India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[PanzerKiel]

Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored.

That depends upon.... Well.. Depends upon the info which you have regarding the originating points of PAF strike, escorts, EW and Saab...

That depends upon.... Well.. Depends upon the info which you have regarding the originating points of PAF strike, escorts, EW and Saab...

... Actually you may find some of those bases already covered by Phalcon.

Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?

As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?

In my interaction with the pilots who took part, some innovative yet simple tactics were used due to which they were not deemed hazardous by Indians once they approached... Simple yet ingenious...

 

[SQ8]

Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?

As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?

The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.

While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.

@Nilgiri Regarding the northern front, my comment on the other thread stands. Both sides are extremely hesitant to get into a conflict unlike our borders simply because the escalation rung is a very unknown entity.

@Joe Shearer is aware of the hints I throw regarding the relationship that’s deeper than the marianas and our dynamics.. whether in 10 years or 40; the subcontinent will rue its decisions on alliances and “friends”.

 

[VCheng]

A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.

The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800

More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier

The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)

 

[Joe Shearer]

The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)

Personally, I would rather make the most of the present atmosphere of enquiry and detachment from jingoism to enquire into the condition of the Indian military, and to look into the crystal ball regarding its future and its prospects.

The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.

While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.

@Nilgiri Regarding the northern front, my comment on the other thread stands. Both sides are extremely hesitant to get into a conflict unlike our borders simply because the escalation rung is a very unknown entity.

@Joe Shearer is aware of the hints I throw regarding the relationship that’s deeper than the marianas and our dynamics.. whether in 10 years or 40; the subcontinent will rue its decisions on alliances and “friends”.

This is becoming a major issue for India.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)

After some thought, I feel we can talk about this subject once the existing one is over.

 

[Armchair]

In my interaction with the pilots who took part, some innovative yet simple tactics were used due to which they were not deemed hazardous by Indians once they approached... Simple yet ingenious...

probably doppler notch

 

[notorious_eagle]

The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.

I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.

It is increasingly clear that we are not operating these disparate bits of technology in any kind of integrated or cohesive manner. We have acquired the planes, got a handle on their maintenance routines and their supply chain requirements, kept them in the air, exercised with them solo and in teams, even tried them out in tandem with the AWACS aircraft. But that is it.

On the face of it, these aircraft - not just the SU30, older aircraft already in inventory as well - have never been flown together in simulated defences against different scenarios, and no one is a designated 'battle commander' when such scenarios start playing out in real life. Balakot and aftermath tells us that neither have we figured out how to pull together all our resources - @PanzerKiel has already written about AD and SAR - nor have we designated any level, any authority who will take charge in times of strife.

One of Dhanoa's best exercises was the force-wide exercise in flying repeated sorties in stressed conditions, and it proved a brilliant success. It also gave us - in hindsight, alas - a deep insight into the thinking of the IAF highest echelons. The concern at those echelons is about the serviceability and deployability of the equipment of the IAF; will the planes fly? Can we make them fly for extended periods? What kind of attrition will we have to suffer in order to fly multiple sorties over several days? This is what was worrying them. But the problems were not ended here. We have this painful reminder from @Socra:

The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.

While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.

What was NOT worrying them, it seems, was integration. The pulling together of resources and their deployment in effective defence; for that matter, in effective offence. Unless there is a serious effort at taking forward the proven high availability of aircraft into playing roles in a systematically-organised simulation of a defensive situation - or an offensive situation, we will keep facing problems where our SAM batteries don't go off, our AWACS, bought with parsimony and a penny-pinching attitude, are flying in the wrong places, and our pilots fly Ground Controlled Interception and lose communications with their Ground Controller due to electronic counter-measures.

It is a stressful, testing time for the new Chief. But the buck stops there.

 

[SQ8]

I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.

Without a doubt, but when when using systems that work in harmony as they do on the domestic SM variant.
Not failing mfds or unsynchronized datalinks. Moreover, as was always expected the R-77 and R-27 even mated with what was being touted as the world’s best PESA were not able to deliver wheras the AIM-120 and the APG-68 v9 from 1998 vintage(very little change in code) did.

While acerbic, the basic crux of the issue with present day India is arrogance regarding their abilities as a nation; and whenever nations have practiced it... be it the ruler of Baghdad or ourselves; the outcome has been negative in nature.. Kargil swears by it.

The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation.
If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.

The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.

 

[rockstarIN]

Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?

As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?

First of all, Its not all about the Phalcons or any other platforms in station all the time. It depends upon situations and there are already ground-based radars too for all sectors. Detecting or tracking was not the reason for early slow response. Everything was detected the moment it took off from the bases. it was not considered as a threat. Like @PanzerKiel pointed out, few tricks like switching on IFF systems on the early flights may delay the perception of the threat level. RoEs to be maintained too(though stupid)

And yes, IAF is very much short of AWACS. The reason for not going immediate purchase was just pointed out by Joe and others above.

 

[T90TankGuy]

Is that a fact?

Really disappointed.

@PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90



You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.

PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.

Actually an Awacs was on station , they did vector the eight jets to the area , but in the heat of the moment a lot of things happened, including WC Abhi crossing the LOC and falling for the trap . I cant divulge more due to obvious reasons , but yes we had a clear picture of every jet on the Pakistan side with the awacs and aerostat radars combined.

Is that a fact?

Really disappointed.

@PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90



You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.

PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.

We have spoken about this on multiple occasions , but its purely theory and a bit gleaned form talking to my batchmates. May be one day i might post it here.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Without a doubt, but when when using systems that work in harmony as they do on the domestic SM variant.
Not failing mfds or unsynchronized datalinks. Moreover, as was always expected the R-77 and R-27 even mated with what was being touted as the world’s best PESA were not able to deliver wheras the AIM-120 and the APG-68 v9 from 1998 vintage(very little change in code) did.

While acerbic, the basic crux of the issue with present day India is arrogance regarding their abilities as a nation; and whenever nations have practiced it... be it the ruler of Baghdad or ourselves; the outcome has been negative in nature.. Kargil swears by it.

The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation.
If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.

The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.

Again, and again, and again, the single outstanding lesson towering above all others:

The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation.
If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.

The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.

We face the additional peril that it is not simply our military leadership: the lesson extends to our civilian leadership just as much, in fact, a thousand times more: "... unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.

At the present moment, this does not seem likely.

 

[Ace of Spades]

The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)

dil karta hai likh dun kitab tere masumiat par...

tag me once you have that "analysis"

P.S just passing through; ignore the post and please continue.

 

[Joe Shearer]

dil karta hai likh dun kitab tere masumiat par...

tag me once you have that "analysis"

P.S just passing through; ignore the post and please continue.

Pass, friend; tag us all when you finish writing that book.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Pass, friend; tag us all when you finish writing that book.

Reminds me of Sentry Challenging procedure....