Zarvan
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- Apr 28, 2011
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Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif held an All Parties Conference on 1 June to form a consensus on security related issues in Balochistan province.
Security in Balochistan has become of paramount importance since the announcement of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs largely tincrease-in-militant-attacks-in-pakistan-s-balochistan-in-one-year-outlook-but-chinese-investments-unlikely-to-be-affected
Although militant groups will step up attacks in the coming year, there is no immediate increased risk for Chinese personnel and assets, as these are unlikely to be in place for another three years.
The security situation in Balochistan has been a cause for concern even before the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was made by Chinese president Xi Jinping in April. Baloch nationalist militants have been conducting a low-intensity insurgency in the province since 2004.
More recently, since 2012, sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have targeted the Shia Hazara community. On 29 May, militants killed 19 people when they ambushed a bus in Mastung district, specifically identifying and killing all Pashtun passengers on the bus.
Complex playing field
In addition to the nationalist and sectarian violence in the province, the security scenario in Balochistan is further complicated by the presence of organised crime networks smuggling weapons and drugs from Afghanistan and diesel from Iran. On top of this, the Afghan government has long claimed that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban has been operating from Balochistan for years, while the Pakistani military establishment has alleged that violence in Balochistan has been propagated by India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Both Pakistan and India have officially denied these allegations.
The CPEC will link China's Xinjiang province with the port of Gwadar in southwest Balochistan, with a series of road and rail connections as well as pipelines for sending natural gas and/or oil to China. In April, Pakistan formalised the handover of the management of Gwadar port to Chinese authorities for a period of 40 years. The port's activation, along with the establishment of the CPEC, will radically reduce cargo shipping times from the West to China. The corridor also envisages investment in power and energy infrastructure that will help to eradicate Pakistan's energy shortfall.
However, nationalist and Islamist/sectarian militant groups are likely to oppose the establishment of the corridor. Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), that largely operate in central and southern Balochistan, have previously kidnapped or killed foreigners, especially Chinese, to undermine the government's development objectives in Balochistan. These groups have often resorted to attacking the existing gas pipelines running from Sui and Dera Bugti to disrupt natural gas distribution in the rest of the country. Similarly, Islamist groups, including various splinter factions of the Pakistani Taliban, who are more active in northern Balochistan districts including Zhob and Qila Saifullah, that neighbour South Waziristan, are likely to target infrastructure projects related to the CPEC as well. Islamic militants are likely to perceive that such attacks would highlight the government's inability to provide security for such projects.
Additionally, kidnappings of foreigners from these areas have often been done for purposes of ransom. In May 2014, the Sheharyar Mehsud group, a Pakistani Taliban splinter group, kidnapped a Chinese tourist from Dera Ismail Khan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, just across the border from Balochistan. In May 2015, a video was released by the group reiterating their demands for ransom.
IHS sources in Pakistan claim that the military and civilian leadership of the country is also extremely concerned about Indian attempts to disrupt the establishment of the CPEC. Although India has consistently denied Pakistani allegations about fomenting violence in Balochistan through the support of local militant groups, Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj admitted in a press conference in May that during his recently concluded visit to China, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi had told Chinese leaders that the CPEC was "unacceptable" to India. Senior members of the Pakistan government have pointed to such statements as proof of Indian plans to sabotage the corridor.
FORECAST
IHS assesses that despite the current precarious security situation in Balochistan, there is no immediate increased threat to Chinese personnel or assets. The CPEC is envisioned as a 15-20-year project, with the initial phase of 3-5 years focusing on the construction of transport infrastructure in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan. Although funded through Chinese loans or grants, this construction is unlikely to involve Chinese personnel, and will be primarily completed by Pakistani personnel and companies. Therefore, over the next year, Balochistan is unlikely to see an influx of Chinese workers or technical personnel that would expand the target pattern for militant groups. These will come after the first phase of construction has been completed. At that point, if the Pakistan government has still not been able to control or eradicate militancy in the province, there would be an increased risk to Chinese assets and individuals.
However, to counter that risk, IHS sources claim that the Chinese government has requested, and Pakistan has agreed, to raise a new paramilitary force to protect all assets within the CPEC. Such a force, which would be newly recruited, would be under the direct control of the Army and would probably be the equivalent in size and materiel of at least an Army Division, therefore giving it plenty of resources to provide adequate protection. The Pakistan government has reportedly agreed to provide USD250 million for the raising of this new security force, although it would take at least 3-5 years to have it fully trained and operational.
At the same time, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's holding of an All Party's Conference in Quetta on 1 June is an indicator of the government, backed by the Army, building a consensus across political lines, for the initiation of a massive military operation in Balochistan. It is unclear whether such an operation would target Islamist and nationalist militants, but militant groups of either persuasion would likely step up attacks on security forces and government institutions if faced with such an operation.
(1006 words)
Increase in militant attacks in Pakistan's Balochistan in one-year outlook, but Chinese investments unlikely to be affected - IHS Jane's 360
@Horus @Oscar @Jango @nair @SpArK
Security in Balochistan has become of paramount importance since the announcement of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs largely tincrease-in-militant-attacks-in-pakistan-s-balochistan-in-one-year-outlook-but-chinese-investments-unlikely-to-be-affected
Although militant groups will step up attacks in the coming year, there is no immediate increased risk for Chinese personnel and assets, as these are unlikely to be in place for another three years.
The security situation in Balochistan has been a cause for concern even before the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was made by Chinese president Xi Jinping in April. Baloch nationalist militants have been conducting a low-intensity insurgency in the province since 2004.
More recently, since 2012, sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have targeted the Shia Hazara community. On 29 May, militants killed 19 people when they ambushed a bus in Mastung district, specifically identifying and killing all Pashtun passengers on the bus.
Complex playing field
In addition to the nationalist and sectarian violence in the province, the security scenario in Balochistan is further complicated by the presence of organised crime networks smuggling weapons and drugs from Afghanistan and diesel from Iran. On top of this, the Afghan government has long claimed that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban has been operating from Balochistan for years, while the Pakistani military establishment has alleged that violence in Balochistan has been propagated by India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Both Pakistan and India have officially denied these allegations.
The CPEC will link China's Xinjiang province with the port of Gwadar in southwest Balochistan, with a series of road and rail connections as well as pipelines for sending natural gas and/or oil to China. In April, Pakistan formalised the handover of the management of Gwadar port to Chinese authorities for a period of 40 years. The port's activation, along with the establishment of the CPEC, will radically reduce cargo shipping times from the West to China. The corridor also envisages investment in power and energy infrastructure that will help to eradicate Pakistan's energy shortfall.
However, nationalist and Islamist/sectarian militant groups are likely to oppose the establishment of the corridor. Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), that largely operate in central and southern Balochistan, have previously kidnapped or killed foreigners, especially Chinese, to undermine the government's development objectives in Balochistan. These groups have often resorted to attacking the existing gas pipelines running from Sui and Dera Bugti to disrupt natural gas distribution in the rest of the country. Similarly, Islamist groups, including various splinter factions of the Pakistani Taliban, who are more active in northern Balochistan districts including Zhob and Qila Saifullah, that neighbour South Waziristan, are likely to target infrastructure projects related to the CPEC as well. Islamic militants are likely to perceive that such attacks would highlight the government's inability to provide security for such projects.
Additionally, kidnappings of foreigners from these areas have often been done for purposes of ransom. In May 2014, the Sheharyar Mehsud group, a Pakistani Taliban splinter group, kidnapped a Chinese tourist from Dera Ismail Khan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, just across the border from Balochistan. In May 2015, a video was released by the group reiterating their demands for ransom.
IHS sources in Pakistan claim that the military and civilian leadership of the country is also extremely concerned about Indian attempts to disrupt the establishment of the CPEC. Although India has consistently denied Pakistani allegations about fomenting violence in Balochistan through the support of local militant groups, Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj admitted in a press conference in May that during his recently concluded visit to China, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi had told Chinese leaders that the CPEC was "unacceptable" to India. Senior members of the Pakistan government have pointed to such statements as proof of Indian plans to sabotage the corridor.
FORECAST
IHS assesses that despite the current precarious security situation in Balochistan, there is no immediate increased threat to Chinese personnel or assets. The CPEC is envisioned as a 15-20-year project, with the initial phase of 3-5 years focusing on the construction of transport infrastructure in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan. Although funded through Chinese loans or grants, this construction is unlikely to involve Chinese personnel, and will be primarily completed by Pakistani personnel and companies. Therefore, over the next year, Balochistan is unlikely to see an influx of Chinese workers or technical personnel that would expand the target pattern for militant groups. These will come after the first phase of construction has been completed. At that point, if the Pakistan government has still not been able to control or eradicate militancy in the province, there would be an increased risk to Chinese assets and individuals.
However, to counter that risk, IHS sources claim that the Chinese government has requested, and Pakistan has agreed, to raise a new paramilitary force to protect all assets within the CPEC. Such a force, which would be newly recruited, would be under the direct control of the Army and would probably be the equivalent in size and materiel of at least an Army Division, therefore giving it plenty of resources to provide adequate protection. The Pakistan government has reportedly agreed to provide USD250 million for the raising of this new security force, although it would take at least 3-5 years to have it fully trained and operational.
At the same time, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's holding of an All Party's Conference in Quetta on 1 June is an indicator of the government, backed by the Army, building a consensus across political lines, for the initiation of a massive military operation in Balochistan. It is unclear whether such an operation would target Islamist and nationalist militants, but militant groups of either persuasion would likely step up attacks on security forces and government institutions if faced with such an operation.
(1006 words)
Increase in militant attacks in Pakistan's Balochistan in one-year outlook, but Chinese investments unlikely to be affected - IHS Jane's 360
@Horus @Oscar @Jango @nair @SpArK
but it is very easy to do and not really costly either
