India gifts missile corvette to Vietnam

[Two banks of the River]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1670755044986085377

https://twitter.com/x/status/1670750279887884289

 

[Two banks of the River]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1670712429138051073

 

[Skull and Bones]

Will more likely used as a training vessel to get them used to Indian subsystems and naval doctrine.

 

[Two banks of the River]

Will more likely used as a training vessel to get them used to Indian subsystems and naval doctrine.

Some announcement on Brahmos deal was to happen. Let's see if anything happens.

 

[GreatHanWarrior]

Will more likely used as a training vessel to get them used to Indian subsystems and naval doctrine.

India doesn't want to provide P15 to Vietnam?

And what is the Indian Navy subsystem? Are these ships not assembled goods?

 

[flowerfan2020]

Nice WWII war ship. Indian know where to dump their junk.

 

[Bilal9]

Nice WWII war ship. Indian know where to dump their junk.

I don't think the Vietnamese are fooled. They will never place these garbage heaps on their frontlines.

Probably going to the Coast Guard after they remove the thirty year old Russian Missiles.

 

[Bilal9]

India doesn't want to provide P15 to Vietnam?

And what is the Indian Navy subsystem? Are these ships not assembled goods?

Of course they are assembled. The only thing indigenous in these rustbuckets is $hitty old Indian steel plate (probably more like pot metal, melted from pots and pans).

When Indians do this kind of cheap thing, "donating" thirty year old ships - all it does is make a bad impression.

It's telling the Vietnamese that they don't deserve the best. Not good int'l relations.

Ham-handed Indian moves as usual in China's backyard.

Like Modi's govt. "donated" that rustbucket KILO sub to Myanmar.

Instead of decommissioning and breaking up the damn thing, "donate" and makes a fake name for yourself.

Cheap Modi trick.

I mean - if bhakt Indian people take ten year old clothes from the closet, and "donate" it to charity or "salvation army" - it's an insult to poor people who shop at Charity shops.

Which I have seen Indians do in the US. They "donate" crap that should be thrown away.

In my case, any old clothing is going straight to the trash. And my old clothes aren't even three years old.

 

[Abdul Rehman Majeed]

Nice WWII war ship. Indian know where to dump their junk.

Vietnam should charge India for accepting this junk.

 

[PradoTLC]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1670755044986085377

https://twitter.com/x/status/1670750279887884289

Great idea

Knowing fully no body will actually pay for this junk give it for free

Like buy one get one free stuff

 

[flowerfan2020]

I don't think the Vietnamese are fooled. They will never place these garbage heaps on their frontlines.

Probably going to the Coast Guard after they remove the thirty year old Russian Missiles.

Maybe Vietnamese is going to put it into their museum.

Vietnam should charge India for accepting this junk.

But Vietnam doesn't want any rupees, though.

 

[Puffin]

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important​

• PREMESHA SAHA

Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision

• ASEAN
• DEFENCE
• INDIA-VIETNAM
• INDO-PACIFIC
• LOC
• VPN

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh embarked on a three-day visit to Hanoi, Vietnam, from 8-10 June 2022 with an aim to further strengthen the defence and maritime security cooperation between India and Vietnam. Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision. The defence minister handed over 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam. Five of those were built in India, and the rest in a Vietnamese shipyard under India’s $100 million Defence Line of Credit.
The Defence Minister held extensive talks with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Phan Van Giang, with a focus on exploring new initiatives to further strengthen the defence engagements, besides exchanging views on regional and global issues of shared interest. During his Vietnam tour, he also visited training institutions of the country at Nha Trang, including the Telecommunication University where an Army Software Park is being established with a $5 million grant from India. India and Vietnam signed an MoU on mutual logistics support, the first such major agreement Hanoi has inked with any country for simplifying procedures for mutually-beneficial logistic support to allow militaries of the two sides to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies.

During his Vietnam tour, he also visited training institutions of the country at Nha Trang, including the Telecommunication University where an Army Software Park is being established with a $5 million grant from India.​

The two countries also signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’ which will “significantly enhance” the scope and scale of bilateral defence cooperation. The two sides also agreed to the early finalisation of the $500 million defence Line of Credit (LoC) extended to Vietnam by India.
In a statement issued by the Indian defence ministry, it said, “The implementation of the projects under the LoC will add substantially to Vietnam’s defence capabilities and further Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘Make in India, Make for the World”. From the Indian end, gifting of two simulators and monetary grants towards setting up a language and IT laboratory at the Air Force Officers Training School for capacity building of the Vietnamese armed forces was also announced.
These developments during the recent visit are indeed reflective of the fact that the India-Vietnam defence partnership is getting a push. The deepening of the defence ties has been a gradual process nonetheless. Vietnam was the first country in the Southeast Asian region with whom India had signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2007, which from 2016 onwards after the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Vietnam has been elevated to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’.
In the early 2000s, both sides also signed a defence protocol through which Vietnam could procure military helicopters and equipment for the repair of Vietnamese aircraft. A provision was also made for facilitating the training of Vietnam’s military personnel by India. During the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, India had reiterated “its commitment to provide necessary assistance in developing Vietnam’s defence capabilities as well as providing a new line of credit facility for the country.” Moreover, on the logistics front, the implementation of the $100 million Line of Credit for building high-speed patrol vessels to be used by the Vietnamese Border Guards is a classic example of India’s strategic support.

During the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, India had reiterated “its commitment to provide necessary assistance in developing Vietnam’s defence capabilities as well as providing a new line of credit facility for the country.”​

The Vietnamese side has also appreciated India’s offer of $500 million Line of Credit to the local defence industry and agreed to accelerate procedures for its timely approval. Other defence engagements include joint military exercises, the latest of which was held in August 2021 when Indian and Vietnamese navies took part in a bilateral exercise in the South China Sea. India had deployed four frontline ships for the exercise, including INS Ranvijay and INS Kora, which were already on overseas deployment in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and Western Pacific. Vietnam sent Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) frigate VPNS Ly Thai To (HQ-012) for the exercise.
Vietnam has always been a critical partner for India in its Southeast Asian diplomacy, both under its Look East policy and now in the era of the Act East policy. India was the only country to have supported Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. This had also stalled the process of India becoming a dialogue member in the ASEAN.
Vietnam’s approach or foreign policy orientation has evolved over the years and this can be seen at how the US-Vietnam relations have advanced over the years. The relationship is currently seen as mutually beneficial. This evolution of approach is also reflective in the way Vietnam handles China as well, where on the one hand it is one of the leading ASEAN countries to openly call out China for its aggressive stance in the disputed South China Sea, and on the other hand China is also the leading trading partner of Vietnam. With India on the contrary, Vietnam hardly has had any differences or conflict of opinions and the relation has been smooth.

India has ongoing oil exploration projects with PetroVietnam, although China continues to object to India’s oil exploration operations in areas offered by Vietnam and has on a number of occasions asked India to withdraw these projects.​

But as mentioned above this reform in attitude has provided the much-needed push for this bilateral relationship to make some substantial progress and not just remain a talking shop marked by some agreements and high-level visits. The wariness of other Southeast Asian countries when it comes to the growing influence in Southeast Asia of external powers like the US, Australia, India among others to balance a rising China is clearly visible, it is Vietnam which openly supports the idea of countries like the US, India taking more interest in the challenges that the region is facing.

Vietnam has insisted on several forums that other stakeholders, even if not direct claimants in the South China Sea dispute like the US and India, should persuade China to work faster on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnam though also is keeping its relations with China intact, given the economic benefits, but also does not shy away from calling out Beijing when needed. India has ongoing oil exploration projects with PetroVietnam, although China continues to object to India’s oil exploration operations in areas offered by Vietnam and has on a number of occasions asked India to withdraw these projects. But Vietnam has lent its full support to India in this regard. This indeed makes Vietnam a valuable partner and player in the Indo-Pacific. India and Vietnam have agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in order to ensure shared security, growth and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific region.
Another push to further boost the defence ties and defence industry collaboration has been for India’s drive of establishing its place as a potential exporter in the defence sector globally. This can be seen in Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement at Hanoi: “The project is a glowing example of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of Make in India, Make for the World. The successful completion of the project, despite the challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic, is a testimonial to the commitment and professional excellence of the Indian defence manufacturing sector as also of Hong Ha Shipyard and expressed confidence that it will be a precursor to many more cooperative defence projects between India and Vietnam in future.”
Vietnam has mostly faced the brunt of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea since the 1970s — from China’s occupation of Paracels in 1974, to the occupation of Spratlys in the 1980s. This threat has only intensified in recent times. This looming threat and Vietnam’s reformed attitude and foreign policy orientation will only provide the much needed impetus to Vietnam to look at potential like-minded players in the Indo-Pacific like India.

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

www.orfonline.org

Vietnam, India look to enhance defence cooperation​

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.
VNA Friday, May 05, 2023 17:58
https://link.gov.vn/bYFQ3n62

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosts a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal. (Photo: VNA)
Hanoi (VNA) – Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.

He said that on the basis of traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership, the Vietnam-India defence cooperation has been steadily consolidated and strengthened, achieving practical results.

The Vietnamese military chief praised the effective coordination between the relevant agencies of both sides in realising cooperation contents on the ground of signed documents and agreements, Chien noted.

Exchange activities and cooperation mechanisms are developed in a flexible manner, achieving concrete and outstanding results in various fields such as human resources training, effective implementation of aid packages, and credit from the Indian government to the Vietnam Ministry of National Defence. Cooperation between combat forces, collaboration in defence industry and United Nations peacekeeping, and mutual support in multilateral forums are also part of the planned activities between the two countries.

The official expressed his belief that Col Kotwal will closely coordinate with relevant agencies of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence to effectively implement the cooperation contents that have been agreed upon by the leaders of the defence ministries. This falls in line with the Joint Vision Statement on defence partnership towards 2030, which focuses on such activities as cooperation in defence industry, UN peacekeeping, cyber security, maritime security and transfer of used boats.

The Indian Defence Attache emphasised that bilateral defence cooperation is one of the bright spots in the relationship between the two countries.

Col. Kotwal affirmed that in his position, he will make important contributions to promoting the development of the traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries in general, and defence cooperation in particular./.
VNA

https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-india-look-to-enhance-defence-cooperation/252572.vnp

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground​

June 26, 2023

Download [PDF]

Summary​

Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in scope and intensity and includes defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. Vietnam at the same time is following a pragmatic and diversified foreign policy approach, and has strengthened relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea and Russia.
Vietnam’s Minister of National Defence General Phan Van Giang held talks with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on 19 June 2023. Both sides reviewed the progress on various bilateral defence cooperation initiatives and expressed satisfaction at the ongoing engagements.1 The two-day visit of Gen Giang comes amidst reports that India may be considering to sell the BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, with the value of the deal estimated at $625 million.2 Vietnam has shown interest in acquiring BrahMos in order to help strengthen its coastal defence operations. The Defence Minister of Vietnam also visited DRDO headquarters and discussed ways to enhance defence industrial capabilities by enhancing cooperation in defence research and joint production.3 The regular military exchanges and high-level visits between India and Vietnam reflects the deepening in the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

Towards a Comprehensive Defence Partnership​

The growing trajectory of the India-Vietnam defence cooperation has continued through the Strategic Partnership established in 2007 which was elevated to the level of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in September 2016. Defence and security cooperation between India and Vietnam has emerged as a key component under the CSP, with both sides emphasising on the need to further enhance existing areas of collaboration. India-Vietnam collaboration in the defence sector began in 1994 with the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation. It was followed by a formal Defence Protocol in March 2000 where both nations agreed for joint military exercises, joint campaigns on anti-piracy in the South China Sea (SCS) and anti-insurgency training.
In 2003, a Joint Declaration was signed which binds both nations to conduct periodic high-ranking visits and pledged expansion of cooperation in the defence and security spheres. The signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation in November 2009 has helped build closer interactions, through regular defence dialogue, training, exercises, and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits, along with capacity building.4 Since the establishment of Strategic Partnership and the CSP, there has been progress in the bilateral defence cooperation that included exchange of high-level visits with the first India-Vietnam Security Dialogue taking place in July 2018.5
The India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and People announced in December 2020 is significant as it serves as the cornerstone for a new era in the bilateral defence partnership. In terms of defence and security cooperation, key agreements include implementing arrangements on defence industry cooperation, increased frequency/regular high-level and institutionalised exchanges aimed at enhancing the security partnership to help maintain and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.6
During an online interaction between Rajnath Singh and Gen Phan Van Giang of the Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam on 1 July 2021, both sides expressed commitments to further enhance cooperation in defence industry and technology domain under the framework of the Joint Vision Statement of 2020. On 8 June 2022, during the visit of Minister Singh to Vietnam, both sides signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’. A MoU on Mutual Logistics Support was also singed during that visit.7 The MoU was the first such agreement signed by Vietnam with any other country. This would help simplify the procedure of acquiring logistical equipment and support between the two nations.8
Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in its scope and intensity that includes wide-ranging contacts between the services, through closer interaction and regular defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. In February 2016, for the first time, a Vietnamese ship participated in the International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam. In December 2020, the Indian Navy took part in the ‘passage exercise’ (PASSEX) with the Vietnamese Navy in the SCS as part of efforts to boost maritime cooperation between the two countries.
Two Indian Naval Ships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta paid port calls to Ho Chi Minh City Port in November 2022 and INS Delhi and INS Satpura made a port call at Da Nang Port from 19-22 May 2023. The gifting of the indigenously-built in-service missile corvette INS Kirpan, during the recent visit of the General Phan Van Gang would enhance the capabilities of the Vietnam People’s Navy.9 Apart from conventional security, the two nations are also enhancing cooperation in the non-traditional security domain in the area of counter-terrorism, transnational organised crimes, and disaster management and response.

Geo-Political Context​

The November 1991 Sino-Vietnamese Summit, which normalised relations between the two countries, was driven at least in part by ideology as well as more pragmatic considerations. Over the years, Vietnam has built close political, economic, military as well as cultural ties with China. Although Vietnam has been able to resolve most of its land border disputes with China, the mutual confidence between the two countries has not been fully restored.10 This is as a consequence of the ongoing divergences between Vietnam and China regarding sovereignty in the East Sea/ South China Sea that still remains unsettled.
While Vietnam’s relations with China since the normalisation has matured and grown, there remains a shared mistrust that makes the relationship complex.11 Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea/SCS with significant contribution from the marine economic sector to its GDP. The ongoing maritime dispute thus becomes critical in terms of Vietnam’s geo-strategic thinking with Vietnam prioritising the protection of maritime sovereignty and the maritime economy as a key national security pillar.12
Since 2010, sovereignty disputes in the SCS have intensified with rise in the number of standoffs that includes low intensity engagements such as firing at fishing vessels by the navies of some of the claimants. Further, China’s unilateral action to increase its military presence in the region includes construction of new military bases in the SCS. This poses a major challenge as it impacts regional peace and stability while also having environmental consequences.13
Vietnam remains one of the most strident voices in Southeast Asia against China’s unilateral actions in the SCS. According to China’s self-declared maritime boundary – the ‘nine-dash line’ – the Paracel and the Spratly islands fall within its maritime boundary. Four Southeast Asian countries – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are involved in the SCS territorial and maritime boundary disputes with China. Malaysia and the Philippines claim jurisdiction over some of the Spratly Islands while Brunei claims jurisdiction over the centre on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly. The dispute between China and Vietnam in the SCS is over the Paracel and the Spratly islands. Vietnam continues to emphasis on maintaining stability in the SCS, and complying with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which both countries are signatories. 14
The contestation over the demarcation of maritime borders in the SCS in recent years has witnessed China’s unswerving sovereignty claims supported by its ongoing military modernisation and growing economic clout.15 These factors have escalated tensions between the two countries with China sending more ships to Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The presence of Chinese research, coast guard, and civilian ships in the SCS, sailing through sensitive locations within Vietnamese waters, has been increasing and causing tensions.16
Vietnam acknowledges that the prevailing geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic tensions are exerting immense pressure on regional stability and peace. The great power rivalry in the region has further influenced and intensified the ongoing traditional and non-traditional challenges being faced by the region. In this regard, disputes over territorial sovereignty in the SCS has become more complex, which could potentially lead to conflicts, and threaten regional stability, peace, and prosperity.17
The consequence of this evolving scenario has triggered a regional arms race. The rapid growth of China as a military power and its renewed activities in the SCS is one of the major drivers of increased military spending, arms acquisitions and force deployment by Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam is increasing its military spending, especially on its navy, in tandem with its fast-growing economy and in response to perceived threats, including from China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Vietnam has seen one of the largest increase in military expenditure in Southeast Asia. Between 2003 and 2018, its military spending increased nearly 700 percent, from $841 million to $5.5 billion. It has been estimated that from 2018 to 2020, there was an annual increase of nearly nine percent in Vietnam’s military spending, as per the report published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Further, Vietnam was in the 12th position of top arms importers in the world between 2010 and 2016. As per data from SIPRI, from 1995 to 2021, Vietnam’s arms imports totalled $ 9.07 billion.18
The issue over the SCS is one of the biggest challenges for Vietnam’s foreign policy in terms of the political and security dimensions. Vietnam’s military has been prioritising maritime security-related activities by focussing on strengthening its air force, air defence systems, surface, and subsurface capabilities. The procurement of naval combatants, aerial defence, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment indicates a strategy of building the capability to engage with any threat from another country, even one far away from the home country, as well as the capability to strike at a foreign country or protect far-off interests such as trade routes or source of raw materials.19
This has also led to Vietnam adopting a more pragmatic and diversified approach in its foreign policy based on multilateralism. Vietnam not only promotes its relations with India, but is also looking at strengthening its relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia.20 Vietnam prioritises its defence cooperation with countries with which it has established a strategic partnership or a comprehensive strategic partnership.21
Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper outlines the pursuit of a non-aligned policy known as ‘four no and one-depend’. These are No military alliances; No aligning with one country against another; No foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; No using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will also consider developing necessary defence and military relations with other countries at various levels.22
This policy of non-alignment being followed in Vietnam’s defence policy is evident given that it shares a Strategic Partnership with all of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with two of the five P5 members, namely, China and Russia. Such policy positions ensures that Vietnam has the flexibility in order to meet its strategic goals through enhancing its military and defence capabilities.

Conclusion​

India-Vietnam relations are based on the long historical and cultural linkages, with defence cooperation becoming a key pillar of the emerging partnership. In the post-Cold War period, the new security environment which led to India’s growing engagement with ASEAN also enabled India and Vietnam to strengthen their bilateral defence cooperation. It is fair to state that as both nations began to deepen their strategic partnership, defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation. This relation is based on the commonality of principles, and is maturing in the context of the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
India and Vietnam geographically lie at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries would play a major role in this strategic space which is becoming a core theatre of competition for power and influence amongst the major powers. The India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement of 2020 recognises the importance of this partnership towards addressing the emerging geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the region and beyond. Further, the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Partnership signed in 2022 has significantly enhanced the scale and scope of the bilateral defence cooperation. Vietnam is a key pillar in India’s Act East policy and an important partner in its Indo-Pacific vision. The India-Vietnam defence partnership is exploring new initiatives besides continuing cooperation on regional and global issues of shared interest.

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

The visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang to India reflects the deepening of the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

www.idsa.in

 

[Bilal9]

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important​

• PREMESHA SAHA

Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision

• ASEAN
• DEFENCE
• INDIA-VIETNAM
• INDO-PACIFIC
• LOC
• VPN

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh embarked on a three-day visit to Hanoi, Vietnam, from 8-10 June 2022 with an aim to further strengthen the defence and maritime security cooperation between India and Vietnam. Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision. The defence minister handed over 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam. Five of those were built in India, and the rest in a Vietnamese shipyard under India’s $100 million Defence Line of Credit.
The Defence Minister held extensive talks with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Phan Van Giang, with a focus on exploring new initiatives to further strengthen the defence engagements, besides exchanging views on regional and global issues of shared interest. During his Vietnam tour, he also visited training institutions of the country at Nha Trang, including the Telecommunication University where an Army Software Park is being established with a $5 million grant from India. India and Vietnam signed an MoU on mutual logistics support, the first such major agreement Hanoi has inked with any country for simplifying procedures for mutually-beneficial logistic support to allow militaries of the two sides to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies.

The two countries also signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’ which will “significantly enhance” the scope and scale of bilateral defence cooperation. The two sides also agreed to the early finalisation of the $500 million defence Line of Credit (LoC) extended to Vietnam by India.
In a statement issued by the Indian defence ministry, it said, “The implementation of the projects under the LoC will add substantially to Vietnam’s defence capabilities and further Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘Make in India, Make for the World”. From the Indian end, gifting of two simulators and monetary grants towards setting up a language and IT laboratory at the Air Force Officers Training School for capacity building of the Vietnamese armed forces was also announced.
These developments during the recent visit are indeed reflective of the fact that the India-Vietnam defence partnership is getting a push. The deepening of the defence ties has been a gradual process nonetheless. Vietnam was the first country in the Southeast Asian region with whom India had signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2007, which from 2016 onwards after the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Vietnam has been elevated to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’.
In the early 2000s, both sides also signed a defence protocol through which Vietnam could procure military helicopters and equipment for the repair of Vietnamese aircraft. A provision was also made for facilitating the training of Vietnam’s military personnel by India. During the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, India had reiterated “its commitment to provide necessary assistance in developing Vietnam’s defence capabilities as well as providing a new line of credit facility for the country.” Moreover, on the logistics front, the implementation of the $100 million Line of Credit for building high-speed patrol vessels to be used by the Vietnamese Border Guards is a classic example of India’s strategic support.

The Vietnamese side has also appreciated India’s offer of $500 million Line of Credit to the local defence industry and agreed to accelerate procedures for its timely approval. Other defence engagements include joint military exercises, the latest of which was held in August 2021 when Indian and Vietnamese navies took part in a bilateral exercise in the South China Sea. India had deployed four frontline ships for the exercise, including INS Ranvijay and INS Kora, which were already on overseas deployment in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and Western Pacific. Vietnam sent Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) frigate VPNS Ly Thai To (HQ-012) for the exercise.
Vietnam has always been a critical partner for India in its Southeast Asian diplomacy, both under its Look East policy and now in the era of the Act East policy. India was the only country to have supported Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. This had also stalled the process of India becoming a dialogue member in the ASEAN.
Vietnam’s approach or foreign policy orientation has evolved over the years and this can be seen at how the US-Vietnam relations have advanced over the years. The relationship is currently seen as mutually beneficial. This evolution of approach is also reflective in the way Vietnam handles China as well, where on the one hand it is one of the leading ASEAN countries to openly call out China for its aggressive stance in the disputed South China Sea, and on the other hand China is also the leading trading partner of Vietnam. With India on the contrary, Vietnam hardly has had any differences or conflict of opinions and the relation has been smooth.

But as mentioned above this reform in attitude has provided the much-needed push for this bilateral relationship to make some substantial progress and not just remain a talking shop marked by some agreements and high-level visits. The wariness of other Southeast Asian countries when it comes to the growing influence in Southeast Asia of external powers like the US, Australia, India among others to balance a rising China is clearly visible, it is Vietnam which openly supports the idea of countries like the US, India taking more interest in the challenges that the region is facing.

Vietnam has insisted on several forums that other stakeholders, even if not direct claimants in the South China Sea dispute like the US and India, should persuade China to work faster on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnam though also is keeping its relations with China intact, given the economic benefits, but also does not shy away from calling out Beijing when needed. India has ongoing oil exploration projects with PetroVietnam, although China continues to object to India’s oil exploration operations in areas offered by Vietnam and has on a number of occasions asked India to withdraw these projects. But Vietnam has lent its full support to India in this regard. This indeed makes Vietnam a valuable partner and player in the Indo-Pacific. India and Vietnam have agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in order to ensure shared security, growth and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific region.
Another push to further boost the defence ties and defence industry collaboration has been for India’s drive of establishing its place as a potential exporter in the defence sector globally. This can be seen in Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement at Hanoi: “The project is a glowing example of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of Make in India, Make for the World. The successful completion of the project, despite the challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic, is a testimonial to the commitment and professional excellence of the Indian defence manufacturing sector as also of Hong Ha Shipyard and expressed confidence that it will be a precursor to many more cooperative defence projects between India and Vietnam in future.”
Vietnam has mostly faced the brunt of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea since the 1970s — from China’s occupation of Paracels in 1974, to the occupation of Spratlys in the 1980s. This threat has only intensified in recent times. This looming threat and Vietnam’s reformed attitude and foreign policy orientation will only provide the much needed impetus to Vietnam to look at potential like-minded players in the Indo-Pacific like India.

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

www.orfonline.org

Vietnam, India look to enhance defence cooperation​

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.
VNA Friday, May 05, 2023 17:58
https://link.gov.vn/bYFQ3n62

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosts a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal. (Photo: VNA)
Hanoi (VNA) – Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.

He said that on the basis of traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership, the Vietnam-India defence cooperation has been steadily consolidated and strengthened, achieving practical results.

The Vietnamese military chief praised the effective coordination between the relevant agencies of both sides in realising cooperation contents on the ground of signed documents and agreements, Chien noted.

Exchange activities and cooperation mechanisms are developed in a flexible manner, achieving concrete and outstanding results in various fields such as human resources training, effective implementation of aid packages, and credit from the Indian government to the Vietnam Ministry of National Defence. Cooperation between combat forces, collaboration in defence industry and United Nations peacekeeping, and mutual support in multilateral forums are also part of the planned activities between the two countries.

The official expressed his belief that Col Kotwal will closely coordinate with relevant agencies of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence to effectively implement the cooperation contents that have been agreed upon by the leaders of the defence ministries. This falls in line with the Joint Vision Statement on defence partnership towards 2030, which focuses on such activities as cooperation in defence industry, UN peacekeeping, cyber security, maritime security and transfer of used boats.

The Indian Defence Attache emphasised that bilateral defence cooperation is one of the bright spots in the relationship between the two countries.

Col. Kotwal affirmed that in his position, he will make important contributions to promoting the development of the traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries in general, and defence cooperation in particular./.
VNA

https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-india-look-to-enhance-defence-cooperation/252572.vnp

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground​

June 26, 2023

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Summary​

Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in scope and intensity and includes defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. Vietnam at the same time is following a pragmatic and diversified foreign policy approach, and has strengthened relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea and Russia.
Vietnam’s Minister of National Defence General Phan Van Giang held talks with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on 19 June 2023. Both sides reviewed the progress on various bilateral defence cooperation initiatives and expressed satisfaction at the ongoing engagements.1 The two-day visit of Gen Giang comes amidst reports that India may be considering to sell the BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, with the value of the deal estimated at $625 million.2 Vietnam has shown interest in acquiring BrahMos in order to help strengthen its coastal defence operations. The Defence Minister of Vietnam also visited DRDO headquarters and discussed ways to enhance defence industrial capabilities by enhancing cooperation in defence research and joint production.3 The regular military exchanges and high-level visits between India and Vietnam reflects the deepening in the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

Towards a Comprehensive Defence Partnership​

The growing trajectory of the India-Vietnam defence cooperation has continued through the Strategic Partnership established in 2007 which was elevated to the level of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in September 2016. Defence and security cooperation between India and Vietnam has emerged as a key component under the CSP, with both sides emphasising on the need to further enhance existing areas of collaboration. India-Vietnam collaboration in the defence sector began in 1994 with the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation. It was followed by a formal Defence Protocol in March 2000 where both nations agreed for joint military exercises, joint campaigns on anti-piracy in the South China Sea (SCS) and anti-insurgency training.
In 2003, a Joint Declaration was signed which binds both nations to conduct periodic high-ranking visits and pledged expansion of cooperation in the defence and security spheres. The signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation in November 2009 has helped build closer interactions, through regular defence dialogue, training, exercises, and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits, along with capacity building.4 Since the establishment of Strategic Partnership and the CSP, there has been progress in the bilateral defence cooperation that included exchange of high-level visits with the first India-Vietnam Security Dialogue taking place in July 2018.5
The India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and People announced in December 2020 is significant as it serves as the cornerstone for a new era in the bilateral defence partnership. In terms of defence and security cooperation, key agreements include implementing arrangements on defence industry cooperation, increased frequency/regular high-level and institutionalised exchanges aimed at enhancing the security partnership to help maintain and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.6
During an online interaction between Rajnath Singh and Gen Phan Van Giang of the Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam on 1 July 2021, both sides expressed commitments to further enhance cooperation in defence industry and technology domain under the framework of the Joint Vision Statement of 2020. On 8 June 2022, during the visit of Minister Singh to Vietnam, both sides signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’. A MoU on Mutual Logistics Support was also singed during that visit.7 The MoU was the first such agreement signed by Vietnam with any other country. This would help simplify the procedure of acquiring logistical equipment and support between the two nations.8
Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in its scope and intensity that includes wide-ranging contacts between the services, through closer interaction and regular defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. In February 2016, for the first time, a Vietnamese ship participated in the International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam. In December 2020, the Indian Navy took part in the ‘passage exercise’ (PASSEX) with the Vietnamese Navy in the SCS as part of efforts to boost maritime cooperation between the two countries.
Two Indian Naval Ships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta paid port calls to Ho Chi Minh City Port in November 2022 and INS Delhi and INS Satpura made a port call at Da Nang Port from 19-22 May 2023. The gifting of the indigenously-built in-service missile corvette INS Kirpan, during the recent visit of the General Phan Van Gang would enhance the capabilities of the Vietnam People’s Navy.9 Apart from conventional security, the two nations are also enhancing cooperation in the non-traditional security domain in the area of counter-terrorism, transnational organised crimes, and disaster management and response.

Geo-Political Context​

The November 1991 Sino-Vietnamese Summit, which normalised relations between the two countries, was driven at least in part by ideology as well as more pragmatic considerations. Over the years, Vietnam has built close political, economic, military as well as cultural ties with China. Although Vietnam has been able to resolve most of its land border disputes with China, the mutual confidence between the two countries has not been fully restored.10 This is as a consequence of the ongoing divergences between Vietnam and China regarding sovereignty in the East Sea/ South China Sea that still remains unsettled.
While Vietnam’s relations with China since the normalisation has matured and grown, there remains a shared mistrust that makes the relationship complex.11 Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea/SCS with significant contribution from the marine economic sector to its GDP. The ongoing maritime dispute thus becomes critical in terms of Vietnam’s geo-strategic thinking with Vietnam prioritising the protection of maritime sovereignty and the maritime economy as a key national security pillar.12
Since 2010, sovereignty disputes in the SCS have intensified with rise in the number of standoffs that includes low intensity engagements such as firing at fishing vessels by the navies of some of the claimants. Further, China’s unilateral action to increase its military presence in the region includes construction of new military bases in the SCS. This poses a major challenge as it impacts regional peace and stability while also having environmental consequences.13
Vietnam remains one of the most strident voices in Southeast Asia against China’s unilateral actions in the SCS. According to China’s self-declared maritime boundary – the ‘nine-dash line’ – the Paracel and the Spratly islands fall within its maritime boundary. Four Southeast Asian countries – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are involved in the SCS territorial and maritime boundary disputes with China. Malaysia and the Philippines claim jurisdiction over some of the Spratly Islands while Brunei claims jurisdiction over the centre on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly. The dispute between China and Vietnam in the SCS is over the Paracel and the Spratly islands. Vietnam continues to emphasis on maintaining stability in the SCS, and complying with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which both countries are signatories. 14
The contestation over the demarcation of maritime borders in the SCS in recent years has witnessed China’s unswerving sovereignty claims supported by its ongoing military modernisation and growing economic clout.15 These factors have escalated tensions between the two countries with China sending more ships to Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The presence of Chinese research, coast guard, and civilian ships in the SCS, sailing through sensitive locations within Vietnamese waters, has been increasing and causing tensions.16
Vietnam acknowledges that the prevailing geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic tensions are exerting immense pressure on regional stability and peace. The great power rivalry in the region has further influenced and intensified the ongoing traditional and non-traditional challenges being faced by the region. In this regard, disputes over territorial sovereignty in the SCS has become more complex, which could potentially lead to conflicts, and threaten regional stability, peace, and prosperity.17
The consequence of this evolving scenario has triggered a regional arms race. The rapid growth of China as a military power and its renewed activities in the SCS is one of the major drivers of increased military spending, arms acquisitions and force deployment by Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam is increasing its military spending, especially on its navy, in tandem with its fast-growing economy and in response to perceived threats, including from China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Vietnam has seen one of the largest increase in military expenditure in Southeast Asia. Between 2003 and 2018, its military spending increased nearly 700 percent, from $841 million to $5.5 billion. It has been estimated that from 2018 to 2020, there was an annual increase of nearly nine percent in Vietnam’s military spending, as per the report published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Further, Vietnam was in the 12th position of top arms importers in the world between 2010 and 2016. As per data from SIPRI, from 1995 to 2021, Vietnam’s arms imports totalled $ 9.07 billion.18
The issue over the SCS is one of the biggest challenges for Vietnam’s foreign policy in terms of the political and security dimensions. Vietnam’s military has been prioritising maritime security-related activities by focussing on strengthening its air force, air defence systems, surface, and subsurface capabilities. The procurement of naval combatants, aerial defence, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment indicates a strategy of building the capability to engage with any threat from another country, even one far away from the home country, as well as the capability to strike at a foreign country or protect far-off interests such as trade routes or source of raw materials.19
This has also led to Vietnam adopting a more pragmatic and diversified approach in its foreign policy based on multilateralism. Vietnam not only promotes its relations with India, but is also looking at strengthening its relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia.20 Vietnam prioritises its defence cooperation with countries with which it has established a strategic partnership or a comprehensive strategic partnership.21
Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper outlines the pursuit of a non-aligned policy known as ‘four no and one-depend’. These are No military alliances; No aligning with one country against another; No foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; No using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will also consider developing necessary defence and military relations with other countries at various levels.22
This policy of non-alignment being followed in Vietnam’s defence policy is evident given that it shares a Strategic Partnership with all of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with two of the five P5 members, namely, China and Russia. Such policy positions ensures that Vietnam has the flexibility in order to meet its strategic goals through enhancing its military and defence capabilities.

Conclusion​

India-Vietnam relations are based on the long historical and cultural linkages, with defence cooperation becoming a key pillar of the emerging partnership. In the post-Cold War period, the new security environment which led to India’s growing engagement with ASEAN also enabled India and Vietnam to strengthen their bilateral defence cooperation. It is fair to state that as both nations began to deepen their strategic partnership, defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation. This relation is based on the commonality of principles, and is maturing in the context of the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
India and Vietnam geographically lie at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries would play a major role in this strategic space which is becoming a core theatre of competition for power and influence amongst the major powers. The India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement of 2020 recognises the importance of this partnership towards addressing the emerging geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the region and beyond. Further, the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Partnership signed in 2022 has significantly enhanced the scale and scope of the bilateral defence cooperation. Vietnam is a key pillar in India’s Act East policy and an important partner in its Indo-Pacific vision. The India-Vietnam defence partnership is exploring new initiatives besides continuing cooperation on regional and global issues of shared interest.

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

The visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang to India reflects the deepening of the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

www.idsa.in

What is India going to do? Defend Vietnam in case of territorial disputes with China?

File this under Indian BS overtures.....

 

[mig25]

Of course they are assembled. The only thing indigenous in these rustbuckets is $hitty old Indian steel plate.

When Indians do this kind of cheap thing, "donating" thirty year old ships - all it does is make a bad impression.

It's telling the Vietnamese that they don't deserve the best. Not good int'l relations.

Ham-handed Indian moves as usual in China's backyard.

Like Modi's govt. "donated" that rustbucket KILO sub to Myanmar.

I mean - if bhakt Indian people take ten year old clothes from the closet, and "donate" it to charity or "salvation army" - it's an insult to poor people who sop at Charity shops.

Which I have seen Indians do in the US. They donate crap that should be thrown away.

In my case, it's going straight to the trash. And my old clothes aren't even three years old.

People representing nations that don't have much of any type of military, such ignorant statements are not surprising, especially when they think they are superior to others when they still can't make any military equipment of their own. Funny!

Pakistan has paid for older Mirages...

 

[Bilal9]

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important​

• PREMESHA SAHA

Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision

• ASEAN
• DEFENCE
• INDIA-VIETNAM
• INDO-PACIFIC
• LOC
• VPN

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh embarked on a three-day visit to Hanoi, Vietnam, from 8-10 June 2022 with an aim to further strengthen the defence and maritime security cooperation between India and Vietnam. Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision. The defence minister handed over 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam. Five of those were built in India, and the rest in a Vietnamese shipyard under India’s $100 million Defence Line of Credit.
The Defence Minister held extensive talks with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Phan Van Giang, with a focus on exploring new initiatives to further strengthen the defence engagements, besides exchanging views on regional and global issues of shared interest. During his Vietnam tour, he also visited training institutions of the country at Nha Trang, including the Telecommunication University where an Army Software Park is being established with a $5 million grant from India. India and Vietnam signed an MoU on mutual logistics support, the first such major agreement Hanoi has inked with any country for simplifying procedures for mutually-beneficial logistic support to allow militaries of the two sides to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies.

The two countries also signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’ which will “significantly enhance” the scope and scale of bilateral defence cooperation. The two sides also agreed to the early finalisation of the $500 million defence Line of Credit (LoC) extended to Vietnam by India.
In a statement issued by the Indian defence ministry, it said, “The implementation of the projects under the LoC will add substantially to Vietnam’s defence capabilities and further Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘Make in India, Make for the World”. From the Indian end, gifting of two simulators and monetary grants towards setting up a language and IT laboratory at the Air Force Officers Training School for capacity building of the Vietnamese armed forces was also announced.
These developments during the recent visit are indeed reflective of the fact that the India-Vietnam defence partnership is getting a push. The deepening of the defence ties has been a gradual process nonetheless. Vietnam was the first country in the Southeast Asian region with whom India had signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2007, which from 2016 onwards after the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Vietnam has been elevated to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’.
In the early 2000s, both sides also signed a defence protocol through which Vietnam could procure military helicopters and equipment for the repair of Vietnamese aircraft. A provision was also made for facilitating the training of Vietnam’s military personnel by India. During the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, India had reiterated “its commitment to provide necessary assistance in developing Vietnam’s defence capabilities as well as providing a new line of credit facility for the country.” Moreover, on the logistics front, the implementation of the $100 million Line of Credit for building high-speed patrol vessels to be used by the Vietnamese Border Guards is a classic example of India’s strategic support.

The Vietnamese side has also appreciated India’s offer of $500 million Line of Credit to the local defence industry and agreed to accelerate procedures for its timely approval. Other defence engagements include joint military exercises, the latest of which was held in August 2021 when Indian and Vietnamese navies took part in a bilateral exercise in the South China Sea. India had deployed four frontline ships for the exercise, including INS Ranvijay and INS Kora, which were already on overseas deployment in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and Western Pacific. Vietnam sent Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) frigate VPNS Ly Thai To (HQ-012) for the exercise.
Vietnam has always been a critical partner for India in its Southeast Asian diplomacy, both under its Look East policy and now in the era of the Act East policy. India was the only country to have supported Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. This had also stalled the process of India becoming a dialogue member in the ASEAN.
Vietnam’s approach or foreign policy orientation has evolved over the years and this can be seen at how the US-Vietnam relations have advanced over the years. The relationship is currently seen as mutually beneficial. This evolution of approach is also reflective in the way Vietnam handles China as well, where on the one hand it is one of the leading ASEAN countries to openly call out China for its aggressive stance in the disputed South China Sea, and on the other hand China is also the leading trading partner of Vietnam. With India on the contrary, Vietnam hardly has had any differences or conflict of opinions and the relation has been smooth.

But as mentioned above this reform in attitude has provided the much-needed push for this bilateral relationship to make some substantial progress and not just remain a talking shop marked by some agreements and high-level visits. The wariness of other Southeast Asian countries when it comes to the growing influence in Southeast Asia of external powers like the US, Australia, India among others to balance a rising China is clearly visible, it is Vietnam which openly supports the idea of countries like the US, India taking more interest in the challenges that the region is facing.

Vietnam has insisted on several forums that other stakeholders, even if not direct claimants in the South China Sea dispute like the US and India, should persuade China to work faster on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnam though also is keeping its relations with China intact, given the economic benefits, but also does not shy away from calling out Beijing when needed. India has ongoing oil exploration projects with PetroVietnam, although China continues to object to India’s oil exploration operations in areas offered by Vietnam and has on a number of occasions asked India to withdraw these projects. But Vietnam has lent its full support to India in this regard. This indeed makes Vietnam a valuable partner and player in the Indo-Pacific. India and Vietnam have agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in order to ensure shared security, growth and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific region.
Another push to further boost the defence ties and defence industry collaboration has been for India’s drive of establishing its place as a potential exporter in the defence sector globally. This can be seen in Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement at Hanoi: “The project is a glowing example of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of Make in India, Make for the World. The successful completion of the project, despite the challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic, is a testimonial to the commitment and professional excellence of the Indian defence manufacturing sector as also of Hong Ha Shipyard and expressed confidence that it will be a precursor to many more cooperative defence projects between India and Vietnam in future.”
Vietnam has mostly faced the brunt of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea since the 1970s — from China’s occupation of Paracels in 1974, to the occupation of Spratlys in the 1980s. This threat has only intensified in recent times. This looming threat and Vietnam’s reformed attitude and foreign policy orientation will only provide the much needed impetus to Vietnam to look at potential like-minded players in the Indo-Pacific like India.

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so important

www.orfonline.org

Vietnam, India look to enhance defence cooperation​

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.
VNA Friday, May 05, 2023 17:58
https://link.gov.vn/bYFQ3n62

Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosts a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal. (Photo: VNA)
Hanoi (VNA) – Deputy Defence Minister Sen. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien on May 5 hosted a reception in Hanoi for the Indian Defence Attache, Col. Dheeraj Kotwal.

He said that on the basis of traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership, the Vietnam-India defence cooperation has been steadily consolidated and strengthened, achieving practical results.

The Vietnamese military chief praised the effective coordination between the relevant agencies of both sides in realising cooperation contents on the ground of signed documents and agreements, Chien noted.

Exchange activities and cooperation mechanisms are developed in a flexible manner, achieving concrete and outstanding results in various fields such as human resources training, effective implementation of aid packages, and credit from the Indian government to the Vietnam Ministry of National Defence. Cooperation between combat forces, collaboration in defence industry and United Nations peacekeeping, and mutual support in multilateral forums are also part of the planned activities between the two countries.

The official expressed his belief that Col Kotwal will closely coordinate with relevant agencies of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence to effectively implement the cooperation contents that have been agreed upon by the leaders of the defence ministries. This falls in line with the Joint Vision Statement on defence partnership towards 2030, which focuses on such activities as cooperation in defence industry, UN peacekeeping, cyber security, maritime security and transfer of used boats.

The Indian Defence Attache emphasised that bilateral defence cooperation is one of the bright spots in the relationship between the two countries.

Col. Kotwal affirmed that in his position, he will make important contributions to promoting the development of the traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries in general, and defence cooperation in particular./.
VNA

https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-india-look-to-enhance-defence-cooperation/252572.vnp

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground​

June 26, 2023

Download [PDF]

Summary​

Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in scope and intensity and includes defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. Vietnam at the same time is following a pragmatic and diversified foreign policy approach, and has strengthened relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea and Russia.
Vietnam’s Minister of National Defence General Phan Van Giang held talks with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on 19 June 2023. Both sides reviewed the progress on various bilateral defence cooperation initiatives and expressed satisfaction at the ongoing engagements.1 The two-day visit of Gen Giang comes amidst reports that India may be considering to sell the BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, with the value of the deal estimated at $625 million.2 Vietnam has shown interest in acquiring BrahMos in order to help strengthen its coastal defence operations. The Defence Minister of Vietnam also visited DRDO headquarters and discussed ways to enhance defence industrial capabilities by enhancing cooperation in defence research and joint production.3 The regular military exchanges and high-level visits between India and Vietnam reflects the deepening in the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

Towards a Comprehensive Defence Partnership​

The growing trajectory of the India-Vietnam defence cooperation has continued through the Strategic Partnership established in 2007 which was elevated to the level of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in September 2016. Defence and security cooperation between India and Vietnam has emerged as a key component under the CSP, with both sides emphasising on the need to further enhance existing areas of collaboration. India-Vietnam collaboration in the defence sector began in 1994 with the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation. It was followed by a formal Defence Protocol in March 2000 where both nations agreed for joint military exercises, joint campaigns on anti-piracy in the South China Sea (SCS) and anti-insurgency training.
In 2003, a Joint Declaration was signed which binds both nations to conduct periodic high-ranking visits and pledged expansion of cooperation in the defence and security spheres. The signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation in November 2009 has helped build closer interactions, through regular defence dialogue, training, exercises, and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits, along with capacity building.4 Since the establishment of Strategic Partnership and the CSP, there has been progress in the bilateral defence cooperation that included exchange of high-level visits with the first India-Vietnam Security Dialogue taking place in July 2018.5
The India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and People announced in December 2020 is significant as it serves as the cornerstone for a new era in the bilateral defence partnership. In terms of defence and security cooperation, key agreements include implementing arrangements on defence industry cooperation, increased frequency/regular high-level and institutionalised exchanges aimed at enhancing the security partnership to help maintain and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.6
During an online interaction between Rajnath Singh and Gen Phan Van Giang of the Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam on 1 July 2021, both sides expressed commitments to further enhance cooperation in defence industry and technology domain under the framework of the Joint Vision Statement of 2020. On 8 June 2022, during the visit of Minister Singh to Vietnam, both sides signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’. A MoU on Mutual Logistics Support was also singed during that visit.7 The MoU was the first such agreement signed by Vietnam with any other country. This would help simplify the procedure of acquiring logistical equipment and support between the two nations.8
Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in its scope and intensity that includes wide-ranging contacts between the services, through closer interaction and regular defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. In February 2016, for the first time, a Vietnamese ship participated in the International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam. In December 2020, the Indian Navy took part in the ‘passage exercise’ (PASSEX) with the Vietnamese Navy in the SCS as part of efforts to boost maritime cooperation between the two countries.
Two Indian Naval Ships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta paid port calls to Ho Chi Minh City Port in November 2022 and INS Delhi and INS Satpura made a port call at Da Nang Port from 19-22 May 2023. The gifting of the indigenously-built in-service missile corvette INS Kirpan, during the recent visit of the General Phan Van Gang would enhance the capabilities of the Vietnam People’s Navy.9 Apart from conventional security, the two nations are also enhancing cooperation in the non-traditional security domain in the area of counter-terrorism, transnational organised crimes, and disaster management and response.

Geo-Political Context​

The November 1991 Sino-Vietnamese Summit, which normalised relations between the two countries, was driven at least in part by ideology as well as more pragmatic considerations. Over the years, Vietnam has built close political, economic, military as well as cultural ties with China. Although Vietnam has been able to resolve most of its land border disputes with China, the mutual confidence between the two countries has not been fully restored.10 This is as a consequence of the ongoing divergences between Vietnam and China regarding sovereignty in the East Sea/ South China Sea that still remains unsettled.
While Vietnam’s relations with China since the normalisation has matured and grown, there remains a shared mistrust that makes the relationship complex.11 Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea/SCS with significant contribution from the marine economic sector to its GDP. The ongoing maritime dispute thus becomes critical in terms of Vietnam’s geo-strategic thinking with Vietnam prioritising the protection of maritime sovereignty and the maritime economy as a key national security pillar.12
Since 2010, sovereignty disputes in the SCS have intensified with rise in the number of standoffs that includes low intensity engagements such as firing at fishing vessels by the navies of some of the claimants. Further, China’s unilateral action to increase its military presence in the region includes construction of new military bases in the SCS. This poses a major challenge as it impacts regional peace and stability while also having environmental consequences.13
Vietnam remains one of the most strident voices in Southeast Asia against China’s unilateral actions in the SCS. According to China’s self-declared maritime boundary – the ‘nine-dash line’ – the Paracel and the Spratly islands fall within its maritime boundary. Four Southeast Asian countries – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are involved in the SCS territorial and maritime boundary disputes with China. Malaysia and the Philippines claim jurisdiction over some of the Spratly Islands while Brunei claims jurisdiction over the centre on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly. The dispute between China and Vietnam in the SCS is over the Paracel and the Spratly islands. Vietnam continues to emphasis on maintaining stability in the SCS, and complying with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which both countries are signatories. 14
The contestation over the demarcation of maritime borders in the SCS in recent years has witnessed China’s unswerving sovereignty claims supported by its ongoing military modernisation and growing economic clout.15 These factors have escalated tensions between the two countries with China sending more ships to Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The presence of Chinese research, coast guard, and civilian ships in the SCS, sailing through sensitive locations within Vietnamese waters, has been increasing and causing tensions.16
Vietnam acknowledges that the prevailing geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic tensions are exerting immense pressure on regional stability and peace. The great power rivalry in the region has further influenced and intensified the ongoing traditional and non-traditional challenges being faced by the region. In this regard, disputes over territorial sovereignty in the SCS has become more complex, which could potentially lead to conflicts, and threaten regional stability, peace, and prosperity.17
The consequence of this evolving scenario has triggered a regional arms race. The rapid growth of China as a military power and its renewed activities in the SCS is one of the major drivers of increased military spending, arms acquisitions and force deployment by Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam is increasing its military spending, especially on its navy, in tandem with its fast-growing economy and in response to perceived threats, including from China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Vietnam has seen one of the largest increase in military expenditure in Southeast Asia. Between 2003 and 2018, its military spending increased nearly 700 percent, from $841 million to $5.5 billion. It has been estimated that from 2018 to 2020, there was an annual increase of nearly nine percent in Vietnam’s military spending, as per the report published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Further, Vietnam was in the 12th position of top arms importers in the world between 2010 and 2016. As per data from SIPRI, from 1995 to 2021, Vietnam’s arms imports totalled $ 9.07 billion.18
The issue over the SCS is one of the biggest challenges for Vietnam’s foreign policy in terms of the political and security dimensions. Vietnam’s military has been prioritising maritime security-related activities by focussing on strengthening its air force, air defence systems, surface, and subsurface capabilities. The procurement of naval combatants, aerial defence, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment indicates a strategy of building the capability to engage with any threat from another country, even one far away from the home country, as well as the capability to strike at a foreign country or protect far-off interests such as trade routes or source of raw materials.19
This has also led to Vietnam adopting a more pragmatic and diversified approach in its foreign policy based on multilateralism. Vietnam not only promotes its relations with India, but is also looking at strengthening its relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia.20 Vietnam prioritises its defence cooperation with countries with which it has established a strategic partnership or a comprehensive strategic partnership.21
Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper outlines the pursuit of a non-aligned policy known as ‘four no and one-depend’. These are No military alliances; No aligning with one country against another; No foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; No using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will also consider developing necessary defence and military relations with other countries at various levels.22
This policy of non-alignment being followed in Vietnam’s defence policy is evident given that it shares a Strategic Partnership with all of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with two of the five P5 members, namely, China and Russia. Such policy positions ensures that Vietnam has the flexibility in order to meet its strategic goals through enhancing its military and defence capabilities.

Conclusion​

India-Vietnam relations are based on the long historical and cultural linkages, with defence cooperation becoming a key pillar of the emerging partnership. In the post-Cold War period, the new security environment which led to India’s growing engagement with ASEAN also enabled India and Vietnam to strengthen their bilateral defence cooperation. It is fair to state that as both nations began to deepen their strategic partnership, defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation. This relation is based on the commonality of principles, and is maturing in the context of the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
India and Vietnam geographically lie at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries would play a major role in this strategic space which is becoming a core theatre of competition for power and influence amongst the major powers. The India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement of 2020 recognises the importance of this partnership towards addressing the emerging geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the region and beyond. Further, the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Partnership signed in 2022 has significantly enhanced the scale and scope of the bilateral defence cooperation. Vietnam is a key pillar in India’s Act East policy and an important partner in its Indo-Pacific vision. The India-Vietnam defence partnership is exploring new initiatives besides continuing cooperation on regional and global issues of shared interest.

India-Vietnam Defence Partnership Gaining Ground | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

The visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang to India reflects the deepening of the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics.

www.idsa.in

What is India going to do? Defend Vietnam in case of territorial disputes with China?

File this under Indian BS overtures.....

People representing nations that don't have much of any type of military, such ignorant statements are not surprising, especially when they think they are superior to others when they still can't make any military equipment of their own. Funny!

Pakistan has paid for older Mirages...

Big words coming from citizen of a nation which has been trying to sell us anything military (anything !) since fifty years.

Not one bullet bought from India.

Yeah we don't make anything.

Spoken by the world's largest arms importer.

Thanks Pujaris. Walaiqum Tafat.