Can't help but chuckle when seeing a Pakistani volunteering to to put Indian Point of view on the table (Although I have no doubt a gentleman like you will be sincere in presenting their pov). I must confess that the intellect rich participants as Joe above mentioned them discussing the subject in a tranquil atmosphere makes students like me excited.
Putting the Indian point of view has some reasons....
It will give Indians some food for thought what they have been doing wrong in the conventional wars...
Conversely, it will give Pakistani readers some food for thought as well, that what sort of superior thought processes our predecessors in the Armed Forces had which enabled us to evade, prosper and ultimately become an atomic power as well, while living next to a hostile neighbor who fought all these conventional wars to eliminate us as a strategic threat.....despite being several times bigger, but could not do so.
Gentlemen, my whole argument would be revolving around a single point, that despite India having superiority of almost types since inception, why it has not been able to prevail over Pakistan in 48, 65 and 71...
This way, we’ll come to know some real, and of course hidden capabilities and limitations of both the sides, which will help us in drawing relevant conclusions for our present and future discussions.
We should start by defining “victory”?
Is it by the number of enemy killed? Then the Americans won in Vietnam, because they killed ten times as many Vietnamese as the Vietnamese killed Americans.
Is it by the amount of equipment destroyed? Then the Germans must have won World War 2, because they destroyed more tanks, ships, and aircraft of the allies than the reverse.
Is it by amount of territory captured? Then the Arabs lost the 1973 war because Egypt’ s gains across the canal were more than offset by Israel’s gains against Syria and in its counterattack across the canal.
Now clearly none of these propositions is correct. The Americans lost in Vietnam, the Germans lost World War 2, and the Israelis were defeated 1973.
Victory has to be defined not in terms of casualties or territory but in terms of a favorable strategic outcome- Where there is no such outcome even an ostensible stalemate can actually imply a defeat.
Take 1947-48 first.
What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.
Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.
In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.
Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.
The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.
However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?
Because Pandit Nehru that great and lovable leader India, gave in to his need to maintain his internationalist image as a man of reason, a man of peace, a man open to negotiate any issue….
Nowhere did he think that the division of Kashmir would cripple India in the years to come, physically and emotionally.
Coming to 1965
The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.
It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.
With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.
Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.
At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.
Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.
Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.
But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.
In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.
In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.
India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.
This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.
If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.
Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.
Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.
But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.
Coming to 1971 War
It is believed that in the 1971 War, India had three vital objectives, of which only one was the capture of East Pakistan, ‘the other two’ were liberation of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s war potential for 20 years, thus establishing India’s supremacy once and for all.
It is also believed that with the East Pakistan captured, the Indian Government abandoned the other two objectives because of American pressure, and that the pressure itself was a bluff.
Consider some of the exhibits.
The IA had budgeted for 40,000 casualties, easily three times those incurred in two weeks of fighting. Obviously a longer war was expected.
Lt.-Gen. K.P. Candeth’s entire plan for the Sialkot sector, where India deployed five infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades, makes sense only if we assume that he intended XI and XV Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and AK would have fallen.
The IA Kashmir divisions more or less stood by defensively, letting the Pakistanis do the attacking. This makes no sense unless the idea was to let the Pakistanis expend their strength before India launched a counteroffensive.
Indian Southern Command launched a large, corps-sized force into Sind. Its objectives were exceptionally clear to cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at two points, Hyderabad City and Rahim Yar Khan. The secondary objectives which we must not mistake for the primary ones, were to draw down Pakistani reserves from all over Pakistan, thus easing the task of Indian troops advancing in other sectors, and to occupy as much of Sind as possible, to exchange for possible losses elsewhere.
Indian XI Corps defending Punjab, with greater strength than the opposing Pakistan IV Corps, contented itself with a defensive role, making no move to attack Pakistan. This makes no sense unless we again say that the objective was to conserve IA strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses, allowing breakthroughs to made at other points, namely in the north by I and XV Corps and in the south by Southern Command.
Negotiations to end the fighting in the east were being mooted by Farman Ali, East Pakistan’ s governor, as early as December 10, after the fall of Jessore. By December 12 the process was in fall swing because it was clear that Pakistan could not hold out.
The cease-fire was signed on December 16. Yet every single major Indian formation from Ferojpur to Uri and its counterpart on Pakistan’s side was getting ready for major offensives on December 17 and 19. As the war in the east wound down, both sides planned to step up the war in the west.
Pakistan had reduced its air sorties to the minimum required to defend its air bases. It had, from the start of the war, kept four squadrons in reserve. Concurrently, it avoided committing, it’s two armored divisions. Clearly, it was conserving forces for an anticipated long war.
Indian critics may say that Indian armed forces had no objectives in the West Pakistan.
If India lacked objectives in the west, why did India acted in a manner calculated to make the Pakistanis believe that India was about to attack there? India had crossed the international frontier in the east on November 21, 1971, without provoking a Pakistani attack in the west. Pakistan had, after all, realized right from 1947 that it could not defend its eastern wing without a counteroffensive in the west. So why did this counteroffensive not come on the 21st November? Clearly, that the Pakistanis, at least, were willing to separate the issue of war in the east and a possible response in the west.
Thus war in the west was avoidable. Clearly Pakistan hoped to avoid war, remaining quiet for 13 days while several Indian brigades established strong positions inside East Pakistan.
The notion of a sectorial war is rather siliy, unless you are the weaker power hoping to limit the scale of hostilities. A stronger power has no incentive for the sectorial approach. By fighting across the board, it prevents the adversary from lightly defending low threat sectors and concentrating in high threat ones.
Pakistan’s hope of limiting the war were certainly belied. Point is that Pakistan, after having sat quietly for a crucial 13 days, had had no interest in attacking first in the west, that too in such impulsive and ineffectual fashion, unless it aimed to preempt an Indian attack in the west.
There was no need for India to attack in the west just to prevent reinforcement of the east. Pakistan GHQ had already refused General Niazi’s requests for two more divisions when the magnitude of India’s build- up became clear. With only 12 divisions left in the west, including two (17 and 33 Divisions) raised in extremely hurried fashion, for Pakistan to further weaken the west by reinforcing the east was to tempt India into attacking. Further, the naval blockade of East Pakistan was already in place in November. Reinforcement from the air could have provided only troops with their individual weapons. And, had India found it necessary, it would have mounted an air blockade of the east after the war began on November 21. Remember, Pakistan was outnumbered about ten to one in the air in the east, which contributed significantly to the rapidity of Indian victory.
If Indian strategy was offensive-defensive, then why did they not also attack in Kashmir and Punjab, instead of limiting their offensive to the Pathankot sector ? This requires further amplification.
It may be easily accepted that India has to preempt Pakistan by attacking from Pathankot. The 50- kilometer deep corridor is too shallow to absorb a Pakistani first strike. Equally acceptable is the proposition that India must attack in the desert to obtain territory for further negotiation and to force dispersal of Pakistani reserves.
But then why did India not attack from Chhamb as well? Chhamb is so hard to hold that only an immediate, swift attack towards Marala can protect it. Just as India cannot prevent Pakistan from gaining some ground wherever it attacks, Pakistan must lose ground wherever India attacks. An offensive-defensive strategy requires for attacks all across the front.
Similarly, why did India not attack in the Punjab, particularly from Fazilka, and thus pre-empt the considerable Pakistani gains made by Pakistan’s 105 (1) Brigade? Even though India’s Foxtrot Sector held the equivalent of a reinforced division. In any case, Pakistan, with fewer troops, saw no reason to hold its hand and attacked immediately.
If Indian intention was offensive- defensive, when India had attacked the Sialkot sector in massive force, why they continued attacking? After having advanced 10-kilometers India could have simply dug in and let the Pakistanis bash their heads against Indians, as happened to Pakistan in Lahore in 1965, and to India in Khem Karan and Fazilka in 1965 and 1971 respectively.
Why did India not launch the armored division into Pakistan instead of waiting for Pakistan to launch its I Armored Division, thus conceding the initiative? The argument that using India’s strategic reserve would have left nothing to counter Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force is incorrect. If India was worried about this strike force, better to attack first, forcing its dissipation in defending his territory, then to wait for Pakistan to do the same to us. Besides, India had an armored brigade available to defend against Pakistan’s 1 armored division had India attack by I Armored Division gone seriously wrong.
It is senseless to say India must keep their strike force idle because they have to wait for Pakistan to strike, otherwise India won’t be able to hold off his strike force, and then assume Pakistan is not similarly constrained.
In short, it is clear that India was not following an offensive- defensive strategy
In Sind India followed an offensive-defensive strategy.
In Multan/Punjab India waited for Pakistan, to attack and bog itself down before moving. This was defensive-offensive.
In Sialkot, India had to attack no matter what strategy was involved, but India continued attacking even after ensuring the security of the Pathankot Corridor. This was offensive-offensive.
In Kashmir, India allowed letting Pakistan show its hand before striking. This was defensive-offensive.
There was, thus, no question of an offensive-defensive strategy.
To reiterate, had India not intended offensive objectives, India could merely have played along with the Pakistanis and continued lying passive in the west, something that also suited them.
Possibly this is insufficient to convince the skeptical reader who will demand a higher standard of proof. This reader will insist that as India had no intention to make strategic gains in the west, their failure to achieve these gains is no evidence of a defeat for India.
To meet these objections lets switch our argument.
A failure of Indian nerve can be said as the explanation for Indian failure to push the 1971 war to a logical conclusion. Those who disagree say since India had limited objectives which they achieved, the war did reach a logical conclusion.
If this is correct, then Indian strategic objectives were clearly faulty and that in retrospect, even their success ended up as a failure.
How does it make sense to fight the same opponent for the third time in 25 years, especially when he is inferior to you, and leave him with his war potential intact so that he can hope for another war?
The failure to include the recovery of Azad Kashmir in Indian strategic objectives is itself a confession of weakness.
And in as much as Bangladesh is today hostile, and Pakistan stronger than in 1971, even Indian limited objectives failed. It is instructive to remember that Pakistan had one division with four brigades against Eastern India. Bangladesh feels it necessary to have a 1,50,000 army now. There was one PAF fighter squadron in the east, and an insubstantial and transient naval presence. Bangladesh has atleast three times as many fighter planes and a permanent naval presence.
Which takes us back to our first point….how to define victory….??
Putting the Indian point of view has some reasons....
It will give Indians some food for thought what they have been doing wrong in the conventional wars...
Conversely, it will give Pakistani readers some food for thought as well, that what sort of superior thought processes our predecessors in the Armed Forces had which enabled us to evade, prosper and ultimately become an atomic power as well, while living next to a hostile neighbor who fought all these conventional wars to eliminate us as a strategic threat.....despite being several times bigger, but could not do so.
Gentlemen, my whole argument would be revolving around a single point, that despite India having superiority of almost types since inception, why it has not been able to prevail over Pakistan in 48, 65 and 71...
This way, we’ll come to know some real, and of course hidden capabilities and limitations of both the sides, which will help us in drawing relevant conclusions for our present and future discussions.
We should start by defining “victory”?
Is it by the number of enemy killed? Then the Americans won in Vietnam, because they killed ten times as many Vietnamese as the Vietnamese killed Americans.
Is it by the amount of equipment destroyed? Then the Germans must have won World War 2, because they destroyed more tanks, ships, and aircraft of the allies than the reverse.
Is it by amount of territory captured? Then the Arabs lost the 1973 war because Egypt’ s gains across the canal were more than offset by Israel’s gains against Syria and in its counterattack across the canal.
Now clearly none of these propositions is correct. The Americans lost in Vietnam, the Germans lost World War 2, and the Israelis were defeated 1973.
Victory has to be defined not in terms of casualties or territory but in terms of a favorable strategic outcome- Where there is no such outcome even an ostensible stalemate can actually imply a defeat.
Take 1947-48 first.
What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.
Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.
In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.
Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.
The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.
However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?
Because Pandit Nehru that great and lovable leader India, gave in to his need to maintain his internationalist image as a man of reason, a man of peace, a man open to negotiate any issue….
Nowhere did he think that the division of Kashmir would cripple India in the years to come, physically and emotionally.
Coming to 1965
The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.
It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.
With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.
Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.
At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.
Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.
Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.
But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.
In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.
In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.
India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.
This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.
If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.
Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.
Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.
But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.
Coming to 1971 War
It is believed that in the 1971 War, India had three vital objectives, of which only one was the capture of East Pakistan, ‘the other two’ were liberation of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s war potential for 20 years, thus establishing India’s supremacy once and for all.
It is also believed that with the East Pakistan captured, the Indian Government abandoned the other two objectives because of American pressure, and that the pressure itself was a bluff.
Consider some of the exhibits.
The IA had budgeted for 40,000 casualties, easily three times those incurred in two weeks of fighting. Obviously a longer war was expected.
Lt.-Gen. K.P. Candeth’s entire plan for the Sialkot sector, where India deployed five infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades, makes sense only if we assume that he intended XI and XV Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and AK would have fallen.
The IA Kashmir divisions more or less stood by defensively, letting the Pakistanis do the attacking. This makes no sense unless the idea was to let the Pakistanis expend their strength before India launched a counteroffensive.
Indian Southern Command launched a large, corps-sized force into Sind. Its objectives were exceptionally clear to cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at two points, Hyderabad City and Rahim Yar Khan. The secondary objectives which we must not mistake for the primary ones, were to draw down Pakistani reserves from all over Pakistan, thus easing the task of Indian troops advancing in other sectors, and to occupy as much of Sind as possible, to exchange for possible losses elsewhere.
Indian XI Corps defending Punjab, with greater strength than the opposing Pakistan IV Corps, contented itself with a defensive role, making no move to attack Pakistan. This makes no sense unless we again say that the objective was to conserve IA strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses, allowing breakthroughs to made at other points, namely in the north by I and XV Corps and in the south by Southern Command.
Negotiations to end the fighting in the east were being mooted by Farman Ali, East Pakistan’ s governor, as early as December 10, after the fall of Jessore. By December 12 the process was in fall swing because it was clear that Pakistan could not hold out. The cease-fire was signed on December 16. Yet every single major Indian formation from Ferojpur to Uri and its counterpart on Pakistan’s side was getting ready for major offensives on December 17 and 19. As the war in the east wound down, both sides planned to step up the war in the west.
Pakistan had reduced its air sorties to the minimum required to defend its air bases. It had, from the start of the war, kept four squadrons in reserve. Concurrently, it avoided committing, it’s two armored divisions. Clearly, it was conserving forces for an anticipated long war.
Indian critics may say that Indian armed forces had no objectives in the West Pakistan.
If India lacked objectives in the west, why did India acted in a manner calculated to make the Pakistanis believe that India was about to attack there? India had crossed the international frontier in the east on November 21, 1971, without provoking a Pakistani attack in the west. Pakistan had, after all, realized right from 1947 that it could not defend its eastern wing without a counteroffensive in the west. So why did this counteroffensive not come on the 21st November? Clearly, that the Pakistanis, at least, were willing to separate the issue of war in the east and a possible response in the west.
Thus war in the west was avoidable. Clearly Pakistan hoped to avoid war, remaining quiet for 13 days while several Indian brigades established strong positions inside East Pakistan.
The notion of a sectorial war is rather siliy, unless you are the weaker power hoping to limit the scale of hostilities. A stronger power has no incentive for the sectorial approach. By fighting across the board, it prevents the adversary from lightly defending low threat sectors and concentrating in high threat ones.
Pakistan’s hope of limiting the war were certainly belied. Point is that Pakistan, after having sat quietly for a crucial 13 days, had had no interest in attacking first in the west, that too in such impulsive and ineffectual fashion, unless it aimed to preempt an Indian attack in the west.
There was no need for India to attack in the west just to prevent reinforcement of the east. Pakistan GHQ had already refused General Niazi’s requests for two more divisions when the magnitude of India’s build- up became clear. With only 12 divisions left in the west, including two (17 and 33 Divisions) raised in extremely hurried fashion, for Pakistan to further weaken the west by reinforcing the east was to tempt India into attacking. Further, the naval blockade of East Pakistan was already in place in November. Reinforcement from the air could have provided only troops with their individual weapons. And, had India found it necessary, it would have mounted an air blockade of the east after the war began on November 21. Remember, Pakistan was outnumbered about ten to one in the air in the east, which contributed significantly to the rapidity of Indian victory.
If Indian strategy was offensive-defensive, then why did they not also attack in Kashmir and Punjab, instead of limiting their offensive to the Pathankot sector ? This requires further amplification.
It may be easily accepted that India has to preempt Pakistan by attacking from Pathankot. The 50- kilometer deep corridor is too shallow to absorb a Pakistani first strike. Equally acceptable is the proposition that India must attack in the desert to obtain territory for further negotiation and to force dispersal of Pakistani reserves.
But then why did India not attack from Chhamb as well? Chhamb is so hard to hold that only an immediate, swift attack towards Marala can protect it. Just as India cannot prevent Pakistan from gaining some ground wherever it attacks, Pakistan must lose ground wherever India attacks. An offensive-defensive strategy requires for attacks all across the front.
Similarly, why did India not attack in the Punjab, particularly from Fazilka, and thus pre-empt the considerable Pakistani gains made by Pakistan’s 105 (1) Brigade? Even though India’s Foxtrot Sector held the equivalent of a reinforced division. In any case, Pakistan, with fewer troops, saw no reason to hold its hand and attacked immediately.
If Indian intention was offensive- defensive, when India had attacked the Sialkot sector in massive force, why they continued attacking? After having advanced 10-kilometers India could have simply dug in and let the Pakistanis bash their heads against Indians, as happened to Pakistan in Lahore in 1965, and to India in Khem Karan and Fazilka in 1965 and 1971 respectively.
Why did India not launch the armored division into Pakistan instead of waiting for Pakistan to launch its I Armored Division, thus conceding the initiative? The argument that using India’s strategic reserve would have left nothing to counter Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force is incorrect. If India was worried about this strike force, better to attack first, forcing its dissipation in defending his territory, then to wait for Pakistan to do the same to us. Besides, India had an armored brigade available to defend against Pakistan’s 1 armored division had India attack by I Armored Division gone seriously wrong.
It is senseless to say India must keep their strike force idle because they have to wait for Pakistan to strike, otherwise India won’t be able to hold off his strike force, and then assume Pakistan is not similarly constrained.
In short, it is clear that India was not following an offensive- defensive strategy
In Sind India followed an offensive-defensive strategy.
In Multan/Punjab India waited for Pakistan, to attack and bog itself down before moving. This was defensive-offensive.
In Sialkot, India had to attack no matter what strategy was involved, but India continued attacking even after ensuring the security of the Pathankot Corridor. This was offensive-offensive.
In Kashmir, India allowed letting Pakistan show its hand before striking. This was defensive-offensive.
There was, thus, no question of an offensive-defensive strategy.
To reiterate, had India not intended offensive objectives, India could merely have played along with the Pakistanis and continued lying passive in the west, something that also suited them.
Possibly this is insufficient to convince the skeptical reader who will demand a higher standard of proof. This reader will insist that as India had no intention to make strategic gains in the west, their failure to achieve these gains is no evidence of a defeat for India.
To meet these objections lets switch our argument.
A failure of Indian nerve can be said as the explanation for Indian failure to push the 1971 war to a logical conclusion. Those who disagree say since India had limited objectives which they achieved, the war did reach a logical conclusion.
If this is correct, then Indian strategic objectives were clearly faulty and that in retrospect, even their success ended up as a failure.
How does it make sense to fight the same opponent for the third time in 25 years, especially when he is inferior to you, and leave him with his war potential intact so that he can hope for another war?
The failure to include the recovery of Azad Kashmir in Indian strategic objectives is itself a confession of weakness.
And in as much as Bangladesh is today hostile, and Pakistan stronger than in 1971, even Indian limited objectives failed. It is instructive to remember that Pakistan had one division with four brigades against Eastern India. Bangladesh feels it necessary to have a 1,50,000 army now. There was one PAF fighter squadron in the east, and an insubstantial and transient naval presence. Bangladesh has atleast three times as many fighter planes and a permanent naval presence.
Which takes us back to our first point….how to define victory….??
I will discuss some choosen sectors, from both the wars, so as to give the readers as how both sides fought the wars in these specific sectors, of varied terrain
.....by today's evening....
