Faced with an increasingly assertive China, the United States is embracing India.
Like America, India is a democracy an open, pluralistic society. Military planners in Washington dont spend time fretting about war with India, the way they do about conflict with China. Indias economy, with its vibrant services sector, doesnt pose nearly the same the challenge to the U.S. as Chinas manufacturing juggernaut.
In short, to U.S. policy-makers worried about the long-term threat from China, India looks like a useful counterbalance.
Not so fast, says a newly published book by George Gilboy, the chief representative of an international energy firm in China and Eric Heginbotham, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior argues that the benign view of India in Washington policy-making circles may be an illusion, rooted more in U.S. insecurity about China than a hard-nosed assessment of India. When you stop looking at India through the prism of China, the authors argue, the picture looks very different. On many issues of key concern to Washington, from trade and investment to Iran and arms proliferation, Indias view of the view of the world is strikingly similar to Chinas.
One of the books big takeaways: Far from being a balancer to China, the rise of India could mean double trouble for Washington. The Wall Street Journals China editor Andrew Browne recently sat down with the authors. Edited excerpts below:
What motivated you to write this book?
Gilboy: The original objective is really to understand what rising Chinese and Indian power means for U.S. interests. Theres an impression out there that China is emerging as an inevitable challenger and potential enemy, and India is emerging as a natural ally. And that ought to be investigated, in part by just asking the same question of each power.
Heginbotham: When you just ask How is China a challenger? and How might India help? youre not likely to get the reverse of the coin on either one of those countries. The real purpose here was to ask the same questions in a structured way and look at the empirical data on actual behavior.
So whats the conclusion?
Heginbotham: The punchline here is that what we may be facing with the rise of these two powers is double-trouble. Both are going to present challenges to the United States. At the same time, well be able to partner with both of them on various issues. Its a much more mixed bag a much more nuanced picture than we think is generally recognized.
Gilboy: Both China and India are equally likely to pursue their territorial and maritime claims over disputed areas, theyre equally likely to use force in international disputes, and they spend roughly the same share of GDP on military power. Both of them have an outstanding territorial and political dispute thats wrapped up not only in territorial questions but also questions of state legitimacy in both countries, and also of national identity: Taiwan for China; Kashmir for India. So theyre equally difficult to resolve. Partly as a result, both pursue a common agenda at the U.N. and other security bodies.a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and a protection of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. This helps us understand why India is such a reluctant ally on questions all the way from Libya to Syria to Iran. India is just as committed to this idea of not having Western military interventions in these states.
Heginbotham: The strict interpretation of sovereignty isnt an academic issue it has real consequences.
We looked at UN voting records and theres a very high level of convergence between Indian and China on Iran, Sudan, Burma, WMD issues. On these issues of importance to the U.S., the Chinese and Indian positions are very close.
India and China
