India Is Buying 36 Rafale Fighters from France (and Pakistan Should Worry)

[Zarvan]

Emanuele Scimia
October 3, 2016

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France’s recent arms sale to India is not in itself a game changer in South Asia’s balance of power, but, coupled with the United States’ decision to cut military assistance to Pakistan (Delhi’s arch rival), it is doomed to produce some aftershocks in the region’s defense dynamics.

India secured 36 Rafale multi-role fighters from France’s aircraft manufacturer Dassault Aviation; an $8.8 billion deal was signed by French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar on September 23, after almost 18 months of quarrels over the contract terms. The first delivery is expected by September 2019 and all jet fighters will be at disposal of the Indian Air Force (IAF) within six years. It took 16 years for an Indian government to fulfil the commitment to reinforcing the national air force with new generation fighters.

The new arms sale arrangement highlights a breakthrough in the Indo-French defense relationships. Apart from Delhi-Paris joint cooperation to manufacture six Scorpene submarines, from 2000 to 2015 France provided India with military items worth $715 million, as opposed to $966 million in military goods that Pakistan bought from French defense producers. It is worth saying that between 2011 and 2015, Islamabad received only $24 million in military-related supplies from France, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports, signaling a shift in the French defense manufacturers’ business opportunities from Islamabad to Delhi.

A Valuable Asset Against Pakistan?:

The nuclear-capable Rafale can mount 150-km range Meteor air-to-air missiles and 300-km Scalp air-to-ground cruise missiles. Some Indian observers view Rafale’s capabilities as a combat advantage over Pakistan’s F-16 jets, at a time when tensions between Delhi and Islamabad over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir have again reached boiling point as a result of the armed raid on the Indian military outpost in Uri on September 18 and the subsequent “surgical strikes’ by the Indian armed forces on terrorist launch pads across the line of control in Azad Kashmir.



Currently, India’s air force can deploy in large part outdated Russian-built Sukhoi 30-MKI fighters to challenge superior Pakistani F-16s.

Rafale fighter jets will be modified to meet specific Indian demands. As part of the deal, Dassault will provide a weapons package and reinvest 50% of the value of the contract in India, with the participation of indigenous enterprises. Still, the French aviation company is ready to produce Rafales in India in the event Delhi makes a bigger order, declaring that it is committed to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” project, designed to turn the country into a global manufacturing hub.

Filling the Gap:

Due to the high costs, Rafales’ acquisition has drawn a great deal of criticism in India. Modi’s government has so far rebutted the argument, underlining that it sealed a better agreement than the one the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) cabinet had tried to conclude.

Immediately after the announcement of the purchase, the Indian National Congress leadership blasted Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party. The Indian major opposition force contends that 36 Rafale fighter jets do not serve IAF’s operational needs and that, during its tenure, the Congress-led ruling UPA coalition worked to buy 126 omni-role fighters (including relative technology), the minimum number for IAF’s requirements.

The IAF would need 42 fighter squadrons to counter threats from Pakistan and China, according to Congress top brass and former Defense minister AK Antony. In his estimate, Delhi’s air force has now only 32 squadrons up and running and, without new inductions, they will drop to 25 by 2022. By and large, Antony’s figures match those of many military analysts – 42 to 45 squadrons of fighters as an optimal level and 32 to 33 the current Indian fleet’s size.

Pakistan Lags Behind:

In the past months, the Pakistani government has stressed that its air force would have to retire 190 planes by 2020. That will prompt Islamabad to buy new fighters, if it wants to maintain the current level of 350 to 400 aircraft and try to catch up with India’s fresh acquisitions.

The US Senate blocked a deal for eight F-16 Block-52 fighter aircraft with Pakistan in May and refused $300 million in defense aid to Islamabad in August. Many congressmen in Capitol Hill think that Islamabad is an unreliable ally in the war against terrorist organizations operating on the Pakistani soil and in Afghanistan.

Without the US-made F-16s, and in general with reduced political and financial cover from Washington, Pakistan will have to turn either to Russia for its Sukhoi Su-35 or to China for its J-20 stealth fighter (which is still under development) and Chengdu J-10 to modernize its jets fleet with better aircraft; unless logistical and financial hurdles push the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) to veer to fighters of inferior caliber, like it already did with the procurement of used F-16s from Jordan in the past.

France is yet another option for the PAF, but it remains to be seen whether, in the presence of a relative tender or request from Islamabad, Paris wants to incur Delhi’s inevitable displeasure and thus jeopardize potential military agreements with the Indians that are already in the offing, not least possible new orders of Rafales for the IAF.

This first appeared in AsiaTimes here.

Image: Creative Commons.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...-rafale-fighters-france-pakistan-should-17911

 

[bananarepublic]

outdated Russian-built Sukhoi 30-MKI fighters t

Wait did this guy call the SU-30MKI outdated ???

 

[Shockwave]

Currently, India’s air force can deploy in large part outdated Russian-built Sukhoi 30-MKI fighters to challenge superior Pakistani F-16s.

Seriously man?


The Indian Air Force’s employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions during the 1999 Kargil War at Himalayan heights of 18,000 ft – unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare– achieved three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.
Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war – and again during the 2002 border standoff – the Pakistan Air Force’s “psyche took a big beating”, says a Strategy Page report.
While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAF’s plight. “Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the Pakistan Army, angering the latter,”says the report.
“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.”
The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: “One Pakistani military expert observed that the PAF’s perceived inability to defend Pakistan’s airspace and even put up a token fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders’ warnings that any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAF’s psyche took a big beating.”

In the report “Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground engagements.”

Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.”
Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s strict injunction that Indian forces not cross the LoC, years later IAF chief Anil Tipnis recalled he had “personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy fighters in aerial combat”.
Operation Vijay
It was when an IAF reconnaissance aircraft sustained a direct hit from a Chinese made Anza shoulder-fired surface to air missile launched by Pakistani intruder, that the IAF launched Operation Vijay to clear the Himalayan peaks. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.
The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN and MiG-27ML squadrons, while additional squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s deployed northward to Avantipur.
While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.
An example of Indian jugaad – or improvisation – was the use of stopwatches and handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in “Mountain Warfare and Tri-Service Operations”, another novel technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.
Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R – which normally flies at 80,000 ft – in a medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the aircraft’s Russian designers may not have thought possible.
Laser strikes
However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s –lacking modern weapons – were not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasn’t suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods.
On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, “For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting.”
The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N. Ganesh in “Indian Air Force in Action”.
Check or checkmate?
The effectiveness of the IAF’s operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, rushed to New Delhi on June 12, and implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes.”You don’t get more desperate than that.
However, the most telling statement on the war was made by India’s then defence minister, George Fernandes. In January 2000, he observed that in precipitating the Kargil War, Pakistan “had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation – that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.”
In this backdrop, when the current air chief says India might have to look at “some other options” to make Pakistan behave, it is no empty boast.
And you can take that to the bank.
http://indrus.in/articles/2013/01/16/migs_over_kargil_how_the_fulcrum_buzzed_the_falcons_21659.html

When your f sholas came face to face against our Migs, both of your pilots fled the fight robbing our poor Mig 29 pilot of his kill, trust me mate MKIs are far more deadlier than the rafales and in an air combat your f 16 will be squat like mosquitos.

 

[YeBeWarned]

PAF will issue their usual statement " Pak Fizaia apni Fizaai sarhadoon ki hifazat kerna janti hai "

 

[denel]

Our Mig 29s and Mirages alone are more than enough to take care of pakistan, Rafale will be an disproportionate force to fight pakistanis.

Man, i find this very trivial. Both countries cannot feed their people, provide clean drinking water or even just provide basic sanitation and yet this huge huge spree into arms.

Something is really wrong with this entire picture.

 

[kabooter_maila]

Seriously man?


The Indian Air Force’s employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions during the 1999 Kargil War at Himalayan heights of 18,000 ft – unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare– achieved three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.
Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war – and again during the 2002 border standoff – the Pakistan Air Force’s “psyche took a big beating”, says a Strategy Page report.
While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAF’s plight. “Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the Pakistan Army, angering the latter,”says the report.
“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.”
The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: “One Pakistani military expert observed that the PAF’s perceived inability to defend Pakistan’s airspace and even put up a token fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders’ warnings that any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAF’s psyche took a big beating.”

In the report “Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground engagements.”

Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.”
Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s strict injunction that Indian forces not cross the LoC, years later IAF chief Anil Tipnis recalled he had “personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy fighters in aerial combat”.
Operation Vijay
It was when an IAF reconnaissance aircraft sustained a direct hit from a Chinese made Anza shoulder-fired surface to air missile launched by Pakistani intruder, that the IAF launched Operation Vijay to clear the Himalayan peaks. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.
The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN and MiG-27ML squadrons, while additional squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s deployed northward to Avantipur.
While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.
An example of Indian jugaad – or improvisation – was the use of stopwatches and handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in “Mountain Warfare and Tri-Service Operations”, another novel technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.
Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R – which normally flies at 80,000 ft – in a medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the aircraft’s Russian designers may not have thought possible.
Laser strikes
However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s –lacking modern weapons – were not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasn’t suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods.
On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, “For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting.”
The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N. Ganesh in “Indian Air Force in Action”.
Check or checkmate?
The effectiveness of the IAF’s operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, rushed to New Delhi on June 12, and implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes.”You don’t get more desperate than that.
However, the most telling statement on the war was made by India’s then defence minister, George Fernandes. In January 2000, he observed that in precipitating the Kargil War, Pakistan “had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation – that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.”
In this backdrop, when the current air chief says India might have to look at “some other options” to make Pakistan behave, it is no empty boast.
And you can take that to the bank.
http://indrus.in/articles/2013/01/16/migs_over_kargil_how_the_fulcrum_buzzed_the_falcons_21659.html

When your f sholas came face to face against our Migs, both of your pilots fled the fight robbing our poor Mig 29 pilot of his kill, trust me mate MKIs are far more deadlier than the rafales and in an air combat your f 16 will be squat like mosquitos.

I don't want to wake you up if you want to keep living in your own delusional world. But all your silly boasting is, in fact, misplaced. I never heard of any successful intrusion (much less than a hot pursuit) of Indian aircraft across LoC during or after the Kargil war. The only exceptions are a couple of their cowardly tries to get into our aerospace. One was on the day of Eid and PAF did lock on the intruding enemy planes to force the cowards run back. Since Pakistan was heavily engaged on the western border, Pak government didn't want to get into the mess on the eastern border. Nevertheless Kiyani sent a clear warning (through CENTCOM chief, I think) that next time we'll bring the intruding planes down. A second example was a helicopter that was forced to land on the AJK side of LoC. Musharraf let it return simply due to the same reason. If IAF is that capable as you are day dreaming, why the heck they never dare entering our aerospace? As for PAF not engaging in the Kargil war, the reasons are totally different with nothing to do with IAF capabilities. In fact, engaging PAF in too would have totally negated the silly stand that Musharraf had taken on that war. Also, given the hostile global environment, Pakistan didn't have the option to enlarge the scope of operations. But that doesn't really mean that PAF is incapable to give a devastating blow to IAF. If time allows, you'll see that in future, inshaAllah.

PAF will issue their usual statement " Pak Fizaia apni Fizaai sarhadoon ki hifazat kerna janti hai "

Can you shut up your dirty mouth?

 

[Awan68]

I don't want to wake you up if you want to keep living in your own delusional world. But all your silly boasting is, in fact, misplaced. I never heard of any successful intrusion (much less than a hot pursuit) of Indian aircraft across LoC during or after the Kargil war. The only exceptions are a couple of their cowardly tries to get into our aerospace. One was on the day of Eid and PAF did lock on the intruding enemy planes to force the cowards run back. Since Pakistan was heavily engaged on the western border, Pak government didn't want to get into the mess on the eastern border. Nevertheless Kiyani sent a clear warning (through CENTCOM chief, I think) that next time we'll bring the intruding planes down. A second example was a helicopter that was forced to land on the AJK side of LoC. Musharraf let it return simply due to the same reason. If IAF is that capable as you are day dreaming, why the heck they never dare entering our aerospace? As for PAF not engaging in the Kargil war, the reasons are totally different with nothing to do with IAF capabilities. In fact, engaging PAF in too would have totally negated the silly stand that Musharraf had taken on that war. Also, given the hostile global environment, Pakistan didn't have the option to enlarge the scope of operations. But that doesn't really mean that PAF is incapable to give a devastating blow to IAF. If time allows, you'll see that in future, inshaAllah.


Can you shut up your dirty mouth?

He cant, nasal men masla hi ais ke...

 

[YeBeWarned]

Can you shut up your dirty mouth?

welcome to my Ignore list

 

[PatrioticPaki]

Oh another one of ispr stories, IAF entered your airspace photographed and even mocked paf, remember 97 Mig 25 incident?

who is the writer of your stories by the way?

 

[Shockwave]

who is the writer of your stories by the way?

Not ispr, so dont worry.

 

[bananarepublic]

Seriously man?


The Indian Air Force’s employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions during the 1999 Kargil War at Himalayan heights of 18,000 ft – unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare– achieved three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.
Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war – and again during the 2002 border standoff – the Pakistan Air Force’s “psyche took a big beating”, says a Strategy Page report.
While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAF’s plight. “Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the Pakistan Army, angering the latter,”says the report.
“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.”
The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: “One Pakistani military expert observed that the PAF’s perceived inability to defend Pakistan’s airspace and even put up a token fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders’ warnings that any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAF’s psyche took a big beating.”

In the report “Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground engagements.”

Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.”
Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s strict injunction that Indian forces not cross the LoC, years later IAF chief Anil Tipnis recalled he had “personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy fighters in aerial combat”.
Operation Vijay
It was when an IAF reconnaissance aircraft sustained a direct hit from a Chinese made Anza shoulder-fired surface to air missile launched by Pakistani intruder, that the IAF launched Operation Vijay to clear the Himalayan peaks. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.
The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN and MiG-27ML squadrons, while additional squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s deployed northward to Avantipur.
While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.
An example of Indian jugaad – or improvisation – was the use of stopwatches and handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in “Mountain Warfare and Tri-Service Operations”, another novel technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.
Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R – which normally flies at 80,000 ft – in a medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the aircraft’s Russian designers may not have thought possible.
Laser strikes
However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s –lacking modern weapons – were not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasn’t suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods.
On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, “For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting.”
The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N. Ganesh in “Indian Air Force in Action”.
Check or checkmate?
The effectiveness of the IAF’s operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, rushed to New Delhi on June 12, and implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes.”You don’t get more desperate than that.
However, the most telling statement on the war was made by India’s then defence minister, George Fernandes. In January 2000, he observed that in precipitating the Kargil War, Pakistan “had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation – that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.”
In this backdrop, when the current air chief says India might have to look at “some other options” to make Pakistan behave, it is no empty boast.
And you can take that to the bank.
http://indrus.in/articles/2013/01/16/migs_over_kargil_how_the_fulcrum_buzzed_the_falcons_21659.html

When your f sholas came face to face against our Migs, both of your pilots fled the fight robbing our poor Mig 29 pilot of his kill, trust me mate MKIs are far more deadlier than the rafales and in an air combat your f 16 will be squat like mosquitos.

Huh !! Could've sworn that the superior air force lost 2 planes not even by the PAF but ground forces.. I wonder if the Indians count losing two planes by ground fire when they write long essays on their superiority when their own points were occupied inside their so called territory, a point to ponder for the Indians..

 

[Shockwave]

Huh !! Could've sworn that the superior air force lost 2 planes not even by the PAF but ground forces.. I wonder if the Indians count losing two planes by ground fire when they write long essays on their superiority when their own points were occupied inside their so called territory, a point to ponder for the Indians..

Even i can shoot down your f shola with a manpad, if given a little training so whats the big deal? It was just the lack of intelligence inputs about the enemy forces and their weaponary, and even you know what follwed aftermath when antique mig21s and 27 were removed and mig 29 and mirage joined the party.

 

[Windjammer]

Our Mig 29s and Mirages alone are more than enough to take care of pakistan, Rafale will be an disproportionate force to fight pakistanis.

with Indian pilots on controls, LOL.
Have you been following recent events on LOC....I guess not.

 

[el nino]

Currently, India’s air force can deploy in large part outdated Russian-built Sukhoi 30-MKI fighters to challenge superior Pakistani F-16s.

That line is outrageously incorrect at best and at worst an outright lie

The Pakistani F16 are over 3 decades old block 15s designed to fight in the 1980s with poor apg63 radar and no modern hmd or hobs missles

in contrast the su30mki are brand new being built now as we speak with data linking hmd/hobs and tvc engines and Israeli jammers and ew suites.

PAKISTANIS may be shocked but F16 technology is being replaced the world over by F35 rafales Typhoons & Gripens.

 

[bananarepublic]

Even i can shoot down your f shola with a manpad, if given a little training so whats the big deal? It was just the lack of intelligence inputs about the enemy forces and their weaponary, and even you know what follwed aftermath when antique mig21s and 27 were removed and mig 29 and mirage joined the party.

hey!! lock ons dont make any countries air force superior but shooting down does.... which was done not by the airforce but by ground forces in so called occupied teritory. But do tell me if the migs and mirages were able to dislodge the fighters which was only done by sending hordes of Indian solders to capture the points.
Also the lack of intelligence gathering shows the professionalism of the iaf on combat situations. You don't send vintage migs when you don't know anything about the enemy