction.

Q: What's the prognosis in Libya and are you at a stalemate?

A: I don't think we can call it a stalemate. When we began, the population of Benghazi were under threat of a humanitarian disaster. The people of Misrata have come under bombardment from the mountains. We've now got a substantial portion of the country free from the regime. We've taken out the command and control capabilities of the regime, we're increasingly taking out their intelligence operations. In other words the things that underpin the Libyan state of Gaddafi. It would end tomorrow if Gaddafi recognizes there is no future for his regime.

Q: How does this end?

A: It ends with the Libyan people being saved. It's about protecting civilians. The NTC (National Transitional Council) have made it clear that the people would not be saved if Gaddafi was still in office. He must leave office. How much of the regime continues alongside the NTC and whatever transitional government happens is for the Libyan people, not for us. What happens to Gaddafi, whether he goes into exile, into another country to the ICC, these are things for the next government to decide. We mustn't be too prescriptive about it.

Q: Will the aerial operations continue until a new government is in place?

A: When Gaddafi's forces stop firing on the civilians. It's very simple. But we're still seeing operations mounted against opposition forces. But they are much less capable than they were in doing so. And we will continue to degrade their capabilities as long as it poses a threat and we have the will and capability to do so. The key element will be when the people around Gaddafi recognize that he is no longer worth investing in, because sooner or later, whether it's a week, or a month or more, he will be gone. So getting them to recognize that it's in their best interests, more important for the interests of the Libyan people.

Q: You have a withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan too. What kind of a presence will you have there ultimately?

A: We have a force of 9500. We're only withdrawing 500 by end of 2012. It's a very modest reduction, taking account of the increasing capability of the Afghan national security forces. If you talk to our commanders who work with them, they will tell you that not only have they increased in number but they say they're very quick learners.

Q: What's your position on the reconciliation with the Taliban?

A: That's an Afghan government issue. But we have said where there are those willing to reconcile with the Afghan constitution, stick by the norms asked of them. However, there will be those who are irreconcilable and who will be never sign up to a fundamentalist, Islamist movement. They will provide a constant threat to the people of Afghanistan and we will have to deal with them militarily. But I think the growing signs the Afghans themselves want to take on a faster and deeper role in their sovereignty and we should welcome that.

I met with NSA and will speak to the defence minister this afternoon. Again this conversation is part of regional security and the point I made this morning is that in the interdependent global economy we no longer have the security silos in different parts of the world. Instability here as we saw in 9/11 can cause destruction in different parts of the world. We have to develop partnerships for regional security looking not five years into the future but 15-20 years ahead.

Q: Piracy in the Indian Ocean is a chief concern for Indian security establishment. Did that come up in your conversations?


A: We have a conversation on a daily basis on piracy. We've seen an interesting model. We've seen in the response to piracy off the Somalian coast – we've seen NATO, European Union, UN, non-aligned countries because all have a common purpose – protection of the sea lanes on which trade depends. And it was organic. We didn't invent a structure and hoped that the effect would follow. There should be a lesson for that in global security and how we develop strategic partnerships so people can have a flexible response to problems. In the naval arena again joint capability and interoperability are quite important.

Q: Is India ready to work on interoperability?


A: We're looking at the concept of building a new fighter vessel, called a global combat ship, which we want to have other countries in at the beginning of the project rather than merely making something and selling something. We would like our partners to help us develop something that would suit their interests. So that even though we might have variants of the same basic ship, we would have interoperability. If we have a strategic relationship, we need to have openness.

Q: Are you encouraged by India's response?


A: I think its something the Indian government will think about. Basically, we're trying to find countries that show an interest in it. We've got a basic design and I hope it's something the Indian government would think about as part of a wider strategic relationship given that it's likely to include a number of other countries.

Q: You will be visiting Sri Lanka. What's your message to them?


A: I think the government there is at a crossroads. They need to decide whether with the end of LTTE they should now come to terms with that element of their history, assess where mistakes were made, ask questions openly, if there are individuals to he held to account, do it in a transparent way and move into situation where they can become a valued member of the international family of nations. This is a time of choice for them. They have a huge amount potentially to offer, in terms of their development, the role they can play in the region. I want them to become Malaysia not Myanmar.

Q: What is your vision for the larger India-UK defence relationship?


A: We share a lot of common global security analysis. That's the first - we have a common view of the world. We want to see it outward looking, free trade and that obviously requires a level of protection.

Q: Do we see it governed by a single global structure or single global superpower?

A: No. We would describe it as multi layered security approaches.

Q: Is there a place for India and UK?


A: Absolutely. We also have a lot of shared military common experience. We can offer cooperation that will gradually help India's indigenous defence sector develop. Not overnight, but over time. We obviously have, as the world's fourth biggest military budget, quite a lot of expertise. So I think there's a lot for both of us.

Q: What would Britain get out of it?


A: Britain would get a partner in a region of the world which is quite important for our security and our prosperity. We are no longer a nation that can patrol the world on our own but working with like-minded countries to develop a security strategy over time makes perfect sense. Our relationship of mutual dependence is usually a strong basis for cooperation.

Thank you.



India needs defence partners not suppliers: Liam Fox - The Times of India
 
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so the french are asking for 9 billion euros for 62 rafale???thats 12.8 billion dollars...... 200 million per rafale.
Who says the rafale is cheaper than eft???
 
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Industrial Policy Cost U.S. the Indian Fighter Deal

On Oct. 4, 1957, Sputnik 1 was launched into orbit by the Soviet Union, beating the United States to the punch and sending shock waves through the American military, space and science communities. Why had we failed and the Soviets succeeded? What was wrong with our space program?

The recent decision by India to reject American warplanes in favor of potentially one or another European group (either the Eurofighter consortium or France's Dassault) has created an uproar in the U.S. with eerie parallels to 1957. How did we fail? What went wrong?



In only took a matter of a few hours for the pundits to respond, with a National Defense Industry Association blog declaring that the problem was U.S. export controls. President Barack Obama is reforming them, says the blog, but obviously not fast enough given what happened in India. Yet the blog also points out that Obama himself was personally involved, pushing India to buy either the F-16 from Lockheed Martin or the F-18 from Boeing. Since the president can waive just about any export control he wants, why was there no sale?

Maybe he does not want to waive export controls because the real problem was not truly an export control issue. Was it something else? The U.S. could have offered India the F-35, instead of the F-16 or F-18. Or it could have gone even further and offered the F-22, in which India may have been interested.

In fact, Japan also wanted the F-22 but was told to forget it. Now, the Japanese aren't sure if they really want the F-35 as a substitute because it is less of a strategic airplane and its stealthiness con-strains what it can do. And the U.S. was not in the least ready to share technology on the F-35 or F-22 with India.

You cannot attribute the U.S. decisions in regard to either Japan or to India as export control decisions. They are policy decisions, and in both cases, the policy decisions reflect strong opinions in the Defense Department, particularly inside the Air Force, as well as in industry.


U.S. industry is wary of sharing front-line technology with potential competitors. Not only does such sharing create future competitive issues, demands for industrial-sharing deals and cooperation on future development, but it also eats heavily into potential earnings.

The lucrative parts of aircraft deals are found in the integration of systems and the sensors and computers that control the flight, combat and protective systems. Give those away and it hits on earnings, because systems are much more expensive than parts, and there is much more value added for the manufacturing company.

In this light, it is understandable that aerospace companies are trying to hold onto, as tightly as possible, the integrating elements and know-how of their systems, because that is where present and future profits are going to come from. To some unstated degree, they use government policy and export controls as a way to buttress their industrial position. Strangely, in this context, export reform can work against, rather than on behalf of, their enterprises.

U.S. defense policy, as murky as it often appears, nonetheless tends to track the needs of industry better than even industry is willing to admit. The U.S. government is, despite the propaganda, market oriented. You cannot generate $46 billion in foreign military sales to U.S. clients abroad and be bad at marketing. Nor can you do it if you have a lousy export control system that is too restrictive.

It is illogical to claim there is a major barrier from export controls. The empirical evidence says the reverse. And it makes you wonder if those who are saying so have tongue in cheek.

The U.S. is the world's biggest arms exporter, dominating the global marketplace. And that is good, but it is also a problem.

The problem is that a dominant force like the U.S. is used to dictating deal terms: Here is what we can offer, take it or leave it. The struggles over technology access to the F-35 among key allies, especially the United Kingdom, amply illustrate the U.S. posture, its lack of flexibility, and how an industrial and political giant can use its strategic leverage to make sales even when the customer finds the terms less than ideal.

One of the reasons for the current Sputnik shock is that India is not truly a client of the United States yet. It has a lot of independence and flexibility. And it seems India is not afraid to reject a deal it does not like.

The U.S. needs to work through the industrial policy DoD and industry are following, often linked arm and arm. It has conferred many benefits, but the world is changing rapidly. In an era in which defense spending on new systems is rapidly eroding, and in which exports potentially can count a lot for sustaining the American defense sector, new models of engagement and approaches are needed. Just talking about reforming export controls is wide of the mark. We need to do a lot better.

Stephen Bryen, former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense for trade and security policy, and founder and first director of the Defense Technology Security Administration.

Don't Blame Export Control - Defense News
 
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Where did you get that from???

Difficult negotiation of the Rafale in the UAE

Note: Translated news.. gramatical errors are present.



rafalebourget11.jpeg



After conducting exclusive negotiations with Dassault Aviation for the purchase of Rafale multirole fighter, the UAE Air Force had begun to explore other options for its future combat aircraft.

Initiated four years ago, negotiations with the French group have still not been completed, opening the competition to Lockheed Martin, said a source at Abu Dhabi. The source said that Abu Dhabi UAE complained repeatedly to the lack of flexibility of the French industry in the negotiations on the Rafale, while the multiple interventions of President Sarkozy failed to overcome the difficulties.

Apart from the issue price of the aircraft, the problems focus on four applications of Emiratis: providing a more powerful team than the one currently the Rafale, the recovery of their Mirage 2000-9 (numbering 62) and ability to use weapons of 2000-9 on the Rafale.



During his last visit to Abu Dhabi, the French Minister of Defence, Gerard Longuet, would have presented a new offer, at a total price of nine billion euros. This is the third offering, the first having been encrypted and the second thirteen billion to ten billion.



The Elysee Palace would have asked the member firms of the Rafale Team to work together so that each takes his share of the additional discount of one billion euros. For his part, Abu Dhabi still sticking to a budget of seven billion.


Thus taking advantage of the disagreement between the French and UAE, the U.S. administration has pushed the option Lockheed Martin, who managed to open negotiations with the UAE to assess their needs. The U.S. group proposes, for its part, the combat aircraft of the fifth generation F-35 JSF.


Knowing he can not deliver this unit in 2020 (earliest), given the delay in the program, Washington would have offered to supply Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, the F-16 Block 60 extra. The UAE air force currently has 80 aircraft of this type. The Americans have even offered to deliver F-16 used in the USAF, by bringing them to Block 60 standard, to overcome the hole capability, waiting to deliver all the F-35. Washington will then take over all the F-16 As the new aircraft will be delivered.

While the French negotiators felt that the opening of discussions with Lockheed Martin was only a means to pressure them, the progress of these discussions indicates that they may well succeed. Especially since just launched the modernization of weapons systems by the UAE Mirage 2000-9, which removes the prospects for recovery by France required in case of purchase of the Rafale.

If the mission of Team Rafale seems to be complicated, it is nevertheless doubtful that the offer of F-35 Lockheed final respects to the envelope of $ 7 billion available to the UAE.


Rafale EAU 80711

there you go - french offering 62 rafale for 9 billion euros
 
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