India counters Chinese anti-missile test

[Super Falcon]

har sair ke upar sawa sair hota hain wait karo china ke sawa sair ka

 

[Super Falcon]

i was recently got my rank from birgadier to Major general. now show some respect for meee jokin friends

 

[amarnath]

i was recently got my rank from birgadier to Major general. now show some respect for meee jokin friends

Jahapanaah tussi great ho, tohfa kabool karo



No offense friend, this is from the movie 3 idiots, mordern way to show respect.... hehehe. sorry

 

[faithfulguy]

if everything goes according to the plan, india will got the missile ready in 2011,most likely base on Agni 3. but what about the second precondition, sophisticated powerful radar. as far as i konw, the "less sophisticated radar" being used is an Israel EL/M-2080 Green Pine. they must be making their own one, but no concrete information about the progress as now.

so, i assume its quite certain that
1)India has no Mid-course phase interception capability right now;
2)India has 50% (more or less ) of the Terminal phasephase interception capability as the "less sophisticated radar" is not ready yet.

Very good summary. Some Indian poster have little knowledge of ABM and believe that India tested what China just did 3 years ago. That is totally lack of knowledge on their part. China tested a mid-course interceptor as evidence by their powerful radar. Someone from the Chinese site mentioned that US surveillence satellite detect them inXinjiang a while back.

India is only focus on theater base, terminal phase interceptor. As you mention, the radar is not ready yet.

I believe its pointless to compare India and China missile defence as of now because both countries has different strategy and different needs.

China has a need to show that it can shoot down a missile from the US. I am certain China has no ability to shoot down a minuteman III or Trident III missile unless US notify China of the fireing before hand. On the other hand, I also do not believe the US has the capability to do it detect and intercept Chinese ICBM unless we are lucky to have the satellite point at the right spot at the right tiem. Also, the mid course ABM system is not finish its validation phase yet, even though part of it is already deployed However, this is good for against NK or Iran as they have a fix launch site.

India, on the other hand, has no need for ICBM missile defence. So it has no need for mid course missile defence. The article about India counter China's missile test is just beyond rediculous and make India media and many members here the most and for the rest of the world.

 

[gambit]

I do see the confusion in your statements above. You mentioned that comparing THAAD and Indian ABM is inaccurate. However, you also said that PAD & AAD are theater missile defence, which is exactly what THAAD is, as oppose to mid course missile defence. So in terms of categorizing missile defence into national vs theater missile defence,

THAAD and PAD&AAD are theater missile defence. (against IRMB, MRBM or short range missiles)

Mid course missile defence are natianal missile defence (against ICBM)

What China had tested should be use to counter ICBMs. I do not believe that it is targeted for Indian missiles but rather to send a political message to the US. Even though US do respond to it, as this tet was meant for it, Indian media and public also make a fuss about it. That is why the bonehead article that create this thread is such a

There is a threat and the execution of a threat is a weapons launch. There is also a travel time of that weapons launch, be it a bullet from an infantry rifle or a rocket from an underground silo. The sooner the attack is intercepted, meaning to meet the weapons as far away from one's self or one's territory, the better the defense. So of course, the best defense of all is to prevent the weapons launch in the first place. The ultimate defense is to deny the enemy the resources to make the weapon, be it a sword or an arrow or a rocket, to make credible the threat. But that is another point. So in order to meet the weapons as far away from home territory as possible, there must be sensor capability as close to the enemy as possible. Those sensor capabilities range from human spies to electronic means.

For ballistic missile defense, theater or terminal defense is the least desirable type precisely because it is a battle being fought over home territory. In effect, the enemy is at home soil. So it is the greater desire to intercept the missile earlier in its travel and that mean the greater it must be the sensor and response capabilities. The response capability is the interceptor missile. But it is reactive. The proactive factor in the defense is the sensor, be it human spies or electronic means. We can rule out human spies so this leave us with only electronic means to detect a weapons launch. So how am I going to get my sensor as close to the enemy as possible? To date we have air and space borne sensor systems. They can contain radar or infrared or a fusion of both but that is for another type of discussion.

The point that is missing in reading this debate -- sensor and response capabilities matching. There is a 'pulling' effect between sensor and response capabilities. It does me no good if I have a spaceborne sensor system capable of X-ray vision into the enemy's silos and read the soldiers' minds but my interceptors can only go as high as 10km altitude. The fight would end up over my home soil anyway. So if a country is capable of midcourse interception, which for ICBM defense is pretty much suborbital, the next demand will be for the country to develop a sensor capability to match. Sensor and response can leapfrog each other but usually it has been the sensor leading the way towards enemy territory.

This 'pulling' effect works both ways. This midcourse interception test by China demonstrate a lead by the response capability. China's air and spaceborne sensor capabilities are nowhere as effective as the American defense systems. In weapons testing, control of variables is important. In this test, China has control of weapons launch and all the test does is show that China is technically capable of a suborbital intercept. If China does not develop a sensor capability at least to match, if not surpass, the response capability, any fight will be over China's home soil as this suborbital weapon will be relegated back to theater or terminal defense because the defense's eyes are insufficiently far reaching to detect what the enemy is doing. Like wielding a long spear but can only see one meter in front of you.

 

[gambit]

China has a need to show that it can shoot down a missile from the US. I am certain China has no ability to shoot down a minuteman III or Trident III missile unless US notify China of the fireing before hand. On the other hand, I also do not believe the US has the capability to do it detect and intercept Chinese ICBM unless we are lucky to have the satellite point at the right spot at the right tiem.

Careful now...

Spaceflight :Missile Early Warning Satellites

DSP, on the other hand, has been tremendously successful. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991 it provided effective warning of the launch of Iraqi Scud missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel. But the basic satellite design and its sensor technology are obsolete. This led the U.S. Air Force to begin developing a replacement. After a frustrating series of stops and starts, by the late 1990s the Air Force was developing two different types of satellites, known as SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low. (SBIRS, pronounced “sibirs,” stands for Space-Based Infrared System.) The SBIRS-High satellites will replace DSP satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Unlike their predecessors, they are three-axis stabilized and their sensors “stare” at the ground continuously rather than sweeping over a specific point every ten seconds, thereby providing much more accurate data. SBIRS-Low satellites, if built, will operate in low Earth orbit and track missiles as they fly above the horizon, offering much more accurate information on their trajectories. Such information is necessary for an effective anti-ballistic missile defense.

 

[faithfulguy]

Careful now...

Spaceflight :Missile Early Warning Satellites

I'm certain that the US is much closer than China in deploying a mid course missile defence as a lot of this technology depends on early detection. We have China's detection cap ability way back in late 70s, early 80?? when we build those big radar receptors in Alaska and Europe (England?)

However, the interceptor part of it still has not finish testing yet. I do not know how long it will take. The technology must be very difficult that its taking as long as the how the Indians handle its LCA project. Maybe you can shed some light on why the mi-course testing is taking so long where as the THAAD is almost completed.

 

[gambit]

I'm certain that the US is much closer than China in deploying a mid course missile defence as a lot of this technology depends on early detection. We have China's detection cap ability way back in late 70s, early 80?? when we build those big radar receptors in Alaska and Europe (England?)

However, the interceptor part of it still has not finish testing yet. I do not know how long it will take. The technology must be very difficult that its taking as long as the how the Indians handle its LCA project. Maybe you can shed some light on why the mi-course testing is taking so long where as the THAAD is almost completed.

Am going to elaborate a bit more on sensor and response matching capabilities in ABM defense.

Radar is Line-of-Sight (LoS) limited. No matter how matter how powerful the radar, pointing at the horizon and eventually the beam will go off Earth and into space. Bouncing off the atmosphere layers, aka 'over the horizon', is another point for discussion but essentially, radar is LoS limited. So in order for the sensor capability to reach further away from home soil and towards the potential adversary's territory, sensor capability must be either orbital or constant airborne surveillance looking 'downwards' at his vicinity. Third alternative is to create a series of ground radar platforms leading towards his territory. Each of these stations would be looking upwards and in his direction, thereby in theory providing constant vigil for any launched missile. Of course, you would need compliant allies to provide you with secured real estates to create these ground stations. Any detection of a missile launch by the enemy, via any of these methods, will be data relayed to the response mechanism, which is the interceptor. Naturally, detection assessment and relay should be as quick as possible, but that is another issue.

ICBM travels thru different mediums and each have different environmental factors that influences their designs and behaviors. We have normal atmosphere, micro-atmosphere that is suborbital and when the warhead reenter normal atmosphere we have plasma. We do not want the interceptor to survive reentry. We do not care since the intention is to destroy it anyway. But precisely because of the fact that there is no usable atmosphere in suborbit to exploit aerodynamics, the interceptor must be able to perform the same duties as the ICBM bus assembly.

The Minuteman III ICBM

The bus, or post-boost vehicle, is maneuverd by six opitch and yam motors, and four smaller roll motors.

The interceptor must be able to orient itself against the attacker and either use proximity fused explosive or a physical impact to destroy the attacker. In this micro-atmosphere environment, the attacker and interceptor are pretty much the same in terms of physical constructs and vehicle controls, just their sizes are different. The suborbital environment which require a different mode of vehicle controls is what make midcourse interception more difficult to execute. It require a more powerful boost phase, which demand a more physically robust design to withstand greater stresses. If there is going to be communication between interceptor and ground guidance at any point in its travel, that communication channel must be secured, powerful and reliable. Since aerodynamics does not exist in micro-atmosphere, the interceptor will use reaction thrust motors to maneuver and that mean it must have as finely tuned thrust command as possible. Course corrections takes time and fuel. These are just a few items that make an exo-atmospheric vehicle more technically complex and greater a financial burden than an interceptor designed solely for terminal defense. For a country that does not have OTH sensor capability, a two-layered BM defense system will have to suffice. Finally...Keep in mind that each test is destructive and that mean extraordinary care are usually taken to ensure a successful test intercept before releasing the next set of variables for the interceptor to compensate.

 

[faithfulguy]

Am going to elaborate a bit more on sensor and response matching capabilities in ABM defense.

Radar is Line-of-Sight (LoS) limited. No matter how matter how powerful the radar, pointing at the horizon and eventually the beam will go off Earth and into space. Bouncing off the atmosphere layers, aka 'over the horizon', is another point for discussion but essentially, radar is LoS limited. So in order for the sensor capability to reach further away from home soil and towards the potential adversary's territory, sensor capability must be either orbital or constant airborne surveillance looking 'downwards' at his vicinity. Third alternative is to create a series of ground radar platforms leading towards his territory. Each of these stations would be looking upwards and in his direction, thereby in theory providing constant vigil for any launched missile. Of course, you would need compliant allies to provide you with secured real estates to create these ground stations. Any detection of a missile launch by the enemy, via any of these methods, will be data relayed to the response mechanism, which is the interceptor. Naturally, detection assessment and relay should be as quick as possible, but that is another issue.

ICBM travels thru different mediums and each have different environmental factors that influences their designs and behaviors. We have normal atmosphere, micro-atmosphere that is suborbital and when the warhead reenter normal atmosphere we have plasma. We do not want the interceptor to survive reentry. We do not care since the intention is to destroy it anyway. But precisely because of the fact that there is no usable atmosphere in suborbit to exploit aerodynamics, the interceptor must be able to perform the same duties as the ICBM bus assembly.

The Minuteman III ICBM

The interceptor must be able to orient itself against the attacker and either use proximity fused explosive or a physical impact to destroy the attacker. In this micro-atmosphere environment, the attacker and interceptor are pretty much the same in terms of physical constructs and vehicle controls, just their sizes are different. The suborbital environment which require a different mode of vehicle controls is what make midcourse interception more difficult to execute. It require a more powerful boost phase, which demand a more physically robust design to withstand greater stresses. If there is going to be communication between interceptor and ground guidance at any point in its travel, that communication channel must be secured, powerful and reliable. Since aerodynamics does not exist in micro-atmosphere, the interceptor will use reaction thrust motors to maneuver and that mean it must have as finely tuned thrust command as possible. Course corrections takes time and fuel. These are just a few items that make an exo-atmospheric vehicle more technically complex and greater a financial burden than an interceptor designed solely for terminal defense. For a country that does not have OTH sensor capability, a two-layered BM defense system will have to suffice. Finally...Keep in mind that each test is destructive and that mean extraordinary care are usually taken to ensure a successful test intercept before releasing the next set of variables for the interceptor to compensate.

sounds like its virtually impossible to have a mid course interceptor unless the interceptor itself has smart enough sensors to respond to the action taken by the ICBM. Are the SS-18 or DF-31A capable of maneuvering like Minuteman III or are they non-maneuverable ICBMs. From what I heard, the NK ICBM is not maneuverable.

 

[gambit]

sounds like its virtually impossible to have a mid course interceptor unless the interceptor itself has smart enough sensors to respond to the action taken by the ICBM. Are the SS-18 or DF-31A capable of maneuvering like Minuteman III or are they non-maneuverable ICBMs. From what I heard, the NK ICBM is not maneuverable.

Not impossible at all. Even though the midcourse phase has the longest flight time any maneuvers will affect the final descent path of the warhead, requiring the warhead to have it own maneuvering capability to return to the original target. This would result in a more complex missile. The alternative is to deploy decoys during the midcourse or even the terminal phase. I chuckled at the fanciful arguments out there with supposedly Russian or Chinese warheads making large circle maneuvers in the sky before landing pinpoint on the target. The problem for the interceptor is the double digit Mach closing speed. There is no second chance after a miss.

Radar system for determining first time around targets from multiple time around targets - US Patent 4973968 Description

A known method of relieving the multiple time around target problem is to transmit pulse trains having different pulse repetition intervals. The delay between the different echo pulses received provides a means of distinguishing the targets. This method however becomes inaccurate when a high duty cycle is used particularly when the transmitted pulse length is significant compared to the pulse repetition interval. When this occurs, echo pulses received from the different pulse trains overlap and it may be impossible to distinguish which echo pulse has been received from which target.

Note the highlighted. Even though the description is related to multiple targets discrimination, some poorly designed radars using PRF jittering, for example, may not be able to deal with high closing velocity between two objects where the echo from the second pulse with a different pulse characteristics confusing the radar receiver when it is trying to process the echo from the first pulse with a different pulse characteristics. With a poorly designed radar suite, the enemy does not need to do anything at all. With decoys creating all sorts of radar echos, the interceptor will be deceived. This is why this successful test by China should be taken with a grain of salt, especially when we know so little about the testing conditions. I would not consider any controls to be 'cheating' as this is standard practice. But it is amusing to see the many Russian and Chinese weapons 'fanboys' jumping for joy.

 

[gogbot]

I do see the confusion in your statements above. You mentioned that comparing THAAD and Indian ABM is inaccurate. However, you also said that PAD & AAD are theater missile defence, which is exactly what THAAD is, as oppose to mid course missile defence. So in terms of categorizing missile defence into national vs theater missile defence,


THAAD and PAD&AAD are theater missile defence. (against IRMB, MRBM or short range missiles)

Mid course missile defence are natianal missile defence (against ICBM)

dude, you understand ballistic trajectory right.

Boost, mid-course, terminal. any ballistic missile not just ICBM's have
have those trajectories.

Now you know that since the short range and intermittent range missiles are launched so close to India.

Its easier to detect them and take them down with less sophisticated sensors.

weather the missile is intercepted Mid course by PAD

or terminal by AAD.

Or in phase 2 of the ABM where the same will be true for ICBM's

They are still intercepted by Theater based system. This is their similarity with THAAD its sensors.

Now that's what makes it theater based is the sensor and early detection systems involved which are below the grand Systems the US has set up or its National missile defense.
But as far as the missiles are concerned apart form the difference in ranges which is a response to the distance and required range of threats. The systems are more or less alike.

theater missile defense offers all the interception trajectories as an strategic level defense. even more so when the launch sites are right next door.

The only real difference between a strategic defense and Theater based system is the primarily the sensors it employs.
And to a lesser extent the ranges of the missiles.

What China had tested should be use to counter ICBMs. I do not believe that it is targeted for Indian missiles but rather to send a political message to the US. Even though US do respond to it, as this tet was meant for it, Indian media and public also make a fuss about it. That is why the bonehead article that create this thread is such a

Its your fault for reading if you though it was. then

 

[faithfulguy]

self delete

 

[faithfulguy]

dude, you understand ballistic trajectory right.

Boost, mid-course, terminal. any ballistic weather the missile is intercepted Mid course by PAD

or terminal by AAD.

Or in phase 2 of the ABM where the same will be true for ICBM's
They are still intercepted by Theater based system. This is their similarity with THAAD its sensors.

Now that's what makes it theater based is the sensor and early detection systems involved which are below the grand Systems the US has set up or its National missile defense.
But as far as the missiles are concerned apart form the difference in ranges which is a response to the distance and required range of threats. The systems are more or less alike.

theater missile defense offers all the interception trajectories as an strategic level defense. even more so when the launch sites are right next door.

The only real difference between a strategic defense and Theater based system is the primarily the sensors it employs.
And to a lesser extent the ranges of the missiles.

In order to detect and track an ICBM, a strong sensor is needed. its because a longer range and more precise censor can track suck a missile. So that is why mid range ICBM interceptor is not integrated with THAAD tracker. THAAD has very limited anti-ICBM capability.

If PAD has the tracking ability to intercept ICBMs at mid course, then it has censors that is much more powerful than THAAD and more similar to that of

PAVE PAWS

or

Sea-based X-band Radar

If India doesn't provide this ability. Then I would accept the wikipedia article about future develpoment of Indian ABM.

"Phase 2
Two new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5000 km.[23] The test trials of these two systems is expected to take place in 2011.[24] The new missile will be similar to the THAAD missile deployed by the U.S.A. These missiles will have to travel at hypersonic speeds and will require radars with scan capability of over 1500 kilometers to successfully intercept the target.[25]


If the phase 2 of PAD is to equal the ability of THAAD, than it definitely has no ability to intercept an ICBM at mid course. Maybe IRBMs. But definitely not ICBM at mid course. The bold statement at the beginning is therefore incorrect. Otherwise, someone should go into Wikipedia and correct that phase 2 of PAD is similar to the mid course missile defence of the US.